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French nuclear idiosyncrasy: how it affects French nuclear policies towards the United Arab Emirates and Iran

2012; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 25; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/09557571.2011.647763

1474-449X

Benoît Pélopidas,

Global Energy Security and Policy

Abstract This article elaborates the notion of 'nuclear idiosyncrasy' as a specific understanding of what nuclear weapons and energy are, what they stand for and what they can do. It then assesses the persistence of nuclear idiosyncrasy over time and its effects on French nuclear policies in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Iran. Based on interviews in France, Geneva and the UAE, this article contributes to three debates within foreign policy analysis and nuclear history. Is a regional approach necessary to understand the framing of foreign policies in the twenty-first century? Does a change in leadership fundamentally affect the orientations of nuclear policies? Are the risks of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and the measures to prevent it similarly understood by all the players in the international community? First, it shows that French nuclear policies in the Middle East are not shaped by dynamics specific to the region as the often invoked notion of an 'Arab policy of France' would suggest. Secondly, in-depth analysis leads one to reject the idea of a major change between the nuclear policies of Presidents Chirac and Sarkozy. Thirdly, persistent French nuclear idiosyncrasy leads also to rejection of the idea of convergence towards a shared understanding of the proliferation threat in the Middle East. Notes This article is based on a series of interviews that took place in Paris, Geneva and the UAE in September 2010. I thank the interviewees, most of whom explicitly stated they did not want to be named, and the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (Monterey Institute of International Studies) for giving me the time to do the interviews. I am also very grateful to John Downer, John Joss, Nicola Horsburgh, Georges Le Guelte, Jonathan Pearl, Thomas Young and Zach Zwald and three anonymous reviewers for the Cambridge Review of International Affairs for their insights on previous versions of the paper. Of course, any omissions or mistakes are my responsibility only. The final version of the article was submitted in July 2011. 1 Specific theories are dedicated to explaining the evolution of the export of nuclear-sensitive technology but these only account for this aspect; they do not attempt to offer insights on domestic energy policy, let alone nuclear deterrence. See Matthew Kroenig (Citation2010, chapter 3) for a study of French nuclear assistance to Israel. His study only intends to understand why states provide 'sensitive nuclear assistance' and suggests that further elaboration on the differential effects of proliferation is required. Another series of studies on the French case intends to account for the nuclear weapon programme or the decision to start it. See, among many others, Dominique Mongin (Citation1997), André Benjebbar (Citation2000), Jacques Hymans (Citation2006, chapter 4). Finally, the historical institutionalist perspective of Jabko and Weber (Citation1998) goes beyond the dichotomy between domestic nuclear industry and export of nuclear technology and recognizes the connection with nuclear weapons but does not analyse it. It does not need to because, as in the works mentioned above, its research question deals with only one policy issue: the shift in nuclear nonproliferation. The rare examples of works that combine these aspects are written by practitioners of nuclear policy writing as historians rather than political scientists. See Betrand Goldschmidt (Citation1982) and Georges Le Guelte (Citation1997). 2 A classical definition is: 'an integrated system of symbols … that acts to establish pervasive and long-lasting grand strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs' (Johnston Citation2005, 36–37, emphasis added). This definition is also limited to the interstate dimension and excludes the domestic effects of strategic culture, but this is more typical of realism than of works on strategic culture. 3 According to Article 15 of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic, the president of the French Republic is the 'Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces'. It is customary to see foreign policy as the domaine reservé of the president. In the second volume of his memoirs, Jacques Chirac offers a most recent example of this practice. He describes 'national defence and diplomacy' as 'domaines reservés of the Head of State' (Chirac Citation2011, 29–30, author's translation). For a study of the constitutional powers of the French president regarding nuclear use, see Chantebout (Citation1986) and Tertrais (Citation2010b, 108–110). 4 Beyond the motto of President CitationSarkozy's campaign, la rupture, his speech to the ambassadors' conference on 27 August 2008 reaffirms this notion in five aspects of foreign policy (2008c). President Sarkozy also showed his desire to appear as a candidate offering radical change by not referring to his predecessor, Jacques Chirac, in his inaugural speech. This is a significant gesture, given that Chirac is the founding father of President Sarkozy's party (UMP) and was his official supporter. In his memoirs, Chirac expresses his surprise and some degree of bitterness at this particular moment. He also shows that he disagreed with his former minister on core issues and, for this reason, never wanted to appoint him as prime minister even when his close advisers suggested Nicolas Sarkozy was the best candidate (Chirac Citation2011, 489, 534, 587). These two elements suggest the change introduced by the Sarkozy presidency. 