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From pre-emption to negotiation? The failure of the Iraq-as-deterrent nuclear non-proliferation model

2005; Routledge; Volume: 17; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/14781150500091680

1478-1166

Andrew Newman,

Nuclear Issues and Defense

Abstract This article critically examines one of the most important corollaries of the Bush administration's 2003 invasion of Iraq: the expectation that the war would deter other proliferators from pursuing their purported nuclear ambitions. Although Iraq likely provided the final impetus for Libya to renounce its nuclear program, it is argued that in the cases of Iran and North Korea, regime change did not act as a deterrent. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that the war heightened the perception that nuclear weapons are effective guarantors of security in these countries. The apparent failure of the Iraq-as-deterrent model and the extreme difficulties inherent in conducting effective pre-emptive strikes on nuclear facilities in Iran and North Korea have forced the US to embrace more multilateral and diplomatic approaches to counter-proliferation. Notes 1 Robert Kagan, Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order, (London: Atlantic Books, 2003), pp. 27–28. 2 See Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and The Monterey Institute of International Studies, Nuclear Successor States of the Soviet Union: Nuclear Weapon and Sensitive Export Status Report, 1 (1994), pp. 4–11. 3 See William Potter, The Politics of Nuclear Renunciation: The Cases of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, 1995), and Andrew Newman, 'Cooperative Threat Reduction: "Locking In" Tomorrow's Security', Contemporary Security Policy, 22, 1 (2001), pp. 83–106. 4 Leon Sigal, Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), p. 6. 5 Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities, (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995), p. 7. 6 Reiss, Bridled Ambition, p. 20. 7 Reiss, Bridled Ambition, p. 45. 8 John Redick, Julio Carasales and Paulo Wrobel, 'Nuclear Rapprochement: Argentina, Brazil, and the Nonproliferation Regime', in Brad Roberts (ed.), Weapons Proliferation in the 1990s, (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1995), p. 386. 9 See David Kay, 'Denial and Deception Practices of WMD Proliferators: Iraq and Beyond', in Brad Roberts (ed.), Weapons Proliferation in the 1990s, (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1995), pp. 305–325. 10 See, for example, Kenneth Pollack, 'Spies, Lies, and Weapons: What Went Wrong', Atlantic Monthly, (January/February 2004), (accessed 29 January 2004). 11 Jon Wolfsthal, 'Keeping a Nuke Peddler in Line', Los Angeles Times, (11 January 2004). 12 Office of the President of the United States of America, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, 2002); Office of the President of the United States of America, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, 2002); and United States Department of State, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (Washington, 2003). 13 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, p. ii. 14 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, pp. 13–14. 15 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, p. 15. 16 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, p. 3. In 1996, the US civil administrator in Iraq Paul Bremer argued in the Wall Street Journal that the United States should be prepared to retaliate against state sponsors of terrorism even when it could not be proven that the state sponsor specifically ordered the attack. Richard Falkenrath, Robert Newman and Bradley Thayer, America's Achilles' Heel: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Cover Attack, (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1998), p. 193, note 52. 17 Marc Dean Millot, 'Facing the Emerging Reality of Regional Nuclear Adversaries', in Brad Roberts (ed.), Order and Disorder after the Cold War, (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1995), p. 204, note 29; Warren Christopher, In the Stream of History: Shaping Foreign Policy for a New Era, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 28. 18 President George W. Bush, 'State of the Union Address', 20 January 2004, (accessed 21 January 2004). 19 The Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee was established to provide the Secretary of Defense and his Deputy and Under Secretaries for Policy with 'independent, informed advice and opinion concerning major matters of defense policy'. 'Charter: Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee', . Board members include Harold Brown, Newt Gingrich, Henry Kissinger, Dan Quayle, James Schlesinger, George Schultz, Brent Scowcroft and James Woolsey. Former Reagan administration officials include Kenneth Adelman (Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) director), Richard Allen (National Security Adviser), Fred Ikle (Under Secretary of Defense for Policy) and Henry Rowen (Chairman of the National Intelligence Committee). 