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Between emigration, de-Islamization and the nation-state: Muslim communities in the Balkans today

2011; Routledge; Volume: 11; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/14683857.2011.587249

1743-9639

Kerem Öktem,

Balkans: History, Politics, Society

Abstract Based on interviews and a series of fieldwork visits to Albania, Greece, Bosnia, Macedonia, Bulgaria and Turkey, this paper provides a synopsis of the main Muslim communities in Southeast Europe, their ethno-linguistic differentiation and their community organisations. It argues that in the last decade, an often-exaggerated concern with Islamist terrorism in the region has obfuscated the much more important processes of de-Islamization and emigration within the context of ambivalent or unsympathetic nation-states. As this paper shows, Muslim communities in the Balkans are characterised by the tension between both fragmentation and stagnation on the one side and stabilisation on the other: Fragmentation in linguistic, ethnic and religious terms as well as demographic and cultural stagnation particularly in Bulgaria and Greece, countered by processes of stabilisation through the re-emergence of established Muslim administrations and communities, particularly in the Western Balkans. This stabilisation is partly supported by Turkish state and religious institutions, which have replaced the conservative missionaries from the Gulf and Saudi Arabia. This 'Turkish turn', the paper argues, is likely to have a considerable impact on the future of Islam and Muslims in the Balkans. Keywords: IslamMuslimsTurkeyterrorismIslamic UnionsSalafismWahhabismTurkish foreign policyOttoman EmpireemigrationJihadismBalkansDiyanetRijaset Notes aThese figures exclude the significant numbers of Muslim immigrant communities in the Attiki region of Athens and to a lesser extent in Thessaloniki (Antoniou Citation2005; Papadopoulou-Kourkoula Citation2008). 1. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the international workshop 'After the Wahhabi Mirage: Islam, politics and international networks in the Balkans' at the University of Oxford in June 2010. This research is based on a British Academy Small Research Grant. I would also like to thank Eldar Sarajlić, Gëzim Krasniqi, Ali Chouseinoglou, Altin Raxhimi, Patricia Styss and Dimitris Antoniou for their contributions. 2. European and American popular interest in Islamist radicalism is surely not a phenomenon of the early 2000s. It can be traced back at least to the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 (cf. Said Citation1981). In many European countries, a series of crises implicating Muslim immigrant communities marked such rise in interest. In the UK, the fatwa against Salman Rushdie in the late 1980s was such a turning point; and in France, it was the election victory of the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria and the following war in the 1990s (Öktem and Abou-El-Fadl Citation2009). The fear of larger geopolitical conflicts between 'Islam' and the 'West' was later reinforced with the articulation of Huntington's theory on the Clash of Civilizations in the early 1990s (Huntington Citation1993). 3. Books were published with such enticing titles as Unholy Terror: Bosnia, Al-Qaida and the Rise of Global Jihad (Schindler Citation2007), Al-Qaida's Jihad in Europe: The Afghan–Bosnian Network (Kohlman Citation2004), Al Qaeda in Europe: the New Battleground of International Jihad (Vidino Citation2006) and The Coming Balkan Caliphate: the Threat of Radical Islam to Europe and the West (Deliso Citation2007). 4. I conducted interviews with members of the Islamic Unions of Bosnia, Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia, Bulgaria, with the Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), as well as with think-tankers, academics and religious actors. 5. Bougarel had dismissed the 'Islamic encirclement' and 'radicalization' narrative as early as 1997, concluding that it would 'be unjustified and dangerous to present Balkan Islam and its current evolutions as a threat to Europe. There is no "green axis" in the Balkans, and the Muslim populations of this region are not a crisis factor, but victims and actors among others in a wider regional crisis' (1997, 17). This thoughtful rejection of a biased discourse, however, came just a few years before 9/11, a date after which the 'green axis' narrative became even more pronounced. 