The Apparent Ideological Behavior of Legislators: Testing for Principal-Agent Slack in Political Institutions
1990; University of Chicago Press; Volume: 33; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1086/467201
ISSN1537-5285
AutoresJoseph P. Kalt, Mark A. Zupan,
Tópico(s)Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth
ResumoPrevious articleNext article No AccessThe Apparent Ideological Behavior of Legislators: Testing for Principal-Agent Slack in Political InstitutionsJoseph P. Kalt and Mark A. ZupanJoseph P. Kalt and Mark A. ZupanPDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Law and Economics Volume 33, Number 1Apr., 1990 Sponsored by The University of Chicago Booth School of Business and The University of Chicago Law School Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/467201 Views: 38Total views on this site Citations: 163Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1990 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Bon Sang Koo When legislators responded to news media surveys: unstable responses, missing not at random responses, and self-censorship, Quality & Quantity 57, no.22 (Jun 2022): 1821–1843.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11135-022-01442-5Matilde Bombardini, Bingjing Li, Francesco Trebbi Did US Politicians Expect the China Shock?, American Economic Review 113, no.11 (Jan 2023): 174–209.https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20210140Matias Iaryczower, Gabriel Lopez‐Moctezuma, Adam Meirowitz Career Concerns and the Dynamics of Electoral Accountability, American Journal of Political Science 85 (Nov 2022).https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12740Peter T. 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