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A Theory of Terrorist Leadership (and its Consequences for Leadership Targeting)

2014; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 26; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/09546553.2012.751912

1556-1836

Michael Freeman,

Politics and Conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Middle East

Abstract States often target terrorist leaders with the belief that the leader's death or capture will cause the terrorist organization to collapse. Yet the history of this strategy of "leadership targeting" provides a mixed record—for every example of effectiveness, there are similar examples of ineffectiveness. The central question of this article is: what makes a terrorist leader important? Specifically, what does a terrorist leader do that no one else can do (or do as well) for the organization? To answer this question, I develop a theory of terrorist leadership that argues that leaders might potentially perform two main functions: they can provide inspiration and/or operational direction (or not for both). I also theorize as to how and why the provision of these functions changes over time as the organization itself changes. The consequences for leadership targeting flow naturally from this theory—when leaders provide these functions to the organization, leadership targeting is most likely to be effective. Case studies of Algeria, Peru, and Japan offer insights into why some cases of leadership targeting were effective and why others were not. The conclusion extends this model with an analysis of al-Qaeda's prospects after the death of bin Laden. Keywords: Algeriaal-QaedaAum shinrikyobin ladendecapitationleadership targetingShining Pathterrorism Notes This article not subject to U.S. copyright law. For more on the moral and legal basis of decapitation, which is not the subject of this essay, see Nils Melzer, Targeted Killings in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Catherine Lotrionte, "When to Target Leaders," The Washington Quarterly 26, no. 3 (Summer 2003): 73–86; and Avery Plaw, Targeting Terrorists: A License to Kill (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2008). Leaders are defined as the singular person generally recognized as the person at the top of the organization. Leadership targeting describes operations designed to capture, arrest, or kill the enemy leader. Effective leadership targeting is defined as a notable decrease in violence by the terrorist organization that results from the loss of the leader. Effective operations are distinguished from successful operations, in which the leader is successfully killed or captured. For generally similar approaches to defining these terms, see Bryan Price, "Targeting Top Terrorists: How Leadership Decapitation Contributes to Counterterrorism," International Security 36, no. 4 (Spring 2012): 9–46; Jenna Jordan, "When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation," Security Studies, 18 (2009): 719–755; Patrick Johnston, "Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns," International Security 36, no. 4 (Spring 2012): 47–79. For a longer list of effective decapitations, see Martha Crenshaw, "How Terrorism Declines," Terrorism and Political Violence 3, no. 1 (Spring 1991): 69–87; Audrey Kurth Cronin, "How al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups," International Security 31, no. 1 (Summer 2006): 7–48; Daniel Byman, "Do Targeted Killings Work?," Foreign Affairs 85, no. 2 (March/April 2006): 95–111; Graham H. Turbiville, Jr., "Hunting Leadership Targets in Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorist Operations," Joint Special Operations University Report (June 2007); and Price, "Targeting Top Terrorists" (see note 2 above). Steven David, "Israel's Policy of Targeted Killing," Ethics and International Affairs 17, no. 1 (2003): 111–126; Mohammed M. Hafez and Joseph M. Hatfield, "Do Targeted Assassinations Work? A Multivariate Analysis of Israel's Controversial Tactic during the Al-Aqsa Uprising," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29, no. 4 (June 2006): 362. Turbiville, "Hunting Leadership Targets" (see note 3 above), 74, 77. Lisa Langdon, Alexander J. Sarapu, and Matthew Wells, "Targeting the Leadership of Terrorist and Insurgent Movements: Historical Lessons for Contemporary Policy Makers," Journal of Public and International Affairs 15 (Spring 2004): 59–78; Alex Wilner, "Targeted