Organizational Profiling of Suicide Terrorism: A Pakistani Case Study
2009; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 9; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/14702430903155191
ISSN1743-9698
Autores Tópico(s)Health and Conflict Studies
ResumoClick to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1 Robert A. Pape, ‘The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism’, ASPR 97/3 (Aug. 2003) p.345. 2 E.g. Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia UP 1998); Brian N. Jenkins, International Terrorism (Washington, DC: Rand Corp. 1985); Walter Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism (Boston: Little, Brown 1987). 3 E.g. Martin Kramer, ‘The Moral Logic of Hizballah’, in Walter Reich (ed.), Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, State of Mind (New York: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars/Cambridge UP 1990); Ariel Merari, ‘The Readiness to Kill and Die: Suicidal Terrorism in the Middle East’, in Reich, ibid; Jerrold M. Post, ‘Terrorist Psycho‐Logic: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Psychological Forces’, in Reich, ibid. 4 Pape, ‘The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism’ (note 1). 5 Ibid. 6 Merari (note 3); Ehud Sprinzak, ‘Rational Fanatics’, Foreign Policy, No.120 (Sept./Oct. 2000) pp.66 –73. 7 Harvey W. Kushner, ‘Suicide Bombers: Business as Usual’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 19/4 (1996) pp.349–67. See also, Emad Salib, ‘Suicide Terrorism: A Case of Folie à Plusieurs?’, British Journal of Psychiatry 182/6 (2003) pp.475–6; John Rosenberger, ‘Discerning the Behaviour of the Suicide Bomber: The Role of Vengeance’, Journal of Religion and Health 42/1 (2003) pp.13–20; Harvey Gordon, ‘The ‘‘Suicide’’ Bomber: Is it a Psychiatric Phenomenon?’, Psychiatric Bulletin 26/8 (2002) pp.285–7. 8 Ariel Merari, ‘The Readiness to Kill and Die: Suicidal Terrorism in the Middle East’, in Reich (note 3) p.203; Scott Atran, ‘Genesis of Suicide Terrorism’, Science 299(5619) (2003) p.1537; Ariel Merari, ‘Suicide Terrorism’, in R. Yufit and D. Lester (eds.), Assessment, Treatment and Prevention of Suicide (New York: John Wiley 2004). 9 Dave Grossman, On Killing (Boston: Little Brown 1995); Ervin Straub, The Roots of Evil: The Origin of Genocide and Other Group Violence (Cambridge: CUP 1989). 10 Merari (note 3); Post (note 3). 11 Sprinzak (note 6). 12 Ariel Merari, ‘Social, Organizational and Psychological Factors in Suicide Terrorism’, in Tore Bjørgo (ed.), Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward (Abingdon, UK: Routledge 2005) pp.70–86. 13 Sue Grand, The Reproduction of Evil: A Clinical and Cultural Perspective (Hillsdale, NJ: The Analytic Press 2000). 14 Judith Lewis Herman, Trauma and Recovery (New York: Basic Books 1992). 15 Stein, Jang, Taylor et al., ‘Genetic and Environmental Influences on Trauma Exposure and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder Syndromes: A Twin Study’, American Journal of Psychiatry (Oct. 2002). 16 Ami Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism (Manchester, UK: Polity Press 2005) p.23. 17 Ibid. p.24. 18 Radio interview with Iyad Saraj and Ariel Merari, ‘Today’s Suicide Bombers are the Children of the Previous Intifada’, Studio (2002), 134, p.27 [Hebrew]; Bruce Hoffman, ‘The Logic of Suicide Terrorism’, Atlantic Monthly 291/5 (2003) pp.40–7. 19 Atran (note 8) p.1534. 20 Pedahzur (note 16) p.12. 21 Pape, ‘The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism’ (note 1) pp.346–7. 22 For further elaboration on the advantages which terrorist organizations gain from using suicide terrorists, refer to Bruce Hoffman and Gordon H. McCormick, ‘Terrorism, Signaling, and Suicide Attack’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 27/4 (2004) pp.243–81. 23 Pape, ‘The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism’ (note 1) p.347. 24 Ibid. 25 Ibid. p.346. 26 In Pape’s study, he in fact presents an assumption according to which more than half of the organized campaigns of suicide terrorism in different places in the world between 1980 and 2001 wound up with various degrees of success for the organization that led the campaign; Pape, ‘The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism’ (note 1) p.351. 27 Hoffman and McCormick (note 22); Sprinzak (note 6) p.68. 28 Pape, ‘The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism’ (note 1); Martha Crenshaw, ‘The Causes of Terrorism’, Comparative Politics 13 (July 1981) pp.397–9. 