No Outside, No Inside: Duality, Reality and Vasubandhu's Illusory Elephant
2006; Routledge; Volume: 16; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/09552360500491817
ISSN1469-2961
Autores Tópico(s)Environmental and Cultural Studies in Latin America and Beyond
ResumoAbstract Some of the basic terminology of Yogācāra philosophy needs reevaluation. Whereas commentaries almost universally gloss the term dvaya (‘duality’) with some version of the phrase grāhya grāhaka ca (lit. ‘grasped and grasper’, but usually translated as ‘subject and object’), in fact this gloss is absent from the earliest strata. The term and its gloss are derived from separate streams of Yogācāra reasoning—one from discussions of linguistic conceptualization and the other from discussions of perception. Once we see that these two are distinct, it becomes clear that the commentarial literature asserts their identity in order to philosophically unify Yogācāra thought. One upshot of this is that even in this later assertion ‘duality’ refers not to the distinction between internal and external reality (as in ‘textbook’ Yogācāra), but to the falsely projected distinction between mental subjects and mental objects. Notes Notes [1] The reduction is not always explicit. Wood (Citation1991, p. 43) directly equates the two, writing, for instance, ‘duality (dvaya)—the supposed external object—is the imagined nature’. Somewhat more subtly, Garfield (Citation2002, p. 139) equates ‘actual phenomena’ with ‘objects of experience’ in spite of the fact that the verse upon which he is commenting describes these ‘actual phenomena’ as (in Garfield's translation) ‘emergent consciousness, / Having emerged from the conceptualization of seer and seen’—i.e. duality. Other authors recognize that duality and external objects are different but nonetheless slip occasionally into mistakes that I will argue represent a conflation of the two. Such mistakes include, for instance, Hattori's apparently uncontroversial description of the ultimate Yogācāra awakening (1988, p. 27) as a realization ‘that the object does not really exist’. In fact, the subject also must fail the test of existence, and in fact the notion of existence and non-existence is itself considered a dualistic error. My analysis is intended to counter such simplifications. [2] MAVBh on 1.1, MSABh on XI.24. I will discuss an alternative interpretation of the term below. [3] This is Garfield's interpretation (Citation2002, p. 142), for instance, when he says of what is ‘dual in nature’ that ‘it is an independent object of mind and so is distinct from the subject that apprehends it’. [4] Such is a sensible interpretation of the opening section of Vasubandhu's Viś, which explains that the triple world is only mind (cittamātra), and then explains the mātra of cittamātra by saying, ‘the point of ‘only’ (mātra) is to exclude external objects (artha)’. Viś 3: mātramityarthapratisedhārtha. I am not arguing against this being a denial of the external world, but I do hope to show that the preoccupation with the external world is only part of the denial of duality, which includes a denial of the internal world as well. [5] This places me at odds with Dan Lusthaus (Citation2004), though only partially. I am convinced by Lusthaus’ analysis of Yogācāra as similar to epistemological idealism. Yes, the whole point of Yogācāra is to show that our ordinary conception of reality is false, and must be transformed. And yes, the Yogācāra must, as good Buddhists, maintain belief in some kind of reality that is unavailable to ordinary beings. Where he is discussing perception, however, Lusthaus fails to note the centrality of the Yogācāra critique of our ordinary understanding of perception in general, and rūpa in particular: ‘The case of material elements is important for understanding one reason why Yogaacaara is not metaphysical idealism. No Yogaacaara text denies materiality (ruupa) as a valid Buddhist category. On the contrary, Yogaacaarins include materiality in their analysis’. I consider this a mistake. While Yogācārins may retain the term rūpa for analytical purposes, to suggest that Yogācāra unequivocally inherits the Abhidharma categorization of rūpa is to misconstrue the crucial Yogācāra emphasis on the falsity of duality. As this article seeks to show, materiality in Yogācāra analysis is associated with exactly what is false in our ordinary conceptions. Lusthaus (Citation2002) is somewhat more subtle on this point, and I prefer to treat it in detail elsewhere. [6] AKBh I.9a–b. The two that are not rūpa are, of course, the mind and mental objects. [7] More text-critical research will be necessary to determine whether Vasubandhu was the first, or even the most important, advocate of the positions he articulates. My central goal here is to articulate the distinctive character of the positions themselves. [8] By this term I intend the Mahāyānasūtrālakāra together with its commentary. [9] Recent examples include Hattori (Citation1982), Kaplan (Citation1990), Nagao and Kawamura (Citation1991, pp. 51–60), Prasad (Citation1993) and Tripathi (Citation1969). [10] MS II.27/ gźan gyi dba[ndot] gi [ndot]o bo ñid ci’i phyir ji skad smos pa’i sgyu ma la sogs pa lta bur bstan ce na/ gźan gyi dba[ndot] gi [ndot]o bo ñid la gźan dag nor ba ñid du som ñi za ba bzlog pa’i phyir ro/ I take Asa[ndot]ga to be the author of the MS and the AS, but do not consider other texts attributed to Asa[ndot]ga to have any well established authorship. I thus refer to them by their titles only. [11] TSN 2a,c: yat khyāti paratantro 'sau … pratyayādhīnavittitvāt … . [12] TSN 6 explains that the mental ‘cause’ (hetu) is the ‘consciousness called the storehouse’ (ālayākhyavijñāna) and the ‘result’ (phala) is the ‘sevenfold [consciousnesses] called active’ (pravittyākhya ca saptadhā). See Waldron (Citation2003) for a detailed, current treatment of the ālayavijñāna. [13] MS II.27 1. ’di ltar gźan dag ’di sñam du ji ltar na med pa spyod yul du ’gyur sñam du sems pa de dag gi som ñi za ba de bzlog pa’i phyir sgyu ma lta bu ñid do/ 2. /sems da[ndot] sems las byu[ndot] ba don med pa rnams ji ltar ’byu[ndot] sñam du som ñi za ba bzlog pa’i phyir smig rgyu lta bu ñid do/ 3. /don med na ’dod pa da[ndot] mi ’dod pa’i ñe bar spyod par ji tar ’gyur sñam du som ñi za ba bzlog pa’i phyir rmi lam lta bu ñid do/. The MS provides another five figures, but I am focusing here on the magical illusion and using the dream as a comparative example. [14] This is doubtless a reference to SNS I.6, which I discuss below. [15] AS I.2, p. 30.1–4. Rahula (Citation1971, p. 48). [16] AKBh I.39. [17] MS II.5, p. 26: de la lus da[ndot] lus can da[ndot] za ba po’i rnam par rig pa ni mig la sogs pa’i na[ndot] gi khams drug tu rig par bya’o/. [18] In AS I.IV he calls this the ‘internal body’ (ādhyātma kāya). Rahula (Citation1971, p. 118). [19] There is a slight discrepancy between the MSBh and the MS on this passage. The former glosses the ‘body-possessor’ as the klisia-manas and the ‘experiencer’ as the mano-dhātu. The latter glosses the ‘body-possessor’ as the five outer-directed sensory consciousnesses and the ‘experiencer’ as the mental consciousness. The latter seems to be more consistent with the the Abhidharmasamuccaya, which says, Rahula (Citation1971, p. 19), that all seven of the mental dharmas constitute the mana āyatana. But the former's indictment of belief in the body, as the basis of the defiled mind, is consistent with my argument below that Vasubandhu is centrally interested in undermining such belief. [20] In truth, ten are listed, but since the last five are forms of the first five, I opt for simplicity and skip them here. [21] MS II.5, p. 26: de ñe bar spyad par bya ba’i rnam par rig pa ni gzugs la sogs pa’i phyi’i khams drug tu rig par bya’o/. [22] MS II.5, p. 26: de la