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Terrorism Targeting Industrial Chemical Facilities: Strategic Motivations and the Implications for U.S. Security

2006; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 29; Issue: 7 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/10576100600702006

1521-0731

Margaret E. Kosal,

Nuclear Issues and Defense

Abstract Policy to reduce the threat of a terrorist attack against industrial chemical facilities—critical infrastructure with potential to cause mass casualties—is being driven by incomplete and, in some cases, incorrect assumptions. This article chronicles incidents by non-state actors directed at the chemical industry and explores the strategic considerations prompting groups to target the industry. By incorporating motivations for targeting infrastructure a more robust, comprehensive risk assessment is realized. Analysis challenging the “insider” threat paradigm and recommendations to ameliorate the potential effects are also presented. These are found to differ substantially from the leading policy measures currently advocated. Acknowledgments The author thanks the MacArthur Foundation and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace for generous financial support. This work was initiated under contract from the University of California's Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). Thanks foremost to Helen Kinsella for providing particularly valuable discussions and comments, as well as appreciation to Charles Perrow, Praveen Abhayaratne, Kevin Moran, Jacob Shapiro, Brian Ingram, and Jennifer Hough. Thanks to Andrew Jayne and other summer 2004 research assistants at the Monterey Institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies for early research assistance. Notes 1. The editor-in-chief, vice president, and editorial director of the chemical industry's leading trade publication, writing about the September 2001 explosion at a Toulouse plant that killed thirty people, wounded over 3,500 and destroyed a substantial part of the southern French city, “Toulouse Tragedy Postscript,” Chemical Week, 163(37) (3 October 2001), p. 3. 2. U.S. Army, Draft Medical NBC Hazard Analysis of Chemical-Biological-Radiological-Nuclear-High Explosive Threat, Possible Scenarios & Planning Requirements, Army Office of the Surgeon General, October 2001 cited in United States General Accounting Office (GAO), Homeland Security: Voluntary Initiatives are Under Way at Chemical Facilities, but the Extent of Security Preparedness is Unknown. Report to Congressional Requesters, March 2003, GAO-03-439, p. 11, available at (http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-439), and in Eric Pianin, “Study Assesses Risk of Attack on Chemical Plant,” Washington Post, 12 March 2002, p. A8. 3. R. Nicholas Palarino and Robert Briggs, Briefing Memorandum for the hearing Combating Terrorism: Chemical Plant Security, U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations, 19 February 2004, available at (http://reform.house.gov/UploadedFiles/PittMemo.pdf); Lois Ember, “Worst-Case Scenario for Chemical Plant Attack,” Chemical & Engineering News, 80 (18 March 2002), p. 8; and Homeland Unsecured: The Bush Administration's Hostility to Regulation and Ties to Industry Leave America Vulnerable (Washington, DC: Public Citizen, October 2004), pp. 19–40, 63–65, available at (http://www.citizen.org/documents/ACF1B7.pdf). 4. U.S. Senate, Chemical Security Act of 2002: Report to Accompany S. 1602, Report 107-342, 15 November 2002, contains internal reference to data submitted in accordance with EPA-required Risk Management Plans (40 CFR 68). 5. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Characteristics and Common Vulnerabilities Report for Chemical Facilities (Washington, DC, 17 July 2003), version 1, revision 1. The Congressional Research Service recently released an updated list of those facilities required to file Risk Management Plans (RMP) under the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Clean Air Act. Between 107 and 112 facilities, in a worst-case scenario, are estimated to be capable of effecting more than one million people; 448–488 facilities potentially affecting between 100,000 and 999,999 people; 1,873–2,172 facilities potentially affecting between 10,000 and 99,999 people; and 4,244–4,842 facilities potentially affecting between 1,000 and 9,999 people (Dana A. Shea, “RMP Facilities in the United States as of May 2005,” 27 June 2005, available at [http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/rmp062705.pdf]. The largest total number of facilities were in Texas (1,134 faciities), followed by Iowa (914), Illinois (913), California (825), Kansas (727), Nebraska (532), and Minnesota (403). 