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The Second World War and Political Dynamics in Afghanistan

2014; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 50; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/00263206.2013.870892

1743-7881

Faridullah Bezhan,

Islamic Studies and History

AbstractThis paper explores how the Second World War brought a new breadth to Afghanistani politics despite the fact that the country did not participate in the war. It widened the power struggle between members of the royal family and introduced new players to the scene who, by fighting for their own interests, shaped the course of events. The paper looks at the main political issues which caused division within the ruling class, mobilized the educated classes, and shaped Afghanistani politics. It also examines those players who brought about the new political developments. Notes1. S. Farhang, Afghanistan dar Panj Qarn-i Akhir [Afghanistan in the Past Five Centuries], 2nd ed. (Tehran: Erfan, 1992), p.641.2. According to a US State Department document, the invasion of Iran thoroughly alarmed the Afghanistani elites. In September 1941 the German envoy reported that the hostile feeling against England and Russia on the part of the Government and people, produced by the Iranian event, still persists. Although the Government has taken account of this feeling by sharply criticizing what has happened through public statements in the newspaper Anis and the Radio, nevertheless it is dominated by its original fears that the Iranian event could be repeated here.Quoted in V. Gregorian, The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan: Politics of Reform and Modernization, 1880–1946 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1969), p.388.3. According to declassified Soviet documents, Zahir Shah was so pleased with the outbreak of war between Germany and the Soviet Union that on 12 June 1941 he donated 12,000 Afghanis from his own pocket to charity. Y. Tikhonov, Siyasat Keshwar-hay Bozurg dar Afghanistan wa Qabael Pashtun, 1919–1945 [Politics of Great Powers in Afghanistan and the Pashtun Tribes, 1919–1945], trans. A. Arianfar (Kabul: Intesharat Kawa, 2011), p.366. Zahir Shah believed that now the Germans were on the march towards India through Afghanistan.4. Tikhonov, Siyasat Keshwar-hay Bozurg, pp.426–7. These contacts were disclosed by Dr Hans Pilgar, the captured German Ambassador in Kabul, to his Russian interrogators. Tikhonov, Siyasat Keshwar-hay Bozurg, p.453.5. Ibid., p.487.6. All Musahiban brothers, including Nadir, Hashim and Mahmud were born and educated in British India.7. M. Hauner, India in Axis Strategy: Germany, Japan, and Indian Nationalists in the Second World War (London: Klett-Cotta, 1981), pp.321–2.8. See ibid., pp.159–73.9. Tikhonov, Siyasat Keshwar-hay Bozurg, p.429.10. According to a British Indian source, owing to his ‘interference in affairs outside’ his duty Daud ‘was said to be a ‘second King of Afghanistan’. Who's Who in Afghanistan 1940, General Staff, India, 10th ed. (Simla: Government of India Press, 1940; British Library, L/P&S/20/B220/5), p.116.11. Afghanistan Strategic Intelligence: British Records 1919–1970, Vol.IV, ed. A.L.P. Burdett (London: Archive Editions, 2002), p.376.12. Pitro Quaroni, the captured Italian minister in Kabul at the time, told his Russian interrogators that Daud had prepared for a coup in 1942. Tikhonov, Siyasat Keshwar-hay Bozurg, pp.428–9.13. Ibid., p.430.14. According to the unwritten agreement of the royal family on the eve of conquering Kabul in 1929, the post of prime minister should have been given to Shah Wali, another brother of Shah Mahmud. In a conversation with the British minister in Kabul on 4 October 1932, Prime Minister Muhammad Hashim said that Shah Wali preferred ‘a life of voluntary exile and idleness in Europe’. The reason behind this decision was that his wife, a sister of ex-King Amanullah, did not want to remain in Afghanistan. Afghanistan. Government of India Foreign Department Printed Correspondence, Secret/Confidential, Dec. 1931–March 1933 (British Library, L/P&S/12/1600: Part 46), pp.25–6.15. Hashim had been able to rule the country with total authority because he had no rival within the royal family, and no one could undermine his authority.16. In order to avoid confrontation with Daud and his clique, Shah Mahmud sometimes spent months overseas or travelling inside the country.17. See M. Yapp, ‘British Perceptions of the Russian Threat to India’, Modern Asian Studies, Vol.21, No.4 (1987), pp.647–65; A.S. Ghaus, The Fall of Afghanistan: An Insider's Account (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1988). 