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The IAEA and the International Politics of Nuclear Intelligence

2014; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 29; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/02684527.2014.895591

1743-9019

Tanya Ogilvie‐White,

Nuclear Issues and Defense

AbstractThis article explores whether the IAEA intelligence apparatus is being stymied by divisions between IAEA member states over how to respond to cases of non-compliance. The first part of the paper charts the key developments in the Department of Safeguards since the early 1990s – all of them authorized by the Board of Governors – that have increased the Secretariat's technical ability and legal authority to acquire and analyze evidence of illicit nuclear activities. The second part of the paper explores some of the political difficulties associated with implementing this expanded mandate and using it to hold states to account, drawing primarily on the IAEA Syria file. This case study indicates that however technically proficient and proactive IAEA monitoring becomes, reliable intelligence will not necessarily improve the global nuclear governance unless member states accept IAEA intrusiveness and develop a common understanding of proliferation threats and the need to deal with them decisively. AcknowledgementsThis article is an updated version of Tanya Ogilvie-White, ‘Nuclear Intelligence and North-South Politics’, International Journal of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence 24/1 (2011) pp.1–21.Notes1 Mark Heinrich, ‘IAEA May Need Intelligence Arm Against Atom Terror’, Reuters, 1 April 2009; Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, ‘Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: A Global Intelligence Imperative’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Watch #1511, 30 April 2009 < http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/19000/preventing_nuclear_terrorism.html>; Elaine M. Grossman, ‘Boost in IAEA Intelligence Capability Looks Unlikely in Near Term’, Global Security Newswire, 22 June 2009 < http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20090622_4368.php>.2 ‘Interview: Mohamed ElBaradei’, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 65/5 (2009).3 Simon Chesterman, ‘Does the UN Have Intelligence?’, Survival 48/3 (2006) pp.149–64.4 Ibid., p.151; James M. Acton, ‘The Problem with Nuclear Mind Reading’, Survival 51/1 (2009) p.124.5 Although resistance to IAEA intrusiveness is more common among developing states today, in the 1970s Western European states were also very keen to resist a vigilant and strong control agency, so they imposed restrictions on the traditional safeguards system (INFCIRC/153). The only state that actively pushed for a more intrusive safeguards regime at the time was the United States, which managed to add paragraphs 73 and 77 to INFCIRC/153, giving the IAEA the right to undertake special inspections when safeguards violations were suspected. These special inspections were never actually used due to disagreements in the board of governors over their legitimacy. See Matthias Dembinski, ‘North Korea, IAEA Special Inspections, and the Future of the Nonproliferation Regime’, The Nonproliferation Review (1995) pp.31–9; David Fischer, ‘Safeguards: Past, Present and Future’, IAEA Bulletin 39/4 (1997) < http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Magazines/Bulletin/Bull394/fischer.html>.6 Thomas E. Shea, ‘The International Nonproliferation Regime and IAEA Safeguards’, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory Paper # PNNL-SA-66582, June 2009.7 IAEA Department of Safeguards, IAEA Safeguards: Staying Ahead of the Game (IAEA: Vienna 2007) p.30.8 Statement by IAEA Director General Hans Blix on IAEA Inspections in Iraq to the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, 23 October 1991 < http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/congress/1991_h/dgsp1991n06.htm>.9 John Carlson, ‘SAGSI: Its Role and Contribution to Safeguards Development’, Australian Safeguards and Nonproliferation Office (ASNO), Barton, Australia, 2007 < http://www.dfat.gov.au/asno/publications/SAGSI_role_contribution_safeguards_dev.pdf>.10 Annette Berriman, Russell Leslie and John Carlson, ‘Information Analysis for IAEA Safeguards’, paper presented at INMM 2004 Symposium, Orlando, Florida, July 2004 < http://www.dfat.gov.au/asno/publications/inmm2004_information.pdf>.11 These tensions were evident in the discussions of ‘Committee 25’ – a special committee