The Prospects for Peace in El Salvador
1990; Johns Hopkins University Press; Volume: 10; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1353/sais.1990.0009
ISSN1946-4444
Autores Tópico(s)International Relations in Latin America
ResumoTHE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE. IN EL SALVADOR Gary Bland Neither the government, the ARENA party, the opposition, nor the social forces, even if they all join together, has sufficient power to overcome the military veto on questions that the Armed Forces considers to effect deeply its interests, unless they can count on the firm and explicit support of the United States.1 Ignacio Ellacuría, March 1989 T,he late Father Ellacuría, one of the six Jesuit priests murdered by members of the armed forces last November, was highly respected for forcefully conveying the reality of the civil war in El Salvador. His point was simple: the nearly ten-year-old war was stalemated and the only way to overcome the army's refusal to negotiate was to secure the active support of the United States for a political settlement. The power ofthe armed forces—its ability to block peaceful social and economic change—has been a fact oflife in El Salvador for many decades. But since 1980, by bankrolling the multi-billion dollar counterinsurgency war, the United States has acquired the leverage to influence substan1 . Ignacio Ellacuría, "Una Nueva Fase En El Proceso Salvadoreño,"i£sí«<¿íos Centroamericanos, año XLIV, no. 485 (March 1989): 189. Gary Bland is a recent graduate ofSAIS (M.A., May 1990). He conducted much of the research for this article while in El Salvador on an Andrew W. Mellon Fellowship. 191 192 SAISREVIEW tially military decision making. While there is no guarantee that U.S. pressure in support of negotiations can end the war, the failure to seek dialogue has fueled the conflict. By providing massive amounts of aid in pursuit ofmilitary victory and failing to foster social and economic reform, Washington has reinforced the armed forces's predominant role in Salvadoran society. The explosion of violence during the final months of 1989 may have been averted had the Bush administration forcefully responded to the important changes that occurred throughout the year. Evidence indicated that El Salvador's new president, inaugurated on June 1, personally desired a political settlement. The Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) rebels, having radically shifted their position over the course ofthe year, had also displayed a genuine desire to negotiate an end to the war. And international pressures were moving both sides toward dialogue. After a series of indirect contacts beginning in mid-summer of 1989, President Alfredo Cristiani's dialogue commission and a high-ranking FMLN delegation met for preliminary talks in mid-September. The outcome was surprisingly favorable: both sides agreed to meet monthly and not withdraw from the process until a final accord was reached. The second meeting in October, however, the first to include discussions on substantive proposals, demonstrated how far apart the two sides were. Costa Rican President Oscar Arias was able to keep the two sides together long enough to agree on a third round for mid-November. A wave of right-wing violence soon ensued, particularly a bombing that killed ten people at a leftist labor confederation. The FMLN withdrew from the dialogue process in protest. Believing that attempts to negotiate were futile, the rebels launched a major offensive on November 11 in an effort to increase pressure on the government and win respect for their moves toward reconciliation. As the talks proceeded it became clear that President Cristiani, like his predecessor, José Napoleón Duarte, was too weak to control the farright members of his party and the military, both of whom are violently opposed to compromise and committed to undermining negotiations. The Bush White House, in effect extending the Reagan administration's policy, showed no commitment to the talks and thus failed to provide Cristiani with the backing he needed to pursue negotiations seriously. Equally important, Washington's lack of strong support for the dialogue process weakened the position of those elements on the left which, despite the right-wing violence, opposed the November rebel offensive. The offensive placed the reality of El Salvador—the limited power of the president, the military strength ofthe rebels, and the strong influence of the United States—in sharp relief. After the fiercest fighting in a decade, however, both President Cristiani and the FMLN showed a PEACEINELSALVADOR 193 willingness to return to the negotiating table with surprising speed. And their efforts may be aided by one tremendously important change. Since the offensive, the Bush administration has moderated its position: It has clearly stated that a negotiated settlement is the only way to end the war and hinted at the need for leverage to pursue such a settlement. A review of the forces that were responsible for producing the