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Georgia's ongoing struggle for a better future continued: democracy promotion through civil society development

2009; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 16; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/13510340903083000

1743-890X

Marina Muskhelishvili, Gia Jorjoliani,

Religion and Society Interactions

Abstract To provide long-term democracy development assistance, foreign actors need to develop a medium through which such assistance will be provided. The NGO community which emerged in Georgia in the 1990s fulfilled this function. It was envisaged as developing into a civil society, but turned out to be elitist and politicized. The role that the NGO community was able to play in Georgia's democratization was weakened by the fact that the community was expected to be politically impartial and to achieve a political result at the same time. During the Rose Revolution, democracy promotion was channelled through the NGO community, and contributed to a change of power, but democracy did not follow. After the Rose Revolution, democracy promotion weakened. Despite the fact that a new wave of political protests during 2007–2008 provided another opportunity for Georgia to accomplish a democratic transition, foreign actors did not play the same role as they did before. The change in approach of the foreign actors can be explained not only by political considerations, but also by the fact that the international community had weak personal, organizational and ideological links with the new wave of the pro-democracy movement. Keywords: democracy promotionGeorgiacivil societynon-governmental organizationsRose Revolution Notes Stewart, 'Democracy Promotion Before and After the "Colour Revolutions"', 647. Burnell, 'Democracy Assistance', 9. The Gettysburg Address by Abraham Lincoln. Freedom House applies a certain taxonomy to label countries with similar scores as having one or another political system, but this labelling does not reflect essential similarities and differences which could provide an answer to our question. The system may also be described as a kind of dominant-power politics. See Carothers, 'The End of Transitional Paradigm'. Freedom House, http://www.freedomhouse.org. Diamond, 'Promoting Democracy'. Some TACIS projects were oriented towards democracy promotion, such as strengthening the parliament through the development of a parliamentary research service. Also, the European Neighborhood Policy Action plan includes strengthening the institutions of democracy and the rule of law as its first priority focus. OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission. 'Final Report', 4 March 2008 and 9 September 2008. On external democracy legitimation see Jorjoliani, 'Colour Revolutions'. Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition, 7–8. De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 513–14; see also Putnam, Making Democracy Work, 89. Putnam's work provides an example of convincing empirical research and demonstrates the importance of a well-established civic communal tradition for the effective performance of the institutions of democracy. The example of NGOs providing support for party development demonstrated this very clearly. Leaders of three local non-governmental organizations, which in 2005–2008 channelled funding for party system development, were awarded ministerial posts by the already openly non-democratic regime (Dmitri Shashkin, Director of the International Republican Institute in Georgia; Ghia Nodia, Head of the Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development; Temur Iakobashvili, Executive Vice-President of the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies). Years established: OSGF – 1994, http://osgf.ge; Eurasia foundation – 1995 http://www.epfound.org; Horizonti foundation – 1994 (first ISAR, issuing small individual grants before 1994), http://www.horizonti.org; Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung – 1994, http://www.fes.ge. On the initial stages of the popular movements see Aves, Path to National Independence in Georgia, 1987–1990. NB: The authors of this paper were part of these developments, and this statement, as well as many others in this article, stems both from their 'participatory observation' and from numerous discussions with other NGO leaders. Economic output in 1995 was less than 25% of the level for 1989 estimates. See UNDP, 'Human Development Report', 39–41. In 1997 over three thousand NGOs were already formally registered, although only a few of them actually functioned. Compare with only two formally registered in 1988. See UNDP, 'Development Report: Georgia 1998', 11. 'Most [NGOs] represent the views of a relatively young, educated and liberal section of urban society', ibid. See also Muskhelishvili, 'Democratization versus the Development of Democracy'; Muskhelishvili, 'The Avant-guarde of "Democratization"'; Muskhelishvili, 'Democracy as Communism'. For one such debate, see for example the round table discussion reported in CIPDD/CAP. 