Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

Al‐Qaeda: Analysis of the Emergence, Radicalism, and Violence of a Jihadist Action Group in Turkey

2010; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 11; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/14683849.2010.483846

1743-9663

Mehmet Orhan,

Political Conflict and Governance

Abstract Abstract This article studies an al‐Qaeda action group founded around 2000 in Turkey. This group constructed a small autonomous movement outside larger social and political structures of power and action in Bingöl, a Kurdish town. The new form of the group's radicalism, with its local and global instruments of socialization and its repertoire of violence, produced organizational, strategic, axiological, and teleological ruptures with traditional Islamist movements in the region. Acknowledgements Mehmet Orhan would like to thank Hamit Bozarslan (EHESS de Paris) and Jean Marcou (Institut Français d'Etudes Anatoliennes d'Istanbul) for their remarks on this work. Notes 1. See "Al Qâ'ida tatabanna hajamât Istanbŭl wa ta'atabirouha hadiyyatal Quds," [Al‐Qaeda Claims Responsibility for the Istanbul Attacks and Consider Them as Gift of Jerusalem], Assabeel Weekly, November 17, 2003, http://www.assabeel.info/inside/article.asp?newsid=5008§ion=0 and "Al Qâ'ida tu'ulinu massûliyâtiha 'an hujûm turkiyâ, wa ta'atabiru tafjr al‐Qâ'ida al‐itâliyya tanfithan li tahdîdbin Ladin," [Al‐Qaeda Claims Responsibility for the Attacks in Turkey and Declares that Bomb Attack on the Italian Base is Threat of Bin Ladin]" Al‐Quds Al‐Arabi, November 17, 2003, http://www.alquds.co.uk:9090/pdf/2003/11Nov/17NovMon/Quds04.pdf. 2. By request, names of interviewees are undisclosed. 3. The term Kurdist (kürtçü in Turkish) refers to a Kurdish nationalist ideology. It is used it to make a distinction between Kurdist and Kurdish, which refers to an ethnicity. 4. A dialect of the Kurdish language. 5. The group was formed around Mümtaz Kotan, Orhan Kotan, Ruşen Arslan, İbrahim Güçlü and others in 1975. 6. Known also as Özgürlük Yolu, the movement was founded by Kemal Burkay, İhsan Aksoy and Faruk Aras in 1974. 7. The party was founded by some Kurdist militants such as Daraf Bilek, Mustafa Fisli and others in 1977. The movement mobilized Kurds, especially in Diyarbakır, Batman and Mardin. 8. Harun İlhan, a captured al‐Qaeda militant, also claimed it. See http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/europe/story/2004/09/040913_qaedatrnew.shtml-28k. 9. It is not possible to sufficiently develop the concept of "Islamist action group" in this paper, but the term's use is necessary for two reasons: first, the militants define their movements as action groups. Second, a jihadist action group sociologically differs from regional mujahidin movements in the Muslim world due to its organizational and strategic structure, which is discussed in this study. 10. For Hamit Bozarslan the concept is a political or social space that can be as important as "center" in some cases. He proposes al‐Qaeda lectures as productions of the "fringe" of Muslim societies. Integration of the concept in this sense is necessary for understanding the emergence of new radical groups and categories. See Hamit Bozarslan, Une Histoire de la Violence au Moyen Orient [History of Violence in the Middle East] (Paris: La Découverte, 2008), pp. 196–220. 11. Friends of Ekinci's family revealed that because of the father's assassination during political violence in the 1970s in Bingöl Ekinci's mother tried to keep him away from any political movement. 12. Similarly, most of the jihadist militants in the Hamburg and London cells were close in age. The key militants of the Hamburg group included Muhammad Atta (1968–2001), Ziad Jarrah 1975–2001), Ramzi Binalshibh (1972–2001), Said Bahaji (1975–2001), and Zakeriyya Essabar (1977–2001). The London group included Muhammad Sidique Khan (1975–2005), Shehzad Tanweer (1983–2005), German Lindsay (1986–2005), and Hasib Mir Hussain (1987–2005). 