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<i>Prigg v. Pennsylvania</i> and Northern State Courts: Anti-Slavery Use of a Pro-Slavery Decision

1979; Kent State University Press; Volume: 25; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1353/cwh.1979.0030

1533-6271

Paul Finkelman,

International Labor and Employment Law

PRIGG V. PENNSYLVANIA AND NORTHERN STATE COURTS: Anti-Slavery Use of a Pro-Slavery Decision Paul Finkelman One year after it was announced, John Quincy Adams spent most of a day "in transient reading the report" of Prigg v. Pennsylvania, "otherwise called the FugitiveSlave Case."Heruefullynotedthat Prigg, consisted of "seven judges, every one of them dissenting from the reasoning of all the rest, and every one of them coming to the same conclusion—the transcendent omnipotence of slavery in these United States, riveted by a clause in the Constitution. . . ."The meaning of the report for Adams, and for most anti-slavery advocates, was clear. The "slave power" had won another victory. This victory was particularly painful because the "opinion of the court" was written by a Massachusetts man and an opponent of slavery. But, Joseph Story, in upholding the Constitution was forced to uphold slavery as well. Thus, when Vice-President Henry Wilson wrote his history of the period he was forced to conclude "this decision ofthe Supreme Court seemed and was evidently designed to be strongly favorable to the slaveholders. . . ." However, with the advantage of hindsight Wilson could happily add that the decision "became, by legitimate inference and by its practical workings, often a real means of protection and defence" of fugitive slaves.1 Ultimately, Northern jurists, lawyers, and legislators were able to turn this pro-slavery decisioninto an anti-slavery tool. Since 1842 lawyers, judges, politicians, and historians have struggled to understand what the Court actually decided in Prigg. This 1 Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Peters (U.S.) 539 (1842); Charles Francis Adams (ed.), Memoirs of John Quincy Adams (Philadelphia, 1876) XI, 336; Henry Wilson, The History of the Rise and Fall of the SlavePowerinAmerica (Boston, 1872), 1, 473. The authorwould like to thank Louis Gerteis, University of Missouri-St. Louis; WilliamWiecek, University of Missouri-Columbia; and Michael Weinberg, Washington University, for their helpful criticism and suggestions. Portions of this articlewere presented atthe 1978 meeting ofthe Organization of American Historians. Civil War History, Vol. XXV, No. 1 Copyright © 1979 by The Kent State University Press 0009-8078/79/2501-0001 $01.55/0 ß CIVIL WAR HISTORY complicated case was critical for a number of reasons: it was the first time the Supreme Court interpreted the Constitution's fugitive slave clause; the decision upheld the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793, and in so doing gave positive constitutional protection for slavery and the right of a master to recapture a runaway slave; at the same time, the Pennsylvania personal liberty law of 1826, and by extension similar laws in other states, was declared unconstitutional. The decision also allowedstates to refuse to enforce the federallaw, which in turn led to increased Southern demands for a new fugitive slave law. Because the case dealt with so many issues, there has been much confusion as to what was decided and what was dicta, and what the holding and dicta really meant. This confusion was heightened by the fact that six justices wrote opinions concurring with the generalresults of the case, one justice dissented, and two justices voted with the majority, but gave no opinion at all.2 The facts surrounding the case are also complicated. A Maryland slaveowner named Ashmore allowed two of his old and infirm slaves to live in virtual freedom. This couple raised a daughter named Margaret, who was never claimed as a slave by Ashmore. Margaret ultimately married a free black named Jerry Morgan, and the couple moved to Pennsylvania in 1832. In 1837Ashmore's niece and heiress hired Edward Prigg to bring Margaret and her children back to Maryland, where Miss Ashmore claimed them as her rightful property. The birthplace of the children further complicated the case. Those born of a slave mother in Maryland were slaves, under Maryland law, but those born in Pennsylvania were free, since under the laws of Pennsylvania, and most other free states, no one born in a free state could be a slave. Atleast one, and perhaps more, of Margaret Morgan's children was born in Pennsylvania, and were thus free and should not have been considered fugitive slaves. This fact would be conveniently ignored by the United States...