29 Organizational Theory: Determinants of structure, ⟨www.analytictech.com/mb021/orgtheory.htm⟩. 30 Mia M. Bloom, ‘Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share and Outbidding’, Political Science Quarterly 119/1 (2004) pp.61–88. 31 Atran (note 8) p.1534. 32 Crenshaw, ‘The Causes of Terrorism’ (note 28). 33 Pape, ‘The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism’ (note 1). 34 Martha Crenshaw, ‘The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behaviour as a Product of Strategic Choice’, in Reich (note 3) pp.7–24; Ted Robert Gurr, ‘Terrorism in Democracies: Its Social and Political Bases’, in ibid. pp.86–102. 35 Crenshaw, ‘The Logic of Terrorism’ (note 34) p.8. 36 Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror (New York: Columbia UP 2007) p.85. 37 This should not be taken to mean that rational terrorist groups have a guaranteed chance of success, or even survival. 38 Audrey Cronin, ‘Studies in Counter Terrorism: Russia and Chechnya’, in Robert J. Art, Louise Richardson and Paul Stares (eds.), Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press 2007) p.4. 39 Pape (note 1). 40 Robert A. Pape, ‘The Universe of Suicide Terrorist Attacks Worldwide, 1980–2001’, Univ. of Chicago, typescript, 2002; Pape (note 1). 41 Khalil Shiqaqi et al., The Israeli‐Palestinian Peace Process (Portland, OR: Sussex Academic Press 2002); Khaled Hroub, Hamas: Political Thought and Practice (Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies 2000); and Andrea Nusse, Muslim Palestine: The Ideology of Hamas (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic 1998). 42 Pedahzur (note 16) p.13. 43 Pape (note 1). 44 Bloom, Dying to Win (note 36) p.81. 45 Yediot Ahronot [Hebrew], 11 March 1994, p.13. Peres is currently President of Israel, aged 86, and has been a major political figure since its foundation in 1948. 46 Bloom (note 36) p.19. 47 As a symbol of public opinion being mobilized for killed Palestinians, see James Fallows, ‘Who Shot Muhammed al Durra?’, Atlantic Monthly, June 2003, pp.49–56. 48 See supra note 46. 49 Interview with an aspiring suicide bomber, Nichole Argo, ‘The Banality of Evil, Understanding Today; Human Bombs’, Policy Paper Preventive Defence Project, Stanford Univ., CA, unpublished MS, 2003, p.13. 50 Interview with Abdul Aziz Rantisi, cited in Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press 2000) pp.187–8. 51 Bloom (note 36) p.25. 52 Ibid. 53 Ziad Abu Amr, Independent Palestinian Cabinet member and Minister of Culture, interview cited by Joyce M. Davis, Martyrs: Innocence, Vengeance and Despair in the Middle East (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2003) pp.168–9. 54 Bloom (note 36) p.26. 55 See Shaul Meshal and Avram Sela, The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence and Coexistence (New York: Columbia UP 2000). 56 Interview with the late George Habash, 20 June 2002, on PFLP website, ⟨http://www.pflp-pal.org/opinion/habash29-6-02.html⟩ (This website was active when accessed for research purposes but sites like these tend to relocate frequently). Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre (JMCC) opinion polls, Palestinian Opinion Pulse 2/4 (June 2001); 2/6 (Oct. 2001); 3/7 (Jan. 2002); 3/8 (April 2002), ⟨www.jmcc.org/publicpoll.opinion.html⟩. Ben Lynfield, ‘As Hope Dwindles, Hamas Thrives’, Christian Science Monitor, 10 Dec. 2001. Also see the Aug. 2002 JMCC Poll and ‘Poll: Majority of Palestinians Support PA Crackdown on Attacks’, Ha’aretz, 28 Nov. 2002. 57 James Bennet, ‘3 Israelis Killed and 50 Wounded in Blast at Mall’, New York Times, 20 May 2003. 58 Pape (note 1) pp.346–7. 59 A term frequently used by Mia Bloom. 60 Bloom (note 36) p.95. 61 For further discussion of the relative deprivation theory and suicide terrorism, see Atran (note 8) pp.77–9. 62 The Economist, 1 Dec. 2001. Also, JMCC Poll, No. 48 (April 2003) at ⟨www.jmcc.org/publicpoll/results/2oo3/no48.htm⟩. 63 Abu Amr interview, cited in Davis, Martyrs (note 53) p.168. 64 Joel Greenberg, ‘7 Killed, 17 Hurt in Ambush of Bus by Palestinians’, New York Times, 17 July 2002; Staff, ‘7 Die in Terror Attack on Immanuel Bus’, Ha’aretz, 17 July 2002. 65 Muhammad Amir Rana, A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan (Lahore: Mashal Press 2006) p.283. 66 Ibid. p.284. 67 Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam (Lahore: Vanguard Press 2007) p.191. 