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Ghost Martyrs in Iraq: An Assessment of the Applicability of Rationalist Models to Explain Suicide Attacks in Iraq

2008; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 31; Issue: 9 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/10576100802291550

1521-0731

Nick Ayers,

Economic Sanctions and International Relations

Abstract Scholars have developed several rationalist explanations for the use of suicide attacks by terrorist organizations. Using evidence from Palestine, Israel, Lebanon, Sri Lanka, Chechnya, and Turkey, these authors have created plausible and rational models for attacks, which many consider to be "irrational." Although the conflict in Iraq has, by most accounts, experienced more suicide bombings than any other struggle, its contemporary nature has made research and analysis on the subject difficult. This article analyzes four of these models and their implications with respect to the events in Iraq. Although the evidence is not conclusive, the data suggests that organizations are not using suicide attacks to (1) gain nationalist objectives, (2) signal strength to a foreign government, or (3)"outbid" rival organizations, as many scholars suggest. Instead, the evidence suggests that these attacks are used for (1) tactical advantages and (2) to aid the global recruiting effort of Al Qaeda–linked organizations. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not reflect the position of the United States Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense. The author would like to thank the following for their assistance: James Fearon, James Forest, Mohammad Hafez, David Holloway, David Laitin, Assaf Moghadam, and Jacob Shapiro. Notes 1. See Table 1. 2. This figure is based on the data related to Table 4. Using data personally coded from June 2006 to February 2007, the author could approximate claims for 46% of conventional attacks while only being to confirm claims for 7% of suicide attacks. 3. Andrew Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, "Sabotaging Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence," International Organization 56(2) (2002), pp. 263–296 and Walter and Kydd, "The Strategies of Terrorism." International Security (Summer 2006), pp. 49–79. 4. David Kreps and Robert Wilson, "Reputation and Imperfect Information," Journal of Economic Theory 27 (1982), pp. 253–279; Harvey E. Lapan and Todd Sandler, "To Bargain or Not to Bargain: That is the Question," The American Economic Review 78(2) (May 1998), pp. 16–21; Per Baltzer Overgaard, "The Scale of Terrorist Attacks as a Signal of Resources," Journal of Conflict Resolution 38(3) (September 1994), pp. 452, 478; Peter Sederberg, "Conciliation as Counter-Terrorist Strategy," Journal of Peace Research 3(3) (August 1995), pp. 295–312. 5. Ibid. 6. See also Bruce Hoffman and George McCormick, "Terrorism, Signaling and Suicide Attacks," Journal of Conflict and Terrorism 27 (2004), pp. 243–281. 7. Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House, 2005), pp. 28, 29. 8. Ibid., p. 39. 9. Ibid. and Stephen Hopgood, in Diego Gambetta, ed., Making Sense of Suicide Missions (New York: Oxford Press, 2005), p. 74. 10. For additional discussions on the link between democracy and terrorism see Quan Li, "Do Democracies Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorism?" Journal of Conflict Resolution 49(2) (April 2005), pp. 279–280; Joe Eyermann, "Terrorism and Democratic States: Soft Targets or Accessible Systems," International Interactions 24 (1998), pp. 151–170; William Eubank and Leonard Weinberg, "Does Democracy Encourage Terrorism?" Terrorism and Political Violence 6(4) (1994), pp. 417–443. 11. Pape, Dying to Win, p. 30. 12. See Robert Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996). 13. Pape, 69. Statement by Yitzhak Rabin, April 1994, "I can't recall in the past any suicidal terror acts by the PLO. We have seen by now at least six acts of this type of Hamas and Islamic Jihad. … The only response to them and to the enemies of peace on the part of Israel is to accelerate the negotiations." 14. Pape, 246. 15. Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), p. 96. For other theoretical models for "outbidding" as a strategy see Kydd and Walter, "Sabotaging Peace," pp. 263–296. 16. Ibid., p. 23 and figures 2.1a and b., pp. 193, 194. The figures show an overall increasing trend in support for these missions in public opinion surveys from July 1997 through October 2003. 17. Ibid., p. 193. 18. Ibid., p. 29. These groups have produced a much smaller number of suicide attacks, but their increasing number, according to Bloom, is indicative of a desire to gain greater support within the Palestinian constituency. Also, Luca Ricofli, in Diego Gambetta, ed., Making Sense of Suicide Missions (New York: Oxford Press, 2005), p. 99. 19. Bloom, Dying to Kill, pp. 29–31, Ricolfi, p. 100. 