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David and Gulliver: Fifty Years of Competing Metaphors in the Cuban–United States Relationship

2009; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 20; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/09592290903001537

1557-301X

Philip Brenner, Soraya Castro,

Latin American and Latino Studies

Abstract The national narratives Cuba and the United States have constructed about their relationship since 1959 reflect the enormous differences in size, power, and wealth of the two countries. Cuban leaders often characterize the relationship with the metaphor of David and Goliath, which conveys the image of a small, valiant defender facing an enormous aggressor. American leaders invoke images of Gulliver and the Lilliputians, in which the giant is benign and honourable. He chooses to suffer the pin pricks that the little people occasionally inflict on him rather than destroy the attackers, which he could do easily, because the giant's intention is to help them not kill them. This article reviews the tension between Cuba and the United States since 1959, which has reinforced the metaphor each country developed to explain the hostility between them. In turn, the metaphors have framed the way the leaders view the relationship, and in this way have become an obstacle to improved relations. Cuban officials tend to discount United States fears about the aggressive implications of the David and Goliath framework, which also disposes them to be suspicious about American initiatives. Similarly, in viewing the relationship through the eyes of a Gulliver, American officials tend to discount the history of United States aggression against Cuba, and they seem to act on a belief that only a disingenuous tyrant could doubt the good intentions they have for the Cuban people. Notes 1. José Martí, “Martí: The Diplomat,” Cuban Ministry of Foreign Relations: www.cubaminrex.cu/josemarti/jose marti vers ingles/marti-political testament-ing.htm. 2. “Speech by Fidel Castro at Civic Plaza in Havana on the Second Anniversary of the Cuban Revolution,” Revolucíon, 2 January 1961. 3. Jonathan Swift, Gulliver's Travels (New York, 1960), p. 9. 4. “Secretary Condoleezza Rice Interview on NBC's Meet the Press with Tim Russert,” Crawford, Texas; 6 August 2006: www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/70014.htm. 5. For an elaboration of this argument see: Soraya M. Castro Mariño, “Cuban–U.S. Relations, 1989–2002: A View from Havana”; Philip Brenner, “Overcoming Asymmetry: Is a Normal U.S.-Cuban Relationship Possible?” both in H. Michael Erisman and John M. Kirk, eds., Redefining Cuban Foreign Policy: The Impact of the “Special Period” (Gainesville, FL, 2006). 6. Louis A. Pérez, Jr., Cuba and the United States: Ties of Singular Intimacy (Athens, GA, 1990). 7. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago, 1980), pp. 210–211; Robert Jervis, “Hypotheses on Misperception,” World Politics, 20/3 (1968), p. 461. 8. George Lakoff, “Metaphor and War: The Metaphor System Used to Justify War in the Gulf,” in Martin Pütz, ed., Thirty Years of Linguistic Evolution (Amsterdam, 1992), p. 481. Also see Roland Paris, “Kosovo and the Metaphor War,” Political Science Quarterly, 117/3 (2002), p. 428. 9. Louis A. Pérez, Jr., Cuba in the American Imagination: Metaphor and the Imperial Ethos (Chapel Hill, NC, 2008), p. 14. 10. Lakoff, “Metaphor and War,” p. 481. 11. See Note 2. There have been numerous other occasions. For example, he invoked Martí’s metaphor in remarks at the first inauguration of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. See: Fidel Castro Ruz, “The Battle of Ideas,” 3 February 1999, in David Deutschmann and Deborah Shnookal, eds., Fidel Castro Reader (Melbourne, 2007), p. 459. 12. “Speech by Fidel Castro at José Martí International Airport, 25 January 1998:” www.cuba.cu/gobierno/discursos/1998/esp/f250198e. Accessed 30 September 2008. The original Spanish version of the remark is: “Cuba, Santidad, se enfrenta hoy a la más poderosa potencia de la historia, como un nuevo David, mil veces más pequeño, que con la misma honda de los tiempos bíblicos, lucha para sobrevivir contra un gigantesco Goliat de la era nuclear que trata de impedir nuestro desarrollo y rendirnos por enfermedad y por hambre.” 