ñe bar spyod pa rnam par rig pa ni mig gi rnam par śes pa la sogs pa’i khams drug tu rig par bya’o/. [23] MS II.6–9 draws upon SNS VIII.7–8 and prefigures both Vasubandhu's Viś and Dignāga's Ālambanaparīksā. [24] Hall (Citation1983, pp. 145–146). Hall's edition, p. 234, has: ātmany asati katham ādhyātmika bāhya vā/ ahakārasanniśrayatvāc cittam ātme ’ty upacaryate/ ‘ātmanā hi sudāntena svarga prāpnoti paiiitai ’ity ukta/ cittasya cā ’nyatra damanam ukta bhagavatā/ ‘cittasya damana sādhu citta dānta sukhāvaham’ iti/ ata ātmabhūtasya cittasyā ’śrayabhāvena pratyāsannatvāt caksurādīnām ādkhyātmikatva rūpādīnā visayabhāvād bāhyatvam/. [25] Although the term for figurative comparison (upacāra) does not appear in this passage, I agree with Hall's translation because Vasubandhu's analysis fits with his figurative principle articulated in several places in the AKBh, ‘This is because of the figurative use (upacāra) of the [name of the] effect for the cause’. Hall (Citation1983, pp. 69, 192–193): kāraie kāryopacārāt. [26] MSBh (Sems tsam ri) 152b(304).1–3: bcom ldan ’das kyis don ci las dgo[ndot]s nas yod pa ma yin pa’i sgyu ma la sogs pa’i dpe brgyad bstan ce na/ de bstan par bya’o// de la re źig sgyu ma’i dpe ni na[ndot] gi bdag ñid can gyi skye mched drug po mig la sogs pa rnams kyi gñen po ste ga[ndot] gi phyir sgyu ma’i gla[ndot] po bźin du de dag yod pa ma yin na ya[ndot] ñe bar dmigs pa ñid du blta bar bya’o źes ston to//smig rgyu’i dpes kya[ndot] ga[ndot] gi phyir snod kyi ’jig rten de rnams kya[ndot] de da[ndot] mtshu[ndot]s pa’i phyir smig rgyu bźin te/ yod pa ma yin na ya[ndot] gdu[ndot]s pa’i dba[ndot] gis chur dmigs pa bźin no//gzugs la sogs pa’i ñe bar spyod pa’i gñen po ni rmi lam gyi dpes te/ des na rmi lam bźin du gzugs la sogs pa ’di dag yod pa ma yin na ya[ndot] de las byu[ndot] ba’i ’dod pa da[ndot] mi ’dod pa’i ñe bar spyod pa ya[ndot] de bźin du bstan to/ Cf. Anacker's summary on pp. 635–636 of Potter (Citation1999) and Lamotte's (Citation1973) French summary, Vol. II, p. 124. Note that in n. 578, p. 758, Anacker writes that Lamotte (Citation1934) translates ch. 2 of MSBh, whereas Lamotte (Citation1934), although named ‘chapitre II’ in fact provides a translation of what Lamotte (Citation1973) and Anacker's summary call chapter I, verses 1–28. [27] In fact, MSBh dutifully cites and explains all eight figures exactly as they are explained in the MS before turning to treat them separately in this passage. [28] See D’Amato (Citation2000, pp. 33–39), for discussion of the authorship of the MSABh. As D’Amato points out, Asa[ndot]ga (i.e. the author of the MS) cites the MSA as an authoritative text. Authorship of the MSABh is disputed, and preferring the Sanskrit and Chinese manuscripts over the Tibetan attribution to Vasubandhu, D’Amato concludes that it is most likely the composition of one otherwise unknown Vyavadātasamaya. I adopt D’Amato's practice of referring to the MSA and MSABh without authorial attribution. Vasubandhu's understanding of the MSABh as an authoritative source will be made clear in what follows. [29] MSABh on MSA 11.30 (62): tatra māyopamā dharmāi saiādhyātmikānyāyatanāni/ asatyātmajīvāditve tathā prakhyānāt/ svapnopamāi sai bāhyānyāyatanāni tadupabhogasyāvastukatvāt/ I believe that Vasubandhu's MSBh and TSN draw upon the MSA's explanation of the dream and the magical illusion, but it is interesting that with respect to several other figures Asa[ndot]ga's MS in fact accords better with the MSA. This passage and the next cited from the MSABh below are mentioned by Masaaki Hattori (Citation1982) in his discussion of the dream analogy in Yogācāra. [30] Viś 3.20–22: svapne vināpyarthena kvacideva deśe kicid bhramarārāmastrīpurusādika diśyate na sarvatra/ tatraiva ca deśe kadāciddiśyate na sarvakālamiti siddho vināpyarthena deśakālaniyamai/. [31] Vyāsa's commentary on Patañjali's Yogasūtras provides an argument against Vasubandhu's position