'Public Image of Non-governmental Organizations in Georgia'. Soros named his philanthropic organization the Open Society Foundation, in honour of Karl Popper, who considered society to be 'open' if its members base their decisions on collective deliberation and their intellectual capacity. Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies. Such criteria were normally taken into consideration during the grant competitions for the NGOs. The NGOs were asked to indicate their membership in their grant proposals, as well as to describe the functioning of their internal organizational structures, how they envisage further sustainability of funding, that is through membership fees. Also, the non-partisan character of their activities was emphasized as a strict pre-condition for financing. See also Muskhelishvili, 'Globalization and the Transformation of Institutions'. The intelligentsia was at the core of this movement. See Jorjoliani, 'Georgian Intelligentsia Facing New Challenges'. The leaders of the Liberty Institute, Giga Bokeria and Levan Ramishvili, were especially active in freedom of speech promotion before the Rose Revolution. After the Rose Revolution, in which they organized the 'Kmara' movement, they took the side of the government and were deeply involved in the reform of the Public Broadcasting Corporation of Georgia. Giga Bokeria, as one of the leaders of the National Movement, also shared responsibility for key political decisions directed against media freedom, such as the decision to close the opposition channel Imedi. For a more detailed description of the sector see Wheatley, Georgia from National Awakening to Rose Revolution, 145–8. USAID, 'Civil Society Assessment'. Ibid: 'The Team recommends that larger grants be made to a smaller number of NGOs whose focus is making local and national government more transparent and accountable.' Among such initiatives one should mention the community-based mobilization initiative financed by USAID, as well as support for advocacy by interest groups related to the business sector. Rustavi 2 gained a license to broadcast all over Georgia with the support of Zurab Jvania in 1997; since it provided incisive and dynamic coverage and was very critical of the authorities, it soon gained popularity among the population. The leaders of the Liberty Institute, Giga Bokeria and Levan Ramishvili, were closely linked to this channel. See, for example, the statement by Jvania, 31 October 2001, http://www.civil.ge/geo/article.php?id=379&search= (accessed June 30, 2009). On heightened political tensions in post-Soviet presidential systems during the last terms of presidents in power see Hale, 'Presidentialism, Revolution and Democracy'. Mikheil Saakashvili became a member of parliament in 1995 from the proportional list of Citizens Union of Georgia, and later a leader of the parliamentary majority, Minister of Justice, and Chairman of the Tbilisi Council. Both Jvania and Saakashvili gained a reputation as 'reformers' and had strong links to the leading NGOs. See Wheatley, 'Georgia from National Awakening to Rose Revolution', 147. Already in the 1999 parliamentary elections, two NGO activists who had the support of Zurab Jvania, Vano Merabishvili and Zurab Adeishvili, were included in the proportional list of the Citizens Union of Georgia. They headed important parliamentary committees, participated in the Rose Revolution, and later became leading political figures in Saakashvili's government. For the general overview of the Shevardnadze regime before the Rose Revolution, see Wheatley, Georgia from National Awakening to Rose Revolution, 104–20, 129–33. Various surveys, conducted by different researchers; one of the available sources for 2003–2008 is www.iri.org.ge (accessed June 30, 2009). Compared data from the International Republican Institute (IRI) (www.iri.org.ge) and the 'Living Conditions, Lifestyle and Health' (LLH) project website (http://www.llh.at/). Khutsishvili, Civil Society and the Rose Revolution in Georgia, 219. Democratic Coalition, www.demcoalition.org. See also Broers, 'After the "Revolution"'. For the official data compared with the parallel vote tabulation see Khutsishvili, Civil Society and the Rose Revolution in Georgia, 91. For a more detailed account of the events and for the role of NGOs in them see Wheatley, Georgia from National Awakening to Rose Revolution, 181–90. The most prominent of them were Giga Bokeria (Liberty Institute), who became a member of parliament and one of the leaders of the National Movement, Gigi Ugulava (Foundation Alpe), who became governor of one of the regions; Kakha Lomaia, the coordinator of the Democracy Coalition Project in Georgia and later the Executive Director of OSGF, who became Minister of Education and Science. The most visible and radical representation of such feelings were ongoing protest manifestations in front of the OSGF office in 2005. Khmaladze et al. 