6. Rick Hind and David Halperin, “Lots of Chemicals, Little Reaction,” New York Times, 22 September 2004, p. A23. 7. “Our Unnecessary Insecurity,” New York Times, 20 February 2005, p. D8. 8. Charles E. Schumer, Three Years Later: Is the Federal Government Doing Enough to Protect New York? Grading the Federal Homeland Security Effort in New York and the Nation, issued 15 September 2004, available at (http://schumer.senate.gov/SchumerWebsite/ pressroom/special_reports/2004/HsupstateConfcall091504.pdf). 9. John F. Sopko, “The Changing Proliferation Threat,” Foreign Policy, No. 105 (Winter 1996–1997), pp. 3–20; Richard K. Betts, “The New Threat of Mass Destruction,” Foreign Affairs, 77(1) (January–February 1998), pp. 26–41; Ehud Sprinzak, “The Great Superterrorism Scare,” Foreign Policy, No. 112 (Fall 1998), pp. 110–125; D. A. Henderson, “The Looming Threat of Bioterrorism,” Science, 283 (26 February 1999), pp. 1279–1282; Jessica Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999); Nadine Gurr and Benjamin Cole, The New Face of Terrorism: Threats From Weapons of Mass Destruction (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2000); Amy E. Smithson and Lesley-Anne Levy. Ataxia: The Chemical and Biological Terrorism Threat and the US Response, Report No. 35 (Washington, DC: Stimson Center, October 2000); Christopher F. Chyba, “Biological Terrorism and Public Health,” Survival, 43(1) (2001), pp. 126–150; Brian M. Jenkins, “Terrorism and Beyond: A 21st Century Perspective,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 24(5) (2001), pp. 321–327; Jean Pascal Zanders, “Assessing the Risk of Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation to Terrorists,” Nonproliferation Review, 64 (1999), pp. 17–34; Mark G. Kortepeter and Gerald W. Parker, “Potential Biological Weapons Threats,” Emerging Infectioius Diseases, 5(4) (1999), pp. 523–527; Jessica Stern, “The Prospect of Domestic Bioterrorism,” Emerging Infectious Diseases, 5(4) (1999), pp. 517–522; Edgar J. DaSilva, “Biological Warfare, Bioterrorism, Biodefence and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention,” Electronic Journal of Biotechnology, 2(3) (1999), ISSN: 0717–3458; and Gregory Koblentz, “Pathogens as Weapons: The International Security Implications of Biological Warfare,” International Security, 28(3) (Winter 2003–2004), pp. 84–122. 10. FBI Special Agent Troy Morgan quoted in Carl Prine, “Chemical Industry Slowly Boosts Security,” Pittsburgh Tribune-Review, 22 June 2003, available at (http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/tribune-review/specialreports/potentialfordisaster/s_141184.html). 11. Jonathan B. Tucker and Amy Sands, “An Unlikely Threat,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 55(4) (July–August 1999), pp. 46–52; Dean A. Wilkening, “BCW Attack Scenarios,” in Sidney D. Drell, Abraham D. Sofaer, and George D. Wilson, eds., The New Terror: Facing the Threat of Biological and Chemical Weapons (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1999), pp. 76–114; Milton Leitenberg, in An Assessment of the Threat of the Use of Biological Weapons or Biological Agents, Biosecurity and Bioterrrorism, Landau Network Centro Volta, 2000; Maurizio Martellini, ed. (Landau Network Centro Volta, 2000); Bruce Hoffman, “Rethinking Terrorism and Counterterrorism Since 9/11,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 25 (2002), pp. 303–315; Margaret E. Kosal, “Near Term Threats of Chemical Weapons Terrorism,” paper presented at the Globalization and WMD Proliferation Networks Conference, Center for Contemporary Conflict, Naval Postgraduate School, 29–30 June 2005, Monterey CA. 12. For vulnerability studies specific to the chemical industry, see: GAO, Homeland Security: Federal and Industry Efforts Are Addressing Security Issues at Chemical Facilities, but Additional Action Is Needed, GAO-05-631T, 27 April 