created by the board of governors in 2005 to look into the issue of strengthening safeguards. The committee quickly became hamstrung by divisions, achieving very little by the time it was disbanded in 2007. John Carlson, ‘IAEA Safeguards Additional Protocol’, for the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, 20 January 2009 < http://icnnd.org/Documents/IAEA_Additional_Protocol.pdf>; Jack Boureston and Charles D. Ferguson, ‘Strengthening Nuclear Safeguards: Special Committee to the Rescue?’, Arms Control Today, December 2005 < http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_12/DEC-Safeguards>.12 See IAEA Department of Safeguards, IAEA Safeguards, pp.25–6; J. Whichello, D. Parise and N. Khlebnikov, ‘IAEA Project on Novel Techniques’, INESAP Information Bulletin No. 27, December 2006, pp.27–30; and European Commission Joint Research Centre (JRC) Annual Report 2009, pp.34–5 < http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/jrc/downloads/jrc_ar_2009.pdf>.13 Jack Boureston and Tanya Ogilvie-White, ‘Seeking Nuclear Security Through Greater International Coordination’, IIGG Working Paper, Council on Foreign Relations, March 2010 < http://www.cfr.org/publication/21709/seeking_nuclear_security_through_greater_international_coordination.html>.14 Developing states have always been wary of third-party proliferation intelligence, because only developed states have tended to have access to sophisticated collection methods and sources, including satellite imagery, and they were concerned that data could be deliberately manipulated. Developing an independent IAEA intelligence apparatus (including an Imint capability) was seen as a way to dispel these fears, but concerns about Western technological dominance remain. See Wolfgang Fischer et al., ‘The Role of Satellites and Remote Data Transmission in a Future Safeguards Regime’, in International Safeguards 1994: Proceedings of a Symposium (Vienna: IAEA 1994).15 The countries that provide MSSPs include Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Czech Republic, European Commission, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Netherlands, Republic of Korea, Russia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and United States. IAEA General Conference, ‘Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the Efficiency of the Safeguards System Including Implementation of Additional Protocols’, GC(53)/9, 7 August 2009.16 Only a small percentage of safeguards R&D work takes place at the agency's safeguards analytical laboratory in Seibersdorf, outside Vienna – most is conducted in the agency's network of affiliated laboratories, nearly all of which are based in Western member states (although laboratories in Brazil and China have applied to join the network). GC(53)/9, page 7, paragraph 28.17 Whichello et al., ‘IAEA Project on Novel Techniques’, p.28.18 Independent Group of Scientific Experts (iGSE), ‘Project Description – Problems to Solve’ < http://www.igse.net/index.php?id = 39>.19 iGSE Panel Presentation, Church Center to the United Nations, New York, 10 May 2010. Ole Ross (Meteorological Institute, University of Hamburg) gave a presentation on the relative ease of using Kr-85 signatures in the remote detection of clandestine plutonium programmes, and Alexander Glaser (Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs and Department of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering, Princeton University) gave a presentation on the difficulty of using gas sensor technologies to remotely detect illicit uranium enrichment plants. According to Dr Glaser, it is more feasible to detect conversion plants, but these are currently not covered under safeguards.20 iGSE, ‘Project Description – Problems to Solve’.21 Ibid.22 Since 2005, the IAEA General Council has repeatedly passed a resolution that mandates the IAEA to strengthen safeguards – a priority that was set out in the IAEA Medium Term Strategy (MTS) 2006–11.23 IAEA General Conference, ‘Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the Efficiency of the Safeguards System and Application of the Model Additional Protocol’, GC(53)/RES/14, September 2009.24 See, for example, Working Paper submitted by Japan, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, and Uruguay, ‘Proposed Elements for a Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on Strengthening the International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards’, NPT/CONF.2010/WP.5/Rev.1, 7 May 2010; Working Paper submitted by Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden (‘the Vienna Group of Ten’), ‘Article III and the Fourth and Fifth Preambular Paragraphs, Especially in their Relationship to Article IV and the Sixth and Seventh Preambular Paragraphs (Compliance and Verification)’, NPT/CONF.2010/WP.21, 29 March 2010; and Working Paper on strengthening International Atomic Energy Safeguards, presented by Spain on behalf of the European Union, ‘Working paper on Strengthening International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards’, NPT/CONF.2010/WP.56, 4 May 2010.25 See, for example, Statement by Ambassador Antonio Guerreiro, 8th Review Conference of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Main Committee II, 10 May 2010 < http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/revcon2010/statements/10May_MCII_Brazil.pdf>; Statement of Egypt on Behalf of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties, 8th Review Conference of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Main Committee II, New York, 10 May 2010 < http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/revcon2010/statements/10May_MCII_NAM.pdf>.26 Acton, ‘The Problem with Nuclear Mind Reading’; Tanya Ogilvie-White, ‘International Responses to Iranian Nuclear Defiance: The Non-Aligned Movement and the Issue of Non-Compliance’, European Journal of International Law 18/3 (2007) pp.453–76; Tanya Ogilvie-White, ‘The Defiant States: The Nuclear Diplomacy of North Korea and Iran’, Nonproliferation Review 17/1 (2010) pp.115–38.27 Alexander G. Higgins, ‘Report: Iranian Defector Tipped Syrian Nuke Plans’, The Associated Press, 18 March 2009 < http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/syria/nuclear/2079_4510.html>.28 Anthropogenic particles are produced by human action rather than being already present in the environment. The type of uranium found on the swipes is a signature of the type of fuel that is fed into a reactor to produce plutonium, which, after it is reprocessed, could be used in a nuclear weapon.29 Andrew J. Tabler, ‘How to React to A Reactor: Using Syria's Nuclear Program to Engage Damascus’, Foreign Affairs, 19 April 2010.30 According to Gregory L. Schulte, who was US Ambassador to the IAEA from 2005–9, North Korean experts were involved in the cover-up of the wreckage at Dair Alzour as well as the construction. Gregory L. Schulte, ‘North Korea and Syria: A Warning in the Desert’, Yale Global Online, 28 April 2010 < http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/print/6305>.31 Interview with Syria's permanent representative to the IAEA, Dr Ibrahim Othman, as quoted in ‘Syria Fully Cooperates with IAEA’, Syrian News Station, 24 November 2009 < http://sns.sy/sns/?path = news/read/7066>; Gregory L. Schulte, ‘Uncovering Syria's Covert Reactor’, Carnegie Policy Outlook, January 2010, p.3.32 ‘IAEA Inspects Syria Reactor in Uranium Traces Probe’, Reuters, 6 April 2010.33 IAEA Board of Governors, ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic’, GOV/2011/30, para. 24, 24 May 2011; Peter Crail, ‘IAEA Sends Syria Nuclear Case to UN’, Arms Control Today, July/August 2011 < http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2011_%2007-08/%20IAEA_Sends_Syria_Nuclear_Case_to_UN>.34 Amano, ‘Introductory Statement to Board of Governors’, Vienna, 17 November 2011 < http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/2011/amsp2011n030.html#syria>.35 ‘Syria Nuclear Weapons Site Revealed by UN Investigators’, Associated Press, 1 November 2011 < http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/nov/01/syria-nuclear-arms-site-revealed>.36 Peter Crail, ‘Syria Probe Still Stalled, IAEA Says’, Arms Control Today (December 2011) < http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2011_12/Syria_Probe_Still_Stalled_IAEA_Says>.37 Ibid.38 IAEA Board of Governors, ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic, GOV/2008/60, 19 November 2008, para 16.39 IAEA Board of Governors, ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic’, GOV/2009/36, 5 June 2009, para 14.40 IAEA Board of Governors, ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic’, GOV/2009/9, 19 February 2009, para 7 and GOV/2009/36, para 7.41 IAEA Board of Governors, ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic’, GOV/2010/11, 18 February 2010, para 5–14. Paragraph 5 states that the IAEA has ‘repeatedly requested Syria to have substantive discussions with it on the nature and the destroyed building, and to discuss relevant satellite imagery and other information available to the