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NATO and Turkey in Afghanistan and Central Asia: Possibilities and Blind Spots

2009; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 10; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/14683840802648661

1743-9663

Petros Vamvakas,

Post-Soviet Geopolitical Dynamics

Abstract Abstract Turkey's role in the ongoing revision of the Euro‐Atlantic security framework has ranged from vague to problematic. This has paralleled Turkey's protracted and equally problematic application for EU membership. Turkish dissatisfaction with this treatment has been forcefully expressed through the rejection of the Berlin Plus agreement. This paper argues that this course is counterproductive. The Euro‐Atlantic security alliance needs Turkish cooperation and collaboration as much as Turkey needs it, particularly with respect to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. Mutual policy "blind spots" can be eliminated if the stakeholders can focus on substantive policy goals rather than near‐term disputes based on cultural disconnect. Notes 1. Iceland, Norway, and Turkey are the only current non‐EU members of NATO. 2. "Defense Minister Vecdi Gönül, yesterday, confirmed Turkey's move and said a brigade already allocated for the EU was withdrawn, the Anatolian news agency reported. We cannot accept being a substitute force. This private brigade is a well‐equipped one. We warned them, we gave them time but they did not give us a place in the basic list. According to Turkish sources, the Turkish brigade was appointed as a precautionary force rather than a main force and EU officials did not consult with Turkish officials while preparing the deployment plan. European sources, on the other hand, yesterday expressed their worries over Turkey's decision that would affect strategic cooperation between NATO and EU, and also some missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan"; Duygu Güvenç, "Turkey Withdraws from EU's Security Body," Turkish Daily News, June 8, 2007. 3. "NATO's comparative advantage lies in: First and foremost, its experience in organising the deployment of substantial numbers of armed forces, over long distances, for considerable periods, and to handle a broad range of contingencies. Long‐standing habits of cooperation. In place command structures. All ensure a relative degree of coherence. Note that the EU has made considerable progress in these areas. Second, NATO also has substantial experience in offering assistance in reconstruction, particularly security sector reform. Partnership and cooperation programs. The experience of enlargement. And third, NATO brings the United States to the political and military table in terms of decision making and for assets. For some this is a double‐edged sword with as many disadvantages as advantages. The subject for an entirely different debate, however, the transatlantic element (US and Canada) is one of the critical differences between the two"; Simon Lunn, Secretary General, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, "The Limits of ESDP: Geography or Geo‐politics," The Prospects for EU–NATO Cooperation, July 13, 2006. 4. Paul Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards, "Beyond the EU/NATO Dichotomy: The Beginnings of a European Strategic Culture," International Affairs, Vol.77, No.3 (July 2001), pp.587–603. 5. Madeleine Albright, "The Right Balance Will Secure NATO's Future," Financial Times, December 7, 1998. 6. The St. Malo Summit took place in December 1998 between Prime Minister Jacques Chirac and Prime Minister Tony Blair. The Franco‐British agreement became the basis of the European Security and Defense Policy. Alexander R. Vershbow, the US permanent representative to the North Atlantic Council who had also served on the staff of the National Security Council, outlines the US position and the apprehension on the part of the administration in Alexander R. Vershbow, "European Security and Defense Identity: Berlin, St. Malo, and Beyond," Joint Force Quarterly (Spring 1999), pp.52–55. 7. The Western European Union was a dormant security alliance that had been supplanted by NATO during the Cold War. It became more active in the 1990s in defining European security in the post‐Cold War Europe. 8. The Berlin Plus agreement is a short title for a comprehensive package of agreements between NATO and the EU based on conclusions of the NATO Washington Summit. It is comprised of the following major parts: NATO–EU Security Agreement; Assured access to NATO planning capabilities for EU‐led Crisis Management Operations (CMO); Availability of NATO assets and capabilities for EU‐led CMO; Procedures for Release, Monitoring, Return, and Recall of NATO Assets and Capabilities; Terms of Reference for DSACEUR and European Command Options for NATO; EU–NATO consultation arrangements in the context of an EU‐led CMO making use of NATO assets and capabilities; Arrangements for coherent and mutually reinforcing Capability Requirements. All parts are tied together through the so‐called "Framework Agreement," which consists essentially of an exchange of letters between SG/HR and SG NATO dated March 17, 2003. Since that day, the Berlin Plus package has been in effect and serves as the foundation for practical work between the EU and NATO. In that, the view of EU‐led CMO makes use of NATO planning support or NATO capabilities and assets for the execution of any operations, http://www.nato.int/shape/news/2003/shape_eu/se030822a.htm (accessed September 26, 2008). 