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Popular Uprising and Political Culture in Zacatecas: The Sombrerete Uprisings (1829)

2007; Duke University Press; Volume: 87; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1215/00182168-2007-003

1527-1900

Rosalina Ríos Zúñiga,

Mexican Socioeconomic and Environmental Dynamics

Between January 11 and January 17 of 1829, Sombrerete, one of the most important cities in northern Zacatecas, experienced two popular uprisings. It all began on the 11th, near dusk, when a group of men on horseback entered one of the main streets of the city. The attackers took over the civic militia garrison without meeting any resistance, shouting long live Santa Anna and the fatherland and death to the gachupines (a derogatory term for Spaniards). They freed prisoners from the jail and successfully garnered the support of the townspeople. Together, they looted Spaniards’ houses. The group left the city at dawn, leaving a veritable powder keg behind. Following these actions, on the 13th, a second popular uprising took place, this time spontaneous and massive. The local authorities were unable to contain the unrest until a military expedition, sent by the state government of Zacatecas, arrived on January 17. The events, which sharply raised tensions in the state for several weeks, drew increasing attention from the authorities, due to its inevitable association with the recent Parián uprising that took place in Mexico City in early December 1828, as well as with the two uprisings that took place in the city of Puebla that same month.2 All of these events took place in the wake of the election of moderate presidential candidate Manuel Gómez Pedraza.3 Furthermore, in the case of Zacatecas, the uprisings took pace only days after the new governor, Fran-cisco García Salinas, was sworn into office.4 The magnitude of the events was evident from José Ignacio Esteva’s comment in a letter sent to Vicente Guerrero in late January 1829. He put it simply: “The Sombrerete event still has everyone scared, and emigration is on the rise.”5Similar mobilizations were taking place in not only in Mexico but also in Europe. Economic decline, political factionalism and its effects, changes in political practice following the spread of republican ideals in the wake of the French Revolution, and even environmental factors that triggered a drought during the late 1820s — all were issues that left their mark on both sides of the Atlantic. These social, political, and economic phenomena formed part of an accelerated process that would consolidate the modern nation-state and complete the transition to capitalism.6Despite their importance, research on nineteenth-century politics and rebellions in Mexico and Latin America has not examined the Sombrerete uprisings in detail, unlike the case of the uprisings in Mexico City and Puebla.7 Concerning the Mexico City events, Torcuato di Tella and Silvia Arrom have argued that the Parián riot of 1828 was an expression of popular politics under the control of one of the major political factions in Mexico at the time: the progressive, liberal, and federalist York-rite Masons (yorkinos).8 Putting this form of popular politics into practice involved extending the elites’ political objectives — in this case, support for Guerrero and animosity toward Spaniards — to the masses and maneuvering these groups to support the battles that York-rite Masons waged against their political enemies. Arrom suggests that the Parián riot displayed the characteristics of modern popular revolts, because it sought to change the established order rather than defend existing rights. Finally, both authors agree that the uprising marked the end of this form of popular politics, as it convinced the elite that mass mobilization should be avoided at all costs. Consequently, they indicate that this brought an end to the opportunity for popular groups to participate in a more inclusive political system.9The Puebla uprisings can also be considered copies of the Parián riot, due to the conditions under which they took place and the actors involved. Popular groups resented the difficult economic conditions in the state and disapproved of the results of the 1828 presidential elections.10 Making things worse, authorities in Puebla had decided not to carry out the law of expulsion against the Spaniards, and as a result many peninsulares had taken refuge in the state. Thus, the York-rite Masons, within the framework of these social conditions, put these so-called popular politics to the test at the end of this year. According to Guy Thomson, the participants in the Puebla uprisings did not have clear motives beyond looting and personal enrichment. However, I feel such an assertion should be reserved until we have a thorough investigation of the Sombrerete uprisings, which must be considered within the context of the social and political outbreaks that took place in late 1828 and early 1829 and that were characterized even by contemporary politicians as a threat to the social order.Even though the same factors that played a part in the Parián and Puebla uprisings were present in Sombrerete, and even though the political elites of Zacatecas reacted in the same way as elites in Mexico City, the historiography of Zacatecas mentions the uprisings but has not examined them in detail. The writings of contemporaneous local politicians and men of letters allude to the event, as do later writings on the political history of nineteenth-century Zacate-cas. Scholars have analyzed only one of the uprisings, interpreting it within the framework of a traditional conceptualization of politics. One interpretation views the uprising as a factionalist political movement in support of the Guerrero government.11 Another scholar describes it as an expression of the widespread banditry that plagued the region at the time.12 Either way, the populace appears in the role of a manipulated mass or as unconditional followers of other groups. However, this interpretation only