18. An American Embassy document dated 29 July 1948 stated: ‘A considerable number of persons of good education and proven ability who were long in disfavour or actually in prison have been installed in secondary positions … in recent months.’ American Embassy Kabul, ‘New Appointments in Afghanistani Cabinet with Particular Comment on Selection of H.E. Abdul Hadi Khan Dawi as Private Secretary to the King’, No.122 Confidential (29 July 1948).19. G.M. Ghubar, Afghanistan dar Masir-i Tarikh, Jeld-i Dovum [Afghanistan in the Path of History, Second Volume] (Herndon: American Speedy Press, 1999), p.207. 20. Farhang, Afghanistan dar Panj Qarn-i Akhir, p.660.21. For the Afghanistani government Pashtunistan encompassed the present North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan. For the definition of Pashtunistan for the involved parties, see E. Jansson, India, Pakistan or Pakhtunistan: the Nationalist Movements in the North-West Frontier Province, 1937–47 (Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, 1981), p.231.22. In 1947 the Pashtuns on the Raj side of the Durand Line were asked to choose between becoming citizens of India or Pakistan in a referendum. The Congress Party had demanded that they should be allowed to vote for independence as well, but this was rejected by Lord Mountbattan to ‘avoid complications’. G. Montagno, ‘The Pak–Afghan Détente’, Asian Survey, Vol.3, No.12 (1963), p.620; M. Banerjee, The Pathan Unarmed (Karachi and New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000), p.187. Afghanistan also proposed that two alternatives be offered – accession to Afghanistan and independence. D.S. Frank, ‘Disputed Disposition of a Tribal Land’, Middle East Journal, Vol.6, No.1(1952), p.56. This was also denied. Of the eligible voters to cast ballots, Pakistan received 289,244 votes, while 2874 voted for India. See S.A. Rittenberg, Ethnicity, Nationalism, and the Pakhtuns: the Independence Movement in India's North-West Frontier Province (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 1988), p.222; A. Fletcher, Afghanistan: Highway of Conquest (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1965), p.251. The outcome of the referendum was that the Pashtuns on the British side became citizens of Pakistan.23. The line is named after Sir Mortimer Durand who negotiated the agreement with Amir Abdul Rahman.24. The area, Pashunistan, was known as the ‘the great danger spot in India’ by the viceroy, Lord Louis Mountbatten, who had been sent to India specifically for the task of handing over power to the Indians. Ritttenberg, Ethnicity, Nationalism, and the Pakhtuns, p.234.25. For the agreement, see C.U. Aitchison (ed.), A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads Relating India and Neighbouring Countries, Vol.XIII, No.XIII, Persia and Afghanistan (Calcutta: Government of India Central Publication Branch, 1933). The line aroused resentment among millions of Pashtuns cut off from their fellow tribesmen in Afghanistan. For the agreement and the context in which the Amir signed. See H. Kakar, A Political and Diplomatic History of Afghanistan, 1863–1901 (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2006), especially pp.177–92.26. In 1949 the Afghanistan parliament declared that it did not recognize the Durand Line. Since then successive Afghanistani governments have rejected it, saying that it was never meant to be a formal international boundary.27. M.A.K. Khattak, A Pathan Odyssey, ed. with foreword by J.W. Spain (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), p.75.28. F. Bezhan, ‘The Pashtunistan Issue and the Response of Political Parties in Afghanistan, 1947–52’, Middle East Journal’, forthcoming. 29. Q. Reshtia, Khaterat-i Siyasi [Political Memoirs] (Herndon: American Speedy Press, 1997), p.71. 