Commercial Interests and Calculated Compassion: The Diplomacy and Paradiplomacy of Releasing the Lockerbie Bomber
2012; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 23; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/09592296.2012.706542
ISSN1557-301X
Autores Tópico(s)Military and Defense Studies
ResumoAbstract The release of the only man convicted of the bombing of Pan-Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in December 1988 is the most significant diplomatic decision taken by the Scottish government. The decision constituted a two-level process: the British government's behaviour was characterised by commercial interests; and the Scottish governments by calculated compassion. Britain's policy was steered by its national interest in securing Libya's rehabilitation into international society and ensuring that British businesses could benefit. Scotland's paradiplomacy shifted from a strategy of avoidance to one using the release to further the idea of an independent Scotland. Presenting the release in such a way was to bolster the idea of Scotland as a distinct entity with its own set of values, laws, and customs and possessing an ability to operate autonomously on the international stage. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I am grateful for comments and advice from Dr. Séan Molloy, Dr. Juliet Kaarbo, and Dr. Adham Saouli. The paper was presented at the University of Edinburgh's International Relations Research Group, and I am grateful to the participants for their insights and comments. Notes 1. "Lockerbie: Hillary Clinton Condemns Release of Al-Megrahi," Scotsman (20 August 2009); "Lockerbie Bomber: Letter from FBI Director Robert Mueller," Telegraph (23 August 2009); "Barack Obama Attacks Decision to Free Lockerbie Bomber," Guardian (21 August 2009). 2. "BP and UK Petroleum: What's in a Name?," Economist (16 June 2010); "Obama v. BP," Ibid. (17 June 2010). 3. These conspiracy theories have been debunked in A. Massie, "The Lockerbie Conspiracy," Spectator (16 July 2010). 4. For an analysis of the implications of the events for inter-governmental relations within the devolved United Kingdom, see D. Kenealy, "Concordats and International Relations: Binding in Honour Only?," Regional & Federal Studies, 22/1(2012), 61–85. 5. The documents that are referenced in the article all come from one of four sources: SG (Scottish Government): http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Justice/legal/lockerbie; MoJ (Ministry of Justice): http://www.justice.gov.uk/news/announcement010909a.htm; FCO (Foreign and Commonwealth Office): http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latest-news/?view=News&id=20789408; CAB [Cabinet Office]: http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ resource-library/cabinet-secretarys-review-Al-Megrahi-papers; US (United States Diplomatic Cables) available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/dec/07/wikileaks-gaddafi-britain-lockerbie-bomber. 6. For an authoritative discussion of paradiplomacy, see F. Aldecoa and M. Keating, eds., Paradiplomacy in Action: the Foreign Relations of Subnational Governments (London, 1999). 7. See J.K. Cooley, Libyan Sandstorm (Boston, 1982), 1–20. 8. These actions included Qadhafi siding with the Maltese Prime Minister Dom Mintoff in a Anglo–Maltese dispute regarding military bases; Qadhafi's nationalisation of the Libyan oil sector and ending of all foreign concessions; and his provision of material support to the Irish Republican Army. See Cooley, Libyan Sandstorm, 62–79; Daniel Yergin, The Prize: the Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power (New York, 1991), 577–85; D.J. Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya (Cambridge, 2006), 130–36; and R.B. St. John, Libya: From Colony to Independence (Oxford, 2008), 177–82. 9. Y. Ronen, "Libya's Conflict with Britain: Analysis of a Diplomatic Rupture," Middle Eastern Studies, 42/2(2006), 272. 10. For discussion of the heightened events of September 1983–April 1984, see Ibid., 272–75. 11. See C. Wright, "Libya and the West: Headlong into Confrontation?" International Affairs, 58/1(1981–1982), 13–41. Symbolically, Anglo–American co-operation vis-à-vis Libya came in 1986 as Britain permitted the use of its bases for an American air assault on Tripoli and Benghazi; see D.C. Martin and J. Walcott, Best Laid Plans: The Inside Story of America's War against Terrorism (New York, 1988), 297–311. 12. Libya remained important to Europe for reasons to do with both security and natural resources. See Y.H. Zoubir, "Libya and Europe: Economic Realism at the Rescue of the Qaddafi Authoritarian Regime," Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 17/3(2009), 402–05. 