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Monetary Union and the Transatlantic and Social Dimensions of Europe's Crisis

2007; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 12; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/13563460701302927

1469-9923

Alan W. Cafruny, Magnus Ryner,

European Monetary and Fiscal Policies

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes We thank Daniele Caramani, Ben Clift, Colin Hay, Eric Helleiner, Otto Holman, Johannes Jäger, Bob Jessop, Paul Lewis, Johnna Montgomery, Leila Talani, Matthew Watson, Daniel Wincott and NPE's anonymous reviewers for comments and help. The usual disclaimers apply. 1. Charles Kupchan, The End of the American Era: US Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the 21 st Century (Vintage, 2003), p. 22. See also Jeremy Rifkin, The European Dream: How Europe's Vision of the Future is Quietly Eclipsing the American Dream (Polity Press, 2004); Stephen Hasler, Superstate: The New Europe and its Challenge to America (I. B. Tauris, 2004); T. R. Reid, The United States of Europe: The Superpower No-One Talks About (Penguin, 2005); and Mark Leonard, Why Europe Will Run the 21 st Century (Fourth Estate, 2005). 2. Martin Rhodes, 'Why the EMU is – or May Be – Good for European Welfare States', in Kenneth Dyson (ed.), European States and the Euro (Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 305–33; Anton Hemerijck, 'The Self Transformation of the European Social Model(s)', in G⊘sta Esping-Andersen (ed.), Why We Need a New Welfare State (Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 173–244. 3. Assumptions of basic force relations between the economics and politics also permeate historical materialist analyses. For example, Immanuel Wallerstein, 'Entering Global Anarchy', New Left Review, No. 22 (2003), pp. 27–35 and Giovanni Arrighi, 'Hegemony Unravelling', New Left Review, No. 32 (2005), pp. 23–80 & No. 33 (2005), pp. 83–116. For a critique, see Leo Panitch & Sam Gindin, 'Superintending Global Capital', New Left Review, No. 35 (2005), pp. 101–23. As they argue, the fallacy of the former analyses is caused by a regress to a base-superstructure conception and hence a failure to adequately theorise the structural relation between the economy and the state in capitalism. 4. W. G. Runciman, Social Science and Political Theory (Cambridge University Press, 1963), p. 114. 5. Jürgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis (Beacon Press, 1975), p. 1. 6. This is different from the functionalist fallacy where things are held to happen, because the system 'requires' it. Runciman, Social Science, pp. 109–34. 7. Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, p. 2. 8. Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks (International Publishers, 1971), pp. 175–85, 210–8, 365–6. Gramsci's definition removes any teleological assumption that the crisis will be resolved. 9. Robert W. Cox, 'Towards a Post-Hegemonic Conceptualization of World Order: Reflections on the Relevancy of Ibn Khaldun', in Ernst-Otto Czempiel & James Rosenau (eds), Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics (Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 132–59; James Caporaso (ed.), Continuity and Change in the Westphalian Order (Routledge, 2000). 10. Kees van der Pijl, The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class (Verso, 1984); Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, Transnational Capitalism and the Struggle over European Integration (Routledge, 2002). See also Stephen Gill, American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission (Cambridge University Press, 1990). 11. For example, A. Claire Cutler, Private Power and Global Authority (Cambridge University Press, 2003). This is, of course, not the least the case in the EU, given the status that the principle of 'direct effect' assigns to EU law. 12. Panitch & Gindin, 'Superintending Global Capital', pp. 102–4. 13. Göran Therborn, What Does the Ruling Class Do When It Rules? (Verso, 1980). 14. Graham Allison, The Essence of Decision (Little Brown, 1972); Charles Lindblom, Politics and Markets (Basic Books, 1980); Nicos Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes (Verso, 1978). 15. For example, Amy Verdun, 'The Role of the Delors Committee in the Creation of the EMU: An Epistemic Community?', Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 6, No. 2 (1999), pp. 308–28. 16. Panitch & Gindin, 'Superintending Global Capital', pp. 106–13, 115–8. This analysis is heavily influenced by Nicos Poulantzas, 'Internationalisation of Capitalist Relations and the Nation State', Economy and Society, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1974), pp. 145–79. 