Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

Pakistan's War Within

2009; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 51; Issue: 6 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/00396330903465204

1468-2699

C. Christine Fair, Seth G. Jones,

South Asian Studies and Conflicts

Abstract Prior to 2001, Pakistan had limited experience countering domestic militants. Today, the Pakistani army still prefers to focus on a potential war with India rather than against sub-state actors. Nonetheless, there have been noted improvements since 2001, and throughout 2009 Islamabad has demonstrated increasing resolve to defeat militants challenging the writ of the state. Earlier operations such as Al Mizan revealed serious deficiencies in the ability to conduct cordon-and-search operations and to hold territory. In the later operations in Bajaur and Swat, however, the Frontier Corps and army forces showed an improved capability to clear territory and integrate operations with local tribes. But Pakistani doctrine remains inconsistent with recent population-centric innovations in counter-insurgency warfare. Pakistan's commitment to a conventional orientation and the hardware most appropriate for fighting India has poorly equipped it to deal with the burgeoning domestic threat. Notes In March 2009, for example, US President Barack Obama contended that Pakistan's border region had 'become the most dangerous place in the world' for Americans, and General David Petraeus noted that it was 'the headquarters of the al Qaeda senior leadership' who were planning attacks in the West. See Yochi J. Dreazen, 'Al Qaeda's Global Base Is Pakistan, Says Petraeus', Wall Street Journal, 11 May 2009. British Prime Minister Gordon Brown warned that 'three-quarters of the most serious plots investigated by the British authorities have links to al-Qaeda in Pakistan'. Sam Coates and Jeremy Page, 'Pakistan "Linked to 75% of All UK Terror Plots", Warns Gordon Brown', Times, 15 December 2008. Craig Cohen and Derek Chollet, 'When $10 Billion Is Not Enough', Washington Quarterly, vol. 30, no. 2, Spring 2007, pp. 7–19. On US aid to Pakistan see C. Christine Fair and Peter Chalk, Fortifying Pakistan: The Role of U.S. Internal Security Assistance (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2006). The Coalition Support Funds, which were technically reimbursements, have been controversial because of poor oversight and Pakistani misuse. Neither Pakistani nor American officials can account for the funds. For several critical reviews, see US Government Accountability Office, 'Combating Terrorism: U.S. Oversight of Pakistan Reimbursement Claims for Coalition Support Funds', GAO-08-932T, 24 June 2008, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-932T; US Government Accountability Office, 'The United States Lacks Comprehensive Plan to Destroy the Terrorist Threat and Close the Safe Haven in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas', GAO-08-622, April 2008, http://nationalsecurity.oversight.house.gov/documents/20080417120235.pdf; Craig Cohen, A Perilous Course: U.S. Strategy and Assistance to Pakistan (Washington DC: CSIS, 2007). Cohen and Chollet, 'When $10 Billion Is Not Enough'; Greg Miller, 'Pakistan Fails to Aim Billions in U.S. Military Aid at al Qaeda', Los Angeles Times, 5 November 2007, p. A1; Kathy Gannon, 'Billions in US Aid Never Reached Pakistan Army', Washington Post, 4 October 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/04/AR2009100401260.html. In recent months, Pakistani officials have increasingly begun adopting the term 'counter-insurgency' to describe their low-intensity conflict operations. This is likely in response to US focus upon this concept. However, their operational concepts remain consonant with low-intensity conflict even though they have begun to describe these efforts as counter-insurgency. Author discussions with Pakistani senior military officers about their doctrine. In bilateral forums, Pakistani officers will often adopt the language of 'population-centred' counterinsurgency, at least in part because it is expected and in part to defuse accumulating US concerns about Pakistani efficacy, over which the military leadership has become very defensive. See, for example, 'Pak Army Needs No Foreign Training: COAS', The Nation, 16 May 2009, http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-newsnewspaper-daily-english-online/Regional/Islamabad/16-May-2009/Pak-Army-needs-no-foreign-training-COAS. A June 2009 poll (in which one of the authors, CF, collaborated) suggests that, after the fall of Buner, Pakistani opinion appears to have changed. See Clay Ramsay, Steven Kull, Stephen Weber and Evan Lewis, Pakistani Public Opinion on the Swat Conflict, Afghanistan, and the US (Washington DC: PIPA, 2009). Each corps has two or three divisions and is