9. There is a rich bibliography that deals with the notions of modernity, democracy, and Islam from anthropologist Ernest Gellner, who compares the role of Islam in state‐building to that of ethnicity and nationalism in Europe. See Ernest Gellner, Muslim Society (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Ronald Inglehart, Islam, Gender, Culture, and Democracy: Findings from the Values Survey (Ontario: de Sitter Publications, 2004); and Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, and Daniel Brumberg (eds.), Islam and Democracy in the Middle East (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003). 10. Modernization theory was a prominent theoretical school and an example of grand theory arguing for the superiority of secular, Western, individualist culture. See D. Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1958); and A. Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991). Ronald Inglehart has argued that people's values do change over time, even though he ties his argument to materialist and post‐materialist cohorts in society. His arguments are based on World Values Survey (WSV) and European Values Survey (ESV) measuring data from over 80 countries. Ronald Inglehart, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 11. In December 1999 the EU member states met and set a target of 2003 for meeting the Headline Goal of military capability in coordination with NATO. The St. Malo Summit of December 1998 and the Washington Summit of April 1999 had paved the way for the wide agreement for a European Security and Defense Policy. 12. "The ESDP was formally replacing the Western European Union in which as an associate member Turkey enjoyed priviliges and rights equal to those of full members. As a result of the Helsinki Summit decisions, Turkey lost its previous status in the Western European Union (WEU), which had granted Turkey the right of 'full involvement' in WEU activities, as an associate member of that Organization"; Mahmut Bali Aykan, "Turkey and European Security and Defence Identity/Policy (ESDI/P): A Turkish View," Journal of Contemporary European Studies, Vol.13, No.3 (December 2005), p.3. 13. "The 'NATO first' principle continued to a part of European security language throughout 2000"; Martin Reichard, The EU–NATO Relationship: A Legal and Political Perspective (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2006), p.151. 14. At the 2000 EU Nice Summit the member states agreed to achieve by 2003 the ability to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least one year forces up to 60,000 persons. This was agreed at the Helsinki European Council and became known as the Helsinki Headline Goal 2003. 15. " The US military commitment to Europe will be relativised through the repatriation (AWACS) or re‐assignment (combat forces and equipment) of assets which had previously been based in Europe. Politically, the US administration does not place Europe and its security high on its priority list, other than through the imminent enlargement of NATO, … European 'autonomy' at both political and military levels will become even more crucial, for three reasons. First, because the US military is likely to be concentrated elsewhere and can no longer be relied on to take over tasks of crisis management. Second, NATO, while almost certainly retaining a major combat capability linking the EU to North America, is nevertheless bound to become a very different type of instrument … The integration of an autonomous EU capacity across the entire range of policy instruments is now an urgent task. It is no longer simply a political ambition, but a functional necessity. However, the EU should maintain its current approach to international affairs based on constructive engagement, prioritising the carrot rather than the stick. If anything, September 11 suggests that such an approach is not only morally preferable to the more militaristic impulses of the USA, but also that, at a purely political level, it is the only approach which has any hope of eradicating the deeper causes of terrorism"; Jolyon Howorth, "The European Security Conundrum: Prospects for ESDP after September 11, 2001," Groupment D'Etudes et Recherches Notre Europe, Policy Paper 1, March 2002, p.6. 16. Operations Concordia and Althea respectively were carried out in full cooperation with NATO. In fact, Operation Althea in 2004 was following "NATO's decision at the Istanbul Summit of June 28, 2004 to terminate the Alliance's Stabilisation Force (SFOR) operation by the end of the year, the EU started its own 7,000‐strong mission in the country with the aim to implement the military aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement and to maintain a safe and secure environment"; "NATO–EU Relations," World Security Institute, Brussels, January 16, 2006. 17. Lord George Robertson, NATO secretary general, speaking at the Grandes Conferences Catholiques, Brussels, October 22, 2003, assesses the complex security and defense structure in this way: "This is not the traditional NATO. However, some things do not change. The Cold War and its aftermath saw regular outbursts of transatlantic angst as European or American experts prophesied that the two continents were drifting apart, and that NATO was doomed. They were proved wrong. Sadly, the same prophesies regularly fill today's in‐tray as well. Some pundits unite in sorrow at the incompatibility of Europe's Venus and America's Mars. Others write with a sense of anticipation about the advent of competing poles on either side of the Atlantic. My view is that those who believe that Europe and North America have separate destinies, conflicting interests or incompatible world views are taking a blinkered, short term approach to the transatlantic relationship. This unique partnership was born in common philosophies of freedom and democracy. It was forged in half a century's fight against tyranny. Now it stands as a beacon in a world faced by extremism and instability. A beacon of democracy, toleration, plurality, openness and order. Yes, there are differences between us. Differences across the Atlantic. Differences within Europe and within North America. I rejoice in those differences. They are the reason why I abhorred the Soviet system. They are the reason why I became a democratic politician. A strong partnership will overcome differences. In the Atlantic Alliance, in NATO, we have such a partnership"; http://www.paginedidifesa.it/2003/natosg_031022.html (accessed September 26, 2008). 