30. US State Department, ‘Memorandum of Conversation with Nur Muhammad Taraki: Wikh Zalmian Party’, American Embassy in Kabul, No.A-269 (Oct. and Nov. 1963).31. US State Department, ‘Top Secret’, Joint Weeks, No.12 from S.A., American Embassy in Kabul (23 March 1950).32. According to Dupree, this conformed with the requirements of traditional society: ‘When a young man's father dies (or is killed), his paternal uncle or uncles replace his father in the culturally defined father-son rights and obligations. So rule by the uncles was most logical, and gave the King time to study his nation, his role, and his responsibilities, and to assess his political future.’ Louis Dupree, Afghanistan (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973), p.477.33. See R. Farhadi, ‘Muhammad Zahir Shah: Padshae ke Basa az Arezo-hayesh Jama Amal Naposhid’ [Zahir Shah: the Monarch Whose Most Ambitions Were not Fulfilled], http://www.afghan-german.de (accessed 15 Aug. 2011); M.H. Anwar Memories of Afghanistan, ed. with an afterword by K. Anwar (Bloomington, IN: Author House, 2004), p.257. According to Anwar, the ‘only individuals permitted to have contact with him [Zahir Shah] were his doctor and a painting companion’. Ibid.34. Quoted in L. Adamec, Afghanistan's Foreign Affairs to the Mid-Twentieth Century: Relations with the USSR, Germany, and Britain (Tucson, AZ: The University of Arizona Press, 1974), p.262.35. According to Soviet declassified documents, Britain covertly transferred Rs 5 million per annum to Hashim's bank account with Bank Imperial. Tikhonov, Siyasat Keshwar-hay Bozurg dar Afghanistan, p.387. British sources state that the amount was ‘a gift of £500,000 in instalment over two years’. Hauner, India in Axis Strategy, p.328. When Hashim died he was one of the richest men in Afghanistan.36. One of unique abilities of Hashim was that he ‘knows almost every Afghanistani trouble maker within the country and in most instances knows who can best be depended upon in each instance to assist the Government against such trouble maker’. US State Department, ‘Official Business–Informal Personal and Secret’; US State Department, American Embassy in Kabul, ‘Official Business–Informal Personal and Secret’ (17 Jan. 1948), p.5.37. Who's Who in Afghanistan 1940, p.167.38. Ghubar, Afghanistan dar Masir-i Tarikh, p.56.39. Reshtia, Khaterat-i Siyasi, p.49.40. R.T. Stewart, Fire in Afghanistan 1914–1929: Faith, Hope, and the British Empire (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., 1973), pp.233–4; S.M. Rahim, Khaterat Sardar Muhammad Rahim Khan: Barg-hay az Tarikh Maser Watan Ma [Rahim's Memoir: Accounts of the Contemporary History of Afghanistan], trans. G.S. Ghairat (Peshawar: Fazl, 2001), p.20; K. Saraj, Roydad-hay Nemae Akhir Sada Bistum dar Afghanitsan [Events in the Second Half of the Twentieth Century in Afghanistan] (Frankfurt: Aryana, 1997).41. Interestingly, Amanullah agreed to the marriage of two of his other sisters to two of Hashim's brothers. There ‘was talk that Amanullah became perturbed at the sight of so much power going to this [Musahiban] single family, and he decided to limit it’. Stewart, Fire in Afghanistan, p.234.42. Hashim, who was fond of Razya, and whose name always ‘could excite’ him, remained single all his life. Ibid.43. Tikhonov, Siyasat Keshwar-hay Bozurg, pp.258–9. Hashim appointed Allah Nawaz, an Indian and Nadir Shah's minister of court to Rome, to oversee the assassination of Amanullah. However, with the help of Soviet agents, Nawaz was arrested by Italian police and his weapon was confiscated. Who's Who in Afghanistan 1940, p.89.44. Gregorian, The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan, p.356.45. Ghubar, Afghanistan dar Masir-i Tarikh, p.196.46. According to Anwar, who was an eye-witness, Hashim ‘established the widest network of spies and counter-espionage in the country. His agents could be found in all governmental departments, schools and military establishments and among Pashtun tribes, nomads and beggars … Reports, rumors, gossip and tall tales were pondered over, classified and catalogued. Political reports were pursued relentlessly and suspects were arrested and tortured until they confessed their crimes and named accomplices’. Anwar, Memories of Afghanistan, p.134.47. A.H. Habibi, ‘Mamlakate ke Qoway Selasa ba Dast Saderazam Ast’ [A Country in Which the Three Branches of Power are in the Hands of the Prime