2005, available at (http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05631t.pdf); Linda-Jo Schierow, Chemical Plant Security, Order Code RL3150 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service Report, 26 July 2002, updated 20 January 2004), available at (http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31530.pdf); GAO, Homeland Security: Voluntary Initiatives are Under Way at Chemical Facilities, but the Extent of Security Preparedness is Unknown (2003); Paul Baybutt, “Assessing Risks from Threats to Process Plants: Threat and Vulnerability Analysis,” Process Safety Progress, 21 (December 2002), pp. 269–275; Assessment of the Increased Risk of Terrorist or Other Criminal Activity Associated with Posting Off-Site Consequence Analysis Information on the Internet (Washington, DC.: U.S. Department of Justice, 18 April 2000), available at (http://www.4law.co.il/600.pdf); and American Institute of Chemical Engineers, “Guidelines for Analyzing and Managing the Security Vulnerabilities of Fixed Chemical Sites,” (New York: AIChE, American Center for Chemical Process Safety [CCPS], August 2003). For two very good examples analytic models to evaluate vulnerability on a facility-by-facility basis, see: Brian R. Dunbobbin, Thomas J. Medovich, Marc C. Murphy and Annie L. Ramsey, “Security Vulnerabilty Assessment in the Chemical Industry,” Process Safety Progress, 23(3) (September 2004), pp. 214–220, and J. R. Lemley, Vasilis M. Fthenakis, and Paul D. Moskowitz, “Security Risk Analysis for Chemical Process Facilities,” Process Safety Progress, 22(3) (September 2003), pp. 153–161. For a more general vulnerability assessment of U.S. critical infrastructure, including chemical facilities, see Stephen E. Flynn, America the Vulnerable (Harper Collins: New York, 2004), pp. 55–56, 118–121. 13. Statement of Rep. Christopher Shays, 23 February 2004, available at (http://reform.house.gov/UploadedFiles/ShaysChemical.pdf). 14. Jeff Johnson, “Chemical Accident Data: Plethora of Confusion,” Chemical & Engineering News, 77 (15 March 1999), pp. 22–23. 15. American Chemical Council Fact Sheet, “The Business of Chemistry: Essential to Our Quality of Life and the New Economy,” 31 July 2002, available at (http://www.accnewsmedia.com/docs/300/241.pdf), and Cheryl Hogue, “Portman Picked for Trade Office,” Chemical & Engineering News, 83 (28 March 2005), p. 8. 16. The top 50 U.S. chemical companies alone amassed over $253 billion in sales in 2004, a 23% increase from 2003. Alexander H. Tullo, “Top 50 Chemical Producers,” Chemical & Engineering News, 83 (16 May 2005), pp. 17–21. 17. The chemical industry, along with 12 other sectors, such as agriculture, energy, water, banking and finance, and public health, were identified as “critical infrastructures,” in The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets (Washington, DC: Office of the White House, February 2003), pp. xii, 6, 65–66, available at (http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interweb/assetlibrary/Physical_Strategy.pdf). 18. For this document, the definition of critical infrastructure is based on that given in the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (PL 107–56) and adopted in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (PL 107-296) as “systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.” 19. Thomas Homer-Dixon, “The Rise of Complex Terrorism,” Foreign Policy, No. 128 (January–February 2002), pp. 52–62. 20. Marsh and McLennan, Large Property Damage Losses in the Hydrocarbon-Chemical Industries a Thirty-year Review (New York: Marsh and McLennan Protection Consultants, 18th edition, 1998). 21. Simon Reynolds, “The Price of Tragedy Rises—Industrial Risk Rates are Out of Step With the New Size of Losses,” Financial Times (London), 9 September 1991. 22. Andrew Wood and Shelina Shariff, “Fallout From Channelview Explosion Keeps on Coming,” Chemical Week, 147(3) (25 July 1990), p. 9. 23. “ARCO Petrochemical Unit Blast Jolts Markets,” Oil & Gas Journal, 88 (16 July 1990), p. 28; and Ian Young and Shelina Shariff, “MTBE Still Leading the Way in Global Octane Surge,” Chemical Week, 146(27) (18 July 1990), p. 16. 24. Frank Swoboda, “Settlement Set in ‘90 Plant Blast,” Washington Post, 4 January 1991, p. A6. 