18. As of September 1, 2008, the ISAF mission consisted of 40 contributing nations and 47,600 soldiers, http://www.nato.int/ISAF/docu/epub/pdf/isaf_placemat.pdf (September 26, 2008). 19. "The Turkish experience demonstrates that secularization of law in Islamic societies is an important prerequisite of democracy. However, the recent history of Turkey also points to the contested nature of secularization, which leads to polarization and hence creates tension between democracy and secularism that can threaten both. It is the central thesis of this essay that the division along the religious versus secular axis can only be resolved through the internal logic and mechanisms of democratic rule"; Binnaz Toprak, "Islam and Democracy in Turkey," Turkish Studies, Vol.6, No.2 (June 2005), p.174. 20. Document #351, Memorandum of Conference with President Eisenhower, Ankara, December 6, 1959 in Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1958–1960, Volume 10, Part 2, p.821. 21. Ibid. 22. "NATO's Kosovo operation was a major challenge in the history of the Atlantic alliance. For the first time, a defensive alliance launched a military campaign to avoid a humanitarian tragedy outside its own borders. For the first time, an alliance of sovereign nations fought not to conquer or preserve territory but to protect the values on which the alliance was founded. And despite many challenges, NATO prevailed. Throughout the 1990s NATO has been instrumental in managing Europe's security evolution—a testament both to the vitality of the transatlantic link and to its ability to adapt to changing circumstances"; Javier Solana, "NATO's Success in Kosovo," Foreign Affairs (November/December 1999), p.35. 23. "The alternative representation, on the other hand, has framed NATO's transformation as negative for national defense, claiming that forces trained for global, warlike missions are neither capable nor available for national defense tasks such as containment of Russia's strategic interests in the Barents Sea"; Nina Graeger, "Norway between NATO, the EU, and the US: A Case Study of Post‐Cold War Security and Defence Discourse," Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol.18, No.1 (April 2005), p.100. 24. "One may assume that the 'New NATO' operation in Afghanistan is the forerunner for similar tasks in the future: a mixture of Counter Terrorism, Counter Infiltration, Counter Insurgency, Peace Making, Peace Keeping, Humanitarian and Nation Building Operations. Any failure of the operation in Afghanistan could break the Alliance. The contradiction between new member states' concerns and the future role of the alliance is very difficult to handle politically in those new member states that still feel a potential threat against their territory. NATO is not a super‐national entity, even if some Alliance officials sometimes behave as if it were. The member states' governments can neither ignore domestic political reality and the advice from their national military advisors, nor the pressure from the Alliance, and are therefore painfully suspended between the two"; General Michael H. Clemmesen, "The New NATO and the Security of the Alliance Periphery States," Baltic Defence Review, Vol.2, No.10 (2003), p.3. 25. "General Yasar Buyukanit, the chief of the Turkish General Staff (TGS), has publicly warned that Turkey remains under threat from Islamism and Kurdish separatism, while attacking the EU over the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and individual member states for their alleged support of the separatist Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)," Gareth Jenkins, "Buyukanit Warns against Islamism and Kurdish Separatism, Attacks EU over Policies on ESDP and PKK," Eurasia Daily Monitor, April 7, 2008, http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2372951 (accessed September 26, 2008). 26. "Sources said that Turkey's security problems are of more concern than a commitment to the EU stating that terrorists kill one or two Turkish soldiers everyday and that it had been proven that some of allies directly or indirectly support the terrorists. The priority will be the fight against terrorism. Gen. Büyükanıt earlier said that some allied countries gave support to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in the name of democracy and human rights, during an international symposium in Istanbul"; "NATO's Chief to Convince Turkey Not to Block NATO–EU Ties," Turkish Daily News, June 11, 2007. 27. "Turkey was the first Muslim country to join the United States in the global war on terrorism. As a NATO ally, Turkey first sent troops to Afghanistan in 2002 to join the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which came under NATO command the following year (Turkish Daily News, January 8, 2002). Under the ISAF framework, Turkey currently has about 1,200 troops in Afghanistan. Most of the Turkish force is deployed in the Kabul area, where it provides local security as well as logistical and communications services. There is also a provincial reconstruction team working in Wardak province. Now, as a response to increased attacks against coalition forces in Afghanistan, the United States is asking its NATO allies, including Turkey, for a greater commitment in troops (Milliyet, March 20)"; Giray Sadik, "Turkey Unwilling to Commit to Expanded Military Mission in Afghanistan," Global Terrorism Focus, Vol.5, No.12 (March 25, 2008), http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2374056 (accessed September 26, 2008). 