13. On the other hand, two or three of the Turkish jihadist militants (Baki Yiğit, Harun İlhan) could have been affiliated with small Islamist groups such as Müslüman Gençlik (Muslim Youth) and Rahmet Grubu (Group of Mercy) in the late 1980s. See Mehmet Faraç, El Kaide Turca [Al‐Qaeda Turca] (Istanbul: Günizi Yayıncılık, 2004), pp. 165–167. However, it would be inaccurate to establish a parallel between al‐Qaeda and these small Islamist groups, as several young Turks and Kurds have been politicized around these types of Islamist groups—especially in their university years—since the 1980s, and not all of them are radicalized around violent movements. On the contrary, some of the activists coming from these groups are integrated into the Turkish political system. Moreover, when looking at the motivations of jihadist‐salafist militants, al‐Qaeda constitutes an alternative movement rather than continuity with Islamist movements in Turkey. 14. These kinds of relations could also be observed in the case of Muhammad Ali al‐Makki, the suicide bomber for al‐Qaeda's Nairobi attack in 1998 and in the case of Ramzi Yousef. The former was the cousin of Abd al‐Rahim al‐Nashiri, mastermind of the USS Cole bombings in 2000. The latter is the nephew of Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, mastermind of the September 11 attacks. See the 9/11 Commission Report, http://www.9-11commission.gov/report.pdf. 15. Uriya Shavit defines the use of internet as both operational and informative for al‐Qaeda. See Uriya Shavit, "Al Qaeda's Saudi Origins: Islamist Ideology," Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Fall 2006), pp. 3–13. 16. This argument is considered for both peaceful and violent salafist movements. See Dominique Thomas, "Le Rôle d'Internet dans la Diffusion de la Doctrine Salafiste," [The Role of Internet in Diffusion of The Salafist Doctrine] in Bernard Rougier (ed.), Qu'est ce que le Salafisme? [What is Salafism?] (Paris: PUF, 2008), pp. 87–102. 17. Al‐Qaeda means base in Arabic. The term can be also metaphorically read as network, method, model, or database, as Jason Burke and Gilles Kepel explain. See Burke in Al‐Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2003), pp. 7–22 and Kepel in Fitna: Guerre au Cœur de l'Islam [Fitna: War in the Hearth of Islam] (Paris: Gallimard, 2004), p. 17. 18. Thomas, "Le Rôle d'Internet dans la Diffusion de la Doctrine Salafiste," p. 90. 19. The picnic can be proposed as a general place of al‐Qaeda's micro‐mobilization in Turkey because it also served the same role for the Istanbul group. Habib Akdaş and Gürcan Baç organized picnics in order to mobilize and motivate the militants. See Faraç, El Kaide Turca, pp. 145–46. 20. This means "attach" in Arabic. The prayer is generally done to attach one's heart to shaykh or God. 21. Jihadist mobilization came about through private home schooling in other groups too. The group responsible for the London attacks had rented also a house in the student area of Leeds in 2005. See Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005, http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/hc0506/hc10/1087.pdf. Muhammad Atta's Dâr al‐Ansâr (house of followers) in Hamburg was also comparable to the Bingöl group's house. 22. Fevzi Yitiş, a captured militant, told to the Turkish police that Habib Akdaş organized courses at the home of Feridun Uğurlu (the suicide bomber of the British consulate). See Mehmet Faraç, El Kaide Turca, p. 147. 23. Olivier Roy and Mariam Abou‐Zahab, Réseaux Islamiques: la connection afghano‐pakistanaise [Islamist Networks: The Afghan‐Pakistan Connection] (Paris: Collection CERI, 2004). 24. The 9/11 Commission Report, Chapter 5. 25. Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005. 26. He was a former Egyptian police officer and one of the founders of al‐Qaeda (1944–2001). He had been in Peshawar since 1983 and seemed to have substantial personal relations with Turkish jihadists in Afghanistan. 27. Around 2000, guest houses were known as safe places where Turkish‐Kurdish jihadist militants stayed before going to training camps. 28. Faraç, El Kaide Turca, p. 149. 29. Roy and Abou‐Zahab defend the same argument for transnational networks between Pakistani religious movements, the Taliban and al‐Qaeda, which do not seem to be organizational. For them, everything is based on personal links, madrasas, personal meetings in training camps, and the convergence of different interests. See Roy and Abou‐Zahab, Réseaux Islamiques: la connection afghano‐pakistanaise, p. 59. 30. Bernard Rougier, Le Jihad au Quotidien [Everyday Jihad] (Paris: PUF, 2004), p. 97. 31. Zaman, February 17, 2006, http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=256928. 32. See Faraç, El Kaide Turca, pp. 143, 151, and 153. 