17. On the transformation of transnational capitalist accumulation strategies, see van Apeldoorn, Transnational Capitalism; Hans-Jürgen Bieling, 'Social Forces in the Making of the New European Economy: The Case of Financial Market Integration', New Political Economy, Vol. 8, No. 2 (2003), pp. 203–24. On how such a mode of integration also has served the profitability and merger objectives of such capital, see European Commission, The 1996 Single Market Review: Background Information for the Report to the Council and the European Parliament (European Commission, 1996). 18. Verdun, 'The Role of the Delors Committee'. 19. 'The fact of hegemony presupposes that account be taken of the interests and tendencies of the groups over which hegemony is to be exercised and that a certain equilibrium should be formed – in other words, that the leading group should make sacrifices of an economic-corporate kind'. Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, p. 161. 20. Alan Cafruny, 'A Gramscian Concept of Declining Hegemony: Stages of US Power and the Evolution of International Economic Relations', in David Rapkin (ed.), World Leadership and Hegemony (Lynne Rienner, 1990), pp. 97–118. 21. Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View (Macmillan, 1974). 22. Van der Pijl, The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class, pp. 76–106, 138–243. 23. Eric Helleiner, States and the Re-emergence of Global Finance (Cornell University Press, 1994), pp. 25–50. 24. John Gerard Ruggie, 'International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order', in Stephen Krasner (ed.), International Regimes (Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 195–232. 25. Riccardo Parboni, The Dollar and its Rivals: Recession, Inflation and International Finance (Verso, 1982). 26. Alain Lipietz, Mirages and Miracles: The Crisis of Global Fordism (Verso, 1985). 27. David Calleo, The Imperious Economy (Harvard University Press, 1982). 28. Magnus Ryner, 'Disciplinary Neoliberalism, Regionalization and the Social Market in German Restructuring', in Alan Cafruny & Magnus Ryner (eds), A Ruined Fortress? (Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), pp. 204–7; Peter Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets (Cornell University Press, 1985). 29. Ben Clift, 'The Changing Political Economy of France: Dirigisme under Duress', in Cafruny & Ryner (eds), A Ruined Fortress?, pp. 178–83. 30. Stephen Gill, 'The Emerging World Order and European Change', in Ralph Miliband & Leo Panitch (eds), The Socialist Register 1992 (Merlin Press, 1992), pp. 157–96. Neo-constitutional disciplinary neoliberalism refers to the practice of 'binding' discrete day-to-day policy through framework agreements, so as to insulate policy makers from market-protecting demands and in order to socialise actors so as to behave in a market-confirming manner. 31. As the traditional industries such as steel and automobiles declined, in part as a result of a geopolitical decision to remain open to Japanese imports, the US government sought to establish liberal regimes in sectors which it could dominate, including not only finance, but also pharmaceuticals, communication equipment and even agriculture. 32. Kees van der Pijl, Transnational Classes and International Relations (Routledge, 1998), pp. 57–63; Gerard Dumenil & Dominic Levy, 'Costs and Benefits of Neoliberalism: A Class Analysis', Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 8, No. 4 (2001), pp. 578–607. 33. Leonard Seabrooke, US Power in International Finance: The Victory of Dividends (Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), p. 10. 34. Ibid., p. 19; Peter Gowan, The Global Gamble: Washington's Faustian Bid for World Dominance (Verso, 1999), pp. 3–59; Gerard Dumenil & Domenic Levy, 'The Economics of US Imperialism at the Turn of the 21st Century', Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 11, No. 4 (2004), pp. 657–76. 35. Seabrooke, US Power, p. 48. 36. Ibid., p. 60. 37. Ibid., pp. 64, 66–70. 38. Ibid., pp. 73–106, 111, 118. 39. Processing data from the French state and the Federal Reserve, Dumenil and Levy ('The Economics of US Imperialism', pp. 664–5) show that yields on US direct investments abroad are about three times larger than the yield on foreign direct investments in the USA. With regards to total holdings, the yield on the holdings of the USA to the rest of the world is more than twice that on the holding of the rest of the world in the USA. Consistent with our argument, they attribute this asymmetry to the USA being 'at the centre of a system in which capital is simultaneously exported and imported, to and from the rest of the world . … Agents of other countries may want to protect their holdings from national risk or constraints. … Such investments are seen as risk free and liquid, but are remunerated at comparatively low rates' (p. 665). 