20 See, for example, comments of John Bolton in 'Expounding Bush's Approach to US Nuclear Security: An Interview with John R. Bolton', Arms Control Today, (March 2002), (accessed 28 March 2002). 21 Joshua Muravchik, 'The Neoconservative Cabal', American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, (1 September 2003), (accessed 10 December 2003). 22 Lawrence Kaplan and William Kristol, The War over Iraq: Saddam's Tyranny and America's Mission, (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2003), pp. 105–106; see also pp. 45–49, 96–97; David Frum and Richard Perle, An End To Evil: How to Win the War on Terror, (New York: Random House, 2003), pp. 113–114, 216–217. 23 Bob Woodward, Bush at War, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), p. 340; Patrick Tyler, 'Yemen, an Uneasy Ally, Proves Adept at Playing off Old Rivals', New York Times, (19 December 2002), (accessed 20 December 2002). 28 Resolution 687 (1991) adopted by the United Nations Security Council at its 2981st meeting, 3 April 1991, < gopher://gopher.undp.org:70/00/undocs/scd/scouncil/s91/4%09 + Text/plain > (accessed 5 February 2003). 24 Michael Friend, After Non-detection, What? What Iraq's Unfound WMD Mean for the Future of Non-Proliferation (Geneva, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2003), p. 2. 25 Kaplan and Kristol, The War over Iraq, p. 52. 26 Richard Butler, Saddam Defiant: The Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the Crisis of Global Security, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2000), pp. 187–188. 27 Kenneth Pollack, The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq, (New York: Random House, 2002), p. 233. 29 Elizabeth Shelburne, 'Weapons of Misperception, Interview with Kenneth Pollack', Atlantic Online, (13 January 2004), (accessed 29 January 2004). 30 'UNMOVIC: Basic Facts', (accessed 8 April 2004). 31 The Blix Reports can be found at , and . 32 For a summary of the breakdown within the Security Council see Steven Weisman, 'A Long, Winding Road to a Diplomatic End', New York Times, (17 March 2003), (accessed 18 March 2003). 33 Philip Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, Allies at War: America, Europe, and the Crisis over Iraq (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004), p. 155. The author does not deny that the WMD threat was one of several motivations for the US-led action in Iraq. The most 'celebrated' substantiation of this was contained in an interview Sam Tannenhaus conducted with Paul Wolfowitz for Vanity Fair. See . That it may not have been the primary motivation does not, however, diminish the Bush administration's expectation that Iraq would serve as a cautionary tale for other proliferators. 34 Joseph Cirincione with Jon Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction, (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), pp. 243–247. 35 'Dealing with North Korea's Nuclear Programs', Statement of James A. Kelly, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, 15 July 2004, (accessed 27 August 2004); Paul Eckert, 'US Envoy Urges Libya-Style WMD Solution for North Korea', Reuters, 21 July 2004, (accessed 23 July 2004). For an excellent analysis of the problems inherent in interpreting North Korean statements see Daniel Pinkston and Phillip Saunders, 'Seeing North Korea Clearly', Survival, 45, 3 (2003), esp. pp. 79–84. 36 Unless otherwise footnoted, all information for this paragraph is taken from 'North Korea Profile', Nuclear Threat Initiative, last updated May 2003, (accessed 10 February 2004). 37 Michael O'Hanlon and Mike Mochizuki, Crisis on the Korean Peninsula: How to Deal with a Nuclear North Korea, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2003), pp. 34–35; National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, p. 3 38 This is not to suggest that the talks are a waste of time; quite the contrary. While Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly has conceded that key substantive differences remain, the Six Party dialogue offers the prospect of a negotiated settlement. On Kelly's assessment see his 'Opening Remarks before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee', Washington, 2 March 2004, (accessed 1 September 2004). 39 David Sanger, 'Iran and North Korea Reignite Fears on Atomic Programs', New York Times, (25 June 2004), (accessed 30 June 2004). 40 Jon Wolfsthal, 'Crying Wolf on Iraqi WMD Costs US Credibility on North Korea', Christian Science Monitor, (29 January 2004), (accessed 1 September 2004). 41 Cirincione with Wolfsthal and Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals, p. 256. 