first substantive dialogue ofthe decade-long war is essential to an understanding of the prospects for peace in the wake of the FMLN offensive. Those forces—a major shift in the FMLN's approach, a Salvadoran president who wants a political settlement, favorable international pressures, and a pragmatic U.S. administration—are present today. Their combined impact appears to be pushing both sides toward the negotiating table. But what happens when they get there will be largely determined by how strongly the U.S. backs a negotiated settlement. A Major Shift by the FMLN On January 23, 1989, with the Duarte era approaching its end, the Bush administration settling into office, and El Salvador's presidential elections less than two months away, the FMLN announced a landmark proposal for ending the war. The FMLN, which had repeatedly labeled the U.S.-sponsored electoral process a farce and had attempted to disrupt it by force, suddenly offered to participate in the upcoming election provided several conditions were met, including a six-month delay in the vote. In accepting the legitimacy of elections, the proposal represented a major shift in the rebels' approach and it quickly dominated the national debate in El Salvador. President Duarte, after receiving signals from the Bush administration that the plan was worthy of consideration, showed flexibility toward it. An unprecedented flurry of political jockeying ensued, producing what many believed was the best opportunity for peace since the start of the war. In the process, it became clear that the FMLN had dropped two longstanding demands: a period of transitional "powersharing " between the two sides and integration ofthe rebel army into the Salvadoran military. Weeks before election day, however, both sides recognized that postponement ofthe election was not a serious possibility. The significance of these events was twofold. First, the FMLN was hailed at home and abroad for exhibiting a new moderation. With gestures of conciliation and another proposal that outlined conditions for ending the war, the rebels placed themselves at the center ofthe national debate for weeks. They set the agenda, forcing the United States, the Duarte government, and all political parties to respond or else risk 194 SAISREVIEW appearing intransigent. At home and abroad, peace in El Salvador was now widely viewed as a powerful political issue and, for having taken the initiative, the FMLN was accorded renewed legitimacy. Second, the FMLN demonstrated that its new approach represented a permanent shift. As a leading rebel diplomat stated after the peace effort failed—"We aren't going to take back everything we have said just because our proposal wasn't accepted."2 Each of the six proposals made by the FMLN in 1989 appeared to accept elections as a means of gaining power, provided certain conditions could be agreed upon to ensure that the vote would be truly "democratic." Some of the proposed conditions were reasonable. Others reflected a hard line toward talks. But the key concessions, particularly the acceptance ofdemocratic elections, remained constant. The January 1989 peace proposal was the culmination of a radical reassessment by the rebels of their long-range goals. Beginning at a major strategy session in May 1988, the FMLN sought to respond to the fundamental changes that had occurred in the political climate at home and abroad.3 In formulating a new strategy, the FMLN decided to send a delegation to tour Western Europe and Latin America in the fall. For the rebels, who had not left the mountains in years, the response they received on the tour was a rude awakening: pursue a negotiated settlement—not military victory. Mexico, whose views the FMLN respects and which in 1981 joined with France in recognizing the rebels as a "representative political force," unexpectedly criticized them.4 The FMLN's self-examination reportedly included a realistic view ofthe war: it was stalemated and its social and economic costs to the country were great. Even if victorious, the rebels could, as in Nicaragua, expect to face U.S. hostility and, given the changes under Mikhail Gorbachev, could not count on support from the Soviet Union. The Soviets had reportedly informed the FMLN that since they could not underwrite another revolutionary regime, it should pursue negotiations with the aim ofsecuring support from the West.5 Changes in El Salvador, particularly the increased tolerance shown for their political allies and a free press, influenced the rebels' analysis. Finally, there was the progress of the 2.Washington Post, March 5, 1989, A30. 3.Ellacuría, "Una Nueva Fase en El Proceso Salvadoreño," 175. 4.Frank Smythe, "Negotiations or Total War," The Nation, (August 7-14, 1989), 164; and Daniel Levy and Gabriel Szekeley, Mexico: Paradoxes ofStability and Change (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1987), 196. During their Latin American tour, the FMLN reportedly visited Argentina, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and Uruguay. 