'Government of Georgia on a Central Level: The Balance between its Branches', 12. Zurab Jvania died suddenly in February 2005. This death was considered suspicious by both his family members and the opposition, who furthermore were not satisfied with its official investigation. The most well-known case is that of Irakli Batiashvili, who was released from prison after the November 2007 events. Both officials and Rustavi 2 spoke in the name of 'the people', while addressing opponents as 'criminals', 'contra-revolutionaries', etc.; for the nature of post-revolutionary political discourse see Muskhelishvili, 'Constitutional Changes in Georgia'. The most scandalous cases were the shooting of Amiran Robakidze and the killing of Sandro Girgvliani by the police. After the public protest following these cases, the most violent practice of shooting suspects on the street stopped. 'Policeman Jailed for Murder', Civil Georgia: Daily News Online, August 10, 2006, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=13291&search=robakidze (accessed June 30, 2009); 'High-Profile Murder Case Trial Ends, But Questions Remain', Civil Georgia: Daily News Online, July 5, 2006, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=12965 (accessed June 30, 2009). Number of prisoners in penal establishments: 19,441 in 2007, compared with 6274 in 2003. See Ombudsman of Georgia, State of Human Rights in Georgia, 61. A further liberalization of the economy began, which included privatization of state property and sharp growth in foreign direct investments (FDI); the traffic police was reformed, and as a result petty corruption in it sharply decreased; petty corruption also decreased in other state agencies; consolidated budget revenues increased from 14.9% of GDP in 2003 to 34.8% of GDP in 2007 (Georgian Economic Trends Quarterly Review, May, 2008); infrastructure improvement and road renovation started, etc. The Freedom House scores reflected this decline later, in 2008–2009. Public opinion was much more sensitive: responses to the question 'Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with how democracy is developing in Georgia?' gradually changed, with only 13% being 'rather dissatisfied' immediately after the Rose Revolution, while this same category reached 53% in September 2007. Data from www.iri.org.ge. As an example, 'small governance' is named as one of the guiding principles in 'Basic Data and Directions', a document which outlined the medium-term governmental program for 2007–2010. Georgia was ranked as one of the countries with the most rapid liberal economic reforms by the World Bank benchmarking agency: Doing Business in 2007, http://www.doingbusiness.org (accessed June 30, 2009). One well-known example is the case of a building on Tabukashvili Street, the inhabitants (owners) of which were turned out of their flats by the police by force. This term is used by Manuel Castells. See Castells, 'Information Technology'. Taking into consideration that more than half of the population is considered to be agricultural employees, this statement is best of all demonstrated by the following statistics. While from 2002 until 2006 the real income of the population was increasing (by 6% per year on average) in urban areas, it was decreasing (by 3% per year on average) in rural areas (Ministry of Economic Development of Georgia, Food Security Situation). Foreign direct investments, while massive, accounted for almost nothing in the agricultural realm (Ministry Of Economic Development Of Georgia, Department Of Statistics). Labour productivity, which increased overall by almost 90% during the last 10 years, has increased by only 4.5% in the agricultural sector (Burkadze, 'Structural Adjustments of the Georgian Agricultural Sector'). This belief was most pointedly articulated by the US president George W. Bush in his well-known characterization of Georgia as a 'beacon of democracy'. In the framework of the Millenium Challenge Program, the ENP and other initiatives. As an example, the EU rule of law mission 'EUJUST THEMIS' was launched in the beginning of 2004, and later reinforced with €4.65 million under the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) for measures to strengthen the rule of law and democratic processes in Georgia. 