42 'The Bush Administration's Nonproliferation Policy: Successes and Future Challenges', Testimony by Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John R. Bolton to the House International Relations Committee, 30 March 2004, (accessed 31 March 2004). 43 . 44 . 45 International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors, 'Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran', Resolution adopted by the Board, 13 March 2004, GOV/2004/21. 46 Douglas Frantz, 'Iran Restricted Inspectors, IAEA Says', Los Angeles Times, (1 April 2004), (accessed 2 April 2004). There has also been a dispute as to the source of tiny quantities of enriched uranium found at Iranian nuclear facilities. While Iranian officials have insisted the material was already on the equipment when it was purchased (almost certainly from Pakistan), it has fuelled fears in the US and elsewhere that Iran is secretly producing nuclear material. As of this writing, investigations by the IAEA are pending. See 'Diplomats Say IAEA Tests on Enriched Uranium Traces Found Inside Iran Vindicate Tehran So Far', Associated Press, 10 August 2004, (accessed 14 August 2004). 47 'Iran Resumes Centrifuge Building', BBC News, 31 July 2004, (accessed 4 August 2004); David Sanger, 'Iran and North Korea Reignite Fears on Atomic Programs', New York Times, (25 June 2004), (accessed 30 June 2004); 'Iran Admits Resuming Centrifuge Assembly; European Powers Report "No Progress" in Talks', Nuclear Threat Initiative Global Security Newswire, (2 August 2004), (accessed 5 August 2004). 48 Anton La Guardia, 'Hand over Nuclear Weapons and Know-How, Iran Tells Britain', Daily Telegraph, (11 August 2004), (accessed 16 August 2004). 49 Mahan Adedin, 'Why Israel Probably Won't Attack Iran', Daily Star, (7 August 2004), (accessed 15 August 2004). 50 General Mohammad Baqer Zolqadr, a commander with the Revolutionary Guards went further, claiming, 'If Israel fires one missile at Bushehr atomic power plant, it should permanently forget about the Dimona nuclear center, where it produces and keeps its nuclear weapons.' Nazila Fathi, 'Iran Says It May Pre-empt Attack against Its Nuclear Facilities', New York Times, (20 August 2004), (accessed 25 August 2004). 51 David Sanger, 'Rice Says Iran Must Not Be Allowed to Develop Nuclear Arms', New York Times, (9 August 2004), (accessed 10 August 2004); Reuters, 'US Says Iran Must Cooperate on Nuclear Program', New York Times, (2 August 2004), (accessed 4 August 2004). 52 India had already conducted a so-called 'peaceful nuclear explosion' in 1974. 53 See Leonard Weiss, 'Pakistan: It's Déjà Vu All Over Again', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, (May/June 2004), (accessed 27 April 2004). 54 'Report: Syria Sought Nuclear Know-How', Jerusalem Post, (26 August 2004), (accessed 27 August 2004). 55 Transcript of interview with David Albright in 'Four Corners: The Nuclear Bazaar', Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 26 April 2004, (accessed 27 April 2004). 56 US Department of State, International Information Programs Washington File, Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation John Wolf, 'Nonproliferation Policies and Initiatives', Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, 19 March 2003. 57 Douglas Frantz, 'Libya's Arms Development Surprises UN', Los Angeles Times, (21 February 2004), (accessed 26 February 2004). 58 'UN Nuke Inspectors Arrive in Libya', CBSNews.com, 27 December 2003, (accessed 30 March 2004). 59 Libya ratified the NPT in 1975, negotiated a Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA in 1980 and supported indefinite extension of that Treaty in 1995; became a party to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1982; and, though not a member of the CWC, in 1971 became a party to the 1925 Geneva Protocol forbidding the use of chemical and biological weapons in war. Cirincione with Wolfsthal and Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals, pp. 307–308. 60 Meghan O'Sullivan, Shrewd Sanctions: Statecraft and State Sponsors of Terrorism, (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), p. 217. 61 'Plugging Nuclear Leaks', New York Times, (4 January 2004), (accessed 5 January 2004). 62 Anjali Bhattacharjee and Sammy Salama, 'Libya and Nonproliferation', Monterey Institute of International Studies, Center for Nonproliferation Studies Research Story, (24 December 2003), (accessed 25 March 2004). Secretary of State Colin Powell has provided support for this interpretation of Libya's actions. See Powell, 'The Craft of Diplomacy', Wilson Quarterly, 28, 3, (2004), p. 63. 63 For an excellent description of the near total collapse of the sanctions regime in Iraq see Pollack, The Threatening Storm, pp. 211–232. 64 Even the most pessimistic assessments only projected that Iraq would have nuclear weapons 'fairly soon'. Elisabeth Bumiller and James Dao, 'Cheney Says Peril of a Nuclear Iraq Justifies an Attack', New York Times, (27 August 2002), (accessed 30 August 2002). 