5.Washington Post, January 24, 1989, A15. PEACE IN EL SALVADOR 195 Central American peace plan, the election ofa pragmatic U.S. administration , and the deep desire for peace among Salvadorans. All ofthese were reportedly important considerations in the FMLN's reassessment.6 The FMLN now sought, according to its senior leader, Joaquin Villalobos, "an El Salvador that is open, flexible, pluralistic, and democratic in both the economic and political spheres."7 Villalobos also asserted that the rebels were not dogmatic socialists but were demanding resolution of the country's social problems within a Western-style democracy. Accordingly, the FMLN decided to abandon the "prolonged popular war" approach and to seek compromise in an effort to achieve a political settlement, including peaceful coexistence with the United States. The new FMLN position should be qualified on two points. First, events from last year indicate that there are opposing tendencies within the rebel movement. For example, after the rebel assassination of the attorney general in April, Villalobos was reportedly furious with the FMLN group that carried it out. While two of the five groups that make up the FMLN maintained their right to use such tactics, assassinations of civilians were by late summer apparently halted on the grounds that they were politically counterproductive. Villalobos' visible role in the rebel peace offensive throughout 1989 is viewed as significant. The rebel group he leads reportedly can be ruthless in its tactics, but it is nevertheless politically pragmatic and the most flexible regarding talks with the government.8 Second, to prevent the enemy from viewing its concessions as a sign of weakness, the FMLN consistently used military force to bolster its appeals for serious negotiations. For example, the FMLN stepped up the fighting prior to its diplomatic offensive in January 1989. The rebels threatened to make the country ungovernable iftheir peace proposal was rejected. And immediately after the second round of dialogue, for which the rebels had called a ten-day unilateral truce, they launched a series of strong attacks in the wake of perceived government intransigence. By mid-summer 1989, however, the FMLN decided to use more carrot than stick in its dual-track approach to a political settlement. At that time, El Salvador's major opposition parties were serving as intermediaries in an effort to bring the government and the rebels to the negotiating table. The FMLN reacted positively to the parties' reports that President 6.Ellacuría, "Una Nueva Fase en El Proceso Salvadoreño," 175-81. 7.Joaquín Villalobos, "A Democratic Revolution For El Salvador," Foreign Policy, no. 74 (Spring 1989): 120-21. 8.Frank Smythe, "Stark Choice In El Salvador: Negotiations or Total War," The Nation (August 7-14, 1989), 164-65; an interview conducted with a leading party member in August 1989; and Washington Post, February 27, 1990, A17. 196 SAISREVIEW Cristiani was serious about forming a government commission to begin a permanent dialogue. Consequently, showing a strong willingness to be flexible, the five top rebel leaders sent a letter to Cristiani telling him that a few points in his plan for a dialogue commission were "inconvenient ."9 In contrast, just two months earlier, the FMLN had declared that Cristiani's idea for a dialogue commission was an "offer to surrender."10 Cristiani, however, could not come to agreement on naming a new commission due to strong opposition from the right wing, which was insisting on a number of conditions for talks. The president's first commission plan had failed, and the second was on the verge of collapse. The rebels, as if to help the president surmount his political difficulties, subsequently announced they would accept "virtually all" of the government 's conditions and called for talks to begin the following week.11 A week later, the dialogue began. President Cristiani Supports a Political Settlement The victory ofAlfredo Cristiani in the 1989 presidential election gave ARENA, the right-wing party formed out ofthe paramilitary death squads of the early 1980s, control of all three branches of the Salvadoran government. It was feared that the government would reject any hint of serious negotiations and push for "total war" aimed at out wiping out the rebels and their sympathizers. Cristiani was expected to serve as the front-man for the right wing's human rights atrocities. To an extent these predictions proved accurate. With regard to negotiations, however, the events leading from Cristiani's inauguration to the November FMLN offensive demonstrated that the president wanted the dialogue process to succeed. He strongly expressed his support for a political settlement, angered the far Right by pursuing negotiations, and even convinced the FMLN that his desire to achieve peace was sincere. The problem, once again, was the severely limited power of the civilian president. The Cristiani government appeared semi-detached from the ARENA party's hardliners, partially because ofthe Bush administration's efforts to pull the president away from them. Cristiani and his close supporters 9.Letter of the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional to Alfredo Cristiani, El Salvador, August 6, 1989. 