Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

Two Steps Forward, One and a Half Steps Back: Police Reform in Peru, 2001–2004

2006; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 8; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/13698240600877361

1743-968X

Gino Costa,

Policing Practices and Perceptions

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1. The Peruvian National Police (Policía Nacional del Peru, PNP) was created in 1988 with the integration of three pre-existing forces: the Republican Guard (the most militarized of the three); the Civil Guard (which also had a military rank structure); and the Investigative Police (the most civilian). In the unification process, however, the most militarized traditions prevailed. 2. Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación. Informe Final (Lima: CVR 2003) < www.cverdad.org.pe>. All websites were accessed in Feb. 2006. 3. Informe de la Comisión Especial de Reestructuración de la Policía Nacional del Perú < www.pnp.gob.pe/especiales/modernizacion.asp>. 4. Informe de la Comisión Especial de Reestructuración de la Policía Nacional del Perú < www.pnp.gob.pe/especiales/modernizacion.asp> 5. Gino Costa and Carlos Basombrío, C. Liderazgo Civil en el Ministerio del Interior. Testimonio de una experiencia de reforma policial y gestión democrática de la seguridad en el Perú (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos 2004) p.79 < www.seguridadidl.org.pe/institucional/liderazgocivil.doc>. For the inaugural speech see the Diario Oficial ‘El Peruano’, 29 July 2001 < www.editoraperu.com.pe>. 6. Costa and Basombrío (note 5) pp.79–80. 7. Costa was previously vice-minister of the interior. 8. For further details on the public order crisis, see Costa and Basombrío (note 5) pp.50–4. 9. Diario Oficial ‘El Peruano’ (note 5). 10. Informe de la Comisión Especial de Reestructuración de la Policía Nacional del Perú 11. Informe de la Comisión Especial de Reestructuración de la Policía Nacional del Perú 12. See < www.acuerdonacional.gob.pe>. 13. The UK also gave a grant of some US$300,000 to support the creation of the Police Ombudsman's Office. Germany financed some activities of the Peace and Development Commissioners, which were established in Ayacucho, Satipo and Tingo María as part of the anti-terrorist strategy. Spain funded the visit of some of its police experts during the work of the Restructuring Commission. Costa and Basombrío (note 5) pp.92–6. 14. The UK also gave a grant of some US$300,000 to support the creation of the Police Ombudsman's Office. Germany financed some activities of the Peace and Development Commissioners, which were established in Ayacucho, Satipo and Tingo María as part of the anti-terrorist strategy. Spain funded the visit of some of its police experts during the work of the Restructuring Commission. Costa and Basombrío (note 5) pp.94–5, 108–10. 15. This support complemented the regular police training programmes in drug enforcement and operational intelligence, as well as the exchange of drug enforcement agents in the Western Hemisphere within the context of the activities of the Lima-based School for Drug Enforcement Intelligence. 16. The Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), the Center for Development Studies (CED) in Santiago, Chile, and the Institute of Legal Defense (IDL) in Lima, Peru were active members of the network. 17. For further information on the seminar see Costa and Basombrío (note 5) pp.92–4. 18. For further information on the seminar see Costa and Basombrío (note 5) pp.95–6, 216–22. In early 2006, two months before the presidential and parliamentary elections, only a few of the preliminary studies had been conducted. 19. As embodied in Law 27860. 20. Attempts to arrive at an agreement with the police on communications equipment needed were so elusive that a decision had to be taken by the ministry. Unfortunately changes of ministers made it impossible to purchase urgently needed communication equipment and resources have been used elsewhere, where investment was not a priority. Although difficult to prove, illegal economic gains from purchasing specific systems probably explains both the deadlock in discussions at the Modernization Commission and 2004's decision not to invest in communication systems. See Adolfo Gazzo Vega, ‘Informática y telecomunicación policial. La historia interminable’ in Carlos Basombrio et al., Manejo y Gestión de la Seguridad. De la Reforma al Inmovilismo (Lima: Instituto de Defensa Legal 2004) pp.153–62 < www.seguridadidl.org.pe/libros/manejoygestion.pdf>. 21. For example, decisions about replacing the existing inefficient and corrupt systems for purchasing and distributing petrol and medicines were avoided. Compare Ricardo Valdes, ‘Combustible y medicinas: la punta del iceberg (lecciones de las licitaciones)’ in Basombrio et al. (note 20) pp.119–27. 22. Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. 23. As of Feb. 2006, the presentation of the law to Congress was still pending. 24. Universidad Particular San Martín de Porres. 25. For more on the Police Ombudsman's Office and the Internal Affairs Office see Costa and Basombrio (note 5) pp.139–44, 108–10. On the work of the Ombudsman's Office and efforts to promote respect for the human rights of the police, see also Carlos Basombrio, Gino Costa, Miguel Huerta and Susana Villaran, ‘Activistas de derechos humanos a cargo de la seguridad y el orden en el Perú’ (Lima: Instituto de Defensa Legal 2004) pp.179–219 < www.seguridadidl.org.pe/trabajos/activistasmininter.doc>. On the stagnation of the Ombudsman's Office, see S. Villarán, ‘La Defensoría se desvanece’, in Basombrio et al., (note 20) pp.101–5. On the work of the Internal Affairs Office, see L. Caparros, ‘OASI: una bien ganada mala fama’ in Basombrio et al. (note 20) pp.106–12. 26. The Surquillo pilot project was established in Sept. 2002. 27. Law 27933. See E. Yépez Dávalos, Seguridad Ciudadana. 14 Lecciones Fundamentales (Lima: Instituto de Defensa Legal 2004) pp.112–20 < www.seguridadidl.org.pe/libros/yepez.htm>. 28. An Open Society Justice Initiative project supporting local committees in six pilot areas is demonstrating that in addition to political will on the part of the mayors and police, significant investments in education and capacity-building on the concept and strategic approaches to prevention are required to produce results. See < www.justiceinitiative.org>. 29. Informe de la Comisión Especial de Reestructuración de la Policía Nacional del Perú. 30. Valdes (note 21) in Basombrio et al. (note 20) pp.119–27. 31. Valdes (note 21) in Basombrio et al. (note 20) 32. There have been no serious external security threats in recent years. The possibility of the Colombian conflict spreading was never real, given the geographic characteristics of the dense jungle border area. It was not difficult for the armed forces to tackle sporadic incursions by the Colombian rebel movement FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) into Peruvian territory, for they had excellent intelligence from Colombian and United States sources on FARC movements, and were used to handling small-scale deployments. The other important threat to the country's security, which had larger repercussions in the national psyche and political discourse than in reality, lay in the last remnants of terrorist groups, confined within the Alto Huallaga and Ene–Apurímac basins. 33. Costa and Basombrío (note 5) pp.228–9. 34. Eileen Rosin and Coletta Youngers (eds.), Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: the Impact of U.S. Policy (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 2005). 35. See Carlos Basombrio's analysis of public perceptions of the police in Percepciones, victimización, respuesta de la sociedad y actuación del Estado. Evolución de las tendencias de opinión pública en Lima Metropolitana 2001–2005 (Lima: Instituto de Defensa Legal 2005); Seguridad Ciudadana y Actuación del Estado, Análisis de tendencias de opinión pública (Lima: Instituto de Defensa Legal 2004); Perú 2003: Inseguridad ciudadana y delito común. Percepciones y realidades (Lima: Instituto de Defensa Legal 2003).