Too Many to Fail? Evidence of Regulatory Forbearance When the Banking Sector Is Weak
2009; Oxford University Press; Volume: 24; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1093/rfs/hhp039
ISSN1465-7368
Autores Tópico(s)Credit Risk and Financial Regulations
ResumoJournal Article Too Many to Fail? Evidence of Regulatory Forbearance When the Banking Sector Is Weak Get access Craig O. Brown, Craig O. Brown Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar I. Serdar Dinç I. Serdar Dinç Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Financial Studies, Volume 24, Issue 4, April 2011, Pages 1378–1405, https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhp039 Published: 01 April 2011
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