10."Crònica del mes," Estudios Centroamericanos, año XLD7, no. 488 (June 1989): 507. 11.News Release of the Farabundo Marti Front for National Liberation and the Democratic Revolutionary Front, September 7, 1989. PEACEINELSALVADOR 197 recognized that they now had to govern the country, and they hoped that their policies could produce an economic turnaround. Killing peasants, labor leaders, or leftist sympathizers, as certain members of ARENA are notorious for having done, was neither desirable nor acceptable to the United States. And Cristiani understood the cost to his government of losing U.S. congressional support. At his June inauguration, the Salvadoran president unveiled his own peace plan, the central component of which was the creation of a permanent dialogue commission. In a strong call for talks, the new president declared that "[t]he process of dialogue . . . will not be easy, or simple, but we are ready to initiate it immediately" without preconditions.12 His first attempt at forming a commission failed, however, largely because it lacked decisionmaking power. According to one veteranjournalist, the commission idea "was the minimum you could get away with in terms of a call for dialogue."13 Nonetheless, Cristiani reacted positively later in the summer when the major opposition political parties approached him with the idea ofserving as a channel of communication between the government and the FMLN. The opposition party leaders, including members of the leftist Democratic Convergence, became convinced that Cristiani was sincere about dialogue. But they also soon realized that the president had little room to maneuver. In fact, by the time the FMLN announced in early September that it would accept almost all of the government's conditions for dialogue, Cristiani had been working for nearly a month to placate the far Right. Cristiani's cabinet and ARENA party leaders reportedly held a stormy, day-long meeting on the commission issue but could not reach agreement. As Guillermo Ungo, one ofthe leaders ofthe Democratic Convergence, noted at the time, "Cristiani thought this was going to be easy. He is in a very difficult position [ofhaving to consult with the economic oligarchy, the Army, ARENA party leaders, and the United States] .... Cristiani has a better attitude and the political will," Ungo added, "but it is very difficult for him to do as he pleases."14 The Regional and International Situation Regional and international forces played a major role in the dialogue process that developed last year. In Latin America the broad transition 12."Discurso presidencial y reacciones," Estudios Centroamericanos, año XLrV, no. 488 (June 1989): 523. 13.Interview with Douglas Farah of the Washington Post, July 12, 1989. 14.Interview with Guillermo Ungo, August 22, 1989. 198 SAISREVIEW to democratic government has replaced the appeals for revolutionary change that characterized the 1960s and 1970s. The 1980s witnessed both a collapse of bureaucratic authoritarian regimes and a growing recognition that world competition was moving from the military sphere to the economic arena. Glasnost and perestroïka in the Soviet Union seemed to reinforce this trend. In Central America, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's determination to improve relations with the United States and restructure the Soviet economy prompted a withdrawal from the region. The Soviets reportedly halted arms shipments to the Nicaraguan government in January 1989 and called on the FMLN to seek support from Western nations because it could not underwrite another revolutionary regime. These changes in the international situation not only helped prompt the rebels' reassessment of their goals but also maintained pressure on them to negotiate. In its own effort to make use of international pressure, the FMLN worked to increase the involvement of the United Nations (UN) and the Organization of American States (OAS) in the settlement of the war. Both the Cristiani government and the FMLN were at times talking past each other and toward the U.S. Congress and international opinion. Each sought U.S. and international acceptance of its democratic credentials . ARENA, for its part, sought to alter its image as the party of rightwing death squads. For example, as Congress was considering legislation to condition a portion of U.S. aid on progress toward negotiations, an overeager President-elect Cristiani proposed immediate talks—two and a half months before his inauguration. Likewise, the FMLN offered new peace proposals just prior to two high-profile events for Cristiani—his post-election meeting with President Bush and his inauguration. The fifth summit ofthe Central American presidents in early August in Honduras gave a boost to the move toward dialogue. Having