68 This paper relates to the phenomenon of suicide terrorism in Pakistan, not with the exported variant of the same to Afghanistan and Kashmir, such as the Lashkar‐e‐Taiba‐endorsed Fidayin (commando) attacks, which deserves a separate study in its own right. 69 Sheikh Jameel‐ur‐Rehman was heading the Wahhabi organization known as Jamaat‐ud‐Daawa‐tul‐Tauheed‐e‐wal‐Sunnah. He was successful in capturing and establishing a Mujahidin government in Kunhar Province of Afghanistan in 1984, but was unwilling to share political power with Gulbeddin Hikmetyar despite armed conflict continuing between the two for three long years. This scuffle finally ended, but after the assassination of Sheikh Jameel‐ur‐Rehman at the hands of a suicide assassin. 70 Muhammad Amir Rana, ‘How the Suicide Attackers Operate in Pakistan’, 26 June 2007, Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies, online version, ⟨http://san-pips.com/PIPS-R&D-%20 Files/Reports/R&D-Report-Article2/R&D-Report-A2-D.asp⟩. 71 Jewish Virtual Library, Biography of Ayman Muhammad Rabi Al‐Zawahiri, ⟨www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/biography/Zawahiri.html⟩. 72 Tim Mcgirk, ‘Rogues No More?’, Time INTERNET edition, 29 April 2002, ⟨www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,501020506-233999,00.html⟩. 73 ‘Al Qaeda Casualties Not Known: US’, Dawn, 17 March 2002, Internet edition, ⟨www.dawn.com/2002/03/17/top9.htm⟩. 74 ‘Islamic Extremist Terrorist Operations, Suspected al‐Qaeda Operations’, Global security website, ⟨www.dawn.com/2002/03/17/top9.htm⟩. 75 Amir Mir, ‘Manufacturing Martyrs’, Sept. 2005, Newsline, ⟨www.newsline.com.pk/NewsSep2005/sprepsep2005.htm⟩. 76 ‘Yet Another Act of Terror’, Dawn, editorial section, 19 March 2002, Internet edition, ⟨www.dawn.com/2002/03/19/ed.htm⟩. Also see Table 1 at the end. 77 JUI is led by Fazlur Rehman, widely considered as the surrogate father of the Taliban. 78 Author interview with a Harkat ul‐Mujahideen district leader, who had abandoned militancy. He had requested anonymity. 79 Amir Mir, The Fluttering Flag of Jehad (Lahore: Mashal Press 2008) p.297. 80 Though not necessarily with the ISI, which continued support to many groups. ISI has been dubbed by many commentators as ‘a state within a state’. 81 Two suicide bombers rammed their explosive‐laden cars into the presidential convoy of Musharraf on 25 Dec. 2003 at a petrol station two kilometres from his army residence in Rawalpindi, adjoining Islamabad, killing 16 people and injuring 54 others. The General, however, had a narrow escape. 82 Shaukat Aziz was targeted in June 2004, weeks before he took office as the prime minister, when he was getting into his vehicle. 83 Mir (note 79) p.134. 84 Jameel Suddhan and Khalique Ahmed, the two suicide bombers who rammed their explosives‐laden cars into Musharraf’s cavalcade on 25 Dec. 2003, were active members of the Jaish‐e‐Mohammad and Harkat ul‐Jihad ul‐Islami. Twenty‐six years of age, Suddhan was a staunch follower of the Jaish chief, Maulana Masood Azhar, and had spent most of his youth in religious seminaries. He was a resident of the Rawalkot area in Pakistan‐administered Kashmir. Khalique Ahmed, the second bomber, was 25‐years old and considered close to the Harkat ul‐Jihad ul‐Islami chief, Qari Saifullah Akhtar, while the latter was serving as special adviser to the Taliban Ameer Mullah Mohammad Omar. 85 An apparent reference to Lt. Khalid Islambouli, who had led the group of soldiers in the 1981 assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. 86 Mohammad Irfan, a suicide bomber who blew himself up during an abortive assassination attempt on Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz in Fateh Jang on 30 July 2004, was an unemployed youth with an eighth grade education. The 23‐year‐old suicide bomber had been identified as the son of a tailor, Mohammed Mukhtar. Irfan, a tall, well‐built youth, received his religious education from a local madrasah and later became a member of the Sipah‐e‐Sahaba Pakistan’s splinter group, Lashkar‐e‐Jhangvi. 87 Mir (note 79) p.69. 88 There is a large amount of literature on the topic of the Lal Masjid’s radical links with ISI. Many ISI officials said their jumma (Friday) prayers in the Masjid, and the seminary has a long history of collusion with the Islamist establishment; whence Maulana Abdullah, Abdul Aziz and Rasheed Ghazi’s father maintained cordial links with President Zia ul‐Haq and the Taliban. After his death in 1988, the Lal Masjid establishment was in intimate contact with the Taliban, JM chief Masood Azhar and HUM. 89 Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies database, ⟨http://san-pips.com/PIPS-SAN-Files/SAN-Pakistan/SAN-PAK-Article22/San-Pak-Main-A22-D.asp⟩. 