13. The move to liberalise domestically was a result of the combined effect of domestic challenges, international failures, and neighbourhood tensions. See D.J. Vandewalle, "Qadhafi's 'Perestroika': Economic and Political Liberalization in Libya," Middle East Journal, 45/2(1991), 216–31. 14. For the impact of the sanctions, see T. Niblock, Pariah States and Sanctions in the Middle East—Iraq, Libya, Sudan (Boulder, CO, 2001), 60–92. 15. For a discussion of the manoeuvring regarding the sanctions, see R. Waller, "The Lockerbie Endgame," Journal of North African Studies, 1/1(1996), 73–94. 16. See R. Black, "Analysis: The Lockerbie Disaster," Edinburgh Law Review, 3/1(2000), 85–95; idem., "Lockerbie: A Satisfactory Process but a Flawed Result," Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, 36/2–3(2004), 443–51; D.J. Andrews, "A Thorn on the Tulip—A Scottish Trial in the Netherlands: The Story Behind the Lockerbie Trial," Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, 36/2–3(2004), 307–18. 17. Acting Permanent Representatives of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc S/1998/795 (24 August 1998), 2: www.un.org/en/documents/index.shtml. 18. The re-establishment of diplomatic ties came with Libya's acceptance of a responsibility for the killing of Yvonne Fletcher, compensation payments to her family, and a commitment to co-operate with a British police inquiry into the incident. 19. Y.H. Zoubir, "The United States and Libya: From Confrontation to Normalization," Middle East Policy, 13/2(2006), 56–57; R.B. St. John, "Libya is Not Iraq: Preemptive Strikes, W.M.D. and Diplomacy," Middle East Journal, 58/3(2004), 391–92. 20. Y.H. Zoubir, "The United States and Maghreb-Sahel Security," International Affairs, 85/5(2009), 995. 21. Zoubir, "United States and Libya," 63–5. 22. "Tony Blair's big tent," Economist (25 March 2004). 23. Zoubir, "Libya and Europe," 405. 24. Ibid., 407–13. 25. "Lockerbie Fallout: Counting the Cost," Economist (27 August 2009). 26. Zoubir, "Libya and Europe," 413. 27. Hans Morgenthau argued that "the main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power." H. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th Revised Edition (New York, 1978), 5. See also E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919–1939 (London, 1939). 28. S. Hoffmann, "Obstinate but not Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe," Daedalus, 95/3(1966), 868. This is not all that far from Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 8–9. 29. A. Lecours, "Paradiplomacy: Reflections on the Foreign Policy and International Relations of Regions," International Negotiation, 7/1(2002), 92. Also B. Hocking, Localizing Foreign Policy: Non-Central Governments and Multilayered Diplomacy (New York, 1993); and, for a comprehensive collection of essays about the concept, Aldecoa and Keating, Paradiplomacy in Action. 30. M. Keating, "Regions and International Affairs: Motives, Opportunities and Strategies," Regional & Federal Studies, 9/1(1999), 3–6. 31. Scotland has engaged actively within the EU in pursuit of its agricultural, fishing, and regional development interests; see C. Archer and J. Main, Scotland's Voice in International Affairs: The Overseas Representation of Scottish Interests, with special reference to the European Economic Community (Montreal, 1980); A. Scott, S. Bulmer, M. Burch, and P. Hogwood, British Devolution and European Policy-Making: Transforming Britain into Multi-Level Governance (Basingstoke, 2002). Scotland has also, for many years, had agencies independent of Britain to pursue its economic interests through attracting overseas investment and promoting its exports; see C. Imrie, "Internationalising Scotland: Making Scotland Global and International in its Outlook," Scottish Affairs, 54(Winter (2006), 68–90. 32. Keating, "Regions and International Affairs," p. 5. 33. Ibid. 34. See Scottish Government, Europe and Foreign Affairs: Taking Forward our National Conversation (Edinburgh, 2009). 35. FCO, Memorandum of Understanding on the Pursuit of Agreements on Judicial Cooperation Between the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahriya and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, House of Commons Library, Deposited Paper 07/1638. 36. Kenealy, "Concordats," 71. 37. "Letter from Rt Hon Alex Salmond to Rt Hon Tony Blair, 'Memorandum of Understanding—Libya,'" 7 June 2007, SG. Apart from extradition, all the issues that would potentially flow from the MoU were devolved competences—that is, they are policy areas for which the Scottish Government is responsible domestically). This makes the lack of communication even more difficult to fathom. 