28. Turkey has led the civilian component of the ISAF mission twice since its inception in 2002 and both times with great success, especially in regard to EU and NATO coordination. In addition, the usage of the Incirlik airbase provides essential logistical support for US forces in Afghanistan. 29. "Turkey declared last week that it withdrew its commitment to contribute its air and naval units to the EU's joint battle group, in a move to protest against the 27‐nation union for excluding it from the decision‐making bodies of European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Turkey, in a separate context, vetoed the involvement of Greek Cyprus in a multinational task force in South Kosovo. The EU and NATO consider Turkey's decision as an obstacle to their concerted efforts to create efficient trans‐Atlantic cooperation"; "NATO's Chief to Convince Turkey Not to Block NATO‐EU Ties," Turkish Daily News, June 11, 2007. 30. "An EU police mission (EUPOL AFGHANISTAN) has been in Afghanistan since June 2007, but NATO has been blocked by Turkey from providing security to the EU police training forces. As a result, the German‐led EU mission has to painstakingly negotiate bilateral security provisions with every … PRT on the ground. Sharing intelligence is also more difficult because there is no across‐the‐board agreement as a result of the Turkish veto"; Alastair Cameron and Michael Williams, NATO's Strategic and Operational Challenges (London: The Royal United Services Institute, A RUSI Transantlantic and European Programme Study, 2008), p.6, http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/NATOSTRATOP.pdf (accessed September 26, 2008). 31. "Militarily, co‐operation between NATO and the EU is usually good; armed forces are, after all, trained to co‐operate with allied and coalition forces to at least some extent … It is precisely at the political level that many analysts find the operational partnership most deficient. There remains lingering controversy over the questions of 'autonomy' (should the EU assume autonomy merely in decision‐making, or in the deployment and control of armed force as well?), and 'sequencing' (should NATO be offered 'first refusal' as a crisis develops and a response is required?). There is also concern that, in spite of the March 2003 intelligence sharing agreement, the exchange of classified information between the two organisations is still inadequate; largely a result of Turkey's refusal to grant Cyprus and Malta clearance to receive NATO intelligence material … What is still absent from NATO/EU collaboration is precisely the sort of grand bargain … James Dobbins, for example, sees that in Afghanistan the 'synergy between NATO and the European Union is largely missing' and argues that 'if Afghan reconstruction is to become a truly transatlantic project, then the EU should become more prominent on the civil side even as NATO takes over on the military side"; Paul Cornish, "EU and NATO: Co‐operation or competition?" Directorate‐General for External Policies of the Union, European Parliament, October 2006, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/committees/studies/download.do?file=18355 (accessed September 26, 2008). 32. The alliance values as proclaimed in the original Washington Charter of 1949: "They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law;" and as they are outlined in the 1999 Washington declaration emphasize the foundation of the alliance "on democracy, human rights and the rule of law." 33. According to the September 1, 2008 ISAF figures of contributing states, Turkey has the tenth largest contingency in Afghanistan with 725 members among 40 contributing states. In addition, Turkey continues to command the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Wardak, one of only ten states that lead one of the 26 PRTs. 34. In March 2008, American vice president Dick Cheney met with Turkish officials requesting additional Turkish soldiers for counterterrorism and was rebuffed. "Turkey's Foreign Minister Ali Babacan said Ankara will soon decide whether to send more troops to Afghanistan, a day after Buyukanit opposed the idea, saying that his forces were already busy fighting separatist fighters of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). 'We give importance to security in Afghanistan and, as a NATO ally, we abide by NATO decisions. We can obey these decisions as long as they do not weaken our own struggle against terrorism,' a Turkish official said in Ankara"; "Turkish Leader Tells Cheney No Afghan Help for Now," Japan Today, March 25, 2008, http://www.japantoday.com/category/world/view/turkish-leaders-tells-cheney-no-afghan-help-for-now (accessed September 26, 2008). "At a press conference on March 18, General Buyukanit clarified the position of the Turkish General Staff on the issue of providing combat troops to Afghanistan: 'Just a month after taking up my duty in this post [in 2006] I said that we would not send a single soldier to Afghanistan in the fight against terrorism. I still hold onto the same position … Our troops are in Kabul and under the ISAF which has no mission to fight against terrorism. Thus our troops are not there for this purpose. Additional troops are asked for the fight against terrorism…but we have no authority to send troops for this.' After indicating that the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) were already at war with PKK terrorists, Buyukanit added that 'it would not be proper for Turkey to deploy some of its troops for another struggle'"; Giray Sadik, "Turkey Unwilling to Expanded Military Mission in Afghanistan," Global Terrorism Analysis, Vol.5, No.12 (2008). Available at http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2374056.