Concept Individuation, Possession Conditions, and Propositional Attitudes
2005; Wiley; Volume: 39; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1111/j.0029-4624.2005.00497.x
ISSN1468-0068
Autores Tópico(s)Philosophy and History of Science
ResumoNoûsVolume 39, Issue 1 p. 140-166 Concept Individuation, Possession Conditions, and Propositional Attitudes Wayne A. Davis, Wayne A. Davis Georgetown UniversitySearch for more papers by this author Wayne A. Davis, Wayne A. Davis Georgetown UniversitySearch for more papers by this author First published: 09 February 2005 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0029-4624.2005.00497.xCitations: 10AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat References Audi, R. 1998 Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge. 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