90 ‘Musharraf Vows War on Militants’, BBC online, South Asia, 12 July 2007. 91 The SSG is the same elite unit of the Army to which Gen. Musharraf himself belonged, and which was specially trained by the US Special Forces for carrying out covert operations and counter‐terrorism and counter‐insurgency operations across Pakistan, especially in the trouble‐ridden tribal belt of Pakistan. 92 The Pakistani media and the intelligentsia overwhelmingly supports this hypothesis. See Zaffar Abbas, ‘Pindi Attacks Deliver Chilling Message’, Dawn, Internet edition, 6 Sept. 2007. Also see Dawn and The News online archives for a plethora of news opinion in this regard. 93 Syed Irfan Raza and Mohammad Asghar, ‘27 Die as Suicide Bombers Hit High Security Areas’, Dawn, Internet edition, 5 Sept. 2007, ⟨www.dawn.com/2007/09/05/top1.htm⟩. 94 Dawn, Internet edition, 25 Nov. 2007. 95 Mir (note 79) p.76. 96 Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi, ‘A Profile of Baitullah Mehsud’, Featured reports section, The Long War Journal, Sept. 2008, pp.1–18, ⟨www.longwarjournal.org/multimedia/Baitullah-profile-Manzar-LWJ-09302008.pdf⟩. 97 Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and bin Laden (London: Penguin 2004) p.238. 98 Technically, the Swat valley is not part of the FATA tribal belt, but is a settled district which has been tremendously affected by Talibanization. 99 Zaidi (note 96). 100 Dawn [Karachi edition] newspaper, 31 Dec. 2007. 101 Ibid. 102 Serial review of Dawn and other news sources. 103 Some other spectacular attacks were the 25 Feb. 2008 killing of Lt.‐Gen. Mushtaq Baig, the Director General of Army’s Medical Services in a suicide attack in Rawalpindi, the 4 March suicide attacks on the Naval War College in Lahore, the 11 March attack on the provincial headquarters of the Federal Investigation Agency in Lahore, the 2 June attack on the Royal Danish Embassy in Islamabad, and the 6 July attack on the conference being held to commemorate t he Lal Masjid incident by its students. 104 Mir (note 79) pp.70–1. 105 The study did not comment about the psychological propensities of these subjects. 106 Rana, A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan (note 65) p.259. HUM had existed since 1985. 107 Mir (note 79) p.134. 108 Ibid. 109 Mir (note 79) p.227. 110 Rana, A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan (note 65) p.264. 111 Mir (note 79) p.103. 112 Mir (note 79) p.107. 113 Rana (note 65) p.265. 114 Ibid. pp.244–5. 115 Pakistan has four provinces; Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan and NWFP. Punjab is the largest in terms of population, while Baluchistan possesses the largest land area. NWFP and Baluchistan have been the seats of their nationalist movements, while Sindh harbours an ethnic divide on the lines of indigenous Sindhis and Muhajirs, who emigrated to Pakistan after the partition of India in 1947. 116 According to interviews with investigating officials of the Special Investigative Group (special task force investigating terrorism) of the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), who requested anonymity. 119 Bloom (note 36) Chapter 4. 120 Pape (note 1). 121 Zaidi (note 96) p.15. 122 Safiya Aftab, ‘Poverty and Militancy’, Conflict and Peace Studies (A Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies Journal) Issue 1, 2008. Other works which focus specifically on the Pakistani Jihadist issue are Sohail Abbas, Probing the Jihadi Mindset (Salemabad: National Book Foundation: 2007). For a more ‘macro’ level approach, see C. Christine Fair, ‘Militant Recruitment in Pakistan: A New Look at the Military Madrassah Connection’, Asia Policy, No.4 (July 2007). 123 Husain Haqqani, ‘Poverty Fuels Extremism’, Gulf News, 2 Aug. 2007. Also, ‘Experts: Poverty, Culture of Violence Contribute to Growing Child Militancy in Pakistan’, International Herald Tribune, 13 Dec. 2007, ⟨www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/12/13/asia/AS-GEN-Pakistan-Child-Militants.php⟩; and Benazir Bhutto, ‘Without a War on Poverty, We will Never Defeat Terror’, Guardian, 9 Aug. 2004, ⟨www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,,1278931,00.html⟩.
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