'Since the so-called Rose Revolution (November 2003), the Government of Georgia has committed itself to democratic reforms with the aim of bringing Georgia closer to European standards'. See http://www.delgeo.ec.europa.eu/en/press/2jul2004.htm (accessed June 30, 2009). An example is David Darchiashvili, OSGF Executive Director and later a member of parliament from the National Movement party list. Support from the US was stronger than that of the EU; as an example the differences in approach towards awarding Georgia a membership action plan (MAP) for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership during the Bucharest NATO summit in April 2007 may be considered. Both university professors and petty traders went on strike to protect their rights and to make their voices heard. They held numerous strikes, both in front of the parliament and around the university. The petty traders did not manage to institutionalize their activities, while the professors later initiated the creation of a 'Georgian Academy'. The responses to the question 'Do you think that things in Georgia are going in the right or wrong direction?' changed radically as a result of the Rose Revolution (from 85% – wrong and only 5% – right in August 2003, to 14% – wrong and 68% – right in December 2003). In 2004 the positive evaluations declined, and in March 2005 negative answers again prevailed (39% – wrong and 31% – right). Data from Georgian Opinion Research Business International (GORBI Gallup International). This was done mostly by directly appointing or manipulatively promoting new leaders of these organizations. ISFED, Monitoring report on the local self-government elections of 5 March 2006. Mezvrishvili et al., 'Public Expectations towards Programming Priorities'. This polarization later (in November 2007) manifested itself in mass rallies, which called on the President to resign. It is worth mentioning that the participants were much more radical than their leaders, who began by demanding parliamentary elections and had to shift towards more radical demands due to pressure from the demonstrators. The opposition had been continuously criticized for failing to provide any positive messages to their supporters, both during the November events and later, during the 2008 presidential and parliamentary elections. The main demands of the opposition centered on human rights, media freedom, fair elections and constitutional guarantees for the deconcentration of power. Almost no economic, social or geopolitical initiatives, other than those identified with governmental policies, ever played any political role in this struggle. 'Okruashvili Breaks Silence by Lashing Out at Saakashvili', Civil Georgia: Daily News Online, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=15861&search= (accessed June 30, 2009). This amount constitutes up to 5% of active voters in Georgia; typical voter turnout is less than two million. 'State of Emergency Declared in Tbilisi, as Two TV Stations Off Air', Civil Georgia: Daily News Online, November 7, 2007, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=16234&search= (accessed June 30, 2009). On 7 November the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy of the EU, Javier Solana, expressed his concern and sent to Tbilisi his special representative for the South Caucasus, Peter Semneby, who later led a process of mediation between the government and the opposition, in which ambassadors and representatives from European countries and the US, as well as from the OSCE, the Council of Europe, and its Parliamentary Assembly were involved. See OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission. 'Final Report', March 4, 2008 and September 9, 2008. 'The campaign was overshadowed by widespread allegations of intimidation and pressure, among others on public-sector employees and opposition activists, some of which were verified by the OSCE/ODIHR EOM. The distinction between State activities and the campaign of the ruling United National Movement (UNM) party candidate, Mikheil Saakashvili, was blurred. In addition, as referenced in a Post-Election Interim Report issued by the OSCE/ODIHR on 18 January, other aspects of the election process, notably vote count and tabulation procedures, as well as the post-election complaints and appeals process, further presented serious challenges to the fulfilment of some OSCE commitments'. See OSCE/ODIHR, 'Extraordinary Presidential Elections'. OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission, 'Final Report', September 9, 2008. The statements were immediately supported by the US administration. As Sean McCormack, Spokesman of the State Department, stated, 'We would like to congratulate the people of Georgia on an election that was conducted largely in accordance with international standards, as judged by the OSCE.' 'McCormack "it was a good election"', Rustavi 2 news, January 8, 2008, http://rustavi2.com/news_text.php?id_news=24287&pg=1&im=main&ct=0&wth= (accessed June 30, 2009). See for example Mitchell, 'Democracy Bound'. Stewart, 'Democracy Promotion Before and After the "Colour Revolutions"', 648. Schmitter and Brouwer, 'Democracy Promotion and Protection', 11. Cited in Stewart's introductory paper in this special issue: Stewart, 'Democracy Promotion Before and after the "Colour Revolutions"'. Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media.