13. Sheldon B. Liss, Fidel! Castro's Political and Social Thought (Boulder, CO, 1994), p. 35. 14. Pérez, American Imagination, p. 98; Lars Schoultz, Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America (Cambridge, MA, 1998), pp. 139–140, 147–149. The Teller Amendment to the 1898 congressional declaration of war against Spain stated that the United States “hereby disclaims any disposition of intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island except for pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of the island to its people.” 15. U.S. State Department, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of the Historian, “The United States, Cuba, and the Platt Amendment, 1901:” www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/ip/86557.htm. Accessed 30 September 2008. 16. Schoultz, Beneath the United States, p. xvi. 17. Pérez, American Imagination, p. 104–107. 18. Ibid., pp. 123–124. The parent-child metaphor, George Lakoff explains, conveys the notion of undisciplined children who require a strict father able to teach “them discipline and right from wrong. When children disobey, the father is obligated to punish… .” George Lakoff, Thinking Points: Communicating Our American Values and Vision (New York, 2006), pp. 57–58. Michael Paul Rogin demonstrates how the idea of punishing Native Americans to foster their development into adulthood enabled United States leaders “to reconcile the elimination of the Indians with the liberal self-image.” Michael Paul Rogin, “Liberal Society and the Indian Question,” in Ira Katznelson et al., eds., The Politics and Society Reader (New York, 1974), p. 12. A 2006 study offers some empirical verification for Lakoff's claim that a source of the ideological liberal-conservative dichotomy may rest on the meaning a person gives to the metaphor of the nuclear family. See David C. Barker and James Tinnock III, “Competing Visions of Parental Roles and Ideological Constraint,” American Political Science Review, 100(2006). 19. In 1959, the book value of United States investments in Cuba was greater than in any other Latin American country except Venezuela. See Leland Johnson, “U.S. Business Interests in Cuba and the Rise of Castro,” World Politics, 17(1965), pp. 441–442. 20. Pérez, American Imagination, pp. 248–256. Wayne Smith wryly comments on the change: “when most Americans think of Cuba today, they have a sense … of the rightful order of things violated. Since the days of Thomas Jefferson, Americans have felt that Cuba ought one day to be ours … No longer.” See: Wayne S. Smith, The Closest of Enemies (New York, 1987), p. 280. 21. Michael Mandelbaum, The Case for Goliath: How America Acts as the World's Government in the Twenty-First Century (New York, 2005), p. 10. He asserts that the “biblical Goliath served the Philistines but not the people of Israel. The twenty-first century United States … is not the lion of the international system, terrorizing and preying on smaller, weaker animals… . It is, rather, the elephant, which supports a wide variety of other creatures … by generating nourishment for them as it goes about the business of feeding itself.” 22. Swift, Gulliver's Travels, p. 61. 23. See Note 4. The remainder of her remarks about Cuba was: “But what Cuba should not have is the replacement of one dictator by another. The United States will support a democratic and peaceful process. But this is simply trying to think through how we might help the Cuban people have more democratic institutions when that time comes.” 24. James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn and David Welch, Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse, enlarged paperback edition (Lanham, MD, 2002), pp. 159–160. 25. Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy (New York, 1984), p. 129. For his private comments, see William M. LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America, 1977–1992 (Chapel Hill, NC, 1998), p. 82. 