obscures the divisions and battles between local and regional actors and their relationship with national processes.In this article I will reconstruct the Sombrerete uprisings and their aftermath. I hope to contribute to recent research focusing on the role of popular participation in the construction of the modern nation-state and its corresponding political culture, in Mexico and in Latin America in general during the nineteenth century.13 I will use the legal proceedings that unfolded in Zacatecas, especially declarations from the individual participants and those affected by the riots, as well as the allegations from the legislature concerning the events, to explain the complexities of local politics at their different levels and the class conflicts that were in play. Even though the uprisings have their origins in popular politics controlled by the yorkino political faction, they must be understood not just as a power struggle among elites. They also reflect the conscious participation of popular groups who sought to gain an audience for their political interests and objectives within the new political community. In fact, all the political actors, both elites and the masses, found themselves immersed in a struggle over the construction and practice of citizenship.This conflict is particularly important because it took place in a state considered one of the most politically sophisticated in all of independent Mexico. The laws, institutions, and civil practices that Zacatecas elites established allowed for a controlled but relatively broad political participation. They enacted liberal requirements for suffrage and created a civic militia of armed citizens, organized in the upper ranks according to secret and direct voting.14 Their town councils and state legislature had broad powers and tried to impose taxes that were equal and equitable for all citizens.15 In this state, an incipient new political culture began to spread among the majority of the population through the press (newspapers, broadsheets, and pamphlets), civic ceremonies, and festivals, as well as through the schools, which introduced a new vocabulary from the very beginning of this whole process. Despite these apparent conditions of advance toward a new political community, the popular uprisings provoked a strong negative reaction among the political elite, who then took measures to restrict popular participation. In seeking to better understand these events, we are forced to reconsider existing perspectives on the political history of Zacatecas.This article is divided into five parts. The first two describe how events unfolded in Sombrerete, who participated, and what actions the government took to contain the mobilization. In the third part I study the government response, and in the fourth part I analyze and interpret the central aspects of the riots — that is, I explore their anatomy. Finally, in the fifth part, I try to establish the characteristics, both old and new, of the political culture of the period, as well as to emphasize the nature of the battle for citizenship that can be observed in these riots.“Death to Spaniards! Well, not that they die, but that they depart.”17 A climate of political effervescence dominated Mexico in late 1828 and early 1829. Predictions of revolt and upheaval were heard everywhere, and Zacatecas was no exception.18 Rumors of riots or pillaging circulated among the state’s most important cities toward the close of 1828. One December night, the inhabitants of the capital awoke to a cry announcing the city would be looted, but nothing happened.19 Fresnillo had suffered an attack that left the municipal president wounded.20 That same December, other voices also warned against the looting of the municipality of Sombrerete, an event that finally transpired in January. Why Sombrerete? What special characteristics did this city have?Sombrerete was a mining center far from the state capital, close to the border with Durango.21 Its economy and society mirrored the rest of the state: mining was the main economic activity, followed by agriculture and ranching, with its relatively insignificant commercial activity regulated by the ups and downs of the mining sector. Silver production was very important during the colonial period but fell off considerably after independence. Apparently, the decline of the mining sector resulted from the depletion of its ore deposits; according to an 1803 report by Intendant Rendón, “not even [with] the injection of more capital is there hope of extracting anything from them.” Despite this, the mining sector was stimulated after independence by British capitalists who thought they could still profit from investments in Sombrerete.The administrative district (partido) of Sombrerete contained three municipalities: the small city bearing its name, plus Chalchihuites and Sain Alto. The population of the municipality of Sombrerete was approximately 22,946 by the beginning of the nineteenth century, and included Spaniards, criollos, mestizos, blacks, and other mixed-race individuals, along with a handful of British; by 1830, it had fallen to 14,988.22 Most were mineworkers, rural laborers, and artisans. Spaniards dominated the commercial sector, as they did elsewhere in Mexico.23Sombrerete, like the rest of the state, underwent major social, political, economic, and cultural changes during this period. The city, home to the majority of the most important activities in the district, was connected to the state capital in many ways. Newspapers arrived from Zacatecas and elsewhere, and Sombrerete’s civic groups included a Masonic lodge known as the Guerrero Fortress.24 Most of the district’s elites resided in the municipality of Sombrerete. Here, conditions were ripe for “doing politics” and engaging in conspiracies, a common phenomenon since 1824, when various scandal sheets directed either against the Spaniards or in favor of Iturbide were intercepted. Nonetheless, the political tendencies of the York-rite Masons gradually gained prevalence