25. “Phillips to Pay $4 Million For Fatal Safety Violations: 23 Workers Died in Chemical Plant Blast,” Atlanta Journal and Constitution (Georgia), 23 August 1991, p. C4. 26. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region III, Office of External Affairs, 66,000 Facilities Need to Prepare “Worst-Case” Scenario Plan, 6 April 1998, available at (http://www.epa.gov/region3/r3press/pr98-162.htm); and Environmental Health Center, Guides to Environmental Risk Management, Chemical Safety in Your Community: EPA's New Risk Management Program, EPA 550-B-99-010, 1999, available at (http://www.nsc.org/public/xroads/general.pdf). 27. Ibid. 28. Kara Sissell, “Dark Cloud or Silver Lining?” Chemical Week, 160(24) (24 June 1998), p. 28, which cites a lower estimate of only 1,500–2,000 oil and chemical plants. 29. In 1999, propane dealers and other flammable fuel users/retailers were excepted from the EPA's Clean Air Act's RMP requirement under the Chemical Safety Information Site Security and Fuels Regulatory Relief Act (P.L. 106-40). As of May 2005, between 12,292 and 14,269 facilities are covered under the Clean Air Act's RMP requirements, of which less than one-quarter are expected to be industrial chemical plants (Dana A. Shea, Congressional Research Service “RMP Facilities in the United States as of May 2005,” 27 June 2005, p. 2). 30. For example, silanes, arsines, phosphines, nitrogen trifluorides, gallium, and selenide compounds. These chemicals are dangerous in terms of lethality and ease of use because most are gases at standard ambient temperature and pressure. 31. Personal communication, 23 November 2004, Kimberly Branshaw, Technical Program Manager, Applied Materials Inc., Santa Clara, CA, USA. 32. For a representative list of companies comprising the industrial chemical infrastructure, see Patricia L. Short, “Global Top 50,” Chemical & Engineering News, 82 (19 July 2004), pp. 11–13. 33. The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets, p. 9. 34. U.S. Senate, Chemical Security Act of 2003, S. 157, introduced 14 January 2003, available at (http://www.theorator.com/bills108/s157.html). 35. Transportation incidents should be the focus of subsequent in-depth study. 36. For every ton of crude oil, six percent is diverted to ethylene, propylene, and benzene production. Less than one percent is used for the synthesis of fine chemicals, which are subsequently converted to pharmaceutical, personal care, and other consumer products. For more on the relationship between petroleum and the chemical industry, see: Mark M. Green and Harold A. Wittcoff, Organic Chemistry Principles and Industrial Practices (Weinheim, Germany: Wiley-VCH, 2003). 37. The Critical Infrastructure Database compiled by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, CA, includes over 1000 attacks by terrorist groups on critical physical infrastructure; cyberattacks are not currently included. 38. No terrorist cases originating in Russia or Asia were found in the English-language open literature. 39. Barbara Crossette, “Bhopal's Tragedy Revisited; 10 Years After the Gas,” New York Times, 11 December 1994, p. D4; Dominique LaPierre and Javier Moro, Five Past Midnight: The Epic Story of the World's Deadliest Industrial Accident (New York: Warner Books, 2002); Debora MacKenzie, “Fresh Evidence on Bhopal Disaster: Documents Suggest U.S. Company Was Responsible for Plant's Design and Cut Investment to Maintain Control,” New Scientist, 176 (7 December 2002), p. 6; Mazhar Ullah, “Court Refuses to Reduce Murder Charge Against Bhopal Chief,” Guardian (London), 29 August 2002; Marc S. Reisch, “Twenty Years After Bhopal,” Chemical & Engineering News, 82 (7 June 2004), pp. 19–23; and Scott Baldauf, “Bhopal Gas Tragedy Lives On, 20 Years Later,” Christian Science Monitor (Boston, MA), 4 May 2004. 40. Penny Wark, “The Toxic Legacy of the Explosion of a Pesticide Factory in Bhopal is Still Felt 20 Years On,” The Times (London), 25 May 2004; Rajeshree Sisodia, “A Toxic Legacy,” Al-Ahram Weekly, 2–8 December 2004, available at (http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/719/feature.htm). 