Artigo Acesso aberto Revisado por pares

I Feel Your Pain: Embodied Knowledges and Situated Neurons

2013; Cambridge University Press; Volume: 28; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1111/hypa.12049

ISSN

1527-2001

Autores

Victoria Pitts‐Taylor,

Tópico(s)

Empathy and Medical Education

Resumo

HypatiaVolume 28, Issue 4 p. 852-869 Original Article I Feel Your Pain: Embodied Knowledges and Situated Neurons Victoria Pitts-Taylor, Victoria Pitts-Taylor [email protected] Search for more papers by this author Victoria Pitts-Taylor, Victoria Pitts-Taylor [email protected] Search for more papers by this author First published: 07 October 2013 https://doi.org/10.1111/hypa.12049Citations: 12Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Abstract The widely touted discovery of mirror neurons has generated intense scientific interest in the neurobiology of intersubjectivity. Social neuroscientists have claimed that mirror neurons, located in brain regions associated with motor action, facial recognition, and somatosensory processing, allow us to automatically grasp other people's intentions and emotions. Despite controversies, mirror neuron research is animating materialist, affective, and embodied accounts of intersubjectivity. My view is that mirror neurons raise issues that are directly relevant to feminism and cultural studies, but interventions are needed for the work to be compatible with nonreductionist critical thought. In this article I critique the dominant neuroscientific account of mirror neurons, called embodied simulation theory. 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