here, in a treatment that clearly considers the dream as evidence that needs to be refuted in order to maintain confidence in the reality of external objects. This is summarized by Sharma (Citation1992). No such counter-arguments are provided against magical illusions. Prasad (Citation1993) summarizes a ‘Śa[ndot]karite critique’ of the dream argument that fits Vasubandhu's position above. Prasad seems to indicate, however, that Vasubandhu uses the argument to prove that reality is necessarily only a dream, whereas surely Vasubandhu intends the dream only to prove that reality could be like a dream. Both Sharma and Prasad paint Vasubandhu as requiring that perception and/or knowledge be indubitable, but I do not find this position in the Viś. [32] The other instances are both exceptions that prove the rule for which I am arguing. The first, at TSN 4b (though see Tola and Dragonetti (Citation1983, p. 263, n. 50) for manuscript divergences), is the initial appearance of the same compound that I discuss here, dvayātmanā: tatra ki khyāty asatkalpai katha khyāti dvayātmanā/ tasya kā nāstitā tena yā tatrādvayadharmatā//. While every commentator understands the significance of the verse's distinction between dvaya and advaya, no one to my knowledge has yet pointed out the parallel opposition of -ātmanā and -dharmatā set up in the second half of each compound. It is, of course, legitimate to translate dvayātmanā, as most do, without explicit reference to a personal ātman, but I believe that to do so loses Vasubandhu's contrasting the ‘self ’ with ‘reality’ when he finishes one line with ‘with the self of duality’ (dvayātmanā) and the next line with ‘the reality of non-duality’ (advayadharmatā). The second instance, at 23a, also refers to the mistaken reality of the constructed nature, describing it as ‘the self of convention’ (vyavahārātmā). In many compounds throughout the TSN Vasubandhu indicates something ‘having the nature of’ using not ātman but the derivative ātmaka/ātmika. Only the falsely constructed dual nature—the unreal self—is referred to by the term ātman. [33] TSN 27 & 29: māyākita mantravaśāt khyāti hastyātmanā yathā/ ākāramātra tatrāsti hastī nāsti tu sarvathā// … . // asatkalpas tathā khyāti mūlacittād dvayātmanā/ dvayam atyantato nāsti tartāsty ākitimātrakam// I mention that I am translating ātman literally because the term often means ‘the nature of’ or some such and not, as I have it here, ‘the self ’. The words that I translate here as ‘as the self of an elephant … as the self of duality’ appear: ‘like an elephant … by nature of duality’ in Anacker (Citation1998, p. 294); ‘Like an elephant … duality’ in Garfield (Citation2002, pp. 133–134); ‘an elephant … with the nature of duality’ in Kaplan (Citation1990, p. 56); ‘in the nature of an elephant … in the nature of duality’ in Kochumuttom (Citation1989, pp. 112–113); ‘comme un éléphant … en dualité’ in De la Vallée Poussin (1933, p. 160); ‘as an elephant … with duality’ in Tola and Dragonetti (Citation1983). Only Kochumuttom's translation preserves the obvious parallel between the verses, and is how I would translate the expressions if I were not drawn by the passages just cited to take the ātman to refer literally to the personal self. Garfield's translation is based on the Tibetan translations, none of which preserve the parallel. Each Tibetan translator seems to have chosen to translate ātman literally as bdag or bdag ñid either in the case of the elephant or in the case of duality, but never both. [34] This summary holds even if the reader remains skeptical about my translation of dvayātmanā as ‘as the self of duality’. [35] On smityupasthāna, see Rahula (Citation1971, p. 169) and Dudjom (1991, Vol. II, p. 129), which contains further references. [36] MSABh on MSA XVIII.43–44 (141): katham parijñātai kāyasya māyopamatvaparijñayāt tathaivābhūtarūpasaprakhyānāt/ vedanāyāi svapnopamatvaparijñayā