20. Although it is possible to develop a game theoretic model that would support a strategy to claim attacks that they do not commit, the organization would also face risks of having the truth come out. Bloom does not discuss this possibility, but because an organization's reputation is based on its credibility, claiming responsibility for someone else's attack would carry a sizeable, and inherent risk. The present author is not as convinced that organizations would routinely make this decision as after multiple incidents, a constituency might get suspicious and thus endanger the organization's support. It may be more accurate to predict that only weak groups would attempt to claim attacks that they do not conduct, because it potentially could not afford to actually conduct the attack itself. 21. Bloom, Dying to Kill, p. 97. 22. Although this model has gained less attention as a "formal" model than the previous two, the literature supports its inclusion as a potential organizational strategy. Formal models by Sun-Ki Chai and Ethan Bueno de Mesquita suggest that organizational recruitment is affected by the types of activities the organization conducts and potential payoffs for member activity. See Sun-Ki Chai, "An Organizational Economics Theory of Antigovernment Violence," Comparative Politics 26(1) (October 1993), pp. 106–108; Ethan Bueno De Mesquita, "The Quality of Terror," American Journal of Political Science 49(3) (July 2005), pp. 515–530. More generally, the potential influence of suicide bombings on recruitment is discussed in several works. See Jon Elster, "Motivations and Beliefs in Suicide Missions" in Diego Gambetta, ed., Making Sense of Suicide Missions New York: Oxford Press, 2005), pp. 234–258; Ami Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2005), pp. 155–160; Pape, pp. 171–198; Bloom, Dying to Kill, pp. 76–98. 23. Gambetta, Making Sense of Suicide Missions, pp. 272–274. 24. Scot Atran, "Mishandling Suicide Terrorism," Washington Quarterly (Summer 2004), p. 76; Eli Berman and David Laitin, "Rational Martyrs vs. Hard Targets," an inclusion in a forthcoming book, Suicide Bombing from an Interdisciplinary Perspective by Eva Meyersson Milgrom (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), p. 68. 25. Ricofli, pp. 60–61, 113–114. 26. Bloom, Dying to Kill, p. 30. Bloom cites this from an interview from Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), pp. 187–188. The author cannot confirm whether the emphasis was added by the original interviewer, Mark Juergensmeyer, or by Mia Bloom who reproduced the interview. 27. Hoffman and McCormick, "Terrorism, Signaling and Suicide Attacks," p. 255. 28. Stephen Hopgood, in Diego Gambetta, ed., Making Sense of Suicide Missions (New York: Oxford Press, 2005), 60–61. 29. Ansar Al-Sunnah: www.ansar-alsonnah.8k.com; Palestinian Islamic Jihad: www.sarayaalquds.com; Al Aqsa Martyr's Brigade: www.kataebaqsa1.com; and Al Qaeda: www.qal3ati.org/vb 30. Gambetta, Making Sense of Suicide Missions, pp. 272–274. 31. Berman and Laitin, "Rational Martyrs vs. Hard Targets," p. 6. 32. Berman and Laitin are not the first to point out the tactical efficiency of suicide attacks. However, in the present author's opinion, they have done the best at formalizing the conditions that make suicide attacks a preferred tactic over other available methods. 33. Hoffman and McCormick, "Terrorism, Signaling and Suicide Attacks," p. 248. 34. Pape, p. 32. 35. Ibid., p. 32. 36. Ibid., pp. 32–33. 37. Berman and Laitin, "Rational Martyrs vs. Hard Targets," p. 34, Table 5. 38. John Reuter, "Chechnya's Suicide Bombers: Desperate, Devout, or Deceived?" (Published for the American Committee for Peace in Chechnya, 16 September 2004), pp. 18–20. 39. For examples of these models see Jeffery Ian Ross, "Structural Causes of Oppositional Political Terrorism: Towards a Causal Model," Journal of Peace Research 30(3) (August 1993), pp. 317–329; William Eubank and Leonard Weinberg, "Does Democracy Encourage Terrorism?' Terrorism and Political Violence 6(4) (1994), pp. 417–443; Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, "Distribution of Transnational Terrorism Among Countries By Income Classes and Geography after 9/11," Department of Homeland Security White Paper (January 2005). Other good structural models are found in Quan Li, "Do Democracies Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorism?" Journal of Conflict Resolution 49(2) (April 2005), pp. 279–280 and Joe Eyermann, "Terrorism and Democratic States: Soft Targets or Accessible Systems," International Interactions 24(2) (1989), pp. 151–170. 40. For examples of psychological models, see Martha Crenshaw, "The Psychology of Terrorism: An Agenda for the 21st Century," Political Psychology 21(2) (June 2000), pp. 405–420; Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," Comparative Politics 13(4) (July 1981), pp. 379–399; Scott Atran, "The Future and Genesis of Terrorism," Science (7 March 2003), pp. 1534–1539. Robert Pape also discusses individual factors in his book Dying to Win, pp. 171–236. 41. Additionally, the data available did not support the development of a purely structural model for attacks within Iraq (i.e.. no "in-country" variation on variables such as economy, government strength) or a model on psychological factors (i.e., the author did not have the ability to conduct interviews). 