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Predatory versus developmental rule in Africa

2004; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 11; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/1351034042000238185

1743-890X

Arthur A. Goldsmith,

Global Peace and Security Dynamics

Abstract Political economy predicts that national leaders opt for economic development when institutions encourage them to extend their time horizons. By contrast, leaders turn predatory if they feel at risk. Leaders are most able to bear risk right upon taking office, but this can be offset by a perception of high volatility in office holding or by concern about catastrophic losses. Political institutions can therefore discourage predation by fostering recurrent, predictable replacement of leaders without harsh payback for ex-leaders who acted developmentally. Cataloguing all national leadership transitions in Africa since 1960, the article demonstrates that electoral cycles, term limits and the prospect of judgement before international tribunals have lately led to declines in the volatility of top office holding and in the risk of catastrophic loss to the occupants. These new institutions have yet to establish full credibility, but they show promise of altering African leaders' risk assessments to encourage more developmental rule. Keywords: democracyleadershippolitical economypolitical transitionsrational actor models of politicssub-Saharan Africa Acknowledgements The author thanks the University of Massachusetts Boston, Scholarship Support Program for supporting the work on this article. Notes Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub and Fernando Limongi, Democracy and Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p.189. See for example Philip C. Aka, 'Leadership in African Development', Journal of Third World Studies, Vol.14, No.2 (Fall 1997), pp.213–42; and Clive Grey and Malcolm McPherson, 'The Leadership Factor in African Policy Reform and Growth', Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol.49, No.4 (July 2001), pp.707–40. See for example Catherine Boone, 'States and Ruling Classes in Post-Colonial Africa: The Enduring Contradictions of Power', in Joel S. Migdal, Atul Kohli and Vivienne Shue (eds), State Power and Social Forces (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Barbara Grosh, 'Through the Structural Adjustment Minefield: Politics in an Era of Economic Liberalization', in Jennifer Widner (ed.), Economic Change and Political Liberalization in Sub-Saharan Africa (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994). See for example, Robert Fatton Jr, Predatory Rule: State and Civil Society in Africa (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992); George B.N. Ayittey, Africa in Chaos (New York: St Martin's Press, 1992); Peter B. Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995). There are several schools of political economy, ranging from Marxist to neo-classicist. All share a concern with how politics affect economic outcomes. Recently, some political economists have been moving toward an integrated analysis, trying to combine parsimonious theories that analyze agency in terms of optimization, incentives and constraints, with contextual theories that analyze structures institutionally and historically. This article represents that emerging viewpoint. Barbara Geddes, Politician's Dilemma: Building State Capacity in Latin America (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1994). Transparency International, '2002 Corruption Perception Index', Berlin, . World Economic Forum, The Africa Competitiveness Report 2000/2001 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), p.10. John Githongo, 'Independency, Investigation and Denunciation of Corruption From the Press: The Case of Kenya', paper presented at the 8th International Corruption Conference, Lima, Peru, 7–11 September 1997, . James K. Boyce and Léonce Ndikumana, 'Is Africa a Net Creditor? 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See CIET International, Uganda National Integrity Survey 1998 (Washington, DC: World Bank Institute, 1998). On Botswana, see Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James Robinson, 'An African Success Story: Botswana', in Dani Rodrik (ed.), Analytical Development Narratives (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002); Wayne A. Edge, 'Botswana: A Developmental State', in W.A. Edge and M.H. Lekorwe (eds), Botswana: Politics and Society (Pretoria: J.L. Van Schaik, 1998); and Balefi Tsie, 'The Political Context of Botswana's Development Performance', Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol.22, No.4 (1996), pp.599–615. For useful accounts of Mauritius' experience, see Thomas Meisenhelder, 'The Developmental State in Mauritius', Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol.35, No.2 (1997), pp.279–97; Deborah Bra¨utigam, 'Institutions, Economic Reform, and Democratic Consolidation in Mauritius', Comparative Politics, Vol.30, No.1 (1997), pp.45–62; Arvind Subramanian and Devesh Roy, 'Who Can Explain the Mauritian Miracle: Meade, Romer, Sachs, or Rodrik?', in Rodrik (note 22). Botswana's state-owned corporate sector is still smaller than in many other African countries. The same is true of Mauritius. Arthur A. Goldsmith, 'Africa's Overgrown State Revisited: Bureaucracy and Economic Growth', World Politics, Vol.51, No.1 (1999), pp.520–46. Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Pablo Zoido-Lobaton, Governance Matters II: Updated Indicators for 2000/01, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No.2772 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2002). 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Leaders who must reward relatively large coalitions (typical of democratically elected administrations) have incentives to provide public goods (such as economic growth); leaders who depend on small cliques have incentives to focus on providing private goods (such as patronage and , in the terminology of US politics, 'political pork') that may harm the larger economy. See Bruce Bueno de Mequita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson and James D. Morrow, The Logic of Political Survival (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003). Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), p.158. John B. Londregen and Keith T. Poole, 'Does High Income Promote Democracy?' World Politics, Vol.49, No.1 (1996), pp.1–30. Margaret S. McMillan and Will A. Masters use the retrospective hazard rate of leadership changeovers as a proxy for the political discount rate in Africa. This leads to exactly the wrong interpretation, since a leader's discount rate (estimation of insecurity) should rise as the hazard rate drops (that is, the longer a leader is in office). See 'An African Growth Trap: Production Technology and the Time-Consistency of Agricultural Taxation, R&D and Investment', Review of Development Economics, Vol.7, No.2 (2003), pp.179–91. James G. March and Chip Heath, A Primer on Decision Making: How Decisions Happen (New York: Free Press, 1994), p.45. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, 'Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk', Econometrica, Vol.47, No.2 (1979), pp.263–92. Henry Bienen and Nicolas van de Walle, Of Time and Power: Leadership Duration in the Modern World (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991). March and Heath (note 33) p.42. For example Arnold Hughes and Roy May, 'The Politics of Succession in Black Africa', Third World Quarterly, Vol.10, No.1 (1988), pp.1–22. The countries covered are Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zaire/Democratic Republic of Congo, Zambia and Zimbabwe. John N. Anene, 'Military Coups and Redemocratization in sub-Saharan Africa', Journal of Third World Studies, Vol.12, No.1 (1995), pp.181–200. Also see John A. Wiseman, 'Leadership and Personal Danger in African Politics', Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol.31, No.4 (1993), pp.657–60. Robert Bates, The Africa Research Program (Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 2000), . A coup is defined as an event in which the existing political regime is suddenly and illegally displaced by the action of small elite groups that include elements of the state military, security or police forces. A plotted coup is an announcement or admission by the elite group in power that a plot to overthrow the government by violence has been discovered before any action other than 'plotting' being undertaken. This data set does not include Eritrea or South Africa. Because of single party dominance, Przeworski et al. (note 1) do not classify Botswana as a democracy. Along these lines, Boston University established the Lloyd G. Balfour African Presidents in Residence Program in 2001. Zambia's Kenneth Kaunda was the first ex-ruler to hold this post. By providing an internationally recognized forum for former democratically elected leaders, the university hopes to help serve as an incentive for positive political change. Risk analysis suggests that it is the non-democratic leaders who most need the safe harbour. Barrington Moore, Jr, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1966), p.19. Recently in Latin America, some chief executives facing discontent and violence have been willing to change the political rules and try to remain in power that way. See Merilee S. Grindle, Audacious Reforms: Institutional Invention and Democracy in Latin America (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 2000). Arthur A. Goldsmith, 'Foreign Aid and Statehood in Africa', International Organization, Vol.55, No.1 (2001), pp.132–4. 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Reed Brody, 'The Prosecution of Hissène Habré - An "African Pinochet"', New England Law Review, Vol.35, No.2 (2001), pp.321–35. Przeworski et al. (note 1) p.273. Samuel P.Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968), pp.14–17. Ibid., p.12.