41. Substantial effort can be invested in attempts to resolve and reconcile the differences between the official and unofficial fatality and injury estimates. Due to the socioeconomic status of the people living in the area and migration surrounding the Bhopal plant, an exact figure will never be known with meaningful precision. Regardless of the arguments revolving around certain numerical values, the larger figures are part of the public discourse and, thereby, have a chilling and potentially fear-engendering impact on the general populace. Larger values may also appeal to and empower terrorist types motivated to pursue mass-impact or mass-destruction events. 42. Union Carbide Corporation, Bhopal Methyl Isocyanate Investigation Team Report (Danbury, CT: March 1985), and Jackson B. Browning, “Union Carbide: Disaster at Bhopal,” 1993, available at (http://www.bhopal.com/pdfs/browning.pdf). Reprinted from original in Crisis Response: Inside Stories on Managing Under Siege, Jack A. Gottschalk, ed. (Detroit, MI: Visible Ink Press, 1993). 43. Exothermic polymerization of methyl isocyanate (MIC) in the storage tank had been inhibited by added phosgene (the same chemical used as a WWI weapon), as a minority component of the mixture. Enough water entered the tank to completely react with the phosgene. In turn, this led to a build up of carbon dioxide gas that raised the temperature of the MIC. As the temperature in the storage tank increased and the concentration of phosgene decreased, the heat generated by the exothermic polymerization of the MIC occurred at a rate more rapid than the heat could be dissipated, eventually leading the temperature of the tank's contents to skyrocket, that is, a “runaway” reaction. The elevated temperatures caused the MIC to boil violently inducing a huge pressure increase on the external walls and fixtures of the storage tank. Runaway reactions have also been responsible for catastrophic chemical accidents in Seveso, Italy (1976); Lodi, New Jersey (1995); and Paterson, New Jersey (1998). 44. In the text of the Arthur D. Little report, the author acknowledges that he “and the organization he represents were a part of [the initial Union Carbide Corporation] investigation team.” Although the Little report was independently commissioned, the author and his organization are not completely disconnected from Union Carbide. 45. Ashok S. Kalelkar, “Investigation of Large-Magnitude Incidents: Bhopal as a Case Study,” presented at the Institution of Chemical Engineers Conference on Preventing Major Chemical Accidents, London England, May 1998, available at (http://www.bhopal.com/pdfs/casestdy.pdf). 46. U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, Hazard Investigation: Improving Reactive Hazard Management, Report No. 2001-01-H, October 2002. 47. Michael J. Hepher, “Case Studies: Bhopal,” in Monitoring and Impact of Air Quality (Ames, IA: Blackwell Publishing, 2006); Peter Avis, “Planned Chemical Plant Stirs Hopes and Old Fears in India,” Toronto Star, 4 February 1995, p. B4; Faezah Ismail, “Our Responsibility to the Future,” New Straits Times (Malaysia), 24 January 1995, p. 30; Peter Kammerer, “Dead Men Walking at Work Every Day,” South China Morning Post, 2 May 2004, p. 11; and Jeff Siirola and Scott Berger, “Measuring Improvements in Process Safety,” Chemical Week, 166(41), (15 December 2004), p. 3. 48. “One of Two Gasoline Bombs Planted Inside a Union Carbide Plant Exploded,” Associated Press, 6 December 1984, PM cycle; and S. O’Connor, “No Threat Before Factory Bombing,” The Telegraph (Sydney, Australia), 5 July 1985, p. A1. 49. “Sydney Plants Threatened,” New York Times, 9 December 1984, p. A22. 50. O’Connor, “No Threat Before Factory Bombing.” 51. “Blast at Union Carbide,” Courier-Mail (Brisbane, Australia), 6 July 1983. 52. Raymond Carroll and Loren Jenkins, “Italy: ‘Our Own Hiroshima,’ ” Newsweek, 16 August 1976, p. 49. 53. Specifically, a reactor for the production of trichlorophenol exploded leading to the release of 2–3 kg (∼5 pounds) of 2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzo-para-dioxin (TCDD). A persistent, bioaccumulative, and highly toxic compound, TCDD is also known to be a long-term carcinogen and a teratogen (birth-defecting causing-compound) and to cause chloracne, a disfiguring skin disease. Under current EPA regulations, the production and most uses of TCDD are unilaterally prohibited. TCDD was an unwanted and unavoidable by-product in the manufacture of the phenoxy herbicides used in “Agent Orange” defoliant by U.S. military forces in Vietnam. Dioxins have been implicated in the summer 2004 poisoning of the opposition party presidential candidate in Ukraine's presidential election. 