Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

A Preference for Deference: reforming the military's intelligence role in Argentina, Chile and Peru

2007; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 29; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/01436590701726467

1360-2241

Gregory Weeks,

Military History and Strategy

Abstract Abstract In the past decade an effort to reform the military's role in defence institutions such as intelligence services has been underway across Latin America. Utilising the cases of Argentina, Chile and Peru, this article will argue that reform has occurred, but has been limited in terms of expanding civilian authority, and will offer a means of understanding the dynamics of intelligence reform. In particular, incentives for civilians to pursue complicated reform have been absent. The military's proven ability to operate its own intelligence agencies constitutes a disincentive. To examine the dynamics of reform, the analysis centres on three variables: the number of institutions involved in overseeing intelligence, the degree of presidential control, and whether military intelligence activities are overseen by the civilian government. Notes 1 For example, see Lisa Haugaard, Adam Isacson & Joy Olson, Erasing the Lines: Trends in US Military Programs with Latin America, Washington, DC: Center for International Policy, 2005. 2 For example, Wendy Hunter, Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians against Soldiers, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1997. 3 Kurt Weyland, ‘Limitations of rational-choice institutionalism for the study of Latin American politics’, Studies in Comparative International Development, 37 (1), 2002, pp 57 – 85. 4 Fabrice Lehoucq, ‘Electoral change and political conflict: evaluating alternative explanations of electoral reform in Costa Rica’, Electoral Studies, 14 (1), 1995, pp 23 – 45. 5 Barry Ames, The Deadlock of Democracy in Brazil, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2001. 6 Evelyne Huber & Michelle Dion, ‘Revolution or contribution? Rational choice approaches in the study of Latin American politics’, Latin American Politics & Society, 44 (3), 2002, pp 1 – 28; and Weyland, ‘Limitations of rational-choice institutionalism’. 7 Wendy Hunter, ‘Reason, culture, or structure? Assessing civil – military dynamics in Brazil’, in David Pion-Berlin (ed), Civil – Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001, pp 36 – 58. 8 Barbara Geddes, ‘Uses and limitations of rational choice’, in Peter H Smith, Latin America in Comparative Perspective: New Approaches to Methods and Analysis, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995, p 85. 9 David Pion-Berlin & Harold Trinkunas, ‘Attention deficits: why politicians and scholars ignore defense policy in Latin America’, paper prepared for the meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, 2006. 10 Thomas C Bruneau & Richard B Goetze, ‘Civilian – military relations in Latin America’, Military Review, September – October, 2006, pp 67 – 74. 11 For example, see David Pion-Berlin & Craig Arceneaux, ‘Decision-makers or decision-takers? 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See also Ernesto García Calderón, ‘Peru's decade of living dangerously’, Journal of Democracy, 12 (2), 2001, pp 46 – 58. 33 Maldonado Prieto, ‘Servicios de inteligencia en Sudamérica’. 34 Andrés Gómez de la Torre Rotta, ‘Perú: frustraciones en los intentos por reconstruir sus sistema de inteligencia’, in Russell G Swenson & Susana C Lemozy, Intelligence Professionalism in the Americas, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic Intelligence Research, 2003, p 159. 35 See Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Informe Final, Vol 9, 2003, pp 122 – 123, at http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/index.php, accessed September 2007. The report concluded that 69 280 people were killed between 1980 and 2000 as a result of political violence. 36 ‘Reestructuración en el cni’, Agencia Peru.Com, 17 September 2003, at http://www.agenciaperu.com/reportes/2003/set/panizo_renuncia.htm, accessed September 2007. 37 ‘Toledo dice cierre de cni atiende a reestructuriación’, El Comercio Peru, online edition 30 March 2004, accessed September 2007. 38 For the text of the law, see dini's website, at http://www.cni-peru.gob.pe/resoluciones/ley_dini.pdf, accessed September 2007. 39 David Pion-Berlin, Through Corridors of Power: Institutions and Civil – Military Relations in Argentina, University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997, pp 71 – 73. 40 J Patrice McSherry, ‘National security and social crisis in Argentina’, Journal of Third World Studies, 17 (1), 2000, pp 21 – 43. 41 The text of the law can be found at http://www.mindef.gov.ar/secciones/documentos/ley_23554.htm, accessed September 2007. 42 Jaime Garreta, ‘El diseño de un nuevo marco jurídico regulatorio para la actividad de inteligencia del estado en la Argentina’, Security and Defense Studies Review, 2, 2002 – 03, pp 268 – 282. 43 J Samuel Fitch, The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998, p 143. 44 McSherry, ‘National security and social crisis in Argentina’, p 5. 45 The text can be found at http://infoleg.mecon.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/70000-74999/70496/norma.htm, accessed September 2007. 46 Eduardo E Estévez, ‘Executive and legislative oversight of the intelligence system in Argentina: a new century challenge’, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces conference paper, September 2003.