tathaiva mithyānubhavāt/ cittasya prakitiprabhāsvaratvaparijñayā ākāsavat/ dharmāiām āgantukatvaparijñayā ākāsaganturajodhūmābhranīhāropaklesavat/. [37] See above discussion of MS I.5 and note on Vasubandhu's commentary. Also cf. Rahula (Citation1971, pp. 118 ff.), where Asa[ndot]ga treats the internal and external ‘body’ (kāya) as categories investigated also under the smityupasthāna. [38] AS I.1 (1): saparigrahadehātmavastu. [39] MAV 1.3 (425): sattvapratibhāsa yat pañcendriyatvena svaparasantānayoi. Vasubandhu goes on to attribute the appearance of ‘self ’ (ātman) to the defiled mind (klisia manas), which fits with the other side of the equation, the ‘self of duality’. [40] In a fascinating recent article, Noritoshi Aramaki (Citation2000) argues that early Yogācāra texts reflect what he calls an avavāda structure, in which (if I understand it properly) the paths and practices of the bodhisattva are described from two complementary perspectives: (1) from the perspective of the Tathāgatas’ teaching which must be understood and put into action, and (2) from the perspective of the Tathāgatas’ realization which must be taught. Aramaki focuses on the avavāda structure of the Maitreya chapter of the SNS, and discovers therein that the primary specific realization that must correlate with the teaching contained within the famous first extant passage to declare the vijñapti-mātra doctrine—and thus, the ‘realization’ that generates the defining doctrine of the Yogācāra school—is nothing other than the ‘infinite supernatural power (mahāprabhāva)’ to know how all beings’ citta arises (p. 52). Primarily, this means that the bodhisattva knows how beings are aware of: having a body (ādānavijñāna), perceiving sensory objects such as form, etc. (sakidrūpādivisayodgraha), and mental constructions (vikalpamanovijñāna) (p. 53). Aramaki points out that by correlating these three layers of Early Buddhist vijñāna theory with the declaration of vijñapti-mātra—that is, by declaring that the bodhisattva understands these to be awarenesses without mental objects (‘ālambanavijñaptimātra’)—the SNS succeeds in providing ‘a synthesis of Early and Mahāyāna Buddhisms’ (p. 57). In concurrence with Aramaki, then, we can add the following to our discussion thus far: (1) The two MSABh magical elephant passages discussed thus far also support Aramaki's ‘avadāna structure’ thesis because they describe the very same figurative use first as the ideal aspirant's doctrine and second as the bodhisattva's ‘thorough knowledge’; (2) The declaration of the illusory nature of the body, which we have established as the magical elephant's figurative forté, just may be the primary element in the central doctrine of the Vijñānavāda. It is no coincidence that this figure plays so important a role in the texts under discussion here. [41] Cox (Citation1988, p. 55) notes that the Sautrāntikas believed that a magical illusion required a rūpa such as a piece of wood as a substratum. This is a relevant point, but not essential, because there is no rūpa corresponding to the ‘self ’ that one perceives. The piece of wood does not actually look like an elephant. We think there is an elephant because we fail to rely upon our senses. [42] MAVBh 1.1 (424): abhūtaparikalpo ‘sti dvaya tatra na vidyate/ śūnyatā vidyate tvatra tasyām api sa vidyate // tatrābhūtaparikalpo grāhyagrāhakavikalpai/ dvaya grāhya grāhaka ca/ śūnyatā tasyābhūtaparikalpasya grāhyagrāhakabhāvena virahitatā/ tasyām api sa vidyata ityabhūtaparikalpai/. [43] MAVBh I.5 (425): kalpitai paratantraś ca parinispanna eva ca/ arthād abhūtakalpāc ca dvayābhāvāc ca deśitai // arthai parikalpitai svabhāvai/ abhūtaparikalpai paratantrai svabhāvai/ grāhyagrāhakābhāvai parinispannai svabhāvai/. [44] AS I.2, pp. 30.1–4. Rahula (Citation1971, p. 48). [45] AKBh II.24 (54–55): samādhiścittasyaikāgratā/ sūkśmā hi cittacaittānā viśesai/ sa eva duiparicchedai pravāhesvapi