Paradoxes Involving Conflicts of Interest
2000; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 107; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/00029890.2000.12005157
ISSN1930-0972
Autores Tópico(s)Intelligence, Security, War Strategy
ResumoAs early as 1928, Oskar Morgenstern recognized a paradox in The Adventures of Sherlock Holmes. Though he pondered it at length, and often brought it up in the company of learned men, none could resolve the issue to his satisfaction. He eventually learned, however, that a wunderkind named John von Neumann had contrived a potentially relevant theory. So, upon his arrival in Princeton during the summer of 1938, Morgenstern sought von Neumann out. Their lifelong friendship and collaboration began with the solution Johnny promptly supplied for the paradox the two later described [6, p. 76] as follows: Sherlock Holmes desires to proceed from London to Dover and thence to the Continent in order to escape from Professor Moriarty who pursues him. Having boarded the train he observes, as the train pulls out, the appearance of Professor Moriarty on the platform. Sherlock Holmes takes it for granted and in this he is assumed to be fully justified-that his adversary, who has seen him, might secure a special train and overtake him. Sherlock Holmes is faced with the alternative of going to Dover or leaving the train at Canterbury, the only intermediate station. His adversary-whose intelligence is assumed to be fully adequate to visualize these possibilities-has the same choice. Both opponents must choose the place of their detrainment in ignorance of the other's corresponding decision. If, as a result of these
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