26. Thomas G. Paterson, Contesting Castro: The United States and the Triumph of the Cuban Revolution (New York, 1994), p. 257. 27. Jack B. Pfeiffer/Central Intelligence Agency, “Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation: Volume III: Evolution of CIA's Anti-Castro Policies, 1959–January 1961,” 1 December 1979; File Unit: JFK-M-01 (F6) [Bay of Pigs Operation], 1959–31 January 1961; National Archives and Records Administration, ARC Identifier 632234. Also see Howard Jones, The Bay of Pigs (New York, 2008), pp. 13–14; Peter Kornbluh, “Introduction: History Held Hostage,” in Peter Kornbluh, ed., Bay of Pigs Declassified (New York, 1998), p. 9. 28. “Memorandum from the Secretary of State to the President: Current Basic United States Policy Toward Cuba,” United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume VI: Cuba (Washington, DC, 1991), Doc. No. 387, p. 657. 29. “First Declaration of Havana,” 2 September 1960, in Julio García Luis, ed., Cuban Revolution Reader: A Documentary History of 40 Key Moments of the Cuban Revolution (Melbourne, 2001), pp. 45–51. 30. Morris H. Morley, Imperial State and Revolution: The United States and Cuba, 1952–1986 (Cambridge, England, 1987), p. 109. Cuba also expropriated the refineries of Royal Dutch Shell, a British company. The three oil giants had complied with a United States government request not to refine Soviet oil imported by Cuba. 31. Paterson, Contesting Castro, p. 35. 32. “Text of O.A.S. Declaration of San Jose,” New York Times, 29 August 1960, p. 3. 33. Central Intelligence Agency, “Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation October 1961,” p. 48, National Security Archive, Washington, DC [hereafter “NSA-DC”], Doc. No. CU00223; Jones, Bay of Pigs, p. 16; Smith, Closest of Enemies, p. 71. 34. The moniker comes from Theodore Draper, Castro's Revolution: Myths and Realities (New York, 1962), p. 59, who wrote that the invasion “was one of those rare politico-military events—a perfect failure.” 35. CIA analysts and operatives were aware of this problem, but their warnings did not reach or were ignored by policymakers. See Central Intelligence Agency, “Communist Influence in Cuba,” Special National Intelligence Report 85-60, 22 March 1960, NSA-DC, Doc. No. CU00030; United States States Department, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, “Fidel Castro: The First Year,” Biographic Report No. 312, 17 March 1960, NSA-DC, Doc. No. CU00028; Jones, Bay of Pigs, pp. 77–78; Peter Kornbluh, “The Bay of Pigs Revisited: An Interview with Jacob Esterline and Col. Jack Hawkins,” in Kornbluh, Bay of Pigs Declassified, pp. 263–265; Kornbluh, “History Held Hostage,” p. 7; Pfeiffer, “Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation,” pp. 30, 149–150. 36. United States Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Alleged Assassinations Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, An Interim Report, no. 94–465, 94th Congress, 1st Session, 20 November 1975, pp. 139–148. Also see: BGen Lansdale, “Review of Operation Mongoose,” Memorandum for the Special Group (Augmented), 25 July 1962, Office of the Secretary of Defense, declassified January 5, 1989, p. 8, in Laurence Chang and Peter Kornbluh, eds., The Cuban Missile Crisis 1962: A National Security Archive Documents Reader (New York, 1992), pp. 40–47; Jacinto Valdés-Dapena Vivanco, Operación Mangosta: Preludio de la invasión directa a Cuba (Habana, 2002). 37. For details on the Cuban perspective of the missile crisis, see: James G. Blight and Philip Brenner, Sad and Luminous Days: Cuba's Struggle with the Superpowers after the Missile Crisis (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002), chapters 1–3; Tomás Diez Acosta, October 1962: The “Missile” Crisis as Seen from Cuba (New York: Pathfinder Press, 2002). For details on the Soviet perspective see: Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro and Kennedy, 1958–1964 (NewYork: Norton, 1997); David Munton and David A. Welch, The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Concise History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 20–31. 