Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: US Performance and the Institutional Dimension of Strategy in Afghanistan

2013; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 36; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/01402390.2013.764518

1743-937X

Todd Greentree,

Intelligence, Security, War Strategy

Abstract It is not too soon to draw cautionary lessons from the inconclusive results of US performance during more than 11 years of Operation 'Enduring Freedom' in Afghanistan. As in Vietnam, fundamental difficulties persist in adapting enduring institutions to the requirements of strategy. At the heart of the matter is tension between the assumptions that underlie counterinsurgency as practiced in Afghanistan and organization of the US Armed Forces, State Department, and Agency for International Development. Knowledge of basic principles and necessary changes is available to answer the question, could the US have done better? KEY WORDS : Strategy, Irregular WarfareCounterinsurgencyCivil-Military RelationsOrganizationsAfghanistanVietnam Acknowledgements The Center for Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups at the US Naval War College supported the initial work for this article. I benefitted greatly from a review by members of the Oxford University Programme in the Changing Character of War led by Professors Hew Strachan and Robert Johnson. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US Government. Notes 1 Walt Kelly, 'Pogo, 1970'. Cited in Mrs Walt Kelly and Bill Crouch Jr (eds), The Source: The Best of Pogo (New York: Simon & Schuster 1982), 224. 2 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, 'Town Hall Meeting in Kuwait, 8 Dec. 2004',US Department of Defense News Transcript, . 3 During the Vietnam War, the 'other war' referred to what were then called pacification operations, to differentiate them from the 'real war'of conventional search-and-destroy operations. Austin Long, On 'Other War': Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation 2006), 2. 4 Robert Komer, Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on US-GVN Performance (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation 1972), v–vi. 5 Originally designated the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support program, CORDS was rebranded as Civil Operations and Rural Development Support due to Cold War political sensibilities. In addition to Komer, other first person accounts of counterinsurgency and CORDS in Vietnam can be found in William Colby, Lost Victory (New York: Contemporary Books 1989); and Rufus Phillips, Why Vietnam Matters (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press 2008). Among the many current comparative references to the CORDS programs, influential commentary that focuses on organizational issues can be found in John Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Univ. of Chicago Press 2005). 6 President Barack Obama, 'Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan', United States Military Academy, West Point, NY, 1 Dec. 2009, The White House, . 7 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Samuel B. Griffith (trans.), (Oxford: OUP 1963), 84. The full quotation is more than a slogan: Know your enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril.When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your chances of winning or losing are equal.If ignorant both of your enemy and of yourself, you are certain in every battle to be in peril. 8 For example, see Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History (Princeton UP 2010); and Daniel Marston, 'Realizing the Extent of Our Errors and Forging the Road Ahead: Afghanistan 2001–2010', in Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian (eds), Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare (Oxford: Osprey Publishing 2010), 151–286. 9 For tactical state of the art see David Kilcullen, 'Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency', Military Review 86/3 (May–June 2006), 103–8. The US Army–Marine Corps Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency, published in 2006, established basic operational doctrine, and it will be interesting to see whether the revision to 3-24, due in 2013, amends the original version's gaps in strategic foundation. US Army Combined Arms Center, Ft Leavenworth, KS, . 10 Brian M. Linn and Russell F. Weigley, '"The American Way of War" Revisited', Journal of Military History 66/2 (April 2002), 501–33; and Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and The State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 1957). 11 Henry Crumpton, The Art of Intelligence (New York: The Penguin Press 2012). Stephen Biddle, Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College 2002). 