tāvat kim punai ksanesu/ rūpinīnām api [55] tāvadosadhīnām bahurasānā kāsācid indriyagrāhyā rasaviśesā duravadhārā bhavanti kim punarye dharmā arupino buddhigrāhyāi/. [46] MAV III.17 with MAVBh (443): grāhakagrāhyatadgrāhabījārthaścāparo matai// katamo ’parai/ dhātui/ tatra grāhakabījārthaścakśurdhātvādayai/ grāhyabījārtho rūpadhātvādayai/ tadgrāhabījārthaścaksurvijñānadhātvādayai //. I am grateful to Mario D’Amato for pointing me in the direction of this passage. [47] AS I.2 (20.10–18). This section contains reference to a rather more intricate theory of grāhaka than I can analyze here. [48] SNS VIII.20 (100): ’dzin pa’i don ni skye mched gzugs can l[ndot]a da[ndot]/ sems da[ndot] yid da[ndot]/ rnam par śes pa da[ndot]/ sems las byu[ndot] ba’i chos rnams so/ gzu[ndot] ba’i don ni phyi rol gyi skye mched drub po dag yin no/ byams pa ya[ndot] ’dzin pa’i don gang yin pa de ni gzu[ndot] ba’i don kya[ndot] yin no/. [49] Garfield (Citation2002, p. 150). [50] Readers familiar with these texts may object that the expression grāhyagrāhaka does appear in them several times in evident relation to duality. For instance, it appears at MAV III.4 (438) in a position clearly intended to associate the term with the dependent nature, and then in III.9 (440) places the term dvayam in similar position. My argument here is not that the terms ‘duality’ and ‘grasper and grasped’ cannot or should not be related. I am only suggesting that earlier texts allow for a wider definition than merely ‘grasper and grasped’. At MAV V.23–26 (459), grāhyagrāhaka appears seventh in a laundry list of ‘extremes of duality’ (dvayāntatā) that the work is dedicated to eradicating. Even in MAV III.4 grāhyagrāhaka is paired with bhāvābhāva. Indeed, both pairs of terms, and the term duality, find their most extensive discussions within the context of discussions of the dependent nature. [51] In their commentaries to MS II.3, summarized by Lamotte (Citation1973, p. 90), both Vasubandhu and Asvabhāva bring in grāhya-grāhaka language to explain parikalpitalaksaia and vijñaptimātra. Williams (Citation1989, p. 83) cites this MS passage as a paradigmatic instance of the Cittamātra description of the ‘object’ as both ‘grasper and grasped’—which it is, of course, but only in the commentaries. Asa[ndot]ga does not use this terminology here. [52] See especially MAVBh, MSABh, MSBh, and DhDhVV. I include the MSABh here because the Tibetan canon attributes it to Vasubandhu. I have not previously been a supporter of the ‘two Vasubandhus’ thesis (Jaini, Citation1958) or a ‘Vasubandhu complex’ of texts, but I am hard pressed to account for the difference between these commentaries and Vasubandhu's so-called independent Yogācāra works—Pañcaskandhakaprakaraia, Viś, Trimśikākārikā, and TSN—which entirely lack the definition of duality as grasper and grasped. This section contains only a first pass at sketching the different ideas at play in this development. [53] Mario D’Amato (Citation2003) has made a fascinating study of this and surrounding passages. See especially p. 197. MSA XI.40 with MSABh: trividhatrividhābhāso grāhyagrāhakalaksaiai/ abhūtaparikalpo hi paratantrasya laksaia // trividhatrividhaś cābhāso 'syeti trividhatrividhābhāsai/ tatra trividhābhāsai padābhāso ’rthābhāso dehābhāsaś ca/ punar trividhābhāso manaudgrahavikalpābhāsai/ mano yat klista sarvadā/ udgrahai pañca vijñānakāyāi/ vikalpo manovijñānam/ tatra prathamatrividhābhāso grahyalaksaiai/ dvitīyo grāhakalaksaiai/ ityayam abhūtaparikalpai paratantrasya laksaiam/ [54] This is not a literal translation, but explains the meaning of the gloss. [55] See below for an alternative reading of artha here as indicating not ‘meaning’ but ‘object’ or ‘thing’. [56] SNS X.10 (162-163): bcom ldan ’das de bźin gśegs pa’i m[ndot]on par rdzogs par bya[ndot] chub pa ga[ndot] lags pa da[ndot]/ chos kyi ’khor lo bskor ba ga[ndot] lags pa da[ndot]/ yo[ndot]s su mya [ndot]an