40. John Grahl, 'Globalized Finance: The Challenge to the Euro', New Left Review, No. 8 (2001), pp. 23–47. 41. Michael Loriaux, France after Hegemony: International Change and Financial Reform (Cornell University Press, 1991), pp. 10–1. 42. Clift, 'The Changing Political Economy of France', p. 179. 43. Carl Lankowski, 'Modell Deutschland and the International Regionalization of the West German State', in Andrei S. Markovits (ed.), The Political Economy of West Germany: Modell Deutschland (Praeger, 1982), pp. 96–8. 44. Seabrooke, US Power, p. 163. 45. Alain Lipietz, 'The Debt Problem, European Integration and the New Phase of World Crisis', New Left Review, No. 178 (old series 1989), pp. 37–50; 'The Post-Fordist World: Labour Relations, International Hierarchy and Global Ecology', Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 4, No. 1 (1997), pp. 1–41. 46. Jonathan Story & Ingo Walter, Political Economy of Financial Integration in Europe: The Battle of the Systems (The MIT Press, 1997). 47. Stephen Gill, 'European Governance and New Constitutionalism: Economic and Monetary Union and Alternatives to Disciplinary Neo-Liberalism in Europe', New Political Economy, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1998), pp. 5–26; see also Kenneth Dyson, The Politics of the Euro-Zone (Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 11–64, who calls the macroeconomic constellation produced by the EMU 'asymmetrically ECB-centred'. 48. Ibid.; Otto Holman, 'Asymmetrical Regulation and Multidimensional Governance in the European Union', Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 11, No. 4 (2004), pp. 714–35; ECB's chief economist states bluntly a doctrine amounting to asymmetrical regulation through ex post policy coordination in Otmar Issing, 'On Macroeconomic Policy Coordination and the EMU', Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 40, No. 2 (2002), pp. 435–58. 49. Stephan Tidow, 'The Emergence of European Employment Policy as a Transnational Political Arena', in Henk Overbeek (ed.), The Political Economy of European Employment (Routledge, 2003), pp. 77–98. 50. Hans-Jürgen Bieling & Thorsten Schulten, '"Competitive Restructuring" and Industrial Relations within the European Union: Corporatist Involvement and Beyond', in Cafruny & Ryner (eds), A Ruined Fortress?, pp. 239–47. 51. Longer-range US concerns include the loss of seignorage. While the euro will displace the dollar in eastern Europe, it is doubtful that, in the absence of a generalised global economic crisis, the overall impact on the dollar would be large. Another concern is the protectionist potential of the EMU. Between 1999 and 2002 the euro declined by 25 per cent against the dollar, benefiting German and French export interests. See Leila S. Talani, 'The European Central Bank: Between Growth and Stability', Comparative European Politics, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2005), pp. 204–31. While a strategy of 'neoliberal mercantilism' is consistent with Franco-German interests, it does not provide a basis for the euro to mount a challenge to the dollar. Transatlantic economic integration has accelerated dramatically over the last 25 years and Europe's growth remains heavily dependent on the US economy. See, inter alia, Joseph P. Quinlan, Drifting Apart or Growing Together? The Primacy of the Transatlantic Economy (Johns Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Relations, 2003) and Alan Cafruny, 'Europe, the United States and Neoliberal (Dis)Order: Is there a Coming Crisis of the Euro?', in Cafruny & Ryner (eds), A Ruined Fortress?, pp. 285–305. 