Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

The Truth About Rights

2008; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 7; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/14754830802476787

1475-4843

Vittorio Bufacchi,

Seventeenth-Century Political and Philosophical Thought

Abstract Arguably the biggest challenge facing theories of rights today comes from moral sceptics of all persuasions who are constantly singing the praises of anti-foundationalism, and in so-doing undermining the validity of human rights. This article has two principle aims: to show how different theories of rights tend to presuppose related theories of truth and to argue how Pragmatism, as a theory of truth and a theory of rights, can provide human rights with the foundations it desperately needs. Parts I and II will show how the two major schools of thought on the nature of rights, the Interest (or Benefit) Theory of Rights, and the Choice (or Will) Theory of Rights, correlate with two dominant theories of truth: the Correspondence and the Coherence Theory of Truth. Part III will explore the Pragmatist conception of truth and how it correlated with a Pragmatist Theory of Rights. Finally, Part IV will argue that in terms of human rights, the choice we face is not between foundationalism and anti-foundationalism. There is a third-way that deserves closer analysis called “quasi-foundationalism.” Vittorio Bufacchi teaches moral and political philosophy in the Department of Philosophy at University College Cork, Ireland. He is the author of Violence and Social Justice (Palgrave, 2007). The author is extremely grateful to Lilian O'Brien and Joel Walmsley for detailed comments on an earlier draft of this paper. He would also like to thank Richard Hiskes and two anonymous referees for their valuable and incisive critical responses. Notes 1. For the view that truth is perhaps the central philosophical notion, see Pascal Engel (2002) Dworkin, Ronald. 1996. Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It. Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 25(2) [Google Scholar]. On the central role of rights in moral philosophy see Ronald Dworkin (1978) Dworkin, Ronald. 1978. Taking Rights Seriously, London: Duckworth. [Google Scholar] and J.L. Mackie (1984) Mackie, J. L. 1984. “Can There Be a Right-Based Moral Theory?”. In Theories of Rights, Edited by: Waldron, J. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Google Scholar]. 2. For a sharp, critical analysis of MacIntyre and Bentham, see Attracta Ingram (1994 Ingram, Attracta. 1994. A Political Theory of Rights, Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]: 202–208). 3. This article will deal for the most part with what may be called robust theories of truth, largely leaving aside the debates surrounding deflationary theories of truth, although something like a minimalist conception of truth will make an appearance in Part IV. This is not meant to deny the philosophical impact of the deflationary approach. In fact, Simon Blackburn and Keith Simmons (1999 Blackburn, Simon and Simmons, Keith. 1999. “Introduction”. In Truth, Edited by: Blackburn, S. and Simmons, K. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Google Scholar]: 3) are probably right when they claimed that the issue of deflationism “is amongst the most baffling and the most important in contemporary philosophy.” Yet as this article is fundamentally about suggesting ways to solve the foundational problems facing theories of rights, the issue of deflationism in truth is beyond the scope of this essay. 4. See also Joel Feinberg (1980) Feinberg, Joel. 1980. Rights, Justice, and the Bounds of Liberty, Princeton: Princeton University Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]. 5. For a powerful account of basic interests, see Henry Shue (1980) Shue, Henry. 1980. Basic Rights, Princeton: Princeton University Press. [Google Scholar]. 6. See Peter Jones (1994) Jones, Peter. 1994. Rights, Basingstoke: Macmillan. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]; M.H. Kramer et al. (2000) Kramer, Matthew. 2000. “Rights without Trimmings”. In A Debate Over Rights, Edited by: Kramer, M. H. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Google Scholar]. 7. The literature has for the most part focused on two issues that pose problems for the Correspondence Theory of Truth: the notions of correspondence and facts. See Pascal Engel (2002) Jones, Peter. 1994. Rights, Basingstoke: Macmillan. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]; Simon Blackburn and Keith Simmons (1999) Blackburn, Simon and Simmons, Keith. 1999. “Introduction”. In Truth, Edited by: Blackburn, S. and Simmons, K. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Google Scholar]. 8. Both theories have their critics; see for example David Lyons (1984) Lyons, David. 1984. “Utility and Rights”. In Theories of Rights, Edited by: Waldron, J. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Google Scholar] and Margaret Macdonald (1984) Macdonald, Margaret. 1984. “Natural Rights”. In Theories of Rights, Edited by: Waldron, J. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Google Scholar]. For a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between utility and rights, see R.G. Frey (Eed.) (1984) Frey, R. G., ed. 1984. Utility and Rights, Minnesota: Minnesota University Press. [Google Scholar]. Richard Tuck (1979) Tuck, Richard. 1979. Natural Rights Theories, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar] provided an historically informed account of natural rights theories. 9. Thomas Scanlon (2003 Scanlon, T. M. 2003. “Preference and Urgency”. In The Difficulty of Tolerance, Edited by: Scanlon, T. M. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [Google Scholar]: 72) also suggested that the criteria of well-being that we actually employ in making moral judgements are objective, although it is interesting to note that he distinguished a person's well-being from their personal interests: “By an objective criterion I mean a criterion that provides a basis for appraisal of a person's level of well-being which is independent of that person's tastes and interests, thus allowing for the possibility that such an appraisal could be correct even though it conflicted with the preferences of the individual in question.” This piece was first published in 1975, although Scanlon has since revised his views on well-being. For his current views on the concept of well-being, see T.M. Scanlon (1998) Scanlon, T. M. 1998. What We Owe to Each Other, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. [Google Scholar]. 