The European security order between American hegemony and French independence
2011; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 20; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/09662839.2011.605121
ISSN1746-1545
Autores Tópico(s)Defense, Military, and Policy Studies
ResumoAbstract Abstract We investigate the impact of historically rooted domestic constructions of purpose and ambition on the patterns of discord and collaboration in the Franco-American relationship over the course of the postwar and post-cold war periods. We stress the importance and tenacity of domestic historical constructions for explaining and understanding the foreign policy strategies that would otherwise confound a power-based analysis. The Franco-American bilateral relationship, in particular, illustrates the persistence and tenacity of each nation's historically constructed foreign policy conception during the bipolar distribution of power during the cold war and the contested unipolarity of the post-cold war era. We conclude with an assessment of the salience and relevance of domestic elements of foreign policy role and purpose for explaining and understanding how their bilateral relationship has affected the European security order into the second decade of the twenty-first century. Keywords: FranceUnited Statesbilateral relationship Acknowledgements For helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this article, we thank Joachim Schild and Keery Walker as well as two anonymous reviewers. The usual disclaimer applies. Notes 1. For in-depth treatments of the cold war era, compare Peter J. Katzenstein (2005 Katzenstein, P.J. 2005. A world of regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. [Google Scholar]), David Lake (1999 Lake, D. 1999. Entangling relations: American Foreign Policy in Its Century, Princeton: Princeton University Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]), Geir Lundestad (1998 Lundestad, G. 1998. 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