commanded by a lieutenantgeneral. Each division holds three brigades and is commanded by a major-general. A brigade is commanded by a brigadier and has three or more battalions. A battalion has roughly 600 to 900 soldiers under the command of a lieutenant-colonel. See IISS, The Military Balance 2009 (London: Routledge, 2009); Federation of Atomic Scientists, 'Pakiston [sic]: Total Military Force', http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/man/militarysumfolder/pakistan.html?formAction=297&contentId=165. Ahmed Rashid, 'Pakistan's Worrisome Pullback', Washington Post, 6 June 2008, p. A19. See Hassan Abbas, 'Transforming Pakistan's Frontier Corps', Terrorism Monitor, vol. 5, no. 6, 30 March 2007. David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 57. For an account from 2004 involving the Tochi Scouts, see M. Ilyas Khan, 'Mixed Signals', Herald, March 2004, pp. 63–5. For recent revelations about Frontier Corps complicity and a recent US attack on Frontier Corps positions firing on US troops in Afghanistan, see Peter Beaumont and Mark Townsend, 'Pakistan Troops "Aid Taliban": New Classified US Documents Reveal that Mass Infiltration of Frontier Corps by Afghan Insurgents is Helping Latest Offensive', Observer, 22 June 2008. Author interviews in Pakistan in February and April 2009. Hassan Abbas, Police and Law Enforcement Reform in Pakistan: Crucial for Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism Success, Report of the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, April 2009, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/18976/police_law_enforcement_reform_in_pakistan.html?breadcrumb=/experts/850/hassan_abbas. See Frontier Police, 'Incentive for Martyred Families', http://frontierpolice.gon.pk/PoliceWelfare/index.php. Paul Wiseman and Zafar M. Sheikh, 'Pakistani Police Underfunded, Overwhelmed', USA Today, 5 May 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2009-05-05-pakistancops_N.htm. These objectives were ironed out during negotiations in September 2001. Washington used both carrots and sticks: it agreed to waive sanctions and provide military and non-military aid, promised to forgive $2 billion of Pakistan's debt, and doled out millions of dollars in 'prize money' for the capture of al-Qaeda members, but also issued a veiled threat of military force if Pakistan did not cooperate. Following blunt messages from US Secretary of State Colin Powell and his deputy Richard Armitage, then President and Chief of Army Staff Pervez Musharraf acknowledged that he 'war-gamed the United States as an adversary'. He concluded that 'our military forces would be destroyed'. See, for example, Cohen and Chollet, 'When $10 Billion is Not Enough'. See also Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir (New York: Free Press, 2006), pp. 201–2. Author interview with Wendy Chamberlin, US ambassador to Pakistan, 27 August 2008. See, for example, the negotiations as outlined in Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), p. 59. Also see Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, pp. 201–7. An elite special-operations force within the army, the Special Services Group, was created in 1956 with active US support. For detailed accounts of Pakistan's assistance, see C. Christine Fair, The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2004) and Gary Berntsen and Ralph Pezzullo, Jawbreaker: The Attack on Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda (New York: Crown Publishers, 2005), p. 305. Berntsen commanded the CIA team in Afghanistan in late 2001, taking over from Gary Schroen. Rahimullah Yusufzai, 'Fall of the Last Frontier?', Newsline (Pakistan), June 2002. On Operation Anaconda see, for example, US Air Force, Office of Lessons Learned (AF/XOL), Operation Anaconda: An Air Power Perspective (Washington DC: Headquarters United States Air Force AF/XOL, February 2005); Paul L. Hastert, 'Operation Anaconda: Perception Meets Reality in the Hills of Afghanistan', Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 28, no. 1, January– February 2005, pp. 11–20; and Sean Naylor, Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda (New York: Berkley Books, 2005). International Crisis Group, Pakistan's Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants (Brussels: ICG, December 2006), p. 14. Zaffar Abbas, 'Operation Eyewash', Herald, August 2005, p. 64. Author interview with Robert Grenier, CIA station chief in Islamabad, Washington DC, 6 November 2007. Ashley J. Tellis, Pakistan and the War on Terror: Conflicted Goals, Compromised Performance (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008), p. 7. In June 2002, for example, al-Qaeda militants attacked the Pakistani army in Azam Warsak, near Wana in South Waziristan, killing nearly a dozen soldiers. 