Minister], Azad Afghanistan, No.23 (1952), p.7.48. There are conflicting accounts about the resignation of Hashim. On 14 January 1946 he himself told the British minister in Kabul that ‘he had tendered his resignation to King Zahir Shah on the grounds of ill health’. Afghanistan Strategic Intelligence, Vol.III, p.855. But the official announcement of his resignation was only made on 5 May 1946. Most Afghanistani historians claim that he was in fact removed from the post. According to the king's private secretary, he carried the sealed and unsigned resignation letter from Zahir Shah to Hashim at midnight and woke Hashim. Hashim, who was annoyed at being disturbed, initially refused to receive the letter, but once he realized there were extra soldiers around his residence, he accepted it. After reading the letter, he said: ‘Tell his Majesty I obey his order.’ Farhang, Afghanistan dar Panj Qarn-i Akhir, p.662.49. Afghanistan Strategic Intelligence, Vol.III, p.864.50. US State Department, ‘Incoming Telegram’, 890H.002/7-2947 (29 July 1947).51. US State Department, ‘Incoming Telegram’, 890H.002/8-147 (2 Aug. 1947). The British military attaché in Kabul, who knew him for quite a while, noted that Shah Mahmud ‘is prone to be influenced by flattery, is very touchy on matters affecting his personal prestige’. Afghanistan Strategic Intelligence, Vol.III, p.908.52. Who's Who in Afghanistan 1940, p.204.53. Fletcher, Afghanistan: Highway of Conquest, p.242.54. Just two hours after the assassination of Nadir Shah on 8 November 1933, Shah Mahmud proclaimed Zahir Shah successor to the throne while Hashim was on a tour of the northern provinces. This left Hashim with little choice but to endorse the succession.55. Quoted in A. Akram, Nega-i ba Shakhsiat, Nazaryat wa Siasat-hay Sardar Muhammad Daud [A Review of Sardar Muhammad Daud's Personality, Views and Politics] (n.p.: Mizan Publications, 2001), p.61.56. An American journalist described the government in a 1950 report in the New York Times: ‘Nearly all the ministers and key Afghanistani diplomats are members of the Muhammadzay clan … The Prime Minister – the king's uncle; the War Minister – the king's nephews [sic], the Transport Minister – their son-in-law, and the daughter of a minister without portfolio is the king's wife.’ Cited in J. Sierakowska-dyndo, ‘Tribalism and Afghan Political Traditions’, http://www.wgsr.uw.edu.pl (accessed 15 Aug. 2010), p.59.57. US State Department, ‘New Appointments in Afghan Cabinet’, American Embassy in Kabul, 890H.002/7-2948 (29 July 1948).58. According to a report by Angus Ward, the American ambassador in Kabul, Shah Mahmud lost the support of the most influential members of the royal family. He had two choices: to seek the support of people from outside the family; or submit to the family decision. He chose the latter. Cited in Akram, Nega-i ba Shakhsiat, p.82. The pretext for disagreement between Shah Mahmud and Daud was the Pashtunistan issue. While Daud favoured a tough policy to achieve the goal, Mahmud had a softer approach.59. US State Department, ‘Biographical Report: Mohammad Daud’, American Embassy in Kabul, AF00150 (13 Aug. 1973), p.1.60. L. Adamec, A Biographical Dictionary of Contemporary Afghanistan (Graz, Austria: Akademische Druk-u. Verlagsanstalt, 1987), p.114.61. Farhang, Afghanistan dar Panj Qarn-i Akhir, p.701.62. At that stage Muhammad Naim was considered for the position of prime minister and Daud for minister of defence. However, Daud soon prevailed as the leading figure among the brothers.63. Afghanistan Strategic Intelligence, Vol.III, pp.535–6. According to a British document dated July 1946, the reason for his dissatisfaction was because his ‘powers have been limited in various directions, particularly in relation to finance, dealings with the tribes of the Eastern and Southern provinces, the appointments of senior officers and in minor directions such as sports and games, all of which subjects remain under the control of Shah Mahmud’. Afghanistan Strategic Intelligence, Vol.III, p.941. However the real reason was that Daud wanted the post of prime minister.64. Dupree, Afghanistan, p.498.65. Fletcher, Afghanistan: Highway of Conquest, p.243.66. Afghanistan. Government of India Foreign Department Printed Correspondence, Secret/Confidential, March 1934 to