52. OECD, Historical Statistics (OECD, 1999), Table 3.1; OECD, Economic Outlook 75 (OECD, 2004), Tables 1, 12 and 20. The 2.5 per cent average annual real GDP growth rate of the eurozone since the 1990s should be compared to the 5.1 per cent over the period 1960–73, 2.7 per cent 1973–9 and 2.2 per cent 1980–9. By contrast, US growth figures returned almost to the same level as during the 'Golden Age' in the later part of the 1990s (3.8 per cent between 1994 and 2000 as opposed to 4 per cent 1960–73). In 2005, growth for the eurozone was 1.4 per cent and for the US, 3.6 per cent. See OECD, Economic Outlook 76 (OECD, 2005). Average annual growth of business sector labour productivity 1994–2003 was 1.15 per cent in the euro-area and 2.11 per cent in the USA, reversing by one fifth the tendency towards a European 'catch-up' in the post World War II period. See also Robert Gordon, Why Was Europe Left at the Station When America's Productivity Locomotive Departed, NBER Working Paper 10661, August 2002. The eurozone employment rate in 2002 was 63.9 per cent, compared to 71 per cent in the USA. 53. OECD, Employment Outlook (OECD, 2000); Stephen Nickell, 'Unemployment and Labor Market Rigidities: Europe vs. America', Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 11, No. 3 (1997), pp. 55–74; Robert Buchele & Jens Christiansen, 'Do Employment and Income Security Cause Unemployment? A Comparative Study of the United States and E-4', Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 22, No. 1 (1998), pp. 117–36; Andrew Glyn, 'Inequalities of Employment and Wages in OECD Countries', Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 63, No. 1 (2001), pp. 629–46; Eurostat, Structural Indicators: Labour Productivity, Eurostat, 11 December (2001); J⊘rgen Goul Andersen, 'The Danish Welfare State as 'Politics for Markets': Combining Equality with Competitiveness in a Global Economy', New Political Economy, Vol. 12, No. 1 (2007), pp. 71–8. 54. Paul Pierson, 'Post-industrial Pressures on the Mature Welfare States', in Paul Pierson (ed.), The New Politics of the Welfare State, (Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 80–104. 55. See, for example, the European Commission's own analysis, European Economy 6 (Office for the Official Publications of the EC, 2003). 56. For elaborations see, for example, Rianne Mahon, 'Swedish Model Dying of Baumols? Current Debates', New Political Economy, Vol. 12, No. 1 (2007), pp. 79–85. 57. OECD, Economic Surveys: Euro Area 2003 (OECD, 2003), p. 22. 58. Ibid., pp. 22, 27. 59. Ibid., pp. 22–3, 27. 60. OECD, Economic Outlook 75, Table 10. 61. Robert Boyer, 'Capital-Labour Relations in OECD Countries: From the Fordist Golden Age to Contested National Trajectories', in Juliet Schor & Jong-Il You (eds), Capital, the State and Labour: A Global Perspective (Edward Elgar, 1995), pp. 18–69; Robert Boyer,'The Unanticipated Fallout of European Monetary Union: The Political and Institutional Deficits of the Euro', in Colin Crouch (ed.), After the Euro (Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 42–88; Robert Boyer & Pascal Petit, 'Technical Change, Cumulative Causation and Growth', in Francois Chesnais (ed.), Technology and Productivity: The Challenge of Economic Policy (OECD, 1991), pp. 47–67. Data from the European Commission supports this interpretation. The Commission finds that EU's lower productivity growth, compared to the USA, is due to inadequate investment and innovation outside the non-ICT sectors of the economy (inadequate diffusion). European Commission, European Economy 6. For more 'mainsteam' analyses that also point to adverse effects of macroeconomic austerity for productivity enhancing structural policy, see IMF, 'Euro Area Policies: Selected Issues', IMF Country Report No. 04/235, 2004, pp. 48, 58. 62. Robert Boyer, 'The Impact of the Single Market on Labour and Employment: A Discussion of Macroeconomic Approaches in Light of Research in Labour Economics', Labour and Society, Vol. 15, No. 2 (1990), pp. 109–42; Harvie Ramsey, 'Le Defi Europeen: Multinational Restructuring, Labour and EU Policy', in Ash Amin and John Tomaney (eds), Behind the Myth of European Union (Routledge, 1995), pp. 174–97; Lipietz, 'The Post-Fordist World', pp. 23–4. 63. Gregory Albo, '"Competitive Austerity" and the Impasse of Capitalist Employment Policy', in Ralph Miliband & Leo Panitch (eds), The Socialist Register (Merlin Press, 1994), p. 147. 64. See Deborah Mabbett & Waltraud Schelkle, 'Bringing Macroeconomics Back into the Political Economy of Reform: The Lisbon Agenda and the 'Fiscal Philosophy' of EMU', Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 45, No. 1 (2007), pp. 81–103, for empirical substantiation. 65. Lionel Barber, 'Eichel's Second Thoughts', Financial Times, 21 August 2001. 