A Social Network Analysis of Jemaah Islamiyah: The Applications to Counterterrorism and Intelligence
2006; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 29; Issue: 6 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/10576100600798418
ISSN1521-0731
Autores Tópico(s)Cybercrime and Law Enforcement Studies
ResumoAbstract This article attempts to contribute to and advance the growing literature on social network analysis and terrorism studies, through a social network analysis of the Jemaah Islamiyah cell that was responsible for the Bali bombings in 2002. In doing so, the article endeavors to provide a potential framework for the intelligence analysis of terrorist cells. Such a framework will assist in (1) understanding the communication and structure of such cells and (2) assist in predicting the likely outcomes of terrorist cells when employed in real-time intelligence analysis. Notes 1. S. Wasserman and K. Faust, Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications (Cambridge: 1994), Cambridge University Press, p. 20. 2. V. Krebs. "Mapping Networks of Terrorist Cells," Connections, 24 (3) (2002), pp. 43–52. 3. L. Freeman. "The Study of Social Networks," The International Network for Social Network Analysis. Available at (http://www.sfu.ca/∼insna/INSNA/na_inf.html), accessed 17 May, 2004. 4. R. Renfro and R. Deckro. "A Social Network Analysis of the Iranian Government," paper presented at 69th MORS Symposium, 12–14 June, 2001, p. 4. 5. Ibid., p. 5. 6. S. Aftergood. "Secrecy News: Social Network Analysis and Intelligence" [online], Federation of American Scientists Project on Government Secrecy, Vol. 2004, 15. Available at (http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/2004/02/020904.html), last accessed 17 May, 2004. 7. M. Sparrow. "The Application of Network Analysis to Criminal Intelligence: An Assessment of the Prospects," Social Networks, 13 (1991), pp. 251–252. 8. Ibid., p. 252. 9. Ibid., p. 253. 10. Ibid., pp. 261–263. 11. W. Baker and R. Faulkner. "The Social Organisation of Conspiracy: Illegal Networks in the Heavy Electrical Equipment Industry," American Sociological Review, 58 (6) (1993), pp. 837–860. 12. R. Renfro and R. Deckro. "A Social Network Analysis of the Iranian Government." 13. A. Silke. "The Devil You Know: Continuing Problems with Research on Terrorism," Terrorism and Political Violence, 13 (4) (2001), p. 3. 14. D. Brannan, P. Esler, and N. Strindberg. "Talking to 'Terrorists': Towards an Independent Analytical Framework for the Study of Violent Substate Activism," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 24 (1) (2001), p. 20. 15. J. Arquilla and D. Ronfeldt. Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy (RAND Publications, Santa Monica 2001). 16. Refers to conflict and crime in which the subjects are organised as networks without leaders, as oppose to hierarchical networks. 17. Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars p. 315. 18. Ibid., p. 323. 19. K. Carley, J. Reminga, and N. Kamneva. 2003. Destabilising Terrorist Networks, NAACSOS Conference Proceedings, Pittsburgh, PA. 20. M. Tsvetovat and K. Carley. "Structural Knowledge and Success of Anti-Terrorist Activity: The Downside of Structural Equivilance," Journal of Social Structure, 6 (2) (2005) pp. 23–28. 21. K. Van Meter. "Terrorist/Liberators: Researching and Dealing with Adversary Social Networks," Connections, 24 (3) (2002), pp. 66–78. 22. All essential elements of social network analysis. 23. Krebs. "Mapping Networks of Terrorist Cells." 24. P. Vos Fellman and R. Wright. "Modelling Terrorist Networks: Complex Systems at Mid-Range," A Dual International Conference on Ethics, Complexity, and Organisations, available at (http://www.psych.lse.ac.uk/complexity/Conference/FellmanWright.pdf) (2001). 25. J. Farley. "Breaking al-Qaeda Cells: A Mathematical Analysis of Counterterrorism Operations (A Guide for Risk Assessment and Decision Making)," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 26(6) (2003), pp. 399–411. 26. K. Carley, M. Dombroski, M. Tsvetovat, J. Reminga and N. Kamenva. "Destabilising Dynamic Covert Networks," Proceedings of the 8th International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium, National Defence War College: Washington DC (2003). 27. K. Carley. Dynamic Network Analysis for Counter-Terrorism (Pittsburgh: Carnegie Mellon University, 2005). 28. K. Carley, J. Diesner, J. Reminga, and M. Tsvetovat. Toward an Interoperable Dynamic Network Analysis Toolkit (Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 2005). 29. The significance of such research is evidenced by the amount of further research drawn from Krebs's (2002) study. 30. J. Scott. Social Network Analysis: A Handbook (London: Sage Publications, 1991). 31. Ibid., p. 2. 