Minimum Deterrence and Missile Defenses: U.S. and Russia Going Forward
2011; Routledge; Volume: 30; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/01495933.2011.605024
ISSN1521-0448
Autores Tópico(s)Military and Defense Studies
ResumoAbstract Ratification and entry into force of the New START agreement open the door for possible additional reductions in both states' numbers of deployed long-range nuclear weapons and launchers, but the matrix of post–New START agreement involves nonlinearities with respect to the relationship between minimum deterrence and missile defenses. NATO's Lisbon summit in 2010 invited Russia to participate in a European missile defense system, but Russia is wary of any theaterwide antimissile system that could grow into a more ambitious deterrent-denial force pointed at Russia. Minimum deterrence would drop the numbers of U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear weapons to 1,000 or fewer, but getting Moscow and Washington to move well below 1,000 would require parallel reductions and/or restraints on the part of other nuclear weapons states and a missile defense regime of "cooperative security" rather than mutual suspicion. Notes 1. See "Pentagon Studying Additional Nuke Reductions," Global Security Newswire, March 23, 2011, available at http://gsn.nti.org/siteservices/print_friendly.php. 2. Linking agreements on U.S.–Russian offensive nuclear force reductions to prospective deployments of European missile defenses is mistaken and "fundamentally wrong," according to prominent Russian missile designer Yuri Solomonov. See "Russian Missile Designer Criticizes New START Dependence on Missile Defense," Interfax, March 17, 2011, in Johnson's Russia List 2011, no. 50, March 18, 2011, available at davidjohnson@starpower.net. 3. See "Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Seeks Specific Missile Defence Deal with the US," BBC Monitoring, Ekho Moskvy Radio, March 17, 2011, in Johnson's Russia List 2011, no. 50, March 18, 2011, available at davidjohnson@starpower.net. 4. For important arguments and pertinent citations in recent studies, see: James Wood Forsyth, Jr., B. Chance Saltzman, and Gary Schaub, Jr., "Minimum Deterrence and Its Critics," Strategic Studies Quarterly, no. 4 (Winter 2010): 3–12; James Wood Forsyth, Jr., B. Chance Saltzman, and Gary Schaub, Jr., "Remembrance of Things Past: The Enduring Value of Nuclear Weapons," Strategic Studies Quarterly, no. 1 (Spring 2010), 74–89; and Stephen M. Walt, "All the Nukes You Can Use," foreignpolicy.com, May 24, 2010, available at http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/05/24/all_the_nukes_that_you_can_use. 5. See, for example, George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, "Toward a Nuclear-Free World," Wall Street Journal, January 15, 2008, p. A13. See also: Henry A. Kissinger, "Containing the Fire of the Gods," International Herald Tribune, February 6, 2009, available at www.iht.com/articles/2009/02/06/opinion/edkissinger.php; Press Association, "David Miliband Sets Out Six-Point Plan to Rid World of Nuclear Weapons," guardian.co.uk, February 4, 2009, available at www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2009/feb/04/miliband-nuclear-weapons; and Jennifer Loven, "Obama Outlines Sweeping Goal of Nuclear-Free World," Associated Press, April 5, 2009, in Johnson's Russia List 2009, no. 66, April 5–6 2009, available at davidjohnson@starpower.net. For insightful commentary on this topic, see Thomas C. Schelling, "A World Without Nuclear Weapons?" Daedalus, no. 4 (Fall, 2009): 124–129; Jonathan Schell, The Seventh Decade: The New Shape of Nuclear Danger (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2007), esp. pp. 201–223; Lawrence Freedman, "Eliminators, Marginalists, and the Politics of Disarmament," ch. 4 in John Baylis and Robert O'Neill, eds., Alternative Nuclear Futures: The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Post–Cold War World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 56–69; and Colin S. Gray, The Second Nuclear Age (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999), ch. 4, esp. pp. 82–85. 6. Minimum deterrence has, in fact, a considerable pedigree, dating back to some of the earliest U.S. debates on nuclear strategy and deterrence. "Minimum deterrent" strategies have variations and are sometimes referred to as "deterrence only" or "finite deterrence" strategies. See Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, 2nd edition (New York: The Free Press, 1969), 7–13; and Herman Kahn, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), 281–284. See also John Baylis, "Nuclear Weapons, Prudence, and Morality: The Search for a 'Third Way,'" ch. 5 in John Baylis and Robert O'Neill, eds., Alternative Nuclear futures: The Role of Neclear Weapons in the Post–Cold War World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 70–86 inclusive, esp. pp. 78–81. 