Killings in Afghanistan: Measuring Coercion and Deterrence in Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 33, no. 4 (April 2010): 307–329; Jordan, "When Heads Roll" (see note 2 above). Jordan, "When Heads Roll" (see note 2 above); Johnston, "Does Decapitation Work?" (see note 2 above); Price, "Targeting Top Terrorists" (see note 2 above); and Aaron Mannes, "Testing the Snake Head Strategy: Does Killing or Capturing its Leader Reduce a Terrorist Group's Activity," The Journal of International Policy Solutions 9 (Spring 2008): 40–49. See Price, "Targeting Top Terrorists" (note 2 above), 14–23. Stephen T. Hosmer, Operations Against Enemy Leaders (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001); and Brian Michael Jenkins, Should Our Arsenal Against Terrorism Include Assassination? (Santa Monica: RAND, 1987). John Kotter, "What Leaders Really Do," Harvard Business Review, December 2001, 3–11, uses different language but makes the distinction between leaders (what I call inspirational figures) and managers, both of which I semantically consider as leaders. Using different language, Henry Mintzberg, in "The Manager's Job: Folklore and Fact," Harvard Business Review, July–August 1975, uses different language to describe ten roles of a manager, one of which is a "leader." Martha Crenshaw, "The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic Choice," in Walter Reich, ed., The Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1998), 7–24. For more on selective incentives and the collective action problem, see Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965); Samuel Popkin, The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979); Mark Irving Lichbach, The Rebel's Dilemma (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995); and Jeremy Weinstein, Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). The following discussion draws directly from Gordon H. McCormick's unpublished manuscript, "The Revolutionary Hero: Charismatic Authority and Rebel Organization" (Monterey, CA: Department of Defense Analysis, Naval Postgraduate School, June 2003). Used with permission of the author. For further information on this source contact Michael Freeman at mefreema@nps.edu. Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, trans. and eds., H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 245, 249. See also Arthur Schweitzer, "Theory and Political Charisma," Comparative Studies in Society and History 16, no. 2 (March 1974): 150–181; Bernard Bass, Stogdill's Handbook of Leadership (New York: The Free Press, 1981), 152; Gary Yukl, Leadership in Organizations, 4th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1998), 298–300; Arthur J. Deikman, "The Psychological Power of Charismatic Leaders in Cults and Terrorist Organizations," in James J. F. Forest, ed., The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training, and Root Causes (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006), 71–83; Robert C. Tucker, "Personality and Political Leadership," Political Science Quarterly 92, no. 3 (Fall 1997): 388. Martin E. Spencer, "What Is Charisma?," The British Journal of Sociology 24, no. 3 (September 1973): 342. Ann Ruth Willner and Dorothy Willner, "The Rise and Role of Charismatic Leaders," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 358 (March 1965): 77 and 83. Chanoch Jacobsen and Robert House, "The Rise and Decline of Charismatic Leadership," unpublished manuscript (1999), 11. Tucker, "Personality and Political Leadership" (see note 13 above), 388. Spencer, "What Is Charisma?" (see note 14 above): 346. John H. Humphreys and Walter O. Einstein, "Nothing New Under the Sun: Transformational Leadership from a Historical Perspective," Management Decision 41, no. 1 (2003): 86. Willner and Willner, "The Rise and Role of Charismatic Leaders" (see note 14 above): 77, 79; Reinhard Bendix, "Reflections on Charismatic Leadership," Asian Survey 7, no. 6 (June 1967): 341–352, 344; Spencer, "What is Charisma?" (see note 14 above): 348. While Weber does note that the leader's "charismatic claim breaks down if his mission is not recognized by those to whom he feels he has been sent," Weber also argues that "he does not derive his 'right' from their will … rather, it is the duty of those to whom he addresses his mission to recognize him as their charismatically qualified leader" (Weber, From Max Weber, see note 13 above, 246, 247). Spencer argues that Weber understates this connection, that "the leader in part earns his charisma because of the responsiveness of his followers to his ideas.