July 1935 (British Library, L/P&S/12/1662: Part 68), p.125.67. Adamec, A Biographical Dictionary, p.201.68. M. Fry, The Afghan Economy: Money, Finance, and the Critical Constrains to Economic Development (Leiden: Brill, 1974), p.83; see also Ghubar, Afghanistan dar Masir-i Tarikh, p.90; Farhang, Afghanistan dar Panj Qarn-i Akhir, pp.621–2; J. Griffiths, Afghanistan: Key to a Continent (London: Andre Deutsch, 1981), p.141.69. In a report dated 22 July 1935, the British minister in Kabul noted the close connections between Zabuli and Germany and his role in establishing economic ties between the two countries. [Zabuli] spent several years in Germany and speaks German fluently. Two Germans are employed by [his] Company, and a representative of Siemens has his office in their premises. It is understood that the negotiation for the grant of an export credit of six and half million marks by Germany to Afghanistan have been concluded and it is also reported that the Afghanistani Government has under contemplation a scheme for granting Germany a monopoly of the whole of the annual wool crop of Afghanistan for so long as may be necessary in return for materials for a cartridge factory and plant for manufacture of boots and shoes. Afghanistan. Government of India Foreign Department Printed Correspondence, Secret/Confidential, March 1934 to Nov. 1935 (British Library, L/P&S/12/1662: Part 57), p.79.70. Afghanistan. Government of India Foreign Department Printed Correspondence, Secret/Confidential, Feb. 1937 to Dec. 1938 (British library, L/P&S/12/1664: Part 65), p.130.71. Vartan Gregorian, The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan: Politics of Reform and Modernization, 1880–1946 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1969), p.386.72. Ibid., p.387.73. It was not only during the war that Zabuli crossed the line of his formal authority, but also in peacetime. As a US State Department document of 17 January 1949 indicates, Prime Minister Shah Mahmud and some other officials were displeased with Zabuli ‘as having exceeded the limits of [his] authority in negotiation with US officials’. US State Department, ‘Memorandum of Conversation Abdold Hai Aziz: Possible Afghan Cabinet Changes’, American Embassy in Kabul, 890H.002/1-1749 (17 Jan. 1949).74. Farhang, Afghanistan dar Panj Qarn-i Akhir, p.665.75. US State Department, ‘Afghanistan–Internal Political Trends’, American Embassy in Kabul (12 Dec. 1949).76. A. Arnold and R. Klass, ‘Afghanistan's Communist Party: The Fragmented PDPA’, in R. Klass (ed.), Afghanistan the Great Game Revisited, rev. ed. (New York: Freedom House, 1990), p.138; O. Roy, ‘The Origins of the Afghan Communist Party’, Central Asian Survey, Vol.7, Nos.2–3 (1988), p.45.77. F.-U.-R. Marwat, The Evolution and Growth of Communism in Afghanistan (1917–1919): An Appraisal (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1997), p.244.78. A. Arnold, Afghanistan's Two Party Communism: Parcham and Khalq (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1983), p.10.79. See for example, M.A. Baserki, Weesh Zalmayān: De Afghānistāan Yaw Seyāsi Tahrik [Awaken Youth: Afghanistan's Political Movement] (Netherlands: Afghan Kultori Tolana, 2000), pp.29–31; W. Zalmai, Tarikhcha Tasis-e Matboat-e Afghanistan, 1300–1385 [A Survey of History of Journalism in Afghanistan, 1920–2006] (Kabul: Ameri, 2007), pp.268–70.80. Ghubar, Afghanistan dar Masir-i Tarikh, p.242; V.G. Korgun, ‘Afghanistan in the Contemporary Times’, in Y.V. Gankovski et al. (eds.), A History of Afghanistan (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1985), p.247; V. Boyko, ‘The Origin of Political Parties in Contemporary Afghanistan in the Light of New Archival Data’, Central Asia Journal, No.46 (2000), p.201.81. US State Department, ‘Memorandum of Conversation: Dr Raouf of Afghan–American Trading Company’, American Embassy in Kabul (15 Sept. 1949), pp.2–3.82. Reshtia, Khaterat-i Siyasi, p.85.83. K. Khalili, Yadashat-hay Ustad Khalili: Mokalema ba Dokhataresh Mary [Khalili's Notes in a Conversation with His Daughter] (Virginia, Herndon: All Prints, 2010), pp.340–42; Frank, ‘Disputed Disposition of a Tribal Land’, p.48. Khalili, who served as secretary to the cabinet, provides a detailed account of this incident. See Yadashat-hay Ustad Khalili, pp.339–43.