66. ECOFIN reached an agreement to 'amend' the Pact on 21 March 2005. See Council of the EU, Improving the Implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact 7423/05 UEM 97 ECOFIN 104; European Commission, Proposal for a Council Regulation: Amending Regulation (EC) No. 1466/97 on the Strengthening of the Surveillance of Budgetary Positions and the Surveillance and Coordination of Economic Policies, 20.4.2005 COM (2005) 154 final; Proposal for a Council Regulation: Amending Regulation (EC) No. 1466/97 on Speeding up and Clarifying the Implementation of the Excessive Deficit Procedure, 20.4.2005 COM (2005) 155 final. Whilst being presented as an 'improvement', it can be no doubt that the amendments represent a radical retraction of the objectives initially set for the SGP. They represent a belated admission of the trade-off between macroeconomic 'balance' in the medium term and growth. As such the amended Pact is often represented as more 'intelligent' than the previous version. But it is questionable whether it can be considered a pact at all. The amended version is full of general clauses, inviting ad hoc, arbitrary and discretionary interpretations. First, the call for a differentiated assessment of Medium Term Objectives (in light of structural policies pursued and potential growth rates) opens up considerable room for interpretation, disagreement and conflict. The same is the case for 'exceptional' and 'temporary' deficits 'close' to the reference value. But the most notable general clause is the one stating that 'due consideration will be given to any other factors, which in the opinion of the nation state concerned are relevant in order to comprehensively assess in qualitative terms the excess over the reference value. In that context, special consideration will be given to budgetary efforts towards increasing, or maintaining at a high level financial contributions, international solidarity and to achieving European policy goals, notably the unification of Europe if it has a detrimental effect on the growth of fiscal burden of a Member State' (Council of the EU, Improving the Implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact, p. 15 [our italics]). The latter opens up tremendous room for interpretation and it should be seen against the backdrop of Germany's invocation of its exceptional burden of financing German reunification and France's invocation of its expenditure on defence as a contribution to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) during the negotiations leading up to the amendments. During these negotiations, according to Euro-12 Chairman Jean-Claude Juncker, 'views were expressed … with a vehemence that amazed me' (quoted in George Parker, 'EU Attempts to Reform Stability Pact Breaks Down', Financial Times, March 9, 2005). 67. Wolfgang Munchau, 'Fairy Tale of the Eurozone Goldilocks Recovery', Financial Times, 21 August 2006, p. 9. 68. D. McDougall, Report of the Study Group on the Role of Public Finance in European Integration (European Commission, 1977). 69. David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity (Blackwell, 1990), pp. 182–3, 194–5. 70. Saskia Sassen, The Global City: New York, London and Tokyo (Princeton University Press, 1991). 71. Hans-Jürgen Bieling, 'Social Forces in the Making of the New European Economy, pp. 203–24. 72. See Grahl, 'Globalized Finance, pp. 30–2, 39. 73. Matthew Watson, 'Embedding the 'New Economy' in Europe: A Study in the Institutional Specificities of Knowledge-Based Growth', Economy and Society, Vol. 3, No. 4 (2001), pp. 504–23. Making the distinction between de jure and de facto developments, Watson is much more sceptical than Bieling that regional integration of stock markets will take place as a result of Lisbon. They both agree with Grahl, however, on the negative impacts on European systems of innovation. 74. Michel Freyssenet, '"Reflective Production": An Alternative to Mass Production and Lean Production?', Economic and Industrial Democracy, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1998), pp. 91–117. 75. Colin Crouch, 'National Wage Determination and Economic and Monetary Union', in Crouch (ed.), After the Euro, pp. 203–26. 76. Van Apeldoorn, Transnational Capitalism, pp. 78–82, 115–57. 77. See, for example, Alain Lipietz, 'Social Europe: The Post-Maastricht Challenge', Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 3, No. 3 (1996), pp. 377–8; Magnus Ryner, Capitalist Restructuring, Globalisation and the Third Way: Lessons from the Swedish Model (Routledge, 2002), pp. 27–54. 78. Fritz Scharpf, 'Negative and Positive Integration in the Political Economy of European Welfare States', in Gary Marks, Fritz Scharpf, Philippe Schmitter & Wolfgang Streeck (eds), Governance in the European Union (Sage, 1997), pp. 15–39. 79. Jelle Visser & Anton Hemerijck, 'A Dutch Miracle': Job Growth, Welfare Reform and Corporatism in the Netherlands (Amsterdam University Press, 1997). 80. Uwe Becker, '"A Dutch Model": Employment Growth by Corporatist Consensus and Wage Restraint: A Critical Account of an Idyllic View', New Political Economy, Vol. 6, No. 1 (2000), pp. 19–43; Ryner, Capitalist Restructuring, pp. 35–8. 