54. “Seveso: Lessons From an Escape,” The Economist, 17 June 1978, pp. 101–105. 55. “Swiss Chemical Company Agrees to Pay for Pollution Damage,” Associated Press, 25 March 1980, Tuesday, A.M. cycle. 56. Ibid. 57. “Court Ruling Paves Way for More Seveso Compensation,” Chemical Week, 164(11) (13 March 2002), p. 6. 58. Carroll and Jenkins, “Italy: ‘Our Own Hiroshima.’ ” 59. Ibid. 60. Dorian Falk, “Extremists Said Thursday They Had Bombed the Villa of Chemical Company Executive,” Associated Press, 7 July 1977, AM cycle. 61. Michael Dobbs, “Trial on Chemical Plant Blast Opens; Mystery of Toxic Waste Remains” Washington Post, 19 April 1983, p. A9. 62. Kidnapping for ransom is a criminal rather than terrorist act. 63. Falk, “Extremists Said Thursday They Had Bombed the Villa of Chemical Company Executive.” 64. “Seveso Reprisal: Home Bombed,” Chemical Week, 121 (20 July 1977), p. 15. 65. “Cirie, Italy: Two Homemade Bombs Exploded,” Associated Press, 1 August 1977, BC cycle. 66. “Italian Terrorists Kill Former Icmesa Chemist,” Chemical Week, 126 (13 February 1980), p. 22; and “An Italian Court has Charged 14 Members of the Leftist Terrorist Gang Prima Linea,” Associated Press, 27 May 1981, PM cycle. 67. “Killed Executive Linked to Pollution Disaster,” Associated Press, 5 February 1980, PM cycle. 68. “Swiss Chemical Company Agrees to Pay for Pollution Damage,” Associated Press. 69. “Terrorists Strike Twice,” Chemical Week, 159(34) (10 August 1997), p. 19; “Cirie, Italy: Two Homemade Bombs Exploded.” 70. Ibid. 71. “Terrorists Strike Twice,” Chemical Week. 72. Ibid. 73. William Drozdiak, “Bombs Hit W. German Targets: Leftists Say Attacks Linked to Summit,” Washington Post, 30 April 1985, p. A14. 74. Joseph B. Fleming, “Terrorist Bombs Planted at West German Offices,” United Press International (UPI), 3 May 1985. 75. Drozdiak, “Bombs Hit W. German Targets: Leftists Say Attacks Linked to Summit.” 76. Chris Brice, “Terrorism Has Become the New Boom Industry,” Courier-Mail (Brisbane, Australia), 28 June 1985. 77. “Sabotage Disrupts Sahara Phosphate Rock Shipments,” Chemical Week, 118(3) (21 January 1976), p. 9. 78. William J. Durch, “Building on Sand: UN Peacekeeping in the Western Sahara,” International Security, 17(4). (Spring, 1993), pp. 151–171, and Yahia H. Zoubir and Anthony G. Pazzanita, “The United Nations' Failure in Resolving the Western Sahara Conflict,” The Middle Eastern Journal, 49(4) (Autumn 1995), pp. 614–629. 79. Catherine Lalumière, Report from the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Delegation to the Western Sahara, European Parliament report CR∖471192ED, 2002, available at (http://www.arso.org/LalumiereEN.pdf). 80. “Tunisia Lands Big Turkish Phosphate Rock Account,” Chemical Week, 118 (28 April 1976), p. 73. 81. “Saharan Phosphate Cut Off by Guerrilla Attacks, Chemical Week, 118 (9 June 1976), p. 49. 82. “Ulster Burns But Fiber Plants Stay Cool,” Chemical Week, 120 (5 January 1977), pp. 42–44; and “Business is the Target,” Chemical Week, 120 (23 February 1977), p. 23. 83. Patrick P. McCurdy, “Slick Talk and Oil Slicks,” Chemical Week, 120 (5 January 1977), p. 5. 84. Ibid. 85. “Bombs Hit ICI Subsidiary in Northern Ireland,” Chemical Week, 120 (12 January 1977), p. 30; “Murder in Londonderry,” Chemical Week, 120 (9 February 1977), p. 21. 86. “Murder in Londonderry,” Chemical Week; and Malcolm MacPherson, “The IRA's Young Turks,” Newsweek, 21 February 1977, pp. 30–32. 87. “Business is the Target,” Chemical Week, 120 (23 February 1977), p. 23; “Belfast: Northern Ireland,” Associated Press, 7 February 1977, AM cycle; Tim Pat Coogan, The IRA (London: Harper Collins Publishers, 2000); pp. 377–378; and Richard English, Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA (London: Macmillan, 2003), p. 219. 88. “Murder in Londonderry,” Chemical Week. 89. Kevin Kelly, The Longest War (Westport, CT: Lawrence Hill & Co., 1982), p. 263. 90. J. Bowyer Bell, The Irish Troubles: A Generation of Political Violence, 1967–1992 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), pp. 499–501. 91. MacPherson, “The IRA's Young Turks.” 92. “London Bombings: Return of the IRA,” The Economist, 5 February 1977, p. 24; J. Bowyer Bell, The Irish Troubles: A Generation of Political Violence, 1967–1992, pp. 499–501. 