12 L. Kugler, Michael Baranick, and Hans Binnendijk, Operation Anaconda: Lessons for Joint Operations (Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense Univ. March 2009). Lester W. Grau and Dodge Billingsley, Operation Anaconda: The United States's First Major Battle in Afghanistan (Lawrence, KS: Univ. of Kansas Press 2011). 13 10th Mountain would prove much more capable at employing the advantages of superior force levels and organization when it took over the COIN campaign in Regional Command-South during Oct. 2010, more than 8 and a half years later. 14 Although he does not deal specifically with COIN, the concept of paradoxical logic is from Edward Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 1987). 15 Sebastian Junger, WAR (New York: Twelve 2010), and Restrepo, Dir. by Sebastian Junger and Tim Hetherington (National Geographic Dogwoof Pictures 2010). 16 ISAF Commander's Counterinsurgency Guidance, Aug. 2009, . For the difference between strategies focused on battles vs. winning see Antulio Echeverria, ' American Strategic Culture: Problems and Prospects', in Hew Strachan and Sibylle Scheipers (eds), The Changing Character of War (Oxford: OUP 2011), 434. 17 In addition to Komer, see Leslie Gelb and Richard Betts, The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution 1979). 18 Joseph L. Harsh, 'Battlesword and Rapier: Clausewitz, Jomini, and the American Civil War', Military Affairs 38/4 (Dec. 1974) 133–8. 19 For a more complete assessment of ISAF force development and other security assistance see for example, David Barno (Lt. Gen. US Army, ret.) and Andrew Exum, Responsible Transition: Securing US Interests in Afghanistan beyond 2014 (Washington DC: Center for a New American Security Dec. 2010). 20 Hy Rothstein, Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press 2006). 21 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Little America: The War Within the War for Afghanistan (New York: Alfred A. Knopf 2012), 138–40. 22 Komer, Bureaucracy Does Its Thing, 67. Also quoted in D. Michael Schaefer, The Legacy: The Vietnam War in the American Imagination (Boston, MA: Beacon Press 1990), 100. Neil Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie (New York: Random House 1988) is the Pulitzer Prize winning account of John Paul Vann as hero and metaphor for the US tragedy in Vietnam. 23 See for example, Timothy M. Bonds, Dave Baiocchi, and Laurie L. McDonald, 'Army Deployments to OIF and OEF', RAND Corporation Briefing (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation 2010). 24 Groundhog Day, Dir. by Harold Ramis (Columbia Pictures 1993). In this film, Bill Murray plays Phil Conners, a disgruntled weatherman who finds himself condemned to live the same dreary 2 February. Groundhog Day in Punxatawney, PA over and over again until he gains enlightenment. 25 Interview with Gen. David Petraeus, PBS Frontline, 14 June 2011, . 26 Komer, Bureaucracy Does Its Thing, 79–84. 27 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (London: Pall Mall 1964), 89. 28 Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Department of State Office of Inspector General, 'The US Civilian Uplift in Afghanistan Has Cost Nearly $2 Billion, and State Should Continue to Strengthen Its Management and Oversight of the Funds Transferred to Other Agencies' (8 Sept. 2011), . 29 Chandrasekaran, Little America, 308. For a thorough assessment of the issues related to civilian recruitment, training, and organization, see Terrance Kelly et al., Stabilization and Reconstruction Staffing: Developing US Personnel Capabilities (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation 2008). 31 Eric Edelman, 'Ground Hog Day: Reflections on the Fall and Rise of COIN in American Defense and Foreign Policy', remarks to the International Stability Operations Association, 25 Oct. 2011. 30 The US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (Univ. of Chicago Press 2007). James Dobbins, After The Taliban: Nation-Building in Afghanistan (Washington DC: Potomac Books 2008). 32 Komer, Bureaucracy Does Its Thing, viii. 33 Hillary Clinton, 'Leading Through Civilian Power', Foreign Affairs 89/6 (Nov./Dec. 2010), 13–24; and US Department of State, Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review 2010, . 34 Nina Serafino, In Brief: The State Department Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service Oct. 2012). 35 United States Government Integrated Civil-Military Plan for Support to Afghanistan, Feb. 2011, . 36 Henry Nuzum, 'CORDS in the Kush', Masters Thesis, Johns Hopkins Univ. School of Advanced International Studies, 2009. Francis Fukuyama (ed.), Nation-Building beyond Afghanistan and Iraq (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins UP 2006). 