33. Mathieu Guidère, Les «Martyrs» d'al Qaida [The "Martyrs" of al Qaeda] (Nantes: Editions du Temps, 2006), pp. 94–97. In the al‐Qaeda text published in this book, Azad Ekinci is compared with the Ottoman caliph, his biography is briefly summarized in a political context, and his "suicide operation in Iraq is told in a glorious way." In the text, al‐Qaeda also criticizes Turkey's negotiations with the European Union. 34. Secrecy is used here in the Simmelian sense of the term. See Georg Simmel, "The Sociology of Secrecy and of Secret Societies," The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 11, No. 4 (January 1906), pp. 441–498. 35. In Muslim belief, sunnah are traditions based on the norms and practices derived from Prophet Muhammad's life. 36. Hasan al‐Banna (1906–1949) was the founder of al‐Ikhwân al‐Muslimûn (the Muslim Brotherhood). 37. Works of Sayyed Qutb (1906–1966) such as Ma'âlim fi‐l Tarîq (Milestones), were projected as a manifesto for Islamist radicalism in the twentieth century. 38. Saîd‐i Nursi was a religious leader and Islamist thinker. He was the author of the Risâle‐i Nûr (Epistle of Light) Collection. 39. Land where Muslims do not govern. 40. Necip Fazıl Kısakürek was a Turkish poet and writer. He was the author of Çile (Suffering). 41. Salih Mirzabeyoğlu, IBDA Diyalektiği [Dialectics of IBDA] (Istanbul: IBDA Yayinlari, 2004), p. 60. 42. Ibid. 43. See Gilles Dorronsoro and Olivier Grojean, "Engagement Militant et Phénomène de Radicalisation chez les Kurdes de Turquie," [Militant Engagement and Phenomenon of Radicalization in Kurds of Turkey] in EJTS Articles (2004), http:/www.ejts.org/document198.html and Ruşen Çakır, Derin Hizbullah [Deep Hezbollah] (İIstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2001). 44. According to the author's research in the Turkish press and Faraç (El Kaide Turca, 2004), there are at least 30 different provinces from which al‐Qaeda militants originate in Turkey. About 10 of these provinces are Kurdish, and others are dispersed throughout different regions of the country. 45. "Excommunication" or "declaring unbeliever of an individual or community that was previously considered Muslim" in Arabic. 46. Omar Saghi, "Oussama ben Laden," in Gilles Kepel and Jean Pierre Milelli, (eds.), Al Qaida dans le Texte [Al Qaeda in the Text] (Paris: PUF, 2005), p. 34. 47. Some radical Islamist movements use the Arabic term to refer to "martyrdom operations" and reject to call self‐sacrificial actions suicide operations. 48. Al‐Qaeda militants in Turkey generally tend to be young and many of them are married. Profiles, of course, are not homogenous and vary. 49. For Palestinian movements see Pénélope Larzilière, Etre Jeune en Palestine [Being Young in Palestine] (Paris: Ballard, 2004). 50. Farhad Khosrokhavar, Les Nouveaux Martyrs d'Allah [New Martyrs of Allah] (Paris: Flammarion, 2002), pp. 233–327. 51. Hamit Bozarslan, Une Histoire de la Violence au Moyen Orient, p. 207. 52. Roy and Abou‐Zahab, Réseaux Islamiques, p. 8. 53. Nilüfer Göle, Interpénétrations: L'Islam et l'Europe [Interpenetrations: Islam and Europe] (Paris: Galaade Editions, 2005), p. 43. 54. Jean Marcou uses the term in order to explain Islamist political parties and their process of integration into the Turkish political system. See Jean Marcou, "Islamisme et Post Islamisme en Turquie," [Islamism and Post Islamism in Turkey] Revue Internationale de Politique Comparée, Vol. 11, No. 4 (2004), pp. 587–609. 55. For this problematic, see Gilles Kepel, Fitna: Guerre au Cœur de l'Islam [Fitna: War in the Hearth of Islam] (2004) and Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 56. Milliyet, November 22, 2003, http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2003/11/22/guncel/gun01.html. 57. Nilüfer Göle, Interpénétrations, p. 52. 58. The Islamist Resistant Group claimed responsibility for the operation. See Milliyet, September 7, 1986. 59. Hürriyet, September 14, 2007, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/dunya/7282129.asp?gid=200&a=884504. 60. See "Derin Örgüte Operasyon," [Operation to the Profound Organization] in Çoban Atesi, January 31, 2008, pp. 1–2. This is a weekly newspaper published in Turkish and Kurdish in Gaziantep. According to the journal Turkish police clashed forces with the Selesile group, connected to al‐Qaeda, over the course of 12 hours in a popular district of the city. Four al‐Qaeda militants and one Turkish policeman were killed during the confrontation, and 19 militants were captured by the Turkish security forces.