Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

The corporative third way in Social Catholicism (1830 to 1918)

2009; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 17; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/09672560903204551

1469-5936

Stefano Solari,

European Political History Analysis

Abstract Social Catholicism opposed individualistic conceptions of society in favour of an order of associative institutions fostering a communality of interests between those involved in production processes. As a consequence, guilds were idealised and their model transposed in different ways to the industrial society of the nineteenth century. This paper discusses the different streams of Social Catholicism and the theoretical roots of corporatism in natural law. It will discuss how the idea of a ‘corporative order’ is more grounded in German corporative law than in Neo-Thomism. Keywords: CorporatismSocial Catholicismthird waylabour regulation Notes 1 See Almodovar and Cardoso (Citation2005). 2 Pellegrino Rossi, Droz and Bastiat can be an example of Catholic economists who cannot be associated with Social Catholicism (on this point see also Almodovar and Teixeira Citation2008: 66). However, the number of scholars we are citing tends to be wider than that analysed in Almodovar and Teixeira (Citation2008) because we include many moral philosophers who expressed relevant insights on specific issues connected to the social question and that contributed to form the ‘social doctrine of the Church’. 3 Christian socialists split from Fabian socialists, who instead favoured state intervention. 4 In Pirou (Citation1929) we find a detailed account of Social Economy and corporative theories in France. 5 Fascist corporatism is a complex subject since – similar to the ‘Roman Catholic’ approach – it inextricably linked theorising to practical policies and reforms. 6 Coornaert (Citation1941) found a plurality of forms and names assumed by these associations: Confrerie, charité, fraternité, gilde, hanse, métier, college, communauté, corps de métier, maîtrises and jurandes. 7 Cited in Coornaert (Citation1941: 183). 8 The Chapelier law affirmed that ‘il n'y a que l'intérêt particulier de chaque individu et l'intérêt général. Il n'est permis à personne d'inspirer aux citoyens un intérêt intermédiaire, de les séparer de la chose publique par un esprit de corporation’. 9 Employers had to enter comments on the employee, and the booklet had to be presented to new employers in the event of a change of workplace. 10 In this period we assisted to a revival of interest in religion as a fundamental regulating factor. See Faccarello and Steiner (Citation2008) for a general account. 11 In particular, Cossa and the Lombard-Venetian Lampertico and Luzzatti, later in part, also Toniolo (Molesti Citation2000). 12 The life and deeds of Cardinal Manning have been exalted in Lytton Strachey's Eminent Victorians. 13 The philosophy of St-. Thomas Aquinas was used to obtain a consistency between metaphysics, psychology and epistemology. An integrated system of thinking was developed, directly opposed to positivism, which also included political economy. The main encyclicals of Leo XIII enforced this philosophical system called Neo-Thomism: Aeterni Patris in 1879 illustrated the basic Neo-Thomistic principles and, later, Rerum Novarum in 1891 outlined the new specific position of the Roman Church relative to the economy. 14 There is no specific economic analysis in this text, which is simply theological–political and tends to be a reaction to Proudhon's early works. 15 The work of Kolping, who founded the Kölner Gesellenvereins, attracted the attention of Pius IX, who in 1862 called him to Rome to illustrate him his work. 16 Ketteler exchanged some correspondence with Lassalle asking for advice in the constitution of labour associations. He praised Lassalle's work in forming workers' unions, but did not approve his idea of state action to redistribute capitals in favour of proletarian cooperatives. 17 Other scholars such as Domat, Pothier and Schmalzgrüber concentrated on the revival of Thomistic theory but they did not try to apply it to economics. 18 As reported by Nitsch (Citation1990), this produces a normative economic theory. However, the normative element is provided by ethics, while economics is fairly hermeneutical (Solari-, Citation2007b). 19 Taparelli formulated the principle of social justice according to natural law, which was to become an important theoretical instrument later in the first part of the twentieth century with Pius XI (Quadragesimo Anno of 1931 and Divini Redemptoris of 1937). See Solari (Citation2009) on the theorisation of justice. 20 Liberatore (Citation1989c: 83) later said ‘Political economy, … , is a practical science and therefore intrinsically subordinated to morals’. All economic theory maintains a hermeneutic approach and there is no fixed economic principle. Axioms are external to the economic field and economic principles are derived from a mediation between exogenous ethical principles and the concrete historical context of society. 21 ‘As you can see, reader, either Economics is a science unable to tackle the very problem it has raised or an accomplished treatise of Social Economy should offer into the hands of the public regulator, besides the forces of self-interest, other powers able to introduce order into society which would be impossible to achieve by interest alone’[‘Lo vedete, lettore; o l'Economia è una scienza incapace di risolvere il problema che ella stessa ha proposto; o un trattato compiuto d'Economia sociale dee mettere tra le mani del pubblico ordinatore, oltre le forza dell'interesse, altre potenze capaci d'introdurre nella società quell'ordine che per solo interesse riuscirebbe impossibile’] (Taparelli 1857b: 27). 22 However, Taparelli justified progressive taxation to redistribute wealth, and this is founded in the ‘ability to pay’ argument. 23 Bodies of traders and craftsmen. 