6. Probably around half of those who fled Bulgaria in 1989 eventually came back, yet there is a general consensus among community leaders that the most able and successful members of the community and almost all intellectuals remained in Turkey. There is also a significant number of Bulgarian Turks who now live and work in both countries (Gruev Citation2010; Ismailov Citation2010; Parla Alpan Citation2006, Citation2007). 7. In addition to emigration, Muslim immigration to the Balkans has come to play a role as well, even though there exists little in terms of scholarship or reliable data. Muslim immigrant communities, particularly from Syria, exist particularly in Bulgaria, where Syrian students began to live in the 1960s and 1970s. Greece has certainly the largest Muslim immigrant communities particularly in Athens. They mostly hail from Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, as well as from the Levante and North Africa. A smaller part of early arrivals in the 1960s and 1970s have, mostly educated members of middle-class families from Egypt, Lebanon and Palestine, have now secure residence permits or citizenship. The great bulk of recent immigrants, however, tend to be low-skilled and often have volatile residence status. Their number is estimated at several hundred thousand. 8. This may also partly account for the ferocity of Albanian nationalism in Macedonia and the particularly fearful withdrawal of urban Muslims from Tetovo and Skopje, which Ellis describes in her closing chapter of 'Shadow Genealogies', called 'Everything my father is telling you' (Ellis Citation2003, 151 ff.). 9. None of the actors involved in the migratory waves to Turkey seemed to have an interest in dwelling on the event: Bosniaks and Albanians who migrated to Turkey thought of themselves as fully equal citizens of the Turkish Republic; the Turkish Republic imposed a homogenous national identity that was not to be tainted by memories of the old homeland; and the evicting states were happy to have the number of Muslims reduced. More recently, nationalist sentiment among Albanians, and to a lesser extent Bosniaks, has also added to the focal shift away from the immigrant communities in Turkey. There is often a sense of pride that is conveyed, however, when people in Bosnia claim that '[T]here are probably 3–4 million Bosniaks in Turkey' (Kalajdžić Citation2010). 10. The figure of nine million excludes Muslims in the Thracian provinces of Turkey, i.e. Istanbul, Edirne, Tekirdağ and Kırklaeli. 11. In Macedonia in particular, most Albanians believe that the state is manipulating census data in order to keep the share of Albanians below the constitutionally significant threshold of 33% (Ismaili Citation2010; Selimovski Citation2010). In Albania, members of the Komuniteti Musliman suggest that there have been efforts to manipulate the numbers of Muslims in the census expected for 2011 by counting members of the broadly Muslim Bektashi sect separately (Kruja Citation2010). 12. Clayer and Bougarel's study rests on the figures available at the time, which in some cases were very limited. For example, in Albania, where the share of Muslims in the total population was established as 70% in 1942, no recount has taken place ever since. 13. Strictly speaking, Bosnia-Herzegovina is a Muslim plurality country, in which Muslims constitute the largest group, but not the majority. Considering, however, that the Republika Srpska is now almost homogenously Serbian, it is fair to say that the Bosniaks (i.e. the Bosnian Muslims) are the majority in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 14. According to the Bashkësia Fetare of Macedonia, the number might be as high as 900,000 with a share of 80% Albanians, 10% Turks and 10% Roma and Bosniaks (Selimovski Citation2010). 15. Due to bilateral agreements and the Lausanne Treaty, the Muslim communities of Western Thrace continue to have access to Sharia courts. Since Greece emerged as one of the destinations for Muslim scholars and dignitaries after the abolition of the Caliphate in Turkey, the Ottoman language in Arabic print was used in newspapers and education well into the 1970s (Bonos Citation2008; Chouseinoglu Citation2010; Katsikas Citation2009). 16. It is this linguistic continuum, which is increasingly referred to as a larger 'Albanian space' of cultural interaction (Zogiani Citation2010), not to be confused with the political project of a 'Greater Albania'. 