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NATO and Northern Europe: From Nordic Balance to Northern Balance

2008; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 30; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/10803920802313939

1533-2128

Dan Steinbock,

European and Russian Geopolitical Military Strategies

Abstract Abstract Through the cold war, the bipolar order between the United States and the Soviet Union was reflected by the "Nordic balance" between the Nordic NATO members (Norway, Denmark, Iceland) and the nonmembers (Sweden, Finland). Today Northern Europe is broader, rapidly integrating, prosperous, and one of the most competitive regions worldwide. Nordic balance has been surpassed by a more fluid northern balance. Because of the ongoing enlargement of the European Union and NATO and the role of a resurgent Russia, security issues remain vital in the region. Over time tensions may be reduced by a shared focus on the Baltic Sea region's joint economic, political, and security interests. In the near term Sweden and Finland will deepen NATO cooperation even as they continue to debate NATO membership. Notes The Gini index varies around 23 (Sweden) to 28 (Norway), which is the same as in Germany (28) and far lower than in Japan (38) or the United States (45). Even in Baltic countries, the Gini index varies around 34–38. H. F. Matthews, "Political Estimate of Soviet Policy for Use in Connection with Military Studies," Foreign Relations, United States, 194, vol. 1, (April 1, 1946), 1169. A. O. Brundtland, "Nordisk balanse f⊘r og nå," Internasjonal Politik, vol. 5 (1966): 491–541. All Nordic countries joined the OSCE in 1973; the Baltic States followed in 1991. Quoted in "The Conservative Salolainen Would Explore Carefully Russia's NATO Comments," YLE News, April 5, 2008 [in Finnish]. The NATO Information Bureau was opened in Moscow in 2001 followed by the Liaison Mission a year later. In the aftermath of 9/11, the improved U.S.–Russian ties led to the NATO–Russia Council (NRC), which has weathered controversies caused by the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the second wave of NATO's eastern enlargement in 2004, as well as the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. Historically the Baltic year-round, ice-free ports have been the leading trade route for Russian goods shipped by sea. A significant portion of the oil and natural gas infrastructure in northwest Russia is also geared toward distribution in Baltic ports. Since 2004, when the Baltic States joined NATO, Moscow has been anxious over the prospect that the Baltics are merely the last line of defense before NATO begins to incorporate the core territory of the historical Russian Empire, especially Ukraine, that is seen as the cradle of Russian culture. Putin has been particularly critical of NATO's expansion to the east, calling to mind NATO's promise not to deploy troops to East Germany. See Vladimir Putin, "Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy," February 10, 2007. In April the Danish Intelligence Service warned that the terror threat against Denmark has increased since the reprinting of a cartoon depicting the Prophet Muhammad. Quoted in "Iceland Threatens Direct Markets Intervention," Financial Times, April 2, 2008. Latvia and Estonia have the largest Russian minorities. In 1992 Russia accounted for more than 90 percent of its trade; today three quarters of foreign investment in Estonia originates in the Nordic countries. Estonian troops have been in Afghanistan since 2002 and Iraq since 2003. Estonia participates in the NATO training mission in Iraq and provides peacekeepers in Bosnia and Kosovo while contributing to EU battle groups and NRF rotations. Toomas Hendrik llves, "Estonia as a Nordic Country," Swedish Institute for International Affairs, December 14, 1999. In turn, EU countries blamed the Lithuanians for clumsy diplomacy and posturing before the fall election in which the ruling coalition lagged behind pro-Russian parties. Russia has blocked an oil pipeline to Lithuania's refinery since 2006. In 2007 all Baltic States had substantial current-account deficits, including Estonia (–15.9 percent), Latvia (–24.6 percent), and Lithuania (–13.8 percent). Because of Russia's opposition, Finland could not participate in the Marshall Plan. The first Finnish–U.S. science and technology agreements were not negotiated until the late 1980s, and Finnish–U.S. S&T and higher education mobility remains low in comparison to other Nordic countries. Quoted in "Sweden's Growing Worries about Russia Fuel a Love-in with Norway," Economist, February 22, 2007. In turn, Norway hopes that Sweden will be supportive in its long-running dispute with Russia over the two countries' northern sea border. C. Bildt, "Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Kosovo," Bildt Comments, January 27, 2007. In the Swedish–Finnish talks prior to the NATO Bucharest summit, Stockholm seemed to adopt a positive stance to NRF