93. “Northern Ireland,” Business Week, 21 February 1977, p. 42. 94. Kelly, The Longest War. 95. Ibid. 96. Tim Pat Coogan, The IRA, pp. 377–378. 97. “Dynamite Attacks Plunge Lima Into Darkness,” United Press International, 27 May 1983; and “Bayer's Plant Resumes After Terrorist Attack,” Chemical Week, 132(1) (29 June 1983), p. 14. 98. “Why the People's War in Peru is Justified and Why it is the Road to Liberation,” text of speech by Heriberto Ocasio (National Spokesman Committee to Support the Revolution in Peru, Berkeley CA), May 1995, available at (http://www.csrp.org/15year.htm). 99. Reuters, “Police Detain 500 in Peru Bombings,” New York Times, 30 May 1983, p. A1. 100. Edward F. Mickolus, Todd Sandler, and Jean M. Murdock, International Terrorism in the 1980’s: A Chronology of Events, Vol. 1, 1980–1983 (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1989). 101. Max G. Manwaring, “Peru's Sendero Luminoso: The Shining Path Beckons,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 541 (September 1995), p. 157; and Michael L. Smith, “Shining Path's Urban Strategy: Ate Vitarte,” in The Shining Path of Peru, edited by David Scott Palmer (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), p. 132. 102. Lewis Taylor, “Sendero Luminosa and the Contemporary Guerrilla Movement in Peru,” Working paper No. 2, Centre for Latin American Studies, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, England, 1983. 103. Meyer and Smith, “Peru: the ‘Shining Path’ to Terror,” Newsweek, 13 June 1983, p. 33. Another report lists the 1983 plant output at 27,000-tons per year, “Bayer's Plant Resumes After Terrorist Attack,” Chemical Week. 104. Taylor, “Sendero Luminosa and the Contemporary Guerrilla Movement in Peru.” 105. “Columbian Querrillas Threaten Plant Blowups,” Chemical Week, 129(7) (12 August 1981), p. 18. 106. Virginia M. Bouvier, Civil Society Under Siege in Columbia, Special Report No. 114 (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, February 2004), p. 13, available at (http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr114.pdf). 107. “Terrorists Claim Turkish Plant Blast,” Chemical Week, 150(22) (10 June 1992), p. 35. 108. Personal communications: András Riedlmayer, Harvard University, 7 November 2004 and Birol Yesilada, Portland State University, 9 November 2004. 109. Ely Karmon, “Terrorism in Turkey: An Analysis of the Principal Players,” 16 March 1996, International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, Herzlia, 46150, Israel, available at (http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=74). 110. “Police Arrest Leftist Militants, Seize Dynamite Sticks,” Associated Press Worldstream, 3 February 1994. 111. “World Briefs,” Vancouver Sun (British Columbia), 25 April 1994, p. A6. 112. “Cologne Bombing,” Financial Times (London), 1 October 1986, p. 1. 113. “West German Bomb Attack Foiled,” Washington Post, 12 December 1989, p. A42. 114. “Montedison Executive Wounded by Terrorists,” Chemical Week, 122 (17 May 1978), p. 29. 115. Ronald Koven and Sari Gilbert, “Moro Buried By Family in Private Rite,” Washington Post, 11 May 1978, p. A11; and “Montedison Executive Wounded by Terrorists,” Chemical Week. 116. Michael J. Duffy, “Rome: Aldo Moro was Buried,” Associated Press, 10 May 1978, AM cycle. 117. Peter Webb and Jon Lowell, “Ordeal in the Jungle,” Newsweek, 16 July 1979, p. 4; and Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 30 June 1979, p. A5. 118. “Venezuelan Revolutionary Commandos Claims Responsibility for Abduction of American Businessman,” New York Times, 29 February 1976, p. A9, includes internal citation to El Nacional, a major Venezuelan newspaper. 119. “Around the World,” Washington Post, 21 March 1977, p. A3. 120. Megan Rosenfeld, “Escape From the Jungle,” Washington Post, 4 July 1979, p. B1. 121. Philip H. Dougherty, “Information Bank Abstracts,” New York Times, 7 April 1976, p. A68. 122. “Punishing Owens-Illinois,” Business Week (Industrial Edition), 19 April 1976, p. 48; and “Venezuela Opposes Paying Ransom to Revolutionary Commando,” New York Times, 20 April 1976, p. A31. 123. “Foreign Businessmen in Venezuela Dismayed,” New York Times, 8 April 1976, p. A55. 124. “Venezuela Drops Plans to Nationalize Factory,” Wall Street Journal