17. I conducted most of my interviews with members of Muslim community organizations in Turkish. In Bosnia and Albania, where no indigenous Turkish speakers exist anymore, my counterparts had studied in Turkey or at the Gülen schools, where Turkish is one of the languages of instruction. In Kosovo and Macedonia, Turkish is still spoken widely, at least among the now mostly Albanian urban Muslims. 18. In Macedonia, relations between the state and the Turkish minority have been exceptionally good: For Macedonian political elites, the Turkish community was the proof that Muslims are not marginalized in the country and that existing conflicts are caused by Albanian nationalism. At the same time, good relations with the Turkish community also helped the emergence of the close economic and political cooperation between the Turkey and Macedonia. 19. The Pomaks are a particularly interesting case. They inhabit the mountain ranges of the Rhodopi on either side of the Greek–Bulgarian border. Different contexts have led Pomaks to mostly dissociate themselves from Turks in Bulgaria, while assimilating into the Turkish community in Greece (for these differential trajectories of Pomak identity, see Brunnbauer Citation1999; Demetriou Citation2004; Michail 2003). 20. The ban on the word 'Turkish' and its derivatives in reference to anything concerning the minority population of Western Thrace took place right after the unilateral declaration of independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983. The more successive Greek governments tried to prevent the emergence of a single Turkish minority consciousness, however, the more 'Pomaks' and 'Gypsies' consolidated into 'Turks'. This process was facilitated further by both push and pull factors: Turkey provided generous conditions for university education in Turkey, while Muslim students were disadvantaged in Greece due to their limited language skills. In the last decade or so, Greek policies have become more integrative, particularly in terms of education. 21. In the Kircali area, a Pomak convert to Orthodoxy, Bojan Sarajev, has now established a monastery, which at least Turkish Muslims in the region see as part of a strategy to induce Pomaks into conversion (Gruev Citation2010; Köseömer Citation2010). 22. The Chief Mufti of Bulgaria, Mustafa Aliş Hacı Efendi, himself of Pomak origin (but Turkish-speaker), firmly placed Pomak identity within the Turkish context. He told me: 'We count all Muslims as Turks'. When I inquired whether this also included Pomaks, he responded in a way that really brought to the fore the fluidity of Pomak identity: 'Yes. The Pomaks are the real Muslims. The Turks have survived with their Turkish ethnic identity, but the Pomaks had to cling to their Muslimness' (Aliş Citation2010). 23. There is a wide consensus among both scholars and members of the Muslim community that the Pomaks in Bulgaria suffered disproportionately from punitive discrimination (Emin Citation2010; Ismailov Citation2010) by the state. Some Pomak communities have been more exposed to Saudi influences and education in the Arab world. Polygyny and niqab occurs at least in some Pomak villages, and observers explain this with the impact of imams educated in Salafi institutions (Ismailov Citation2010). In some villages like Ribnovo and Srnca, Saudi foundations are still active and many Imams have an educational background in Saudi Arabian institutions (Gruev Citation2010). 24. As the eminent scholar Fikret Karčić reminds us, the office of the Reis-al Ulema in Sarajevo and the organization of the Bosnian Muslim community developed as an Ottoman institution, and accepted the symbolic sovereignty of Istanbul (Karčić Citation1997, Citation2008). 25. In comparing the situation in Yugoslavia and particularly in Kosovo with both Turkey and other Balkan countries, Şeyh Abidin Efendi, who inherited the chair of the Prizren Halveti lodge from his father, stated that 'Like in Turkey, there has been a rupture here, but the tekkes were never closed. Individuals were discouraged to come. But the places of worship always stayed open' (Abidin Citation2010). 26. Such ambiguity goes alongside strong shows of support during sport events. A good example was the WM match between Turkey and Croatia in 2008, when thousand of Bosniak fans went out to the streets of Sarajevo waving Turkish flags. [http://bosnianfootballculture.blogspot.com/2008/06/turmoil-in-bosnia-after-turkey-croatia.html]. 