received a letter from the FMLN stating that talks were in the making, the region's presidents rejected Cristiani's effort to equate the demobilization of the Contras with that of the FMLN, but did reaffirm their support for the rebels' eventual disarmament. Both sides could claim victory; the FMLN felt it had increased its legitimacy, while Cristiani placated his right wing with a statement from Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega that eventually the FMLN would have to lay down its weapons. No Movement by the United States or El Salvador's Armed Forces The Bush administration, calling the January 1989 FMLN peace proposal "worthy of serious and substantive consideration," initially PEACEINELSALVADOR 199 signaled a major change in U.S. policy toward El Salvador.15 And as the dialogue began in late summer the administration stated that "[w]e sincerely hope that at the ongoing government-FMLN talks, both sides will agree to a definitive end to the conflict. This can be accomplished only if both sides engage seriously with the goal ofachieving agreement . . . ."16 In contrast to the Reagan administration's blanket rejection of serious negotiations, this response demonstrated a pragmatic outlook. Yet the signal that nothing substantive had changed since the Reagan years was much stronger. The U.S. embassy in San Salvador often stated that the FMLN's change in position was a hoax. Embassy officials maintained that the FMLN had a secret "Plan Fire" to use negotiations to promote mass insurrection. According to opposition party members, U.S. Ambassador William Walker saw no reason to change course as long as President Cristiani was doing well. In addition, Ambassador Walker worked to rehabilitate Roberto D'Aubuisson, a cashiered army major whose past ties to death squad activity are well-documented, who in the early 1980s was reportedly involved in a plot to assassinate the United States ambassador, and who almost certainly masterminded the 1980 assassination ofArchbishop Oscar Romero. Apparently, the United States believed that right-wing extremists could change, while left-wing extremists could not—even though Washington had never put the Left's claims to the test. Last year, liberals in Congress unsuccessfully sought to condition military aid on progress toward negotiations. The debate sent a signal to intransigent elements in El Salvador that they would have to at least make a show of support for talks. This congressional pressure, however, never came close to forcing a fundamental change in U.S. policy—change that could have bolstered the fragile dialogue process. Consequently, while the Salvadoran military paid Hp service to dialogue, it staunchly declared that its "organic structure" was not subject to negotiation.17 The paramount concern ofthe Salvadoran armed forces is the integrity ofthe military as an institution. Virtually any significant societal change is perceived as a threat to its position, or that of its farright civilian allies, and therefore unacceptable. Installing presidents, rigging elections, and repressing the political opposition, the military has maintained a corrupt and ruthless grip on Salvadoran society for over halfa century. The military is responsible for 15.Washington Post, January 27, 1989, A16. 16.State Department press conference, September 18, 1989. 17.Colonel Orlando Zepeda, Vice-Minister of Defense, "Al Día," Channel 12 News, San Salvador, August 18, 1989. 200 SAISREVIEW the deaths of many tens of thousands of Salvadorans. Since 1982, with the start of a series ofU.S.-sponsored elections, it has allowed civilians to take office but not the reins of power that matter most. As a recent yearlong study of the Salvadoran armed forces concluded, the military is "an already powerful institution grown virtually untouchable on the spoils of a lucrative war."18 With regard to the war, while moderate members of the army are flexible, the most powerful officers view compromise as an unacceptable sign ofweakness. The major debate within the military, thus, is not over whether or not the military should be subordinate to civilian rule. Rather, the split in the military is between officers who believe working with and profiting from the United States is beneficial and those who are angry that the United States has given them the firepower to wipe out the rebels and their civilian sympathizers but will not let them use it. This latter group prefers the so-called "total war" approach. Motives Behind the FMLN's Offensive The FMLN offensive seriously weakened, albeit temporarily, President Cristiani and created severe problems for him with the right wing. It also uprooted the extensive FMLN clandestine network in San Salvador and eroded confidence in the FMLN's desire for talks. The opening for the political opposition was virtually shut off. Death squad-style killing quickly re-emerged and the view that the war could not be won militarily received even greater justification. Equally significant, however, is that the offensive was an extension