81. Jacob Torfing, 'Workfare within Welfare: Recent Reforms of the Danish Welfare State', Journal of European Social Policy, Vol. 9, No. 1 (1999), pp. 5–28; Goul Andersen, 'The Danish Welfare State'. 82. Christian Deubner, Udo Rehfeld & Frieder Schlupp, 'Franco-German Relations within the International Division of Labour: Interdependence, Divergence or Structural Dominance?', in William Graf (ed.), The Internationalization of the German Political Economy: Evolution of a Hegemonic Project (St Martin's Press, 1992), pp. 154–6. 83. OECD, OECD Economic Surveys: Germany (OECD, 1993), p. 17, passim. 84. Heiner Ganssman, 'Soziale Sicherheit als Standortsproblem', Prokla, No. 106 (1997), pp. 5–28. 85. Mick Dunford, 'Old Europe, New Europe and the USA: Comparative Economic Performance, Inequality and Market-Led Models of Development', European Urban and Regional Studies, Vol. 12, No. 2 (2005), pp. 149–76. 86. Wolfgang Munchau, 'Europe Needs Retail Therapy', Financial Times, 9 May 2004. 87. Wolfgang Streeck & Christine Trampusch, Economic Reform and the Political Economy of the German Welfare State, Max Planck Institut fuer Gesellschaftsforschung, Working Paper No. 2 (2005), p. 22. 88. Rhodes, 'Why the EMU Is – or May Be – Good for European Welfare States', pp. 311–2. 89. Ibid., pp. 319–20. 90. Ibid., pp. 324, 327; Hemerijck, 'The Self Transformation of the European Social Model(s)', pp. 11–2. 91. Rhodes, 'Why the EMU Is – or May Be – Good for European Welfare States' pp. 317–8. 92. G⊘sta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Polity, 1990), p. 19. 93. Rhodes, 'Why the EMU Is – or May Be – Good for European Welfare States' pp. 312–3. 94. Walter Korpi, 'Welfare State Regress in Western Europe: Politics, Institutions, Globalization and Europeanization', Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 29 (2003), p. 597. These indicators are more transparent, since changes in the likes of pension only have an effect after a long time lag (though reforms, such as those in the French pension system, will effect future replacement rates. See, for example, Bruno Palier, '"Defrosting" the French Welfare State', West European Politics, Vol. 23, No. 2 (2000), pp. 113–36.) 95. http://www.frdb.org/documentazione/centro_doc.php, accessed 4 April 2005, cited in Mabbett & Schelkle, Bringing Macroeconomics Back into the Political Economy of Reform. 96. Korpi, 'Welfare State Regress in Western Europe', pp. 592, 593–4, 596. 97. Richard Clayton & Jonas Pontusson, 'Welfare State Retrenchment Revisited: Entitlement Cuts, Public Sector Restructuring, and Inegalitarian Trends in Advanced Capitalist Societies', World Politics, Vol. 51, No. 1 (1998), pp. 67–98. 98. Boyer, 'Capital–Labour Relations in OECD Countries'. 99. Bieling & Schulten, '"Competitive Restructuring" and Industrial Relations within the European Union', pp. 251–4. 100. T. H. Marshall, Citizenship and Class and other Essays (Cambridge University Press, 1950); Roberto M. Unger, Law in Modern Society (The Free Press, 1976), pp. 193–200. 101. Jurgen Hausler & Joachim Hirsch, 'Political Regulation: The Crisis of Fordism and the Transformation of the Party System in West Germany', in Manfred Gottdiener & N. Komninos (eds), Capitalist Development and Crisis Theory (St Martin's Press, 1989), p. 306. 102. Kees van Kersbergen, Social Capitalism: Study of Christian Democracy and the Welfare State (Routledge, 1995), p. 2. 103. Boyer, 'The Unanticipated Fallout of European Monetary Union', pp. 34–43. 104. Ryner, 'Disciplinary Neoliberalism', pp. 210–2. 105. Palier, '"Defrosting" the French Welfare State', pp. 113–36; George Ross, 'Monetary Integration and the French Model', in Andrew Martin & George Ross (eds), Euros and Europeans (Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 76–102. 106. Clift, 'The Changing Political Economy of France', pp. 173–200. 107. Retrenchment of the Schroeder government included a shift towards more regressive taxation (consumption taxes), pension reform increasing the role of private finance and actuarianism, and most recently the Agenda 2010 reforms, with radically reducing the incomes replacement principle. See Martin Seeleib-Kaiser, 'Continuity or Change? Red-Green Social Policy after 16 Years of Christian-Democratic Rule', ZeS-Arbeitspapier 3 (Bremen Zentrum fur Sozialpolitik, 2003); Nico Siegel, 'EMU and German Welfare Capitalism', in Martin & Ross (eds), Euros and Europeans, pp. 103–25. 108. Seymor Martin Lipset & Stein Rokkan, 'Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments', in Peter Mair (ed.), The West European Party System (Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 92.