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Why Bother about a Right to Development?

1994; Wiley; Volume: 21; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.2307/1410679

1467-6478

Wade Mansell, Joanne Scott,

International Law and Human Rights

The idea of international law is often troublesome for domestic lawyers. Suffering from a lack of applicable sanctions, distinguishing itself from politics only with the greatest difficulty, and using an international court which requires the consent of the parties before being seized with issues, international law has a very different 'feel' from the taught orthodoxies of domestic law. If this is true of international law in general, how much more so is it of international law which concerns itself with such nebulous ideas as a 'Right to Development'? Surely at this point the domestic lawyer is entitled to throw up her hands in despair, cast her eyes to the heavens, and maintain that look of cynicism usually reserved for delinquents who wish to plead not guilty. This article is an attempt to show that understandable though such a reaction might be, a discussion of the right to development (indeed, worse still, the human right to development) is not as vacuous as it might first appear; and, further, that such a discussion might provide an important means of making law relevant to crucial international issues. If, at first sight, the usefulness of translating policy goals into legal language seems arguable, there are points to be made in its favour, not least when arguments relating to the existence of such a right are situated in the context of a discussion about the content of the right. Recourse to the language of rights provides an effective means of rendering visible a challenging and innovative conception of the idea of development itself. This is so, notwithstanding the fact that most acute observers would no doubt note with satisfaction the perversity of the human rights law industry which finally wishes to assert a right to development at the very time when theories of post-modernity have called into question the use of such monolithic concepts as 'development', or indeed 'progress'. Certainly the problems which arise from such terms are not insubstantial but, even here, we hope to persuade that the proclaimed right is not devoid of content. Nevertheless, the terms will be used loosely initially though such use will be examined later.