10. According to Dworkin (1996 Dworkin, Ronald. 1996. Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It. Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 25(2) [Google Scholar]: 88) their position is Archimedean because such sceptics “purport to stand outside a whole body of belief, and to judge it as a whole from premises or attitudes that owe nothing to it.” While Dworkin clearly believes in objective truth, he does not defend his position by providing arguments in favour of it. Instead he seems to be more comfortable attacking the position of his adversaries. 11. Hillel Steiner (2000) Steiner, Hillel. 2000. “Working Rights”. In A Debate Over Rights, Edited by: Kramer, M. H. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Google Scholar] argued that the Interest Theory of Rights suffers from five shortcomings: (1) rights do not always match with and person who stands to benefit, as in the case of contractual third-party beneficiaries; (2) the Interest Theory of Rights comes out on the side of paternalism; (3) the Interest Theory of Rights is simply incapable of finding rights correlative to certain public-law duties; (4) the Interest Theory of Rights unavoidably relies on discretionary judicial interpretation; (5) the Interest Theory of Rights unavoidably embraces a conception of “the good,” hence, it takes an evaluative stance. 12. Hillel Steiner (2000 Steiner, Hillel. 2000. “Working Rights”. In A Debate Over Rights, Edited by: Kramer, M. H. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Google Scholar]: 271–274), argued that duty-conflicts entail contradictions, while Matthew Kramer (2000 Kramer, Matthew. 2000. “Rights without Trimmings”. In A Debate Over Rights, Edited by: Kramer, M. H. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Google Scholar]: 17–19), sustained that there may be a conflict without there necessarily being a contradiction. A number of different solutions have been put forward to solve the problem of conflicting rights. Richard Hare (1981) Hare, Richard. 1981. Moral Thinking, Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar] famously argued that a conflict of rights can be resolved only by reference to a principle more fundamental than rights themselves; namely the principle of utility. Jeremy Waldron (1989) Waldron, Jeremy. 1989. Rights in Conflict. Ethics, Vol. 99(3) [Google Scholar] suggested that rights must be weighted against one another and be allowed to override one another. 13. Following in the footsteps of Locke, it appears that according to Robert Nozick (1974) Nozick, Robert. 1974. Anarchy, State, Utopia, Oxford: Blackwell. [Google Scholar], the right to self-ownership belongs to the realm of Natural Rights theories, something that his critics have been quick to point out; see for example Thomas Nagel (1982) Nagel, Thomas. 1982. “Libertarianism without Foundations”. In Reading Nozick, Edited by: Paul, J. Oxford: Blackwell. [Google Scholar]. For a defence of self-ownership and its relation to the Choice Theory of Rights, see Hillel Steiner (1994) Steiner, Hillel. 1994. An Essay on Rights, Oxford: Blackwell. [Google Scholar]. 14. In recent years, David Wiggins, John McDowell, and Susan Hurley have endorsed coherence accounts, among others. There is a debate on whether Rawls's idea of reflective equilibrium means that he also endorses some form of coherentism. 15. I will refer to it as an approach rather than a theory precisely to distinguish it from the aims and aspirations of the Correspondence and Coherence theories of truth. 16. As William James (1999 James, William. 1999. “Pragmatism's Conception of Truth”. In Truth, Edited by: Blackburn, S. and Simmons, K. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Google Scholar]: 61) stated: “Truth for us is simply a collective name for verification-processes, just as health, wealth, strength, etc., are names for other processes connected with life, and also pursued because it pays to pursue them.” 17. See for example Bernard Williams (1999) Williams, Bernard. 1999. “William James's Conception of Truth”. In Truth, Edited by: Blackburn, S. and Simmons, K. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Google Scholar]. 18. Two other authors whose work would fall under this heading are Richard A. Falk (2000) Falk, Richard A. 2000. Human Rights Horizons, London: Routledge. [Google Scholar] and Beth J. Singer (1999) Singer, Beth J. 1999. Pragmatism, Rights and Democracy, New York: Fordham University Press. [Google Scholar]. 19. As Jonathan Gorman (2003 Gorman, Jonathan. 2003. Rights and Reason: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Rights, Chesham: Acumen. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]: 19) pointed put, “Questioning the independent eternal existence of human rights is just one way of expressing the more general philosophical issue of whether any moral ideals or standards can have an independent eternal existence.” 20. Joseph Margolis (1986 Margolis, Joseph. 1986. Pragmatism Without Foundations: Reconciling Realism and Relativism, Oxford: Blackwell. [Google Scholar]: 165) pointed out that Rorty's mistake was to assume too readily a full rejection of foundationalism: “Rorty correctly observes that the strongest contemporary currents of epistemology have undermined foundationalism; he wrongly concludes that the question of epistemic foundations has therefore lost its conceptual relevance.” 21. See Sandra Rosenthal (1992) Rosenthal, Sandra. 1992. “Pragmatism and the Reconstruction of Metaphysics: Toward a New Understanding of Foundations”. In Antifoundationalism Old and New, Edited by: Rockmore, T. and Singer, B. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. [Google Scholar]. 22. I will return to this idea of Pragmatism as a third way. 23. “An Interview with Simon Blackburn,” Philosophy Now, Issue 35, March–April 2002. Perhaps Blackburn is reluctant to embrace pragmatism because he associates this school of thought with relativism. At least, this is the way he depicts William James; see Simon Blackburn (2006 Blackburn, Simon. 2006. Truth: A Guide for the Perplexed, London: Penguin. [Google Scholar]: 49–52).