24 Looking at the economic dimension of guilds, derived from the forms they assumed from the thirteenth century to the eighteenth century, and in the language of contemporary economics, we can identify six main roles of such associations (which go beyond the simplistic defence of common interests). They provided a minimum regulation of professions to reduce uncertainty and secure some basic standards of behaviour. They did not simply enforce property rights, rather they secured an extended system of legal rules (semi-public) within which business could take place. The guild was, in contemporary terms, a constitutional order, a jurisdiction producing ‘club-law’ with internal coercion powers. In general, the guild was a democratic environment. They had the crucial role – in hard times – of transmitting complex forms of knowledge and ensuring quality standards (the classic example is how to build Gothic cathedrals). The system of apprenticeship guaranteed stable and effective learning processes. Rules and rituals helped to ensure the mastery of crafts vis-à-vis the public and a system of incentives to increase performance and secure quality. They ensured fair competition within the business by limiting the size of business units; at the same time they regulated prices to avoid dangerous reductions (function obviously subject to distortion). They provided mutual aid between members. They mainly provided assistance for sick members, widows and orphans, but self-help was extended to a wide number of cases since they defended common interests vis-à-vis numerous dangers. They developed a set of rights and duties in the master–employee relationship that served as (a paternalistic) labour regulation. In particular, they often obliged masters to provide a living for their servants and apprentices also in hard times. They secured the prohibition on working on Sundays and often limited the work of women and children. They later became an institution for the representation of common interests versus the general government. As a consequence, they assumed the role of transmitting members' political demands as well as of aligning members' interests and behaviour. When the Jacobin state abolished them, it failed to replace the many functions they performed with other better-suited institutions. This left many social functions uncovered, in particular ‘welfare’, contributing to the misery of many workers. Our rationalisation is based on Brentano (Citation1969[1870]), Coornaert (Citation1941, Citation1966), Epstein (Citation1991), Penty (Citation1906), Renard (Citation1919) and Schäffle (1878). 25 A similar but less paternalist view was proposed by Toniolo (1874). 26 See Solari (Citation2007a) for a discussion on this theme in Röpke. 27 Périn cites De Maistre arguing that ‘ce n'est point faire une révolution au contraire, c'est faire le contraire de la révolution’ (Périn 1880: 228). 28 ‘Partout les pauvres, à raison de leur infériorité morale et matérielle, auront besoin de l'assistance des classes qui possèdent la double supériorité de l'intelligence et de la richesse’ (Périn 1861: 352). 29 The best references are Talmy (Citation1963) and Jarlot (Citation1938). 30 According to the leaders of Catholic Circles such as Maignen and Keller himself, corporations had to manage common interests – and in particular the problem of apprenticeship, providing a ‘serious and Christian’ education. A system of examinations, patents and controls had to certify quality. ‘Order’ in the trade or craft had to be guaranteed by a professional hierarchy. 31 He professed a ‘retour à une organisation corporative de la société, et à l'attribution des charges du travail national à ces corporations’ (Vogelsang Citation1905: vol. I, 18). 32 The role of guilds as producers of law was the subject of an interesting debate from the sixteenth century to the eighteenth century. Otto von Gierke (Citation1958[1881]) widely discussed this issue in which some scholars were favourable to the autonomy of the guilds in the context of an organic state (for example, Daniel Nettelbladt [1719 to 1791] and Justus Möser [1720 to 1794]). 33 Vogelsang argued that ‘De l'organisation corporative naît naturellement la représentation politique, dont le mandat résulte de la charge même exercée dans le sein de la corporations’ (1905: vol. II, 46). 34 He studied the problem of the most suitable institutional arrangement in which to organise charity in the last year of his life (Taparelli 1862). 35 Here we find a major difference with respect to the theories of liberal Catholicism of Rosmini. 36 This idea was to give an important impulse to the ‘distributionism’ of Chesterton and Belloc. 37 He added a rotation of jobs in factories as a complementary solution internal to firms. 38 ‘Tax competition’ is considered responsible for the lowering of welfare standards and the production of public goods. Only some international regulation can ensure that competition achieves lower prices without the degradation of labour conditions. Germans were well aware of this fact when they implemented social insurances. 39 See Liberatore (Citation1889a). 40 The intention of Bismarck was precisely to widen the legitimisation of the state. The second proposal was based on a compromise (thanks also to a work of Schäffle) and passed in 1883. 41 That could also be related with the less enthusiastic position of Pius X; but this is an unexploited stream of research. 42 This does not mean that Catholic corporatism ended at that time. However, the most interesting developments, in particular as regards firm governance, took place in France with a group of social economists (Perroux and Pirou among others), in Germany (von Nell-Breuning on codetermination) and in countries like Portugal where the regime was more favourable to experimentation (see Bastien and Cardoso Citation2004). However, Francesco Vito continued this line of research with important proposals of reform on corporate governance (see Parisi Citation2008).