37 Komer, Bureaucracy Does Its Thing, 77. 38 US non-defense foreign aid from the Function 150 International Affairs budget totals about $20 billion, out of an estimated $500 billion in non-operational expenditures on Afghanistan. Majority Staff Report for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Evaluating US Foreign Assistance to Afghanistan (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office 2011) and The World Bank, Transition in Afghanistan: Looking Beyond 2014 (21 Feb. 2011). 39 Paul Fishstein and Andrew Wilder, Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship between Aid and Security in Afghanistan (Boston, MA: Tufts Univ. Feinstein International Center 2012). 40 Rufus Phillips, 'Fostering Positive Political Change' (Washington DC: National Strategy Information Center Oct. 2012). Draft working paper cited with permission. 41 The July–Sept. 2011 issue of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School journal Special Warfare, 24/3, is dedicated to Village Stability Operations. 43 See for example, Yaroslav Trofimov, 'Afghans Fear U.S. Pullout Will Unplug Key Projects', The Wall Street Journal, 11 Aug. 2012. 42 US Army Financial Manager's School, Handbook 09-27: The Commander's Guide to Money as a Weapons System (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned 2009). 44 Komer, Bureaucracy Does Its Thing, 64–74. 45 There were other adaptations, including the Special Group (Counterinsurgency) in the Kennedy White House, employment of the Green Berets in unconventional warfare, and the CIA's even earlier role in 'political action'. Thomas Ahern, Vietnam Declassified: CIA and Counterinsurgency in Vietnam (Lexington, KY: The UP of Kentucky 2009). 46 Amb. Richard Holbrooke, Keynote Address: 'The American Experience in Vietnam, 1946–75', Department of State, Washington, DC , 29 Sept. 2010, ; George Packer, 'The Last Mission: Richard Holbrooke's Plan to Avoid the Mistakes of Vietnam in Afghanistan', New Yorker, 28 Sept. 2009; and Nicholas Kristoff, 'What Holbrooke Knew', New York Times, 14 May 2011. 47 Phillips, Why Vietnam Matters, 61–2 and 278. 48 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Peter Paret and Michael Howard (eds & trans.), (Princeton UP 1976), Book One: 7, 119. 49 Long, On 'Other War', 58. Also see Richard Weitz, 'CORDS and the Whole of Government Approach: Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Beyond', Small Wars Journal 6/1 (Feb. 2010), ; and Ethan Kapstein, 'Do Three D's Make an F? The Limits of Defense, Diplomacy, and Development,' Prism 1/3 (July 2010), 21–6. 50 Lt. Col. Jan Gleiman, The Organizational Imperative: Theory and History on Unity of Effort in Counterinsurgency Campaigns (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CGSC Foundation Press 2011). 51 This authority is specified in the President's letter of instruction to each Chief of Mission and by regulation in the U S Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual, Vol. 2, Section 2 FAH-2 H-110. 52 Huntington, The Soldier and The State, 317–19. 53 Center for Complex Operations, 'Initial Impressions Report (IIR) on the state of integrated civilian-military operations between the ISAF Regional Command South (RC-S) and the US Regional Platform South (RP-S)', Draft (Washington DC National Defense Univ. Aug. 2011). 54 Komer, Bureaucracy Does Its Thing, 7–8 and 21. 56 See for example, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication 3-22: Foreign Internal Defense, 12 July 2010, . There are two key differences between the current version of JP 3–22 and the doctrine as originally conceived post-Vietnam: First, Internal Defense and Development should be the higher aim and FID is its handmaiden, but JP 3–22 reverses the order. Second, JP3-22 shies away from unity of command, instead advocating interagency unity of effort to ensure 'minimum disruption of existing agency structures'. 55 John Waghelstein, 'Ruminations of a Pachyderm or What I learned in the Counterinsurgency Business', Small Wars and Insurgencies 5/3 (Winter 1994), 360–78. 57 Nina Serafino, Building Civilian Interagency Capacity for Missions Abroad (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service 2012). This report refers to dozens of studies undertaken in the last decade that recommend improvements to the US national security system. It concludes: '…There is no consensus on how to fix the perceived problems. Nor … whether interagency reform is necessary for missions abroad, which proposals are considered highest priority, whether reforms would save money, and whether reform of congressional organization and procedures must accompany other national security reform measures.'