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Epistemic Obligation and Rationality Constraints

1996; Wiley; Volume: 34; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1111/j.2041-6962.1996.tb00802.x

2041-6962

Charlotte Katzoff,

Philosophy and Theoretical Science

The Southern Journal of PhilosophyVolume 34, Issue 4 p. 455-470 Epistemic Obligation and Rationality Constraints Charlotte Katzoff, Charlotte Katzoff Bar Ilan University Charlotte Katzoff teaches philosophy at Bar Ilan University, Israel. She has published articles in epistemology and theory of action. Her previous articles include “Intentional Action—Sometimes a Matter of Luck,” in Philosophical Investigations and “Justification Without Good Reasons,” in Philosophical Papers.Search for more papers by this author Charlotte Katzoff, Charlotte Katzoff Bar Ilan University Charlotte Katzoff teaches philosophy at Bar Ilan University, Israel. She has published articles in epistemology and theory of action. Her previous articles include “Intentional Action—Sometimes a Matter of Luck,” in Philosophical Investigations and “Justification Without Good Reasons,” in Philosophical Papers.Search for more papers by this author First published: Winter 1996 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.1996.tb00802.xCitations: 1 AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL REFERENCES Alston, William. Epistemic Justification. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989. Alston, William. Concepts of Epistemic Justification”. In Epistemic Justification. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989, 81– 114. Alston, William. The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification”. In Epistemic Justification. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989, 115– 152. Chisholm, Roderick. Theory of Knowledge. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1977. Chisholm, Roderick. The Place of Epistemic Justification. Philosophical Topics 14 (1986): 85– 92. Feldman, Richard. Epistemic Obligations. Philosophical Perspectives 2 (1988): 235– 256. Ginet, Carl. Contra Reliabilism. Monist 68 (1985): 175– 187. Heil, John. Doxastic Incontinence. Mind 93 (1984): 56– 70. Johnston, Mark. Self-Deception and the Nature of the Mind”. In Perspectives on Self-Deception, eds. Brian P. McLaughlin and Amelie Rorty. Oksenberg Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1988. Kornblith, Hilary. Justified Belief and Epistemically Responsible Action. Philosophical Review 92 (1983): 33– 48. McLaughlin, Brian P. Mele's Irrationality: a commentary. Philosophical Psychology 1 (1988): 189– 200. Meiland, Jack W. What Ought We to Believe? or The Ethics of Belief Revisited. American Philosophical Quarterly 17 (1980): 15– 24. Mele, Alfred R. Irrationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987. Scott-Kakures, Dion. On Belief and the Captivity of the Will. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1993): 77– 103. Swinburne, Richard. An Introduction to Confirmation Theory. London: Methuen, 1973. Swinburne, Richard. Faith and Reason. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981. Williams, Bernard. Deciding to Believe”. In Problems of the Self. London: Cambridge University Press, 1973. Citing Literature Volume34, Issue4Winter 1996Pages 455-470 ReferencesRelatedInformation