38. McGeorge Bundy, “Memorandum for the Record,” 12 November 1963, in United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United, 1961–1963, Vol. XI: Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1997), Document No. 377, p. 889; Gregory F. Treverton, “Cuba in U.S. Security Perspective,” in Jorge I. Domínguez and Rafael Hernández, eds., U.S.–Cuban Relations in the 1990s (Boulder, CO, 1989), p. 71. For the most detailed account of decision-making during the crisis, see: Michael Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War (New York, 2008). 39. The new regulations were listed in the Federal Register on 8 October 1976. United States Congress, “U.S. Trade Embargo of Cuba,” Hearings before the Subcommittees on International Trade and Commerce and International Organizations, Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, H.R. 6382, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 8 May to 23 September 1975, pp. 562–564. 40. Manuel Piñeiro [Luis Suárez Salazar, ed.], Che Guevara and the Latin American Revolutionary Movements (Melbourne, 2001), pp. 84–92. 41. Blight and Brenner, Sad and Luminous Days, pp. 87–88; Jorge I. Domínguez, To Make the World Safe for Revolution: Cuba's Foreign Policy (Cambridge, MA, 1989), Chapter 5. 42. “Playboy Interview: Fidel Castro,” Playboy (January 1967), p. 70. 43. H. Michael Erisman, Cuba's Foreign Relations in a Post-Soviet World (Gainesville, FL, 2000), pp. 42–47; Tad Szulc, Fidel: A Critical Portrait (New York, 1986), p. 602. 44. Piero Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959–1976 (Chapel Hill, NC, 2002). 45. For example, in 1981 Secretary of State Alexander Haig's push for a direct attack against Cuba was rebuffed by President Ronald Reagan's other foreign policy advisers by pointing out “that the large and well-trained Cuban army would turn the country into another Vietnam.” See William M. LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America, 1977–1992 (Chapel Hill, NC, 1998), pp. 81–82. 46. For example, former United States Ambassador to Cuba Philip W. Bonsal testified in 1973 that “responsible American policy has never envisaged the use of American forces in Cuba except at the time of the Missile Crisis of 1962… . Our current policy no longer contemplates the overthrow of whatever internal regime the people of Cuba may support… .” “Prepared Statement of Philip W. Bonsal,” in United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Policy Toward Cuba, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., 18 April 1973, pp. 36–37. 47. Phyllis Greene Walker, “National Security,” in James D. Rudolph, ed., Cuba: A Country Study, Third Edition (Washington, DC, 1985), pp. 252, 266–268; Hal Klepak, “Cuba's Revolutionary Armed Forces,” in Philip Brenner, Marguerite Rose Jiménez, John M. Kirk, and William M. LeoGrande, eds., A Contemporary Cuba Reader: Reinventing the Revolution (Lanham, MD, 2008), p. 65. Planning for the new civilian forces actually began in 1980, as tension between Cuba and the United States increased. The first units of the Milicia de Tropas Territoriales were formally commissioned on 20 January 1981. 48. José Pérez Fernández, “Report on 40 Years of U.S. Aggression Against Cuba,” in José Ramón Fernández and José Pérez Fernández, eds., U.S. War on Cuba (Melbourne, 2001), pp. 72–73; Claudia Furiati, ZR Rifle: The Plot to Kill Kennedy & Castro, trans. Maxine Shaw (Melbourne, Australia: Ocean Press, 1994). 49. After the arrests, one of the crew confessed to authorities that they were on a mission to kill the Cuban leader. Ann Louise Bardach and Larry Rohter, “Investigation Leads to Plot to Kill Castro by Powerful Cuban Lobby,” New York Times, 5 May 1998; Juan O. Tamayo, “Castro Death-Plot Defendant Charged in Drug Case,” Miami Herald, 25 January 1999. The boat owner, Jose Antonio Llama, was a member of the CANF board of directors. He and four others were indicted for attempted murder by a federal grand jury in Puerto Rico, but they were found not guilty after the trial venue was moved from San Juan to Miami. Juan O. Tamayo, “Five Acquitted of Exile Plot to Kill Castro,” Miami Herald, 9 December 1999, p. 1A. 50. Ann Louise Bardach, Cuba Confidential: Love and Vengeance in Miami and Havana (New York, 2002), pp. 188–191. 