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Shifting Targets and Disagreements

2014; Routledge; Volume: 92; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/00048402.2014.891145

1471-6828

Robin McKenna,

Deception detection and forensic psychology

AbstractMany have rejected contextualism about 'knows' because the view runs into trouble with intra- and inter-contextual disagreement reports. My aim in this paper is to show that this is a mistake. First, I outline four desiderata for a contextualist solution to the problem. Second, I argue that two extant solutions to the problem fail to satisfy the desiderata. Third, I develop an alternative solution which satisfies the four desiderata. The basic idea, put roughly, is that 'knowledge' ascriptions serve the function of recommending good informants, and disagreement over 'knowledge' ascriptions is a matter of conflicting recommendations. The upshot is that intra- and inter-contextual disagreement reports provide little—if any—reason to reject contextualism.Keywords: contextualismdisagreementepistemologyphilosophy of language Notes1 This assumes a simplistic version of contextualism on which the extension of 'knows' is tied to the epistemic standards of the speaker. While more complex versions are available [DeRose 2009: Ch. 4], I focus on the simple version because, first, my solution to the assessment and disagreement problems is neutral between simple and complex versions and, second, more complex versions have their own problems [McKenna Citation2014].2 I'm using italics for propositions here.3 See Stevenson [Citation1944] for the classic discussion of attitudinal disagreement. For a more recent discussion see Ridge [Citation2013].4 For this strategy, albeit applied to 'funny' rather than 'knows', see López de Sa [Citation2008].5 Objection: If it were pointed out to Polly (or Dougal) that, because 'knowledge' ascriptions are context-sensitive what Ted asserted was true, relative to the epistemic standards in his context, it would be strange if Polly (or Dougal) persisted in thinking that they disagree. Response: I agree that it would be strange for Polly to accept both that what Ted asserted was true relative to his standards and that they disagree. But the problem for the contextualist is that many have argued that, because Polly and Ted disagree, 'knowledge' ascriptions aren't context-sensitive.6 I'm using '#' to indicate pragmatic infelicity.7 Objection: One might think that the presupposition of commonality is like the presupposition that we speak the same language. In most conversational exchanges this presupposition is in place, but it doesn't seem to pass the three tests. Response: While this might help with the third objection, it won't help with the first or second objections. Imagine that, while Ailsa and Laurie speak different languages, they think that they speak the same language. Ailsa and Laurie happen to utter strings of words that are not just meaningful but are actually contradictory in both their respective languages. Consequently, Ailsa and Laurie think they disagree. But upon finding out that they actually speak different languages, the apparent disagreement disappears. In contrast, once Ted and Polly find out that they have different epistemic standards, their apparent disagreement doesn't disappear.8 For a similar idea for contextualism about 'ought', see Björnsson and Finlay [Citation2010].9 This account has a number of supporters in the contemporary literature. See, for instance, Fricker [Citation2012], Greco [Citation2009], and Pritchard [Citation2012].10 Note that someone might qualify as 'knowing' that p yet not be a good informant on the matter of p, perhaps because they're unable to share their information.11 I don't deny that one might recommend some subject as a good informant on some matter for certain purposes but not for others, for instance by making explicit the restriction to those purposes. The aim in the main body of the text is to give a number of reasons for thinking that, in the absence of any special reason to think a recommendation of a good informant is being restricted in this way, the recommendation is unrestricted.12 Thanks to two anonymous reviewers, Sebastian Becker, Matthew Chrisman, Davide Fassio, Patrick Greenough, Allan Hazlett, Torfinn Huvenes, Sebastian Köhler, Joey Pollock, Mark Richard, Tim Sundell and audiences in Aberdeen, Lisbon and Miglieglia. The research for this paper was funded by the Carnegie Trust.