las ’das pa chen po ga[ndot] lags pa de dag gi mtshan ñid ni ji lta bur rig par bgyi lags/ ’jam dpal gñis su med pa’i mtshan ñid yin te/ m[ndot]on par rdzogs par bya[ndot] chub pa ’a[ndot] ma yin/ m[ndot]on par rdzogs par bya[ndot] ma chub pa ’a[ndot] ma yin/ chos kyi ’khor lo bskor ba ’a[ndot] ma yin/ chos kyi ’khor lo mi bskor ba ’a[ndot] ma yin/ yo[ndot]s su mya [ndot]an las ’das pa chen po ’a[ndot] ma yin/ yo[ndot]s su mya [ndot]an las ’das pa chen po med pa ’a[ndot] ma yin te/ chos kyi sku śin tu rnam par dag pa ñid kyi phyir da[ndot]/ sprul pa’i sku kun tu ston pa ñid kyi phyir ro/ [57] SNS I. 1 (34): kye rgyal ba’i sras chos thams cad gñis su med pa chos thams cad gñis su med pa źes bya na/ chos thams cad ni ga[ndot]/ ji ltar na gñis su med pa yin/ rigs kyi bu chos thams cad chos thams cad ces bya ba ni gñis ji tsam pa ste/ ’dus byas da[ndot]/ ’dus ma byas so// de la ’dus byas ni ’dus byas kya[ndot] ma yin/ ’dus ma byas kya[ndot] ma yin no// ’dus ma byas ni ’dus ma byas kya[ndot] ma yin/ ’dus byas kya[ndot] ma yin no/ [58] SNS I.2 (35). [59] SNS I.4–5 (36–37). [60] Here I use the terms ‘observe the illusion’ and ‘see the illusion’ to describe the figure in the SNS although, as I have argued earlier, illusory images are not brought about through perception alone. What the SNS says (36), more precisely, is that when the foolish people ‘see or hear’ the trees and leaves and so on, they form a thought with respect to it (de mtho[ndot] [ndot]am thos na ’di sñam du sems te). In this case, however, since the SNS is not concerned to elucidate the relationship between perceiver and the perceived, focusing as it does on the ‘duality’ of the belief in the existence vs. the non-existence of the elephant, I opt for simplicity. [61] My summary is rather different than the one given in Potter (Citation1999). [62] SNS I.5 (37): chos thams cad kyi brjod du med pa’i chos ñid. This expression is the motivation for the Dharmadharmatā-vibhāga. [63] SNS I.6 (38): zab mo byis pa’i spyod yul ma yin pa // brjod med gñis min rgyal bas bstan mdsad kya[ndot]// byis pa gti mug rmo[ndot]s pa ’di dag ni // smra ba’i spros la dga’ źi[ndot] gñis la gnas // ma rtogs pa ’am log par rtogs pa dag // lug da[ndot] ba la[ndot] dag tu ya[ndot] skye źi[ndot]// de dag śes pa’i smra ba de bor nas// śin tu yun ri[ndot] ’khor ba ’dir ’khor ’gyur/ [64] A particularly interesting point to note here is that the best explanation is the figure, and that the figure must be only a figure, because an example or a direct, discursive explanation would necessarily be tainted by the inherent ‘duality’ of all language and conceptualization. Only figures can stand because since they are, by their nature, self-undermining in the sense that they require the hearer to understand something different from what is asserted. [65] MSA XI.25,27: māyāhastyākitigrāhabhrānter dvayam udāhitam/ dvaya tatra yathā nāsti dvaya caivopalabhyate// … // tathā bhāvāt tathā ’bhāvād ’bhāvābhāvaviśesatai/ sadasanto ’tha māyābhā ye dharmā bhrāntilaksaiāi//. [66] Emphasis added. MSABh on 25–26: grāhya grāhaka ca tatra yathā nāsti dvaya caivopalabhyate/. [67] MSA XI.34–35: citta dvayaprabhāsa rāgādyābhāsam isyate tadvat/ śraddhādyābhāsa na tadanyo dharmai klisiakuśalo 'sti// yathā dvayapratibhāsād anyo na dvayalaksaiai/ iti citta citrābhāsa citrākāra pravartate// [68] MSA XI.21–22, 24: tathā dvayābh[ās]atātrāsti tadbhāvaśca na vidyate/ tasmād astitvanāstitva rūpādisu vidhīyate// na bhāvas tatra cābhāvo nābhāvo bhāva eva ca/ bhāvābhāvāviśesaś ca rūpādisu vidhīyate// … // bhrānter nimitta bhrāntiś ca rūpavijñaptir isyate/ arūpiiī ca vijñaptir abhāvāt syān na cetarā// [69] MSABh on MSA XI.24: kāraiābhāvāt. [70] It is somewhat controversial to declare that the Yogācāra do not believe in the possibility of rūpa. Nonetheless, I believe this not just from what I have written but from a variety of contexts in which it appears that Yogācārins reject