in the city.Rumors of a Sombrerete conspiracy spread by late 1828.25 Information from Spaniards questioned during the Sombrerete trial indicates that reports of conspiracy had been filed with officials, who took vague steps in response. Town authorities arrested and interrogated several suspects, including notary public Ignacio del Toro and his son. Del Toro was found in possession of a written plan to “de-coyote” Sombrerete. Del Toro was named as the leader, and the plan listed several subcommanders; curiously enough, sergeants were found among the thugs tried because of the uprisings.26 After a preliminary investigation, municipal authorities, lacking sufficient evidence to prosecute, released the suspects.In addition to the rumors of looting, which would continue to circulate in the following days, city council members made a move considered strange by local elite: an early morning religious procession took place on January 4th, attracting the participation of most of the town’s residents. They were led by the chief of revenues (jefe de rentas), Salvador Morillo, and the parish priest, Fran-cisco Rivas.27 The procession was accompanied by fireworks, music, and cries of “long live Santa Anna, the fatherland, and Guerrero.” There were also cries of “death to gachupines,” an expression that one daring man turned around to say, “Well, not that they die, but that they depart.”28 The leaders of the procession unabashedly declared their political preferences and their resentment toward the Spaniards.The state government does not seem to have had news of these rumors in Sombrerete, although it did know about other movements ordered by the federal government. These included a mobilization of army troops camped near in San Luis Potosí, ordered to Zacatecas on January 8. According to the information issued later by the minister of war at the request of Governor García Salinas, they were sent to maintain order, especially following events in Mexico City.29 The governor of Zacatecas reacted to this intervention as we might expect: he strongly opposed the steps taken by the federal government, which violated state sovereignty and the federalist agreement. However, in the end, according to a letter sent to Vicente Guerrero, state officials had to accept the permanent stationing of these troops in Villa de Guadalupe.30 Because this military presence in the city of Zacatecas coincided with the Sombrerete uprisings, federal officials could argue that their intervention was an attempt to keep the unrest from spreading to other areas. Locals had to endure the presence of federal troops until late March, when, after a brief period of negotiations between state and federal authorities, the troops from San Luis were withdrawn.31On Sunday, January 11, at dusk, when activities in the small city were almost at a standstill, the conspiracy that had spawned so many rumors finally became a reality.32 A large group of men on horseback arrived via one of the main streets.33 Their number is hard to determine, since differing reports were given by the persons later questioned, depending on their own allegiances. Spaniards stated that it began with some 20 men and later grew as events unfolded. Local officials said there were 50 – 80 men — too many to confront. The city council’s report to the state government claimed there were 60.34 Some of those questioned were not even eyewitnesses. One eyewitness, who swore he had seen it all from his window, stated that there were 20 horsemen. Given the testimony, I think it is most likely that the number of participants was between 30 and 50.The group of outsiders, whom town officials called “the invaders,” headed toward the militia barracks, crying “long live Santa Ana and death to gachupines.” There they encountered no resistance (since, according to the Spaniards, everything had been planned that way). Next they pillaged the houses of Spaniards, joined by popular groups whom the elites referred to as the masses or rabble. The group then moved toward the local jail, where prisoners were set free. At this point, Municipal President Rafael Castañeda asked the priest, Rivas, and the revenue chief, Morillo, to do something to slow the momentum of the crowd. They sought to prevent the looting of the British customhouse, which was rumored to be part of the group’s plans, but there was little they could do. The populace was also opposed to an attack on this property, for reasons clear to all: it “gave them their livelihood.”35 The people’s interest in protecting the British contrasted with the rancor they directed against the Spaniards’ property. Although both represent important sources of employment in those economically critical times, the difference in response stemmed from political-ideological issues. The York-rite Masons encouraged resentment toward the Spaniards among the masses, employing a discourse that must have clearly blamed the Spaniards for the miserable material conditions of the lower classes.36Toward 3:30 a.m., “the invaders” extended an invitation to anyone who wished to depart with them; they then left town by the same road they came in on (some witnesses said that this was the road to Fresnillo).37 The masses, however — “already unleashed,” as the elites put it — carried on until morning, while the authorities remained intimidated.The next day, “most of the workers did not go to work, and in their faces one noted a certain confusion, fear, or repentance for their acts.”38 The city council took the first steps toward restraining the population and reestablishing order. In addition to stationing militiamen in parts of the city, the council arranged for a watchman in the church bell tower to guard against the possible return of “the invaders.”39 Also, some prominent residents met to resolve the situation. They asked that the company of light cavalry camped in the nearby town of Río de San Antonio be sent for.40The municipal president and the commander of the local militia sent the first news about the events in Sombrerete to