38. "Letter from Rt Hon Alex Salmond to Rt Hon Tony Blair, 'Memorandum of Understanding—Libya,'" 13 June 2007, SG. The relevant concordat can be found at Ministry of Justice, Memorandum of Understanding and Supplementary Agreements Between the United Kingdom Government, Scottish Ministers, the Cabinet of the National Assembly of Wales and the Northern Ireland Executive Committee (London, 2010), para. D4.6. Observers and politicians have always held that the concordats represent guidelines and not actual rules. See A. Scott, "The Role of the Concordats in the New Governance of Britain: Taking Subsidiarity Seriously," Edinburgh Law Review, 5(2001), 21–48. 39. "Letter from Rt Hon Lord Falconer of Thoroton to Rt Hon Alex Salmond, 'Memorandum of Understanding—Libya,'" 12 June 2007; "Letter from Rt Hon Lord Falconer of Thoroton to Rt Hon Alex Salmond, 'Memorandum of Understanding—Libya,'" 22 June 2007, both MoJ. 40. Jack Straw, at the time of the MoU the Leader of the House of Commons and subsequently Secretary of State for Justice and thus closely involved in the PTA negotiations, has conceded that the MoU represented a first step towards a PTA under "the standard draft Council of Europe prisoner transfer agreements … which did not provide a specific carve-out for any individual prisoner." See House of Commons, Oral Evidence Taken before the Justice Committee on 24 November 2009, HC 55-I (London, 2009), 4; and Kenealy, "Concordats," 73–76. 41. House of Commons, Oral Evidence, 47. 42. "Letter from Rt Hon Jack Straw to Kenny MacAskill," 26 July 2007, MoJ. 43. "Letter from Kenny MacAskill to Rt Hon Jack Straw," 8 August 2007, SG. 44. "Letter from Lord Hunt of Kings Heath OBE to Kenny MacAskill," 17 August 2007, MoJ. 45. "Letter from Rt Hon Jack Straw to Kenny MacAskill," 23 September 2007, Ibid. 46. "Ministry of Justice Submission," 19 September 2007, CAB. 47. Ibid. 48. "Letter from PM to Col. Qadhafi," 26 September 2007, Ibid.. 49. "Jack Straw to Gordon Brown, PTA," 28 September 2007, Ibid. 50. "Pan Am Bomber al-Megrahi: the View from Tripoli," 28 January 2009, US. 51. "Jack Straw to Gordon Brown, PTA," 28 September 2007, CAB. 52. "Note from HMA (Her Majesty's Ambassador) Tripoli to the FCO," 2 October 2007, CAB. Path dependency and sunk costs are a familiar theme from economics, in which they can lead to sub-optimal outcomes and decisions because of a failure to be forward-looking. It has been applied to political decision-making, notably by Paul Pierson, "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics," American Political Science Review, 94/2(June 2000), 251–67. Interestingly Pierson takes a very different lesson, namely that previously outlays are often relevant for current action and that social adaptation/s represent investments that yield continuing benefits. The ability to distinguish between when sunk costs should be ignored, and when they should be sunk even further, as it were, would be matter for prudent political judgment. 53. Senator John Kerry to Foreign Secretary William Hague, 23 July 2010, confirmed the discussions and noted, "this was a perfectly normal and acceptable practice for a British company. It is the sort of exchange which occurs regularly round the world, and one that certainly did occur with a range of companies with interests in Libya and their national governments at this period." Quoted in "Hague Defends BP to US Senate," Independent (24 July 2010). 54. "Ministry of Justice Submission on PTA," 7 November 2007, CAB. 55. "Record of phone call between Jack Straw and Kenny MacAskill," 2 November 2007, Ibid. 56. "Ministry of Justice Submission on PTA," 7 November 2007, CAB. 57. Ibid. 58. Ibid. 59. "Letter from Kenny MacAskill to Rt Hon Jack Straw," 6 December 2007, SG. 60. "Letter from Rt Hon Jack Straw to Kenny MacAskill," 19 December 2007, MoJ. 61. "Letter from Rt Hon Alex Salmond to Rt Hon Jack Straw," 29 January 2008, SG; House of Commons, Scotland and the UK: Cooperation and Communication between Governments, Scottish Affairs Committee, Session 2009–10, 4th Report HC 256 (London, 2010), ev. 67. 62. Specifically, the British government considered their own issue linkage, linking the PTA to the so-called Somerville judgment that concerned Scotland's liabilities for breaches of the Human Rights Act and to the issue of devolving control over firearms. See "Correspondence between Jack Straw and Des Browne," 7–19 December 2007, CAB. 63. "Correspondence between Jack Straw and Des Browne," 7–19 December 2007, CAB; "Letter from Rt Hon Jack Straw to Rt Hon Alex Salmond," 11 February 2008, MoJ; House of Commons Debates, Hansard (12 October 2009) Volume 497, Col. 31. 64. Kenealy, "Concordats," 16. 