5 Within the realm of nuclear diplomacy, Mohamed ElBaradei describes in his memoirs one case of President Sarkozy making a sudden decision that creates a palpable surprise among his collaborators. ElBaradei argues that in February 2008 he managed to convince an originally hostile President Sarkozy to support his proposal of a freeze of the Iranian enrichment programme in exchange for an end to sanctions and nuclear technology. The meeting ended with ElBaradei saying that he would convey the message to the Iranians but, three days later, he was notified that the French would engage with Iran directly, and they ended up not supporting his proposal (ElBaradei Citation2011, 277–279). 6 The five permanent members of the Security Council have been unanimous on the five resolutions targeting Iran: 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1929 (June 2010). For the latest communication about that topic and in particular about UNSC resolution 1929, see < www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/pays-zones-geo_833/iran_420/question-nucleaire_4050/adoption-une-nouvelle-resolution-sanction-encontre-iran-09.06.10_83003.html>. 7 I am aware that a better case selection would require more independent cases. It is true that the relationship between the UAE and Iran is at the same time tense as far as security and territorial issues are concerned, and very close in terms of trade. Since 1971, the Iranian presence on the islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs has been regarded as an 'occupation' and Abu Musa is now militarized. At the same time, the trade relationship between the two countries, in particular the trade between Tehran and Dubai, remains important, as does the Iranian minority in the UAE (interview with Emirati officials, September 2010; Davidson Citation2005, 144, 157–158; Davidson, 66, 170). In any event, the relationship with Iran has been a component of the relationship of any country in the region with France since the 2002 revelation of its undeclared nuclear programme. Therefore, changing the case selection would not have solved this problem. The fact that French policy towards the UAE has been very active since 2006, and noticeably under-researched, would be another reason to focus on this case in the study of French policy towards the region. On this problem, see Seawright and Gerring (2008, 297 fn 1). 8 Unpredicted events with high impacts do not necessarily lead to a learning process, let alone a change in public policy (Birkland Citation2006, 11, 158–160; Clarke Citation2006, 158). But the existence of change in the French neighbourhood gives me room for comparison. In Germany, the aftermath of Fukushima sparked a heated debate leading to the the decision to decommission all nuclear power plants by 2022, approved by a majority of 513 votes to 79 in the Bundestag on 30 June 2011 (Agence France-Presse Citation2011). In Switzerland, on 8 June 2011, the National Council approved three proposals following the government's plan to progressively stop relying on nuclear energy (Fenazzi Citation2011). Similarly, in Italy, on 14 June 2011, a referendum resulted in the massive rejection of the proposal of Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi to restart a nuclear energy programme. Ninety-four per cent of the voters were opposed to it, the voter turnout of 57 per cent was significantly higher than in previous consultations and the Prime Minister recognized that he had to act accordingly (BBC News Europe Citation2011). 9 The French Government Citation1994 White paper on defence makes this explicit. It discredits the notion of conventional deterrence. A conventional deterrence could, at best, be added to nuclear deterrence (French Government Citation1994, 56). The interesting study by Bruno Tertrais (Citation2009b) only considers the nuclear dimension. One of the rare studies in French addressing this issue is Camille Sicourmat (Citation2007), but the conclusions of the study do not affect French idiosyncrasy regarding nuclear weapons. Another surprise comes from the White paper on defence and national security, published in 2008, which occasionally adopts a very broad concept of deterrence, including 'all capabilities and resources—human and technological, military and civil' (French Government Citation2008b, official English translation, 61). Other studies of non-nuclear deterrence outside France include John Mearsheimer (Citation1983) and George Quester (Citation1986). 10 This January 2006 speech also includes 'the defence of allied countries' as part of French vital interests. Here, I only emphasize strategic supplies because this idea of a dissuasion élargie or concertée ('enlarged' or 'concerted deterrent') loosely defined has been discussed since the 1970s and is not a radical innovation (see, inter alia, Buffotot Citation2007, 410–411; Yost Citation2006). 11 This is why Steven Lee created the notion of 'marginal deterrent value' (Lee Citation1993, 132–140). 12 One of the rare French experts who explicitly considers the 'duelling counterfactuals' and the extreme difficulty in finding an objective answer to this question is François Heisbourg (Citation2005; Citation2011), even if he sees the discourse on deterrence as 'a self-fulfilling prophecy' and does not intend to be too critical of it (2011, 148). 