51. Juan Tamayo, “Exiles Directed Blasts that Rocked Island's Tourism, Investigation Reveals,” Miami Herald, 17 November 1997; Bardach, Cuba Confidential, pp. 205–219; Glenn Garvin, “Panama: Exile says aim was Castro hit,” Miami Herald, 13 January 2001. 52. Julia E. Sweig and Peter Kornbluh, “Amid Cheers, Terrorists Have Landed in the U.S.; To Curry Favor with Cuban Americans, Bush Turns a Blind Eye,” Los Angeles Times, 12 September 2004, p. M2; Marcela Sanchez, “Moral Misstep; Some Terrorists Get a Hero's Welcome,” Washington Post, 3 September 2004, p. A19. 53. Saul Landau, “Terrorists Are On the Run: Some Away from Bush, Others Toward His Nurturing Arms,” Counterpunch, 4 February 2003; Jim Mullin, “The Burden of a Violent History,” Miami New Times, 20 April 2000; Kirk Nielsen, “Spies in Miami, Commandos in Cuba,” Miami New Times, 5 July 2001. 54. They were also convicted of espionage for their surveillance activities at United States military bases in Florida. Sue Anne Pressley, “Five Cuban Agents Guilty of Spying on U.S.,” Washington Post, 9 June 2001; “Cuban Gets Life Term for Spying,” Washington Post, 28 December 2001; Leonard Weinglass, “The Cuban Five and the U.S. War Against Terror,” in Brenner et al., Cuban Reader. 55. Peter Kornbluh, “JFK & Castro: The Secret Quest for Accommodation,” Cigar Aficionado (September/October 1999); Peter Kornbluh and James G. Blight, “Dialogue with Castro: A Hidden History,” New York Review of Books (6 October 1994). 56. Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal (New York, 1999), pp. 785–787; “Ford Says Angola Acts Hurt Detente, Cuba Tie,” New York Times, 21 December 1975, p. 3. 57. Kornbluh and Blight, “Dialogue with Castro,” p. 49; Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, pp. 390–391. 58. This theme is elegantly elaborated in Lars Schoultz, That Infernal Little Republic: The United States and the Cuban Revolution (Chapel Hill, NC, forthcoming 2009). 59. Zbigniew Brzezinksi, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981, revised edition (New York, 1985), pp. 180–190; Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York, 1982), p. 51. 60. .Smith, Closest of Enemies, pp. 128–140, 141–142. 61. Defense Intelligence Agency Report, “The Cuban Threat to U.S. National Security,” United States Department of Defense, 18 November 1997 [submitted to Congress, 6 May 1998]: http://fas.org/irp/dia/product/980507-dia-cubarpt.htm; Joseph Nye, “DoD News Briefing: Dr. Joseph Nye, ASD International Security Affairs,” United States Department of Defense, 11 September 1995; www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=173. 62. Patrick J. Haney and Walt Vanderbush, The Cuban Embargo: The Domestic Politics of an American Foreign Policy (Pittsburgh, PA, 2005), pp. 78–80. 63. Ibid., pp. 84–91. 64. Jorge Domínguez, “U.S. Cuban Relations: From the Cold War to the Colder War,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Volume 39, Number 3(1997), p. 58. 65. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 [Public Law # 104–114]. 66. William M. LeoGrande, “From Havana to Miami: U.S. Cuba Policy as a Two-Level Game,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Volume 40, Number 1 (1998), pp. 67–86. 67. Philip Brenner and Peter Kornbluh, “Clinton's Cuba Calculus,” NACLA Report on the Americas, 29(1995); Carl Nagin, “Backfire,” New Yorker, 26 January 1998; Morris Morley and Chris McGillion, Unfinished Business: American and Cuba after the Cold War (New York, 2002), pp. 98–113, 158–163. 68. Haney and Vanderbush, Cuban Embargo, pp. 118–126. 69. 22 U.S.C. § 7207(b)(1)(A) (2007). Notably the original, and less restrictive, versions of the law were introduced by conservative Republicans, Representative George R. Nethercutt of Washington and Senator John D. Ashcroft of Missouri. 70. Marla Dickerson, “Fidel Castro Steps Down; U.S. Businesses are Eager to Jump in,” Los Angeles Times, 20 February 2008, A10; John Reeder and Joanna Bonarriva, “U.S. Agricultural Sales to Cuba: Certain Economic Effects of U.S. Restrictions,” Publication 3932 (Washington, DC, July 2007), pp. 2–4; U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Statistics, “U.S. Exports to Cuba from 2004 to 2008 by 5-digit End-Use Code” (February 27, 2009). 