…Charisma always involves a relationship between the group and the leader" (Spencer, 347, 348). Tucker, "Personality and Political Leadership" (see note 13 above): 389. Charismatic leaders unite the "ideal-hungry" followers with the "mirror-hungry" leader, according to Jerrold Post (Jerrold Post, "Narcissism and the Charismatic Leader-Follower Relationship," Political Psychology 7, no. 4 (December 1986): 675–688.) This falls under the contingency approach to leadership. S. Alexander Haslam and Michael J. Platow, "The Link Between Leadership and Followership: How Affirming Social Identity Translates Vision Into Action," Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 27, no. 11 (November 2001): 1469. Thomas E. Dow, Jr., "The Theory of Charisma," The Sociological Quarterly 10, no. 3 (Summer 1969): 308. Dow calls this an "irrational bond." Haslam and Platow, "The Link Between Leadership and Followership" (see note 21 above): 1469; Willner and Willner, "The Rise and Role of Charismatic Leaders" (see note 14 above): 79; Dow, "The Theory of Charisma" (see note 22 above): 308 calls this an "irrational bond"; Lichbach, The Rebel's Dilemma (see note 11 above), 168 and 162. Alan Bryman, "Leadership in Organizations," in Stewart R. Clegg, Cynthia Hardy, and Walter R. Nord, eds., Handbook of Organization Studies (London: Sage Publications, 1996), 281–282 cites the work of Burns and Bass on transformational leadership. See also Lichbach, The Rebel's Dilemma (note 11 above), 36–37. Bryman, "Leadership in Organizations" (see note 24 above): 280, referring to the work of Burns. Spencer, "What is Charisma?" (see note 14 above): 346. Crenshaw, "The Logic of Terrorism" (see note 11 above): 8–9. See also Haslam and Platow, "The Link Between Leadership and Followership" (note 21 above): 1470; Elisabeth Jean Wood, Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 19; and Bryman, "Leadership in Organizations" (note 24 above): 277. Willner and Willner, "The Rise and Role of Charismatic Leaders" (see note 14 above): 79. Lichbach, The Rebel's Dilemma (see note 11 above), 92–93 uses essentially similar concepts. Haslam and Platow, "The Link Between Leadership and Followership" (see note 21 above); Lichbach, The Rebel's Dilemma (see note 11 above), 124–125. Willner and Willner, "The Rise and Role of Charismatic Leaders" (see note 14 above): 83. Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002). Werner Stark, "The Routinization of Charisma," Sociological Analysis 26, no. 4 (Winter 1965): 206; Michael A. Toth, "Toward a Theory of the Routinization of Charisma," Rocky Mountain Social Science Journal 9, no. 2 (April 1972): 93–98; Dow, "The Theory of Charisma" (see note 22 above): 307; Willner and Willner, "The Rise and Role of Charismatic Leaders" (see note 14 above): 80; Jacobsen and House, "The Rise and Decline of Charismatic Leadership" (see note 15 above), 6. Stark, "The Routinization of Charisma" (see note 22 above): 207. See Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror (London: I. B. Tauris, 2003); Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2008). Weber, From Max Weber (see note 13 above), 248. Geoffrey Nelson, Cults, New Religions and Religious Creativity (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987), 117 Rogelio Alonso, "The Modernization in Irish Republican Thinking Toward the Utility of Violence," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 24, no. 2 (2001): 131–144. Weinstein, Inside Rebellion (see note 11 above). The organizational literature typically refers to this role as "management." See Mintzberg, "The Manager's Job" (note 10 above); and Kotter, "What Leaders Really Do" (note 10 above). Steven Brooke, "Strategic Fissures: The Near and Far Enemy Debate," in Assaf Moghadam and Brian Fishman, eds., Self Inflicted Wounds: Debates and Divisions within al-Qa'ida and its Periphery (West Point, NY: Harmony Project, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2010). Brynjar Lia, "Jihadi Strategists and Doctrinaires," in Assaf Moghadam and Brian Fishman, eds., Self Inflicted Wounds: Debates and Divisions within al-Qa'ida and its Periphery (West Point: Harmony Project, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2010). For more on the Abu Nidal example, see Patrick Seale, Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire (New York: Random House, 1992). Weinstein, Inside Rebellion (see note 11 above), 128–129. Gerald D. Bell, "Determinants of Span of Control," The American Journal of Sociology 73, no. 1 (July 1967): 100. The original concept was developed by V. A. Graicunas along with Lyndall Urwick, according to Fred Nickols, The Span of Control and the Formulas of V. A. Graicunas, home.att.net/∼nickols/graicunas.htm. Weber is the foundational author for the study of bureaucracy and bureaucratization, see Weber, From Max Weber (note 13 above), 196–244. A. Nizar Hamzeh, "Lebanon's Hizbullah: From Islamic Revolution to Parliamentary Accommodation," Third World Quarterly 14, no. 1 (1993): 326. Sageman, Leaderless Jihad (see note 35 above), and Marc Sageman, "The Next Generation of Terror," Foreign Policy (March/April 2008): 37–42. Ori Brafman and Rod Beckstrom, The Starfish and the Spider: The Unstoppable Power of Leaderless Organizations (New York: Portfolio, 2006), 135–140. See McCormick, "The Revolutionary Hero" (note 12 above); Willner and Willner, "The Rise and Role of Charismatic Leaders" (note 14 above): 87; and Jean C. Robinson, "Institutionalizing Charisma: Leadership, Faith & Rationality in Three Societies," Polity 18, no. 2 (Winter 1985): 184. Marc Galanter and James J. F. Forest, "Cults, Charismatic Groups, and Social Systems: Understanding the Transformation of Terrorist Recruits," in James J. F. Forest, ed., The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training, and Root Causes (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006), 51–70. For more on these questions, see David, "Israel's Policy of Targeted Killing" (note 4 above); Byman, "Do Targeted Killings Work?" (note 3 above); Lotrionte, "When to Target Leaders" (note 1 above); Hafez and Hatfield, "Do Targeted Assassinations Work?" (note 4 above); Wilner, "Targeted Killings in Afghanistan" (note 6 above); and Babak Dehganpisheh and Christopher Dickey, "The Real Nasrallah," Newsweek, August 21/28, 2006. Harry Eckstein, "Case Studies and Theory in Political Science," in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science, vol. 7. Political Science: Scope and Theory (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 79–138. Gary Goertz, Social Science Concepts: A User's Guide (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006) discusses how sub-components of a single variable should be combined into composite variables. Is each component necessary and added together to come with a score? Or are they sufficient and therefore replaceable so that we take the highest score of any of the dimensions? The first is an "essentialist approach" and the second is a "family-resemblance approach." In this article, I take a hybrid approach of "diminishing marginal returns." For example, I could assign 0.5 for any single component that is high, and 0.2 for the second, 0.1 for the third, and so on for a composite variable like "inspiration." For the largest set, see Jordan, "When Heads Roll" (note 2 above): 13, who identifies 298 cases of leadership targeting against 96 organizations. For more on Aum's origins and growth, see Daniel A. Metraux, Aum Shinrikyo's Impact on Japanese Society (Lewsiton, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2000); John Parachini, "Aum Shinrikyo," in Brian A. Jackson, John C. Baker, Kim Cragin, John Parachini, Horacio R. Trujillo, and Peter Clark, eds., Aptitude for Destruction: Volume 2, Case Studies of Organizational Learning in Five Terrorist Groups (Santa Monica: RAND, 2005), 11–36; Robert Jay Lifton, Destroying the World to Save It: Aum Shinrikyo, Apocalyptic Violence, and the New Global Terrorism (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1999); Galanter and Forest, "Cults, Charismatic Groups, and Social Systems" (note 51 above); David E. Kaplan and Andrew Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World: The Terrifying Story of the Aum Doomsday Cult, from the Subways of Tokyo to the Nuclear Arsenals of Russia (New York: Crown, 1996); D. W. Brackett, Holy Terror: Armageddon in Tokyo (New York: Weatherhill, 1996); and Ian Reader, "Spectres and Shadows: Aum Shinrikyô and the Road to Megiddo," Terrorism and Political Violence 14, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 147–186. Gavin Cameron, "Multi-track Microproliferation: Lessons from Aum Shinrikyo and Al Qaida," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 22, no. 4 (1999): 284; Kaplan and Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World (see note 56 above), 21–22, 77, 89–90; Lifton, Destroying the World to Save It (see note 56 above), 31–33, 36. For more on their weapons programs, see William Rosenau, "Aum Shinrikyo's Biological Weapons Program: Why Did it Fail?," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 24, no. 4 (2001): 289–301; Kaplan and Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World (see note 56 above), 51, 58, 85, 94, 96, 119–122, 124, 216; Parachini, "Aum Shinrikyo" (see note 56 above): 19–25; Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, rev. and expanded ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 124; Brackett, Holy Terror (see note 56 above), 109. Brackett, Holy Terror (see note 56 above), 1–7, 121–142; Kaplan and Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World (see note 56 above), 236; Tim Ballard, Jason Pate, Gary Ackerman, Diana McCauley, and Sean Lawson, Chronology of Aum Shinrikyo's CBW Activities (Monterey, CA: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute for International Studies, 2001). Metraux, Aum Shinrikyo's Impact on Japanese Society (see note 56 above), 36. Cameron, "Multi-track Microproliferation" (see note 57 above): 280 refers to Asahara's leadership as "autocratic mysticism." See also Reader, "Spectres and Shadows" (see note 56 above): 149; Kaplan and Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World (see note 56 above), 3, 67, 101; Angus M. Muir, "Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Case of Aum Shinrikyo (A Review Article)," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 22, no. 1 (1999): 81; Kyle Olson, "Aum Shinrikyo: Once and Future Threat?" Emerging Infectious Diseases 5, no. 4 (July–August 1999): 515; James K. Campbell, Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism (Seminole, FL: Interpact Press, 1997), 63; Galanter and Forest, "Cults, Charismatic Groups, and Social Systems" (see note 51 above): 62–67. Metraux, Aum Shinrikyo's Impact on Japanese Society (see note 56 above), 21. Campbell, Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism (see note 61 above), 64. Kaplan and Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World (see note 56 above), 21, 59; Cameron, "Multi-track Microproliferation" (see note 57 above): 280; Lifton, Destroying the World to Save It (see note 56 above), 24. Reader, "Spectres and Shadows" (see note 56 above): 151. Metraux, Aum Shinrikyo's Impact on Japanese Society (see note 56 above), 19, 49–53; Lifton, Destroying the World to Save It (see note 56 above), 59. Kaplan and Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World (see note 56 above), 17; Metraux, Aum Shinrikyo's Impact on Japanese Society (see note 56 above), iii; Lifton, Destroying the World to Save It (see note 56 above), 4–6, 8, 45. Kaplan and Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World (see note 56 above), 17, 18, 23, 36–43, 113–118, 162, 173, 212, 228; Metraux, Aum Shinrikyo's Impact on Japanese Society (see note 56 above), iv, 12, 18-20, 32, 45; Campbell, Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism (see note 61 above), 64–65; and Lifton, Destroying the World to Save It (see note 56 above), 26–27, 36–41, 179–193; Brackett, Holy Terror (see note 56 above), 9–10, 19; Parachini, "Aum Shinrikyo" (see note 56 above): 13; Cameron, "Multi-track Microproliferation" (see note 57 above): 285–287; According to Ballard et al., "Chronology of Aum" (see note 59 above), Aum launched 17 CBW attacks between 1990 and 1995. See Parachini, "Aum Shinrikyo" (see note 56 above). Kaplan and Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World (see note 56 above), 36,41, 227. Brackett, Holy Terror (see note 56 above), 29, 32, 125; Kaplan and Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World (see note 56 above), 215, 238, 242; Brackett, Holy Terror, 125; Lifton, Destroying the World to Save It (see note 56 above), 175. Cameron, "Multi-track Microproliferation" (see note 57 above): 283; Reader, "Spectres and Shadows" (see note 56 above): 157. Parachini, "Aum Shinrikyo" (see note 56 above): 17. Kaplan and Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World (see note 56 above), 23. John V. Parachini and Kutsuhisa Furukawa, "Japan and Aum Shinrikyo," in Robert J. Art and Louise Richardson, eds., Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2007), 535. See Campbell, Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism (note 61 