'Descent Into Anarchy', Herald, March 2004, p. 62. Ibid. ICG, Pakistan's Tribal Areas, p. 14. Amir Mohammad Khan, 'Spiralling into Chaos', Newsline (Pakistan), March 2004, p. 34–6. M. Ilyas Khan, 'Who Are These People?', Herald, April 2004, pp. 60–68. Khan, 'Spiralling Into Chaos'. Khan, 'Who are these People?'; Sailab Mahsud, 'Caught in the Crossfire', Herald, April 2004, p. 66–7. Mahsud, 'Caught in the Crossfire'. Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, pp. 269–70. Rahimullah Yusufzai, 'Whose Country is it Anyway?', Herald, February 2006, pp. 27–32; 'Hit and Run', Herald, February 2006, p. 58; Intikhab Amir, 'Waziristan: No Man's Land?', Herald, April 2006, p. 78. The Pakistani army tried to depict these deals as part of long-standing precedent in the region, noting that the British negotiated with local Pashtun tribes in the North-West Frontier Province during their rule (see, for example, Christian Tripodi, 'Peacemaking through Bribes or Cultural Empathy? The Political Officer and Britain's Strategy towards the North-West Frontier, 1901–1945', Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 31, no. 1, March–April 2008, pp. 123–51). However, the Pakistani deals differ in many serious ways from those of the British. Author discussions in Pakistan. Locals denied the existence of the last clause, and argued that they did not agree to register all foreigners with the government. Mariam Abou Zahab, 'Changing Patterns of Social and Political Life Among the Tribal Pashtuns in Pakistan', unpublished paper, 2007. As Zahab notes, weapons were not surrendered but rather 'offered', and after the recent deal 'exchanged'. Khan, 'Who are these People?'; Owais Tohid, 'The New Frontier', Newsline (Pakistan), April 2004; Ismail Khan, 'Five Militants Pardoned for Peaceful Life: Aliens Asked to Surrender by 30th', Dawn, 25 April 2004, http://www.dawn.com/2004/04/25/top1.htm. For a discussion of traditional jirga practices see Zahab, 'Changing Patterns'. Iqbal Khattak, 'I Did Not Surrender to the Military, Sayd Nek Mohammad', Friday Times, 30 April–6 May 2004. Ismail Khan and Dilawar Khan Wazir, 'Night Raid Kills Nek, Four other Militants', Dawn, 19 June 2004; Khattak, 'I Did Not Surrender'. Pakistan Army, General Headquarters, Military Operations Directorate, Record on Pakistan's War on Terror as of 28 December 2006. Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia (New York: Viking, 2008), p. 270. Intikhab Amir, 'Whose Writ is it Anyway', Herald, April 2006, pp. 80–82. 'Accord in Bajaur to Curb Terrorists', Dawn, 31 May 2005; 'The Bajaur Massacre', Dawn, 1 November 2006; Mohammad Ali, 'Peace Deal in Bajaur Soon, Says Aurakzai', Dawn, 24 February 2007. Joby Warrick, 'CIA Places Blame for Bhutto Assassination', Washington Post, 18 January 2008, p. A01. According to a Pakistan army account, 'about 200 militants charged the fort from four sides … they broke through the fort's wall with rockets'. 'Militants Overrun Pakistan Fort', BBC News, 17 January 2008. See also 'Pakistani Troops "Flee Border Post"', al-Jazeera, 17 January 2008. 'Al-Jazeera TV Interviews Pakistan Taleban Chief', BBC, 29 May 2008. 'Taliban Chief Ideologist Survives "Zalzala"', Daily Times, 26 May 2008. Ibid.; Iqbal Khattak, 'Army in Waziristan Better Equipped, More Relaxed', Daily Times, 21 May 2008. Iqbal Khattak, 'Pakistan: Mehsud says Local Taliban to begin Media War; Slams Reporter's Murder', Daily Times, 27 May 2008. Khattak, 'Army in Waziristan Better Equipped'. Zaffar Abbas, 'Taliban Ousted, but Spinkai is now a Ghost Town', Dawn, 19 May 2008. Author interviews with Pakistani and British government officials, Islamabad, April 2009. Abbas, 'Taliban Ousted'. Ibid. Zulfiqar Ali, 'Over 4,000 Houses Destroyed in Waziristan Operation: Report', Dawn, 8 November 2008; Iqbal Khattak, 'Deserted Town shows Human Cost of Operation Zalzala', Daily Times, 20 May 2008. Abbas, 'Taliban Ousted'; see also Declan Walsh, 'Demolished by the Pakistan Army: The Frontier Village Punished for Harboring the Taliban', Guardian, 20 May 2008. Author interviews with Pakistani and British government officials, Pakistan, April 2009. Amir Mir, 'Story Behind Manawan Fidayee Attack', News, 1 April 2009. Author interviews with Pakistan and British government officials, Pakistan, May 2009. Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, Pakistan Security Report 2008 (Islamabad: Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, 2009), p. 3. Stephen Graham, 'Ghost Village Haunts Pakistani Plans to Make Peace with Tribal Militants', Associated Press, 19 May 2008. Anwarullah Khan, 'ISI Official, Three Others Killed in Bajaur Ambush', Dawn, 28 March 2007. Mukhtar A. Khan, 'A Profile of Militant Groups in Bajaur Tribal Agency', Terrorism Monitor, vol. 7, no. 6, 19 March 2009, p. 1. Anthony Lloyd, 'Captured Battle Plan Shows Strength and Training of Taleban Forces', Times, 11 November 2008. Ismail Khan, 'Battle to be Won or Lost in Bajaur', Dawn, 21 September 2008. The NWFP government and the TNSM had signed an agreement in May 2007 permitting a TNSM leader, Mauluna Fazlullah ('Mullah Radio'), to continue FM broadcasts, while Fazlullah agreed to support government efforts to maintain law and order, education for girls and polio vaccination. Akhtar Amin, 'Government Moves Additional Army Contingents to Swat', Daily Times, 19 October 2007. Khashnud Ali Khan, 'Why and How did the Operation Commence in Mohmand Agency and Bajaur Agency?', Jinnah, 30 September 2008. Nizam e Adl Regulation 2009. A copy of the text can be found at 'Text of Pakistan's Shari'ah law 2009', BBC Monitoring South Asia, 14 April 2009. Abdur Rehman Abid, 'Taliban Ambush FC Convoy, Foil Buner Deployment', Dawn, 24 April 2009; Daud Khattak and Delawar Jan, 'Operation against Taliban on Government Mind', News, 24 April 2009; 'Taliban turn Troops back from Mingora', News, 26 April 2009; Abdur Rehman Abid, 'Buner Falls to Swat Taliban', Dawn, 22 April 2009; Ghulam Farooq, 'Taliban Step into Shangla as Buner Showdown Looms', Daily Times, 24 April 2009. Zahid Hussain, 'From Much Sought After to "Most Wanted"', Dawn, 31 May 2009. Iftikhar A. Khan, 'Security Forces Advance on Strategic Kamber Bridge', Dawn, 21 May 2009; Iftikhar A. Khan, 'Army Takes "Complete Control" over Mingora', Dawn, 30 May 2009. Author interviews with nongovernmental organisation personnel in Pakistan, May 2009; International Committee of the Red Cross, Pakistan: ICRC and Pakistan Red Crescent Substantially Expanding Operations, News Release 09/116 (Islamabad: International Committee of the Red Cross, June 2009); Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Newly Displaced Pakistani Civilians Report Grim Conditions in Swat Valley (Islamabad: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, June 2009). Interview with Maulana Abdul Khaliq Haqqani in the Herald, July 2007, pp. 66–7. This discussion draws from C. Christine Fair, 'Pakistan's Own War on Terror: What the Pakistani Public Thinks', Journal of International Affairs, vol. 63, no. 1, Autumn–Winter 2009 (forthcoming). Author interviews in Pakistan in July 2007, February 2008, April 2008, February 2009 and April 2009. See also various polls on the army's popularity and that of Musharraf conducted by the International Republic Institute at http://www.iri.org/mena/pakistan.asp. See C. Christine Fair, Clay Ramsay and Steve Kull, Pakistani Public Opinion on Democracy, Islamist Militancy, and Relations with the U.S. (Washington DC: USIP/PIPA, 7 January 2008). Ibid. International Republican Institute (IRI), 'IRI Index: Pakistan Public Opinion Survey', 15–30 October 2008, http://www.iri.org/mena/Pakistan.asp. IRI, 'IRI Releases Survey of Pakistan Public Opinion, March 7–30, 2009', 11 May 2009, http://www.iri.org/newsreleases/2009-05-11-Pakistan.asp. Notably, more recent polling data from June 2009 suggest significant public shifts in opinion with respect to military operations and peace deals. However, the period of coverage of that poll exceeds the timeline of this study. See Fair et al., Pakistani Public Opinion. Fair et al., Pakistani Public Opinion. C. Christine Fair, 'From Strategy to Implementation: The Future of the U.S.–Pakistan Relationship', testimony presented before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on 5 May 2009; Hassan Abbas, 'Police & Law Enforcement Reform in Pakistan Crucial for Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism Success', Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, 2009, http://www.ispu.org/files/PDFs/ISPU - Police Reforms in PakistanReport.pdf; C. Christine Fair and Peter Chalk, Fortifying Pakistan: The Role of US Security Assistance to Pakistan (Washington DC: USIP, 2006). Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al-Qa'ida (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008); C. Christine Fair and Sumit Ganguly, Treading on Hallowed Ground: Counterinsurgency Operations in Sacred Spaces (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). Additional informationNotes on contributorsC. Christine Fair C. Christine Fair is an assistant professor at Georgetown University and a senior fellow with the Counter Terrorism Center at West Point. She is the author of The Madrassah Challenge: Militancy and Religious Education in Pakistan (Washington DC: USIP, 2009) and co-editor (with Sumit Ganguly) of Treading on Hallowed Ground: Counterinsurgency Operations in Sacred Spaces (New York: OUP, 2008). Seth G. Jones Seth G. Jones most recently served as Plans Officer and Advisor to the Commanding General, US Special Operations Forces, in Afghanistan, and is the author of In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan (New York and London: W.W. Norton, 2009). The views represent those of the authors and not their employers.