participation only to defer the decision to the fall. Although that caused resentment in the Finnish parliament, Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt said that the Swedish government had never promised Finland that the two Nordic countries would decide to join the NRF synchronously. He added that Sweden recognized Kosovo and decided to participate in a scheme to buy strategic airlifters before Finland did. "Ahtisaari: NATO Membership Would Put an End to Finlandization Murmurs," Helsingin Sanomat, December 15, 2003 [in Finnish]. During World War II, Finland fought the Soviet Union in the Winter War of 1939–1940 and in the Continuation War of 1941–1944. The 1947 peace treaty called for heavy reparations to the Soviet Union and limited the size of Finland's defense forces. The country ceded some 10 percent of its land area (including most of Finnish Karelia) and 20 percent of its industrial capacity. More than 400,000 Finnish refugees fled those areas. Because of the absence of prohibitions on alliances, Helsinki's postcold war "good-neighbor agreement" with Russia opened the path to both the EU and NATO. The Soviet Union was nervous about NATO's military plans in the Arctic region and the Baltic Sea. Such plans prompted Moscow to pressure Finland in 1958, 1961, and again in the late 1960s and the early 1970s to ensure that it would remain on its established foreign policy course, the Paasikivi-Kekkonen policy line. "For many Finnish politicians, NATO was taboo, and as a result contacts with NATO at any level were kept to a minimum," acknowledged Pauli Järvenpää, currently head of the Finnish Defense Policy Department, in 1997. See P. Järvenpää, "What Comes after Madrid? A View from Helsinki," NATO Review, no. 5 (Sept.–Oct. 1997): 30–33. Today EU has no capabilities in common defense that one could compare with NATO, concluded a Finnish government report focusing on the role of EU security guarantees in April 2008. L. Jaakonsaari, "Condemned to Hell, Labeled into a Box," Ulkopolitiikka, March 2004 [in Finnish]. Despite the tone, the speech was not alarmist. "It would be a foolish—and mistaken—conclusion to draw that the new Russia will threaten Finland's security," added Häkämies. See Minister of Defense Jyri Häkämies, "Finland: Similar Yet Different," Speech at the CSIS, September 6, 2007. Prior to Bucharest, NATO was debating Afghanistan operations, whereas the Finnish debate was about the NRF. Because of the dissension among top Finnish foreign policy decision makers, most NATO-related matters are seen as a referendum on NATO membership. "Finland is stumbling in Afghanistan without a real policy or vision," reported the conservative Finnish press. See J. Vesikansa, "Lost," Suomen Kuvalehti, March 20, 2008 [in Finnish]. As his text messages to an erotic dancer became public knowledge, Kanerva lost public credibility. Quoted in Rogozin: 'NATO Membership Is a Wrong Path,' Suomen Kuvalehti, April 7, 2008. According to Salolainen, the Russian statements should be studied in the ongoing work for the new security and defense paper prepared by the government. A proponent of NATO, Salolainen emphasizes that it is not directed against Russia. Under NATO, EU countries would serve as a countervailing force, he believes. "The Conservative Salolainen Would Explore Carefully Russia's NATO Comments." YLE News, April 5, 2008 [in Finnish]. To Häkämies, NATO membership for Finland and Sweden meant increased military security in the Nordic region and a common regional defense; it would also give the Nordic countries greater collective influence within the alliance. Finland's bilateral relations with Russia were defined by the EU–Russia relationship. Further, NATO remains the most important joint forum for transatlantic security policy. Joint procurement activities would enable Nordic countries to achieve substantial savings. Finally, NATO continues to provide security. It is no longer a product of the cold war but a security manager of international politics. See the defense minister's Speech in Atlantic Society, Helsinki, Finland, May 6, 2008. Haasteiden Venäjä (Helsinki: Finland's Ministry of Defense, 2008), 126. Medvedev also made clear Russia's unhappiness with U.S. plans to locate parts of a missile defense shield in Eastern Europe. Quoted in "Medvedev Warns against Expanding NATO East," Financial Times, March 24, 2008. C. Ketels, State of the Region Report (Copenhagen: Baltic Development Forum, 2008). As in Sweden, politics defines NATO attitudes in Finland: 55 percent of the Conservatives but only 28 percent of the Centrists and 21 percent of the Social Democrats are for NATO membership. See Surveys on Finnish Views (Finland's Ministry of Defense, December 19, 2007). In Sweden the new Social Democratic leader, Mona Sahlin, hopes to lead opposition against Reinfeldt's new moderates. In Finland, Erkki Tuomioja, former foreign minister known for his strong anti-NATO position, is campaigning to become the next Social Democratic chairman.