13 A few French thinkers criticized this idea of the weapon able to put an end to war itself but the idea seduced policy circles as well as experts. As early as 1960, General Lionel Chassin (Citation1960) reminded us that during the Middle Ages the same argument was wrongly made for artillery. This new weapon system was too deadly and was expected to put an end to war. The same expectation was projected on air weapons during the twentieth century. Both expectations have proved wrong so far. For a very interesting critique suggesting that the French see nuclear weapons as a perfect weapon, see Michel Rocard and Georges Le Guelte (Citation2010). 14 His words are: 'Our nuclear deterrence protects us from any aggression from a state against our vital interests, wherever it may come from and whatever its form' (author's translation). 15 The original idea was stated as la loi de l'espérance politico-stratégique (the law of politico-strategic expectation) (Poirier Citation1977, 163–170; 2008a; 2008b). 16 Let us recognize that every school of thought in the nuclear debate first saw the crisis as a confirmation of its own views (Malis Citation2009, 470). 17 This interpretation was strengthened by the fact that his contacts in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) confirmed that none of them felt that the world was on the brink of the abyss (Malis Citation2009, 471). 18 For the feelings of Gallois about the defeat and the need to take action to prevent another one, see Christian Malis (Citation2009, 261) and, more broadly, Beatrice Heuser (Citation1998, 86). I do not go into detail here on what is usually labelled the French school of the 'absolute weapon', who favoured massive retaliation over flexible response as a nuclear doctrine. 19 The main changes are the shift from the Cold War concept of 'deterrence of the strong by the weak' to deterring regional powers in breach of their international nonproliferation commitments, namely Iran and North Korea, as exemplified by President Chirac's 2001 and 2006 speeches, as well as the 2008 White paper on defence and national security. 20 While the personal influence of Gallois in the framing of the French nuclear doctrine and idiosyncrasy has yet to be discussed—he borrowed many intuitions from Castex as indicated above—the notion of autoprotection par l'atome (self-defense by the atom), coined in 1952, appears to be one of his original contributions to French strategic thought (Malis Citation2009, 678). For a detailed argument about how the French nuclear weapons programme was never thought of as 'either a national deterrent or the protection of a nuclear-weapon ally', see Benoît Pelopidas (Citation2012, chapter 5). 21 One French diplomat characterized President Sarkozy's role in nuclear trade as a sales representative tous azimuts ('all-out' or 'in all directions') (interview with a French diplomat, 7 September 2010). More recently, this particular source of energy has been represented as safe and, to an extent, environment-friendly (Hecht 2009, 344). 22 See note 9 above. 23 On 23 June 2011, Francois Baroin, spokesperson for the government, underlined that the Autorité de sûreté nucléaire (Nuclear Safety Authority) would submit a report on the safety of French nuclear infrastructure by the end of 2011 and that an improvement of reactor number one of the Fessenheim power plant had already been decided (Baroin Citation2011). 24 A more balanced account of these figures would require the addition of two things. On the one hand, the Minister of Industry, Eric Besson, argues that if one were to ask these same people whether they would be ready to pay more for their electricity, the results would be contradictory. On the other hand, the Fukushima effect on the polls might vanish but one has to recognize that the anti-nuclear feeling is on the increase. Since the same poll two months earlier, the share of proponents of a move away from nuclear energy has risen by seven per cent and the share of proponents of an immediate abandonment of nuclear energy has dropped by four per cent. 25 The words of former President Chirac in the latest, post-Fukushima, part of his memoirs are ambiguous. On the one hand, he talks about 'a need to reaffirm the priority of safety issues', suggests a need to 'massively invest in the post-nuclear energies' and alludes to the emergence of a new coupling of renewable energies and new energies to replace fossil and nuclear energy. On the other hand, he writes that 'it would be as crazy as could be to consider it the only energy for the future'. He also insists that the need for more safety, made obvious by the fact that an accident occurred in a technologically advanced country like Japan, was already taken into consideration at the time of the creation of European Pressurized Reactors, which coincided with the creation of a nuclear safety authority (Chirac Citation2011, 575, 604–605, author's translation). 27 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 26 Decree number 2008-378, signed on 21 April 2008, was published in the Journal Officiel on 23 April and can be consulted at < www.journal-officiel.gouv.fr>. The priorities are stated in Article 1 of the decree. 28 See this institution's website at < www.i2en.fr/fr/> 29 The notion of 'proliferation resistance' is not really meaningful in nuclear physics; it only implies that nuclear security should be enhanced. The author thanks Dr Ferenc Dalnoki-Veress for pointing this out. 30 Interview with François Nicoullaud, 12 January 2009. This assessment is confirmed by non-French sources like Fainberg Citation1981. On the French collaboration with Iraq and Israël, see Péan (Citation1982). 31 Referring to Nicolas Sarkozy, Jacques Chirac writes, 'he is an atlantist, I am not' (Chirac Citation2011, 489, author's translation; see also 366 and chapter 12 for a fuller account of Chirac's relationship with the US). 32 Jacques Chirac sees himself as the father of this approach to dialogue (Chirac Citation2011, 365, 423, 511). 