65. See the correspondence at "Letter from Rt Hon Alex Salmond to Rt Hon Jack Straw," 29 January 2008, SG; "Letter from Rt Hon Jack Straw to Rt Hon Alex Salmond," 11 February 2008, MoJ; "Letter from Rt Hon Alex Salmond to Rt Hon Jack Straw," 18 March 2008, SG. 66. "Ministry of Justice submission on PTA," 29 September 2008, CAB. 67. "Pan Am Bomber al-Megrahi: the View from Tripoli," 28 January 2009, US. 68. "Qadhafi personally welcomes Lockerbie bomber," 23 August 2009, Ibid. 69. "Ministry of Justice Submission – call with First Minister," 10 October 2008, CAB. 70. Ibid. 71. "Ministry of Justice record, Jack Straw call with First Minister," 13 October 2008, CAB. 72. "FCO submission on judicial agreements," 13 November 2008, CAB. The game plan had crystallised over the preceding weeks, see "Cabinet Office submission to Gordon Brown," 21 October 2008, CAB. 73. "FCO Submission on handling Megrahi's death," 3 November 2008, CAB. 74. "FCO submission—advice to the SG [Scottish Government]," 9 December 2008, CAB. 75. Ibid. 76. "FCO letter to SG on foreign policy advice," 15 December 2008, Ibid. 77. Ibid. 78. "FCO submission—contingency planning," 22 January 2009, CAB. 79. Ibid. 80. "Cabinet Office record of cross Whitehall meeting," 25 February 2009, CAB. 81. "FCO submission—further handling of Megrahi," 20 April 2009, CAB. 82. "FCO submission—further handling of Megrahi—PUS and ministerial responses," 21–23 April 2009, CAB. 83. "Note of meeting," 5 May 2009, SG. 84. "MoJ record of Jack Straw call with First Minister," 29 April 2009, CAB. 85. UN Security Council Resolution 1192 (27 August 1998): http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/251/64/PDF/N9825164.pdf?OpenElement. 86. House of Commons, Scotland and the UK, 67; Scottish Parliament, Official Report (24 August 2009), Col. 18991. 87. "FCO submission—legal advice to Scottish Government," 29 June 2009, CAB 88. "Letter from the FCO to George Burgess," 3 July 2009, FCO. 89. "FCO email – foreign policy advice to the Scottish Government," 24 June 2009, CAB. 90. See "Letter for W. George Burgess to Head, North Africa Team, FCO, 'Application for Transfer of Abdelbasit Ali Mohmed al-Megrahi,'" 22 June 2009, SG; "Letter from FCO North Africa Team to W. George Burgess, 'Application for Transfer of Abdelbasit Ali Mohmed al-Megrahi,'" 3 July 2009, FCO; "Letter from Kenny MacAskill to Rt Hon David Miliband, 'Application for Transfer of Abdelbasit Ali Mohmed al-Megrahi,'" 12 July 2009, SG; "Letter from Ivan Lewis to Kenny MacAskill, 'Application for Transfer of Abdelbasit Ali Mohmed al-Megrahi,'" 3 August 2009, FCO. 91. To reiterate, nothing in the documentation disproves the official account of events. 92. K. MacAskill, "Decisions on the applications for prisoner transfer and compassionate release in relation to Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed Al-Megrahi" (20 August 2009): http://www.scotland.gov.uk/News/Speeches/Speeches/Safer-and-stronger/lockerbiedecision. 93. Scottish Parliament, Official Report, 24 August 2009, col. 18991;Scottish Parliament, Official Report, 12 February 2012, col. 6672. The book to which MacAskill was responding was J. Ashton, Megrahi: You are My Jury—the Lockerbie Evidence (Edinburgh, 2012). 94. "We Released Abdelbaset Al-Megrahi in Good Faith, says Alex Salmond," Guardian (20 August 2010); "Two Years On: Alex Salmond Still Defiant over Al-Megrahi," Scotsman (19 August 2011); "Salmond Trade Trip Defended against Megrahi Claims," Herald (24 October 2011). 95. Posing the simple question always central to political decision-making, cui bono, is quite revealing in this case. It seems that everybody benefits. Libya gets achieved its goal and a boost to the prestige of the regime; Britain secured its interests and placated the Libyans; and Scotland ultimately found a way to make the situation work for it as well. The only losers would be the families of the victims who believe a guilty man was freed. 96. Alistair Darling, British Chancellor of the Exchequer during Gordon Brown's premiership, suggested that Salmond "probably fancied a wander out on to the international stage"; see "Darling Denies Lockerbie Bomber was Freed due to Reprisal Fears," Guardian (4 September 2011). 97. Historically, preceding devolution, the Conservative government led by John Major had called for Scotland Europa to have a purely economic function and wanted it to refrain from advancing a distinct Scottish interest. The FCO "waged a war against the inward investment activities of the Scottish Development Agency and its offices abroad" in the early 1980s. See Keating, "Regions and International Affairs," 12. 98. "Why David Cameron's EU Veto was Good News for the SNP," Telegraph (13 December 2011); "Alex Salmond Demands Answers over EU Veto Decision," BBC News (12 December 2011).
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