65 See, for example, 'Top US Military Official Says Iraqi Force Weaker than in 1990s, Briefing with General Richard Myers, US Department of Defense', Iraq Watch, (13 September 2002), (accessed 28 April 2004). 66 On 16 March 2003 on Meet the Press, Vice President Cheney stated, 'The read we get on the people of Iraq is that there's no question but that they want to get rid of Saddam Hussein and they will welcome as liberators the United States when we come to do that.' Reproduced in PBS, Frontline: The Invasion of Iraq, Transcript: The Invasion of Iraq, (accessed 10 April 2004). I am indebted to Mr James Corera for bringing this source to my attention. 67 Richard Perle, 'Iraq: Saddam Unbound', in Robert Kagan and William Kristol (eds), Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign Policy, (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2000), p. 104. 68 Greg Sheridan, 'In the Lair of the Wolf', Weekend Australian, (17 April 2004), (accessed 20 April 2004). Taking into account differences in ideology, one wonders how Kim Jong Il's North Korea is not considered a 'moral equivalent' of Saddam's Iraq. 69 Telephone interview with Richard Perle, 4 March 2004. 70 Patrick Tyler and David Sanger, 'Pakistan Called Libyans' Source of Atom Design', New York Times, (6 January 2004), (accessed 10 January 2004). 71 Ian Traynor, 'Nuclear Chief Tells of Black Market in Bomb Equipment', The Guardian, (26 January 2004), ; Mark Landler and David Sanger, 'Pakistan Chief Says It Appears Scientists Sold Nuclear Data', New York Times, (24 January 2004), (accessed 27 January 2004). 73 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 'Proliferation Security Initiative', (accessed 10 April 2004). The PSI currently consists of 15 participating states—Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, Spain, the UK and the US. Ship-boarding agreements have been signed with Liberia, the Marshall Islands and Panama and expressions of support for PSI aims have come from more than eighty countries. 74 Author email correspondence with Australian Department of Defence official, 31 May 2004. 75 Wade Boese, 'The Proliferation Security Initiative: An Interview with John Bolton', Arms Control Today, (December 2003), (accessed 30 March 2004). 76 The IAEA and the United States have recently expressed concern about Brazil's decision to shroud critical portions of a uranium enrichment facility in Resende from IAEA inspectors. Peter Slevin, 'Brazil Shielding Uranium Facility', Washington Post, (4 April 2004), (accessed 5 April 2004). 72 Unless otherwise footnoted, all information is taken from 'Remarks by the President on Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation', Fort Lesley J. McNair—National Defense University, Washington, 11 February 2004, (accessed 11 February 2004). 77 US Department of State, International Information Programs, 'Byliner: Under Secretary Bolton on North Korea, Iraq', Far Eastern Economic Review, (13 March 2003), (accessed 2 April 2003). 78 William Shawcross, Allies: The US and the World in the Aftermath of the Iraq War, (Crows Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2004), pp. 37–8. 79 G. John Ikenberry, 'America's Imperial Ambition', Foreign Affairs, 81, 5 (2002), p. 45. 80 Wolfsthal, 'Crying Wolf on Iraqi WMD Costs US credibility on North Korea'; Friend, After Non-detection, What?, p. 7. There have been claims that Iraqi National Congress leader Ahmed Chalabi deliberately provided false WMD intelligence to the US and that this was part of an Iranian misinformation campaign to topple Saddam Hussein. If it is true that the US government was subtly manipulated, these revelations would further undermine the Bush administration's non-proliferation policy. On the Chalabi claims, see 'FBI Investigating Intelligence Leaks to Iran', Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 26 May 2004, (accessed 2 September 2004); Saber Baban, 'Chalabi Associate Suspected of Links with Iran', Associated Press, (accessed 2 September 2004). 81 See comments of former South Korean President Kim Dae-jung as reported in Jonathan Watts, 'S Korea Warns of Regional Arms Race', The Guardian, (18 February 2003), (accessed 1 September 2004). 82 James Brooke, 'North Korea Says Seoul's Nuclear Experiments Stoke Arms Race', New York Times, (9 September 2004), (accessed 10 September 2004). 83 See Patricia Lewis and Ramesh Thakur, 'Arms Control, Disarmament and the United Nations', Disarmament Forum: Strengthening Disarmament and Security, 1 (2004), (accessed 28 September 2004). 84 Dafna Linzer, 'Evidence on Iran Called Unclear', Washington Post, (1 September 2004), (accessed 2 September 2004); Paul Taylor, 'Key EU Powers Weigh Bringing Iran Nuclear Issue to UN Panel', Boston Globe, (4 September 2004), (accessed 8 September 2004); Paul Reynolds, 'Iran Faces "Nuclear Ultimatum" ', BBC News, 8 September 2004, (accessed 10 September 2004).