of the FMLN's two-pronged strategy begun in January of last year: use of both carrot and stick to achieve a cease-fire and, ultimately, a political settlement based on "democratic" elections. From the start, Cristiani's difficulties in forming his own dialogue commission could not have given the FMLN much confidence. The FMLN received favorable attention for its September proposal to begin incorporating into the political process, provided reforms were made in the electoral system and the structure of the Army. But the delegation sent by the government to the first round of talks was relatively low level. And at the subsequent round, the government delegation clearly backed away from Cristiani's previous display offlexibility, refusing to consider concessions until the FMLN first surrendered its arms. 18. Joel Millman, "El Salvador's Army: A Force Unto Itself," New York Times Magazine, December 10, 1989, 95. PEACE IN EL SALVADOR 201 Soon after the second round, political violence against leftists rose dramatically, plunging the Cristiani government into crisis and helping make impossible, from the FMLN point of view, a continuation of the dialogue. Perhaps as important as the violence was the FMLN's recognition that the key ingredient to making the process viable—the strong support ofthe United States—was missing. Since March 1987, when the FMLN assaulted the army base at El Paraíso, the United States had been claiming that the FMLN was finished militarily. The United States refused to show a strong sign of support for compromise that would have strengthened the pro-dialogue position on the Left and, until it was too late, apparently declined to take steps to help prevent a violent right-wing reaction to serious dialogue. Given the circumstances, the FMLN decided that it had to prove itself on the battlefield, demonstrate that the economy would continue to disintegrate as long as the war continued, and further tempt the rightwing assassins to expose themselves. Otherwise, the rebels believed the government's stalling at the negotiating table would continue. Some members ofthe FMLN did have other motives for launching the offensive, including igniting a popular uprising. But FMLN leaders have acknowledged that they cannot win militarily; these other motives simply reflected rhetorical zeal, wishful thinking by rebel ground troops, and the continuing belief by some rebel fighters that they can win the war.19 It bears reiterating here that the FMLN is not monolithic. Not all of its members fully agree with the new approach of the movement. For example, the December assassination of the former chief of the Supreme Court, apparently by the FMLN, indicated either a hardline tendency or a lack of control over rebel commandos. President Cristiani and the FMLN Offensive Judging from his efforts to promote dialogue, it appears that if President Cristiani had the power he would seriously pursue a political settlement. Cristiani is among a growing group ofbusinessmen associated with the Right who take a positive view of negotiations. The war is clearly a disaster for business. Leading opposition party figures believe he is amenable to compromise. And so does the FMLN. Less than two months after the offensive, a rebel diplomat stated the FMLN's belief that Cristiani genuinely supported a negotiated settlement.20 19.Washington Post, November 28, 1989, A20. 20.Interview with a rebel diplomat, January 19, 1990. 202 SAISREVIEW Opposition political party members convinced ofPresident Cristiani's sincerity have noted his political inexperience and naivete. Until recently, he has appeared not to understand the motives and methods of the far right and the military. Cristiani, said a U.S. officialjust before the FMLN offensive, "is seeing all the guys in his corner aren't great guys, that not all the accusations about them were made up by the press and the United States."21 The president is despised by members of the right wing, who expected to get someone far less moderate. Much like President Duarte during the Reagan era, Cristiani is being cultivated by the Bush administration as the moderate center between the extremes of the Left and Right. His political survival is the foundation ofU.S. policy, and the limited power he holds stems from the support he receives from Washington. To Congress his presence as a democratically elected president confirms that El Salvador is an emerging democracy. But the fact remains that Cristiani, who does not even have full control of his own party, is largely playing a role defined for him by the United States. Although he supports a political settlement, it would be preposterous to believe that he could, or would ever be willing to, go over the heads of the ARENA right wing, the military, and the United States to achieve one. Days before the FMLN launched its offensive, the right wing increased its attacks against the leftist opposition, putting Cristiani's leadership in crisis. President Bush sent As
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