32. Ibid., p. 3. 33. All of the data presented in this article are from unclassified, open sources. 34. Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia (Canberra: National Capital Printing, 2004). 35. Ibid. 36. Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous (Jakarta: International Crisis Group, 2003), pp. 1–5. 37. Ibid., p. 6. 38. Ibid. 39. Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates (Jakarta: International Crisis Group, 2002), p. 3. 40. S. Neighbour. In the Shadows of Swords (Sydney: Harper Collins Publishers, 2004), pp. 224–226. 41. Ibid., p. 166. 42. Ibid., pp. 284–285. 43. D. Goodsir and W. Miller. "The Night Terror Touched Our Lives: Bali Remembered—How the Terror Unfolded," The Age (4 October, 2003), p. 2, and Neighbour, In the Shadows of Swords, 2004, pp. 284–285. 44. W. Turnbull. A Tangled Web of Southeast Asian Islamic Terrorism: The Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network (Monterey: Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2003). 45. Goodsir and Miller. 2003. "The Night Terror Touched Our Lives." 46. Indonesia Backgrounder, pp. 24–26. 47. D. Goodsir. "Ruthless Enforcer Pulled the Strings," The Sydney Morning Herald, 11 September, 2003, p. 9. 48. Goodsir and Miller, "The Night Terror Touched Our Lives," p. 2. 49. Neighbour, In the Shadows of Swords. 50. Goodsir and Miller, "The Night Terror Touched Our Lives," p. 2. 51. Neighbour, In the Shadows of Swords, p. 286. 52. Apart from the one incident where a small amount of the explosives detonated, and the group left to demonstrate to inquisitive neighbors that the noise was of no significance. 53. Neighbour, In the Shadows of Swords, pp. 285–287. 54. "The Bali Bomber's Song," Jakarta Tempo, 18 February, 2003. 55. Goodsir and Miller, "The Night Terror Touched Our Lives," p. 2. 56. Neighbour, In the Shadows of Swords, p. 287. 57. The Bali Confessions. Four Corners, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Sydney, 10 February 2003. 58. E. Chua. "Ex-UTM Don and Samudra Charged," The Business Times, 3 June 2003, p. 20. 59. Neighbour, In the Shadows of Swords, pp. 290–291. 60. Goodsir and Miller. "The Night Terror Touched Our Lives," p. 2. 61. Neighbour, In the Shadows of Swords, pp. 292–293. 62. Ibid., p. 293. 63. J. Boissevain. Friends of Friends: Networks, Manipulators, and Coalitions (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974), pp. 28–33. 64. Ibid., p. 33. 65. Ties such as family, religion, and friendship are considered to be dormant during the covert stage of an operation, as the only interactions that bind individuals together are those that concern the operation. These are the interactions that can be tracked and monitored by counterterrorism authorities. 66. Boissevain, Friends of Friends, p. 33. 67. W. Kohler. The Mentality of Apes (Mitcham: Penguin Books, 1925). 68. J. Moreno. Who Shall Survive?: A New Approach to the Problem of Human Interrelations (Washington: Nervous and Mental Disease Publishing Co, 1934). 69. K. Lewin. Field Theory in Social Science: Selected Theoretical Papers, D. Cartwright, ed., (New York: Harper Torch Books, 1951). 70. Scott, Social Network Analysis, pp. 4–5. 71. S. Borgatti, M. Everett, and L. Freeman. Ucinet for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis (Harvard, MA: Analytic Technologies, 2002). 72. Boissevain, Friends of Friends, p. 35. 73. Such measures also ensure that the focus and length criticisms of case studies are abided by. 74. Wasserman and Faust, Social Network Analysis, p. 102. 75. A. Radcliffe-Brown. Structure and Function in Primitive Society (London: Cohen and West, 1952), p. 11. 76. Wasserman and Faust, Social Network Analysis, p. 101. 77. Boissevain, Friends of Friends, p. 40. 78. Ibid., p. 41. 79. Wasserman and Faust. Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 187–189. 80. This "degree" simply equates to the number of links the individual node possesses. 81. The standardization of results was devised by Beauchamp in 1965. 82. Wasserman and Faust, Social Network Analysis, 184. 83. G. Sabidussi. "The Centrality Index of a Graph," Psychometrika, 31 (1966), pp. 581–603. 84. L. Freeman. "A Set of Measures of Centrality Based on Betweenness," Sociometry, 40 (1977), pp. 35–41. 85. Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman, Ucinet for Windows. 86. Scott, Social Network Analysis, p. 129. 87. This last role was reserved for the members of Team Lima. 88. Areas of a network with 100% density (every member interacts with every other member). 89. This is not unfeasible, as the operations are conducted by individuals with the same training and indoctrination (Afghanistan and Mindanao), and are often planned and executed by the same individuals.
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