Zacatecas on January 12, but their announcement did not arrive until the 14th. Upon hearing the news, Governor García Salinas called for an emergency meeting of the state congress. In a special session, the congress authorized the first steps in response, including the dispatch of a company of cavalry and an urgent call to all military forces statewide to gather at the site of the uprising. Also, the governor was authorized to make use of any financial resources necessary in order to regain control of the situation, “with the object of avoiding, wherever possible, similar or greater disruption to the fabric of society.”41 Also, the legislative body began to address an issue that seemed urgent: the reorganization of the civic militia. To this end, they proposed the immediate systematization of tax money devoted to the militia, “so that its expenses may be taken care of without creating such a burden as the population now suffers.” Arms, munitions, horses, and uniforms were also to be purchased. In the short run, however, officials were behind the eight-ball due to the remoteness of the events. While they decided what to do, the situation in Sombrerete flared up once again on January 13. Soon the government of Zacatecas would receive fresh and alarming news.After the night of disturbances and tension, Sombrerete settled back into a state of relative calm that continued until nearly midday on the 13th. At that time, officials “and property owners” were advised that various groups of people were gathering, spouting “heated opinions” and looking “enraged.”43 These groups followed the road from the mayor’s house to near the parish church. The municipal president took new precautions. He called the parish priest and the treasurer so that both could go out and try to placate “the infuriated mob”; however, there was little they could do. The crowd was once again up in arms; some protested the indiscriminate searches of their homes and the confiscation of their belongings, while others — who undoubtedly possessed looted goods and had had them confiscated — called for the authorities to “declare them the owners of the stolen property and allow them to sell it.”44As events continued, a “very large number of individuals,” as the municipal president would later say, “gathered around the plaza, long before the troops were able to maneuver.” The number of participants is again difficult to pinpoint. The night of the attack, one eyewitness indicated that nearly two thousand individuals followed after the “invaders,” including men, women, and youths. The impression on the 13th was that the throng came from all neighborhoods, gathered in packs, and that few failed to participate.45 Therefore, according to the municipal president, additional steps could not be taken because there were not enough weapons in Sombrerete to confront such a disturbance. Was this true?The company of cavalry in Río de San Antonio had been sent for on the 12th, but — according to witnesses — authorities prevented them from taking action. During the trial, these soldiers themselves presented a declaration to state officials in self-defense. They confirmed what the Spaniards had said about their role, stating that they could not make use of the “good spirit and enthusiasm that motivated them to repress and teach a lesson to the rebellious mob” because they were held back by the authorities “in the face of the rioting mob, a fact that put [the soldiers] in a disgraceful position and emboldened the mob, placing [the soldiers] at the mercy of the ire and scorn of the national flag.”46 The municipal president responded to the accusation, stating that this was done to prevent bloodshed: a distinct possibility given the circumstances faced by the civic militiamen. His argument took into consideration neighborly bonds and camaraderie among the population.47Curiously, no officers had signed the soldiers’ report, and for this reason they were questioned directly during the trial. Lieutenant Cayetano Benito de Santa María indicated that officers had not signed the statement because the civic militiamen had forged ahead with the declaration without discussing it with the officers (who also had planned to make a declaration). They also wanted to make it clear that they were also “patriotic officials, dedicated to the cause of liberty and obedient to authority, as their public actions demonstrate.”48 This response suggests that in reality, officers from the Río de San Antonio company may have followed orders and not attacked the mob because they were outnumbered. The soldiers did not understand this decision and probably thought the conspiracy would continue. Therefore, in their own defense, the soldiers sent the report on their own to the Zacatecas government, without notifying their superiors. In reality, the reaction of the masses on the 13th had surpassed any magnitude that the “conspirators” might have hoped for.This second uprising was initially sparked when one of the Spaniards who had been looted, mine owner Don Domingo Anitúa, decided to ask the precinct police commissioner to search certain houses in order to find his stolen belongings.49 The police searched many homes, including the homes of some who had not taken part in the looting. This indiscriminate search infuriated the popular classes, and they decided to take measures to prevent it; we can presume they felt their rights were being violated, as can be inferred from the declaration of one “commoner of the people.” Sombrerete resident Felipe Minijares, a cobbler by trade, offered a lengthy narration concerning the events of the 11th through the 13th. On this last day, he saw a large group of people in the plaza, and “he asked, to no one in particular, what was going on, and they answered that the mobili-zation was on account of the fact that the police inspectors were going around searching houses and confiscating even items that had not been looted, which is why they had come down to present their case to the authorities.” Another witness, Fernando