33 President Sarkozy is also much less cautious than his predecessor about Iranian nuclear intentions. This was clear from the parallel he drew between the electoral frauds of the summer 2009 and the difficulty of trusting Iran in relation to its nuclear programme (Mackenzie Citation2009). 34 To be rigorous, one ought to add that this is true provided that the particular country does not decide to give up its acquired nuclear capability. Indeed, the Sarkozy options say nothing about the nature or laws of nuclear history. For a critique of historical determinism in nuclear studies and its political effects, see Benoît Pelopidas (Citation2012). 36 The previous lecture to the ambassadors already focused on the risk of a cascade of proliferation following the Iranian and North Korean crises. The words used were the following: 'Time is not our ally … in the two ballistic and nuclear proliferation crises, Iran and North Korea: they are developing under our eyes, day after day, and if we do not act, others may follow' (Sarkozy Citation2009, author's translation). 35 This idiosyncrasy is strictly identical among the French experts of proliferation. This is so even if proliferation experts would now say that the 'chain reaction' is not likely at all (Potter with Mukhatzhanova 2010). For an analysis of the commonalities of views between policymakers and nuclear weapons experts in France, see Benoît Pelopidas, (Citation2012, chapter 6). 37 After the first readings, amendments to the government bill were proposed and registered on 28 September 2010. The relevant documents are available at < www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/dossiers/armes_destruction_massive.asp>. This effort relates to what is required by UNSC 1540, which was adopted unanimously by the UNSC on 28 April 2004, < www.un.org/sc/1540/>. 38 This does not mean that proliferation is presented as the only threat, though. In the speech he delivered in Cherbourg, for the inauguration of the fourth French ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), Le Terrible, in March 2008, President Sarkozy repeatedly stressed the conventional ballistic missile threat, notably from Iran's improving capabilities in this area (Sarkozy Citation2008b). 40 These words were pronounced when the report was presented to the Commission on 18 November 2009. Similarly, Senator Jacques Gautier stated that 'the possession of nuclear weapons by Iran would certainly lead Turkey and Saudi Arabia to take identical steps' (author's translation and emphasis), even if the co-author of the report Jean-Michel Boucheron downplayed these fears and considered them not entirely credible as far as Turkey is concerned (quoted in Boucheron and Myard Citation2009, 262). 39 The behaviour of France as an active initial member of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in 2003 can also be interpreted as confirmation of this approach. In spite of the disagreements with the US at the time over the Iraq War, France participated in 14 exercises and hosted two in the first 18 months of the PSI, which makes France more active than its European partners. See Davidson and Powers (Citation2005, 408, 416–418). 41 From France's perspective, disarmament should be approached in a multilateral fashion and should comprise nuclear and conventional components. France repeatedly presented itself as being at the forefront of nuclear disarmament and transparency. For one of the latest statements about this, see French Government (Citation2010b). Bruno Tertrais (Citation2007; Citation2009a) provides good representations of the French posture on nuclear disarmament. 42 I write 'acceptable public discourse' and not 'public debate' or 'public discussion' because these latter two are extremely rare in France on nuclear-related issues (Tertrais Citation2010b, 121–126). For an attempt to explain why, see Benoît Pelopidas (Citation2012, chapter 6). 43 Interview with French officials. As for experts worried about the prospects of proliferation in the region, see the contrast that Etel Solingen draws between South Asia and the Middle East (Citation2007; Dunn Citation2008, 97). 44 The agreement was published in May 2009 and can be read at < www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte = JORFTEXT000020584784>. 45 Interview with French officials, September 2010. 46 Interview with Emirati officials, September 2010. 47 See also < http://ola.iaea.org/OLA/what_we_do/AMCPPNM.asp>. 48 The text of the law does not say that the UAE renounces this right; only that it does not wish to exercise it. 49 Interview with French officials, September 2010. 50 The agreement follows and expands on a 1995 agreement. 51 In none of my interviews of French officials in Paris, Geneva or the UAE was this notion mentioned. When I mentioned this category, interviewees denied it had any relevance. 52 My interviews with French officials reiterated how important it was that France was the first to sign a cooperation agreement with a Middle Eastern country in January 2008. 53 For this activism, personalization of every stake, and approach to French interests in mainly economic terms, he has been appropriately styled 'le Prince-PDG' (Prince-CEO). See Alain-Gérard Slama (Citation2009). 54 In 1998, Nicolas Jabko and Steven Weber rightly attacked the 'convergence thesis', suggesting that the nonproliferation norm, and what they called the 'nuclear modernization theory' leading nuclear weapons states to realize that any further proliferation is bad for them, would result in unanimous and uniform support for nonproliferation. Because this teleology persists in the literature, it seems useful to reiterate this critique.