71. Academic exchanges, for example, were severely curtailed. See Kimberly Stanton, compiler, Retreat from Reason: U.S.–Cuban Academic Relations and the Bush Administration (Washington, DC, 2006). 72. Coordinator for Counter terrorism, U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2008, April 30, 2009, Chapter 3. 73. Pablo Bachelet, “U.S.: Cuba facing potential instability,” Miami Herald, 21 February 2006. 74. Anya K. Landau and Wayne S. Smith, “Keeping Things in Perspective: Cuba and the Question of International Terrorism,” Center for International Policy (Washington, DC, 2001). 75. James C. Cason, “Statement by James C. Cason, Policy Planning Coordination, Bureau of Western Hemisphere, Department of State at Panel 1—Regional Impact of the September 11th Events: U.S. Security Concerns,” presented at The Stanley Foundation Policy Forum on Securing the Third Border: Cuba, the Caribbean, and U.S. Foreign Policy Options, Washington, D.C., 1 November 2001), pp. 11–28. 76. Government of the Republic of Cuba, “Statement by the Government of Cuba,” Cuban Interests Section, Washington, D.C., 11 September 2001; Andrew Cawthorne, “Cuba Offers Aid and ‘Solidarity’ to the U.S.,” Reuters, 11 September 2001. 77. “Castro Says Cuba Will Follow All U.N. Anti-Terror Plans,” Wall Street Journal, 3 October 2001. 78. David Gonzalez, “Carter and Powell Cast Doubt on Bioarms in Cuba,” New York Times, 13 May 2002, p. A3. 79. 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Intelligence Director Negroponte Cites Concerns about Close Cuba–Venezuela Ties,” Washington File, Bureau of International Information Programs, United States. Department of State, 21 August 2006. 85. J. Michael McConnell, “Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the Senate Armed Services Committee,” February 27, 2008, Office of the Director of National Intelligence (Washington, DC), p. 34. 86. Simon Romero, “Venezuela Spending on Arms Soars to World's Top Ranks,” New York Times, 25 February 2007. 87. Elson Concepción Pérez, “Cuba y Venezuela Consolidan Proyecto Unitario de Integración,” Granma, 16 October 2007; Ian James, “Venezuela, Allies to Start New Bank,” Associated Press, 26 January 2008. 88. James M. Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, “A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the Cold War Era,” International Organization, 46(1992), pp. 467–491. 89. Michael T. Klare, “The New Geopolitics of Energy,” Nation, 19 May 2008; Mandelbaum, Case for Goliath, Chapter 3. 90. McConnell, “Annual Threat Assessment,” p. 33. 91. Fareed Zakaria, “The Future of American Power,” Foreign Affairs, 86(2008); Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “The Decline of America's Soft Power,” Foreign Affairs, 83(2004); Peter Hakim, “Is Washington Losing Latin America?” Foreign Affairs, 85(2006). 92. Reuters, “Bolivia: Region's Leaders Back Morales,” New York Times, 16 September 2008, p. A10. Before the meeting there were credible reports that the United States may have been involved in supporting the unrest, and Bolivia demanded the removal of the American ambassador. See Simon Romero, “Bolivia Orders U.S. Ambassador to Leave, Accusing Him of Supporting Rebel Groups,” New York Times, 11 September 2008, p. A14; Stephen Zunes, “The United States and Bolivia,” Foreign Policy in Focus(18 September 2008); Jeremy Bigwood, “New Discoveries Reveal U.S. Intervention in Bolivia,” NACLA Report on the Americas, 41(2008). 93. Editorial, “A Choice for Latin America; Should the United States Continue to Subsidize Governments that Treat it as an Enemy?” Washington Post, 6 October 2008, p. A14. 94. Jervis, “Hypotheses on Misperception,” pp. 473–474 95. Quoted in Pérez, Cuba in the American Imagination, p. 222. The reporter had referred to charges that the U.S. government permitted “planes to take off from Florida ‘to bomb the defenseless population of Havana.’” See E. W. Kenworthy, “U.S. Remains Patient Under Castro Attack,” New York Times, 8 November 1959, p. E7. 96. Kissinger, Years of Renewal, p. 785.