Vázquez, a worker, indicated “he saw the people gather once more and furiously attack the authorities, telling them that blood would be spilled before they could confiscate what had been looted.”50Moreover, the testimony of the Spanish victim Juan García Negrete confirms this and further alleges that neither the mayor nor the municipal president ordered the searches. García Negrete said that Police Inspector Patricio Medina had begun to search several houses and that their occupants had come to the mayor to complain. The mayor answered that he hadn’t given any order, and so they went to the municipal president, who gave the same answer, “suggesting to them that [these officials] disapproved of such conduct, and that it was a result of the inspector’s arbitrary actions.” From this point on they became increasingly outraged, demanding the heads of various officials.51 By then, complete chaos reigned in Sombrerete.We should pause here to consider the testimony of this “commoner of the people,” as well as that of four other witnesses who gave similar, though less explicit, testimony. They allow us to hear voices from this sector of the population, albeit through an intermediary man of letters. First, it is useful to point out that these witnesses were labeled citizens in the court records. Governor García Salinas condemned those who were “capable of forgetting, to such a great extent, the rights and obligations of man and citizen” — that is, he denounced both the people who had joined the mob and the circumstances surrounding the indiscriminate searches. Did those who protested against the searches and defended their belongings do so because they truly felt their rights had been violated? To what extent were the masses aware that the authorities had labeled them citizens? To what degree did they understand their rights as such? Or was the discourse of rights and citizens’ rights employed only by the elites? State residents, according to the state constitution, enjoyed the right to “speak, write, and publish their ideas; to do as they wish insofar as it does not infringe on the rights of others; to be equal before the law, and to have right to property.” These concepts, as well as others, were disseminated among the Zacatecan population, albeit orally or symbolically by means of civic rituals and practices organized by the elites. Therefore, there must have been an understanding and conviction among certain individuals — whether or not they participated in the looting — of these concepts of citizenship rights and how they were to be respected. The outcome of this protest, which blurred any previous boundaries between citizen and non-citizen, was a result of the very same confusion concerning citizenship status that reigned in the city.Thus, once they appeared before the authorities, the crowd made its initial demands: that the sentry posted in the church tower be withdrawn and that no more stolen goods be confiscated. Two additional, and somewhat more unusual, requests concerned the economic conditions in the state and give an indication of the most pressing everyday concerns of the population. First, they asked that the price of corn — currently inflated due to the drought — be reduced. The municipal president was well aware of this problem, as he told them that even the ayuntamiento had bought corn for the community grain co-op (Fondo del Común) at a high price. If he were to enact a price reduction, he warned, the co-op would have to sell to community members at a loss. This would be a financial drain on community resources, and “funds that were for their own benefit would be lost.”52 The second social demand was that work in the mines, halted for several days due to the recent events, be resumed.53These requests were presented to the municipal president and his advisers — Rivas and Morillo — who, given the seriousness of the circumstances, agreed to most of their terms: removal of the tower guard, a halt to the confiscation of looted goods (a decision that astonished the Spanish victims and that was perhaps driven perhaps by the heat of the moment or by prejudice against the Spaniards), permission for those who possessed looted goods to dispose of them as they wished, and a reduction in the price of corn.54 Municipal President Castañeda even allowed the jail to be opened a second time so that any remaining prisoners could be freed; however, he didn’t say anything about reopening the mines.The rioters were ecstatic and in their excitement even asked authorities to organize and lead a celebratory procession. Castañeda agreed and called for the parade, during which the town officials were cheered as heroes. People cried out, “Long live our president, who does so much good for the poor; long live our liberal parish priest: long live Mr. Salvador Morillo.”55 The authorities responded to these cheers by shouting “long live Santa Anna, religion, and the town of Sombrerete.” Afterward, the crowd was led to the parish church to celebrate a solemn Te Deum. The authorities said they sought to restore reason and calm to “unsettled minds.” In the church, according to Spanish witnesses, the priest Francisco Rivas exhorted the masses to keep what they had obtained, because it was theirs alone. Thus the day ended. The next day, all that took place in the town was the sale and exchange of looted objects, as well as the municipal festivities. The conflict seemed to have been resolved, and Sombrerete returned to peace, or at least so it appeared.56The next morning, news about events in Sombrerete started to spread, circulating among towns and ranches nearby. In Río Grande, Sauceda, Chachihuites, Nieves, and Fresnillo, authorities began to take precautions, as it was rumored that the marauding bandits would attack again. The administrator of Tetillas hacienda said that “the same band of 40 armed men” that attacked Sombrerete “was headed toward Santiago Hill.”57 Other rumors indicated the band contained some 80 individuals, naming the places where it had stopped to distribute