not just mental sensation, but also the physical sensory organs and fields. Yogācārins reject, for instance, all eleven of the dharmas that the AKBh includes in the aggregate of physical form (rūpa-skandha): the five physical sense organs, the five objects of those sense organs, and the ‘invisible form’ (avijñapti-rūpa). The fact that this last category is rejected is uncontroversial. It serves a special purpose in Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma philosophy, accounting as it does for the unperceived streams of karmic cause and effect. Its designation as avijñapti distinguishes it from all other kinds of matter, since while every other category of rūpa is defined according to its role in perception, the avijñapti-rūpa is ‘invisible’ or ‘unperceived’ or ‘uncognized’ and so plays no role in perception. Yogācāra philosophers not only do away with this extra kind of form, replacing it with a thoroughly mental karmic causal account centering on the ‘storehouse consciousness’ (ālayavijñāna), they also deny the very existence of anything that is avijñapti. Their rejection of the only non-perceptual variety of form fits with their declaration of the non-duality of the standard ten perceptual kinds of rūpa, as we see in MSA XI.21–22, and XI.40. Yogācāra thinkers also describe additional categories of rūpa that are nonetheless denied reality. Asa[ndot]ga's AS adds five kinds of rūpa to the 10 standard organs and fields, all of which he classifies within the dharma-dhātu and therefore consist in ‘physical form’ that exists only as a mental object: ābhisaksepika, abhyavakāśika, sāmādānika, parikalpita, and vaibhutvika (Rahula, Citation1971, p. 24). The very notion that mental objects might be considered within the category of rūpa suggests the merely conventional nature of the category itself. This is confirmed when we notice that (1) the first (ābhisaksepika) is a term for the atom, which is a primary target of Vasubandhu's analytical critique in the Viś, and (2) the fourth (parikalpita) is the constructed nature, which the AS equates with ‘the emptiness of the non-existent’ (abhāvaśūnyatā) and Vasubandhu equates with ‘duality’ and the elephant that one imagines to exist where there is none (Rahula, Citation1971, p. 65.). Both are merely mental imaginations or projections of physicality, and yet to the AS they are as rūpika as the ten organs and fields. What this means, of course, is that rūpa is ultimately unreal. This elimination of materiality is accomplished partially through the addition of two new varieties of consciousness (ālayavijñāna and klisiamanas), but also (as I am arguing) through a denial of the ordinary functionality of perception, as encapsulated in the non-duality of grasper and grasped. This certainly does not mean that rūpa is eliminated as a valid conventional category of analysis. Of course, rūpa is an essential characteristic of our false perceptions of reality. My point is that much of the Yogācāra description of emptiness or ultimate reality begins with a denial of the various kinds of physical form, and that physical form is a primary target when, not only conceptual duality, but grasper and grasped is denied. [71] TSN 36–37 (156): cittamātropalambhena jñeyārthānupalambhatā/ jñeyārthānupalambhena syāc cittānupalambhatā// dvayor anupalambhena dharmadhātūpalambhatā/ dharmadhātūpalambhena syād vibhutvopalambhatā//. [72] Rahder (Citation1926, p. 49). [73] Schmithausen (Citation1984) and Aramaki (Citation2000). Here I summarize not the SNS passage itself but the MS paraphrase. [74] MS II.7 (27): byams pa chos ga[ndot] ya[ndot] chos ga[ndot] la ya[ndot] mi ’dzin mod kyi/ ’on kya[ndot] de ltar skyes pa’i sems ga[ndot] yin pa de ni de ltar sna[ndot] [ndot]o. [75] MS II.7 (27). [76] I do not know whether the change was made before, during, or after the composition of the MS.
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