above), 54 and Brackett, Holy Terror (note 56 above), 104; Kaplan and Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World (note 56 above), 157. See Parachini and Furukawa, "Japan and Aum Shinrikyo" (note 74 above): 544–549; Kaplan and Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World (note 56 above), 256–257, 277, 280, 285; Metraux, Aum Shinrikyo's Impact on Japanese Society (note 56 above), 20. Norimitsu Onishi, "After 8-Year Trial in Japan, Cultist Is Sentenced to Death," New York Times, February 28, 2004. Metraux, Aum Shinrikyo's Impact on Japanese Society (see note 56 above), i. Parachini and Furukawa, "Japan and Aum Shinrikyo" (see note 74 above): 547. For a concise background, see David Scott Palmer, "Countering Terrorism in Latin America: The Case of Shining Path in Peru," in James J. F. Forest, ed., Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century, Volume III (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007), 292–309; and Gordon McCormick, "The Shining Path and Peruvian Terrorism," in David Rapoport, ed., Inside Terrorist Organizations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 106–126. For more detailed accounts, see David Scott Palmer, ed., The Shining Path of Peru (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994); Cynthia McClintock, Revolutionary Movements in Latin America: El Salvador's FMLN and Peru's Shining Path (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1998); and Philip Mauceri, State Under Siege: Development and Policy Making in Peru (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996). Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Final Report 2003, http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ingles/ifinal/conclusiones.php; Palmer, "Countering Terrorism in Latin America" (see note 80 above). Michael Freeman, Freedom or Security: The Consequences for Democracies Using Emergency Powers to Fight Terror (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), 160. Guzman's computer at the time of his capture showed 23,430 members according to Turbiville, "Hunting Leadership Targets" (see note 3 above): 32. Palmer, "Countering Terrorism in Latin America" (see note 80 above): 297; also see the video State of Fear: The Truth About Terrorism (Skylight Pictures, 2005). William Hazleton and Sandra Woy-Hazleton, "Sendero Luminoso: A Communist Party Crosses a River of Blood," Terrorism and Political Violence 4, no. 2 (Summer 1992): 69. Mauceri, State Under Siege (see note 80 above), 122. Gustavo Gorriti, The Shining Path: A History of the Millenarian War in Peru, trans Robin Kirk. (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 104. Freeman, Freedom or Security (see note 82 above), 148. Weinstein, Inside Rebellion (see note 11 above), 84, 85, 87, 150. Turbiville, "Hunting Leadership Targets" (see note 3 above): 31–34; Freeman, Freedom or Security (see note 82 above), 164. Richard Clutterbuck, "Peru: Cocaine, Terrorism and Corruption," International Relations 12 (1995): 86–87. Turbiville, "Hunting Leadership Targets" (see note 3 above): 34. McCormick, "Shining Path and Peruvian Terrorism" (see note 80 above): 123; McClintock, Revolutionary Movements in Latin America (see note 80 above), 92. See State of Fear (note 83 above) and Turbiville, "Hunting Leadership Targets" (note 3 above): 33. Center for Defense Information, In the Spotlight: Sendero Luminoso, July 1, 2002, http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/sendero.cfm. Dan Collyns, "Shining Path Leader Offers Truce," BBC News, November 26, 2006. For histories of Algeria, including its war for independence and the rise of the Islamist movement, see Luis Martinez, The Algerian Civil War 1990–1998 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000); Hugh Roberts, The Battlefield Algeria 1988–2002: Studies in a Broken Polity (London: Verson, 2003); William B. Quandt, Between Ballots and Bullets: Algeria's Transition from Authoritarianism (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1998); Robert Mortimer, "Islamists, Soldiers, and Democrats: The Second Algerian War," Middle East Journal 50, no. 1 (Winter 1996): 18–39; Martin Evans and John Phillips, Algeria: Anger of the Dispossesed (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007); and Mohammed M. Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003); and Kepel, Jihad (see note 32 above). Kepel, Jihad (see note 32 above), 258–259; Evans and Phillips, Algeria (see note 96 above), 165, 190. Mohammed M. Hafez, "Armed Islamist Movements and Political Violence in Algeria," Middle East Journal 4 (Fall 2000): 575; Evans and Phillips, Algeria (see note 96 above), xiv, 221; "Groupe Islamique Armee (GIA)," Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Centre, accessed October 28, 2008, citing U.S. State Department estimates; Kepel, Jihad (see note 32 above), 254. There are frequent discrepancies between sources. Kepel, Jihad (see note 32 above), 259, 262-267, 271; Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel (see note 96 above), 79, 119, 129, 168; Hafez, "Armed Islamist Movements" (see note 98 above): 575, 577–578; Evans and Phillips, Algeria (see note 96 above), 206, 222; "GIA," Jane's (see note 98 above). Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel (see note 96 above), 115; Evans and Phillips, Algeria (see note 96 above), 186; Hafez, "Armed Islamist Movements" (see note 98 above): 576. Kepel, Jihad (see note 32 above), 259–260. Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel (see note 96 above), 115. Kepel, Jihad (see note 32 above), 264–265. Kepel, Jihad (see note 32 above), 254. See Omar Ashour, "Islamist De-Radicalization in Algeria: Successes and Failures," The Middle East Institute Policy Brief 21 (November 2008), 1–10. Hafez, "Armed Islamist Movements" (see note 98 above): 587. See also Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel (note 96 above), 167–168; Evans and Phillips, Algeria (note 96 above), 219. Kepel, Jihad (see note 32 above), 272. Kepel, Jihad (see note 32 above), 272–273. Hafez, "Armed Islamist Movements" (see note 98 above): 588. Hafez, "Armed Islamist Movements" (see note 98 above): 589; Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel (see note 96 above), 119; Kepel, Jihad (see note 32 above), 270. For a background on the GSPC, see Jean-Luc Marret, "Al-Qaeda in Islamic Magrev: A 'Glocal' Organization," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 31, no. 6 (June 2008): 541–552. The demise of the GIA was a result of several factors besides the decapitation of its leadership. Beginning in the mid-1990s, the Algerian security forces became more aggressive in their counter-insurgency operations, while also offering clemency to militants, according to Evans and Phillips, Algeria (see note 96 above), 218–219, 279. Another serious blow was struck by the round-up of over 400 members in late 2004, according to Lauren Vriens, "Armed Islamic Group (Algeria)," Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/publication/9154/. Osama bin Laden, Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places, 1996, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1996.html. For more on the ideological and strategic divides within the jihadi movement, see Cracks in the Foundation: Leadership Schisms in Al Qa'ida 1989–2006 (West Point, NY: Harmony Project, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, September 2007), http://ctc.usma.edu/aq/pdf/Harmony_3_Schism.pdf; Kepel, Jihad (see note 32 above); and Fawaz Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror (London: I. B. Tauris, 2003); Sageman (see note 35 above), 75. Sageman, Leaderless Jihad (see note 35 above). Nelly Lahoud, Stuart Caudill, Liam Collins, Gabriel Koehler-Derrick, Don Rassler, and Muhammad al-Ùbaydi, Letters from Abbottabad: Bin Laden Sidelined? (West Point, NY: Harmony Program at The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, May 3, 2012). Gerges, The Far Enemy (see note 112 above). Sami Yousafzai and Ron Moreau, "Al Qaeda's Feuds and Fears," Newsweek, October 1, 2007. Burke, Al-Qaeda (see note 113 above), 208 Sageman, Leaderless Jihad (see note 35 above). Lahoud et al., Letters from Abbottabad (see note 115 above), 2. Evan Thomas, "Into Thin Air," Newsweek, September 3, 2007, p. 33. Bruce Hoffman, "Redefining Counterterrorism: The Terrorist Leader as CEO," RAND Review (Spring 2004) refers to bin Laden as a combination of a CEO and venture capitalist. Abu Yahya al-Libi is seen by some as the "heir apparent" to bin Laden, according to Michael Moss and Souad Mekhennet, "Rising Leader for Next Phase of Al Qaeda's War," New York Times, April 4, 2008. Additional informationNotes on contributorsMichael Freeman Michael Freeman is an Associate Professor with the Defense Analysis Department, Naval Postgraduate School. The views expressed in this document are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.