Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

A Puzzle About Ineffable Propositions

2010; Routledge; Volume: 89; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/00048401003746009

1471-6828

Agustín Rayo,

Philosophy and History of Science

Abstract I will argue for localism about credal assignments: the view that credal assignments are well-defined only relative to suitably constrained sets of possibilities. I will motivate the position by suggesting that it is the best way of addressing a puzzle devised by Roger White. Notes 1Suppose you are offered a $10 bet on H. What are the highest odds you should be willing to take? My own view is that this is an issue one ought to remain silent about. It is tempting to think otherwise if one assumes that when one's evidence is too complex to be consolidated into a probability assignment one should accept some sort of Indifference Principle. It seems to me that such an assumption ought to be rejected. But this is a delicate matter, which won't be discussed here. 2For their many helpful comments I am grateful to Juan Comesaña, Adam Elga, Dan Greco, Caspar Hare, Alejandro Pérez Carballo, Susanna Rinard, Brad Skow, Bob Stalnaker, Scott Sturgeon, and especially Roger White. I would also like to thank audience members at the 2009 Mexican Philosophers' Conference, and seminar participants at MIT.