REPLY TO MR. RUSSELL'S EXPLANATIONS
1911; Oxford University Press; Volume: XX; Issue: 77 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1093/mind/xx.77.74
ISSN1460-2113
Autores ResumoTHE explanations offered by Mr. Russell in the July number of MIND have been read, I am sure, with interest by many readers.I unfortunately did not see the number at the proper time, but still I hope it is not too late to ask Mr. Russell to explain somewhat further; for in the main I am left still unable to understand.If, however, Mr. Russell should feel that within convenient limits there is no more to be done, such a position, so far as I am conoerned, would call for no justification.1. Iu the first place, my difficulty as to " unities " remains.Is there anything, I ask, in a unity beside its " constituents," i.e. the terms and the relation, and, if there is anything more, in what does this " more " consist ?Mr. Russell tells us that we have got merely an enumeration or merely an aggregate.Even with merely so much I should still have to ask how even so much is possible.But, since we seem to have something beyond either, the puzzle grows worse.If I remember right, Prof. Ptout some years ago stated the problem as attaching essentially to the fact of " relatedness ".What is the difference between a relation which relates in fact and one which does not so relate ?And if we accept a strict pluralism, where, I urge, have we any room for this difference ?2. In the next place, as to " implication " my troubles continue.If we have nothing but facts, I see no room for implication, and if we have anything more or less than facts, I cannot understand what this is.By all means banish possibility as real, but where among facts does implication fall ?Is a disjunction with its " Either-or " an actual fact ?Are " conditions " facts ?^"deducibility " a fact ?With regard to facts I thought our attitude was one of " It is " or (perhaps also) " It is not".I do not in the least understand the position of " either-or " or of " cau be '' or " may be :! .3. I urged against the possibility of a term beinp related to itself the fact that relation implies diversity, and I should like to explain my reason for holding to this fact.I do not proceed here by arguing downwards from some assumption or axiom.I proceed on the contrary by way of actual experiment.With any relation remove diversity (this is my experience), and the relation is destroyed.You have (I find) no relation left unless you also leave that diversity which you may have failed to notice.What I of course am forced *o assume here is that I have correctly peiformed my experiment.If Mr. Russell on the other side says that he can
Referência(s)