42. Although Bloom claims that there should be multiple claims occurring, the present author is not convinced that it is required for the model to work as explained in note 20. 43. Pape, p. 263. 44. Mohammed M. Hafez, "Suicide Terrorism in Iraq: A Preliminary Assessment of the Quantitative Data and Documentary Evidence," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism (May 2006), pp. 591–619. This also follows a breakdown of group characteristics found in regional literature: Dr. Hani Al-Sibai'I, "Ansar Al-Islam, Ansar Al-Sunnah Army, Abu-Mus'ab Al-Zarqawi, and Abu-Hafs Brigades," FBIS Report "Terrorism: Jihadist Website Describes Jihadist Movements in Iraq," Reference Number: GMP20040322000207 Iraq, (14 March 2004). Dr. Al Sibai'I is the director of Al-Maqrizi Center for Historical Studies. The report was originally posted on 14 March on Al-Basrah Net. 45. Ayman Al Zawahiri, captured document, HARMONY Collection at the Combating Terrorism Center, United States Military Academy, REF # : CTC-Zawahiri-Letter-10–05. Available at http://www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony/CTC-Zawahiri-Letter-10–05.pdf 46. Hafez, "Suicide Terrorism in Iraq," p. 595. 47. Hafez uses a database by Ami Pedahzur and Ryan Alsabagh (University of Texas). 48. Statistics are derived from RAND/MIPT data. Available at http:www.tkb.org 49. Pape, pp. 102–125. 50. Ibid., p. 124. This statement is from a document Pape calls, "Knights Under the Prophet's Banner," Part 11. No date or reference number provided. 51. Statement released from FBIS via the U.S. Government Open Source program. Report ID: GMP20050518336002 Jihadist Websites—FBIS Report (in Arabic), 18 May 2005. 52. Ibid., p. 583. Hafez presents the document, although the date and addressee was not specified. 53. The Combating Terrorism Center is located at the United States Military Academy at West Point New York. The HARMONY collection is a compilation of captured documents from Al Qaeda–linked organizations. 54. HARMONY Documents, Combating Terrorism Center, United States Military Academy, REF: CTC-Atiyah Letter, and CTC-Zawahiriletter-10–05. Available at http:www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony 55. HARMONY Documents, Ref Number: AFGP-2002–600053, Combating Terrorism Center Collection, accessed 10 March 2007. Page 18 of 40. 56. Hafez, "Suicide Terrorism in Iraq," pp. 617–619. In his dataset, 9 bombers have unknown origins, which means that even if all 9 were Iraqi, it would only raise the number to 16, which is still less than half of the 44 from Saudi Arabia. Additionally, the reader may wonder about the 8 bombers from Italy. Of these 8, their family origins were as follows: 5 from Tunisia, 1 from Algeria, 1 from Egypt, and 1 from Morocco. 57. Mohammad Hafez, "Martyrdom Mythology in Iraq," Terrorism and Political Violence 19 (2007), p. 101. 58. Ibid. 59. Jihadist Websites—FBIS Report. 60. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars (National Defense Research Institute-RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 2001), p. 34. Additionally, the author acknowledges the help of Dr. James Forest from the United States Military Academy with suggesting this possible explanation. 61. See Appendix 1. 62. Primarily Unclassified and/or FOUO documents from www.opensource.gov, which is the information portal used to access FBIS reports. 63. In fact, extending the search back to June 2005 only yielded two additional claims (Appendix 2, entries 69 and 70). 64. Appendix 2 lists reports by FBIS/Opensource reference number. The conventional attacks, however, are not further broken down by type (i.e., ambush, kidnapping, mortar, etc). 65. This assumption is made based on time constraints and only biases the results against the author because it does not add any of the 65 that RAND/MIPT found. Any total greater than 798 would only lower the unclaimed rate of conventional attacks and work in favor of the present argument. 66. These values do not include the deaths of the suicide operative. 67. Hafez, "Suicide Terrorism in Iraq," pp. 604–605. 68. Ibid., p. 605. 69. See Bloom, Dying to Kill, p. 23; Ricolfi. Also, for a longer discussion see David Jaeger and M. Daniel Paserman, "Israel, the Palestinian Factions, and the Cycle of Violence," College of William & Mary, Department of Economics Working Paper Number 23, December 2005. 70. Hafez, "Suicide Terrorism in Iraq," p. 609. 71. HARMONY Documents, CTC-Atiyah Letter and CTC-Zawahiriletter-10–05. 72. The Al Anbar Revenge Brigade is a organization compromised mostly of tribal groups in the Ramadi and Fallujah area. The group formed in Ramadi as a response to the November 2005 bombing of a Ramadi Police recruitment station that killed 80 potential recruits. The Ramadi wing of the group is led by tribal leaders of the Albu Risha, Albu Obaid, and Albu Fahd tribes. Source for this data is personal military contacts in the area (because the author was deployed there from September 2003–September 2004 and has kept contact with rotating units) and John Ward Anderson, "Iraqi Tribes Strike Back at Insurgents," Washington Post Foreign Service (7 March 2006), p. A12. Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/06/AR2006030601596.html, accessed10 March 2007.