Agency’.42 According to some reports, ElBaradei was incensed that information was not provided to the IAEA ‘in a timely manner’. Others claim that ElBaradei falsely blamed intelligence delays for his inaction in 2007–8, using them as an excuse to fail to indict Syria. Anne Penketh, ‘UN Targets US over Delay in Syrian Nuclear Evidence’, The Independent, 26 April 2008; Peter J. Brown, ‘IAEA's Not-So-Secret Satellite Game’, Asia Times Online, 10 October 2009.43 Some of ElBaradei's caution in handling intelligence stems from his experiences with the North Korea and Iraq files. First, Blix's presentation of US satellite photos in a board of governors meeting in 1993, which exposed North Korea's clandestine nuclear facilities, was regarded by ElBaradei as a textbook example of how not to handle cases of non-compliance. Immediately following the meeting, North Korea expelled IAEA inspectors, breaking its connection with the IAEA, putting an end to on-site safeguards monitoring, and setting Pyongyang on the road to nuclear break-out. As Director General, ElBaradei was always determined to prevent the same thing happening under his leadership. His handling of sensitive intelligence issues was therefore underpinned by a desire to protect IAEA access to facilities and sites and to prevent walkouts, especially in the most defiant states. Second, ElBaradei was sensitized by reports that IAEA inspection activities in Iraq in the 1990s were infiltrated by the CIA, and by his troubled relationship with the Bush administration, which was openly critical of his willingness to acknowledge the interests and concerns of even the most defiant states. These difficulties in IAEA-US relations peaked in the lead up to the invasion of Iraq, when agency experts determined that documents had been forged and manipulated to justify war, and when other Western intelligence was allegedly withheld from inspectors. These experiences caused ElBaradei to be extremely cautious in his intelligence assessments and to treat suspected violators as ‘innocent until proven guilty’, which was how he approached the Syria case between 2007 and the end of his tenure in November 2009.44 Some member states and political commentators accuse the secretariat of accepting US intelligence information on ‘blind faith’ and believe that the IAEA is being turned into a US puppet. These concerns are not new, but they have become more apparent since the intelligence debacle over Iraq. See Muhammad Sahimi, ‘Politicizing the IAEA Against Iran’, Tehran Times, 15 March 2010; Gareth Porter, ‘Leaked Iran Paper Exposes IAEA Rift’, Asia Times Online, 8 October 2009; Kaveh L. Afrasiabi, ‘The IAEA and the New World Order’, Asia Times Online, 3 February 2006; and Daya Thussu, ‘Double Standard in the Use of Satellite Technology’, Third World Network, 3 November 1998.45 Under INFCIRC/153, the IAEA can order a special inspection at suspect sites if it considers that information made available is not adequate for the agency to fulfil its responsibilities for verifying the non-diversion of nuclear material. IAEA, ‘The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons’, INFCIRC/153 (corr.), Part II, paragraph 73 (b).46 As James Acton, Mark Fitzpatrick and Pierre Goldschmidt have argued, a special inspection in Syria is long overdue. They stress that it is dangerous to uphold the principle of ‘innocent until proven guilty’ in the context of the IAEA. The principle is fair when applied to people, but is not feasible when applied to states ‘because it allows a non-compliant state to avoid its guilt being proven by denying the IAEA access. In contrast, an accused person cannot simply stop a police investigation in the same way’. James Acton, Mark Fitzpatrick and Pierre Goldschmidt, ‘The IAEA Should Call for a Special Inspection in Syria’, Proliferation Analysis (26 February 2009). For further discussion of the special inspection issue, see Fiona Simpson, ‘IAEA Special Inspections after Israel's Raid on Syria’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 10 February 2008 < http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/iaea-special-inspections-after-israels-raid-syria>; Tabler, ‘How to React to a Reactor’; and Schulte, ‘Uncovering Syria's Covert Reactor’.47 Penketh, ‘UN Targets US over Delay in Syrian Nuclear Evidence’.48 ‘Assad, Gul: Syrian-Turkish Relations on Solid Foundations’, Syrian News Station, 8 May 2010 < http://sns.sy/sns/?path = news/read/13813>.49 ‘Syria, Lebanon, Iraq Back Iran Nuclear Programme’, AFP, 17 April 2010 < http://dalje.com/en-world/syria-lebanon-iraq-back-iran-nuclear-programme/302397>; ‘Iran Wants US Suspended from UN Nuclear Agency’, AFP, 18 April 2010 < http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2010/04/18/2003470828>. For more on this issue, see Natasha Barnes, Tanya Ogilvie-White and Rodrigo Alvarez, ‘The NPT Holdouts: Universality as an Elusive Goal’, Nonproliferation Review 17/1 (2010); and Ogilvie-White, ‘The Defiant States’.50 ‘IAEA to Help Syria on Possible Nuclear Plant: Diplomats’, AFP, 26 November 2008 < http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jiy1EDckEZe6M_yrDhwc6-dd0Ocw>.51 This frustration is expressed in the working paper on strengthening IAEA safeguards, which Spain presented on behalf of the EU at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The paper called for ‘support in IAEA competent bodies for suspension of access to the Agency's technical cooperation and assistance programmes in appropriate areas, in case of non-compliance with obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reported to the Board of Governors’. NPT/CONF.2010/WP.56, 4 May 2010.52 ‘IAEA Chief ElBaradei: Let Syria Have Nuclear Aid’, Reuters, 25 November 2008.53 Annex II of the additional protocol lists exports of equipment and materials specifically designed and prepared for nuclear use that member states should declare to the agency. Currently, states that have additional protocols in force are obliged to provide information on export approvals of these items, but there is no obligation to provide information on unsuccessful procurement efforts or exports of dual-use equipment and materials. Expanding the Annex II declaration obligations would improve the IAEA's ability to find indicators of possible undeclared nuclear activities. INFCIRC/540 provides that annexes may be amended by the board upon the advice of an ‘open-ended group of experts’ established by the board, but the experiences of Committee 25 from 2005–7, which was set up to address this kind of issue, suggest that the only feasible approach at the moment (which is currently being pursued by the IAEA trade analysis unit), is to encourage vigilant states (especially members of the Nuclear Supplier's Group which regularly updates its control lists) to voluntarily supply the additional information. Matti Tarvainen, ‘Unfair Trade’, IAEA Bulletin 50/2 (2009) pp.61–3; Carlson, ‘IAEA Safeguards Additional Protocol’, pp.7–8 of web version; Mark Fitzpatrick, Prepared Testimony before a Joint Hearing of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs’ Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, and the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade, 27 June 2007 < http://www.iiss.org/whats-new/iiss-in-the-press/press-coverage-2007/june-2007/mark-fitzpatricks-testimony/>.54 With or without these tools, the efforts of national intelligence agencies are likely to continue to focus on states that have significant nuclear activities and are resisting the additional protocol (or have suspended it). There are seven states in this position: Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Iran, North Korea, Syria, and Venezuela. As the nuclear renaissance gets underway, this list might well expand.55 The iGSE is an independent network of academics and analysts engaged in research on new technologies to detect clandestine nuclear activities, which aims to build a new generation of safeguards inspectors and officials committed to strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime. For more information, see the iGSE website at < http://www.igse.net/>.Additional informationNotes on contributorsTanya Ogilvie-WhiteDr Tanya Ogilvie-White is Associate Professor and Research Director at the Centre for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, Australian National University, Canberra. She is a member of the Council on Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, an international partner of the Fissile Material Working Group, and associate editor of Asian Security. Some of her recent publications include: Slaying the Nuclear Dragon: Disarmament Dynamics in the Twenty-First Century (University of Georgia Press, 2012); On Nuclear Deterrence: The Correspondence of Sir Michael Quinlan (IISS/Routledge, 2011); ‘Expanding the IAEA Nuclear Security Mandate’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2010; and ‘The Dynamics of Nuclear Disarmament: New Momentum and the Future of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime’, Nonproliferation Review, 2010.