27. For a detailed overview of the debate in Albania and the often Islamophobic attitudes towards Ottoman history and Muslim identity, including a critique of Albanian novelist Ismail Kadare's principled stand against the Ottoman past and Islam, see Olsi Jazexhi's article on 'The Political Exploitation of Islamophobia in post-communist Albania' (Jazexhi Citation2010). 28. The mufti of Prizren, Lütfü Balık, during an interview in a café in downtown Prizren, confided that 'Turkey is our great brother in spiritual terms. If it was not for Sultan Murat, I would not have been a Mufti but a Priest' (Balık Citation2010). 29. This has been brought to my attention by several interview partners in Prishtina and Tirana, where prayer space in the central town is indeed very limited to only a few Ottoman mosques, many of which are now under reconstruction (Hajrullahu Citation2010; Kruja Citation2010). In both countries, political elites have emphasized the existence of Christian minorities, to de-emphasize the Muslim identity of the majority (Krasniqi Citation2010). The unintended side-effect of these policies is that mosque congregations often unwillingly spill out on to the pavements during Friday prayers in Prishtina (Karabaxhakiu Citation2010) and in Tirana's small but iconic Ethem Paşa mosque on Skanderbeg Square, which biased observers then cite as proof of growing Islamization. 30. The Bektashi are a Sufi brotherhood with roots in the Anatolian town of Hacıbektaş. The brotherhood played a major role in the Islamization of the Balkans in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, despite its relatively heterodox Shia origins and its proximity to the Alevi community. Even though the sect remains strong in Turkey, it held a particularly important role in the formation of Albanian nationalism and took on a more decidedly Albanian orientation after the lodge was closed down in Turkey in the 1920s. Today, relations between the Bektashi organizations in both countries have been revived. 31. Like the Bektashi, the Alevis are a heterodox community with distant relations to Shia Islam and developed mainly among Turks and Kurds, initially in Eastern Anatolia on the border with Safavid Iran. Alevi faith today is still rather localized, yet boasts at least 10 million adherents in Turkey. Due to a very different set of practice and doctrine, Alevis are often seen as heretics by Sunni Muslims. In Bulgaria, Alevis are located in the central Balkan range and particularly in the village of Yablamovo, where they constitute a compact community of 5000–6000 people (Gruev Citation2010). 32. The Hanafi madhab was the dominant school among the Turks and in the Balkan provinces of the Ottoman Empire. It is often described as more flexible (and sometimes, less convincingly, as more liberal). In the Arab world, the predominant madhabs are Shaafi, Hanbali and Maliki. Hence, it would be fair to argue that the Sunni-Hanefi tradition of Ottoman provenance does create a religious continuum that sets it apart from other Muslim traditions. 33. There are Salafi preachers who have established a presence in half a dozen of mosques in Skopje, and who tend to engage in provocative acts against the Islamic Union (Ismaili Citation2010). Some members of the Union suggest that the Salafi preachers may be manipulated by actors within the Macedonian security services to tarnish the Muslim community at large. 34. A member of the Mufti's office described the barrage of court cases surrounding the election of the mufti and the delaying tactics of the state with regard to the construction and accreditation of the Islamic Institute in the following manner: 'This is a state reflex. At the first sight, it looks perfectly legal, as if there were no politics involved. But when you look closer, it is a completely different story'. 35. In Bulgaria, if not in Greece, assimilationist projects undertaken by Todor Jivkov still influence state behaviour. Many Muslims and Turks do, in fact, assimilate, a fact that is not welcome amongst the organized Muslim Community and the Turkish minority (Aliş Citation2010; Köseömer Citation2010). Even though assimilation is a very problematic policy that runs against European human and minority rights norms, it is also fair to say that it creates ways of being accepted into mainstream society, reducing experiences of feeling 'unwelcome' and 'beleaguered'. As a matter of fact, especially for Turks in Bulgaria who insist on their ethnic and religious differences, migration to Turkey is always an easier path than the fight for political change and recognition as a community by the state (Emin Citation2010).