7. An expert assessment in 1999 concluded that nuclear abolition was impractical of realization, leaving the practical question whether the United States could or should reduce its arsenal to hundreds of nuclear weapons any time in the next two or three decades. See: Center for Nonproliferation Research–National Defense University, and Center for Global Security Research, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, U.S. Nuclear Policy in the 21st Century: A Fresh Look at National Strategy and Requirements (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1998), esp. pp. 3.15–3.18. 8. For assessments of deterrence before and after the Cold War, see: Michael Krepon, Better Safe than Sorry: The Ironies of Living with the Bomb (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009); Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence Now (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 3rd edition (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2003); Colin S. Gray, The Second Nuclear Age (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999); Gray, Modern Strategy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), chapters 11–12; Keith B. Payne, Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1996); and Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989). 9. On this point, see Morgan, Deterrence Now, 164. 10. Freedman, Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 464. 11. The text of the New START treaty appears in Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, April 8, 2010), available at www.state.gov/documents/organization/140035.pdf. See also: "Lavrov, Clinton to Bring New START into Force on February 5," RIA Novosti, February 1, 2011, available at http://en.rian.ru/military_news/20110201/162410687.html. Indispensable as a resource is Pavel Podvig, "New START Treaty in Numbers," from his blog, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, April 9, 2010, available at http://russianforces.org/blog/2010/03/new_start_treaty_in_numbers.shtml. Contrasting appraisals of New START appear in: Steven Pifer, "New START: Good News for U.S. Security," Arms Control Today, May 2010, available at www.armscontrol.org/print/4209; Keith B. Payne, "Evaluating the U.S.-Russian Nuclear Deal," Wall Street Journal, April 8, 2010, in Johnson's Russia List 2010, no. 69, April 8, 2010, available at davidjohnson@starpower.net; Jonathan Schell, "Nuclear Balance of Terror Must End," CNN, April 8, 2010, in Johnson's Russia List 2010, no. 69, April 8, 2010, available at davidjohnson@starpower.net; and Alexander Golts, "An Illusory New START," Moscow Times, March 30, 2010, in Johnson's Russia List 2010, no. 62, March 30, 2010, available at davidjohnson@starpower.net. 12. Robert M. Gates, "A Better Missile Defense for a Safer Europe," The New York Times, September 19, 2009, available at www.nytimes.com/2009/09/20/opinion/20gates.html. The Obama Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense will retain and improve some technologies deployed by the George W. Bush Administration, but shift emphasis to other interceptors, supported by improved battle management-command-control-communications (BMC3) systems and launch detection and tracking. See unclassified statement of Lieutenant General Patrick J. O'Reilly, USA, Director, Missile Defense Agency, Before the House Armed Services Committee (Washington, DC: U.S. House of Representatives, House Armed Services Committee, October 1, 2009). Early assessments of the revised Obama missile defense plan include: George Friedman, "The BMD Decision and the Global System," Stratfor.com, September 21, 2009, in Johnson's Russia List 2009, no. 175, September 22, 2009, available at davidjohnson@starpower.net; Alexander Golts, "Calling Moscow's Bluff on Missile Defense," Moscow Times, September 22, 2009, in Johnson's Russia List 2009, no. 175, September 22, 2009; Alexander L. Pikayev, "For the Benefit of All," Moscow Times, September 21, 2009, in Johnson's Russia List 2009, no. 174, September 21, 2009, and Strobe Talbott, "A Better Base for Cutting Nuclear Weapons," Financial Times, September 21, 2009, in Johnson's Russia List 2009, no. 174, September 21, 2009. 13. See "U.S. Launches New Missile Defense Program for Europe," Associated Press, March 1, 2011, in Johnson's Russia List 2011, no. 38, March 2, 2011, and Alexander Gabuyev, "Development of the European Ballistic Missile Defense System is Under Way," Kommersant, March 3, 2011, in Johnson's Russia List 2011, no. 39, March 3, 2011. A critical expert appraisal of the Obama missile defense plan appears in George N. Lewis and Theodore A. Postol, "A Flawed and Dangerous U.S. Missile Defense Plan," Arms Control Today, May 2010, available at www.armscontrol.org/print/4244. See also: William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, "Review Cites Flaws in U.S. Antimissile Program," The New York Times, May 17, 2010, available at www.nytimes.com/2010/05/18/world/18missile.html. A more favorable expert assessment appears in Hans Binnendijk, "A Sensible Decision: A Wider Protective Umbrella," Washington Times, September 30, 2009, in Johnson's Russia List 2009, no. 181, September 30, 2009. Continuing Russian doubts are noted in "Russia Still Suspicious of U.S. Missile Defense Plans," Reuters, September 29, 2009, in Johnson's Russia List 2009, no. 181, September 30, 2009. For additional background, see Arms Control Association, U.S. Missile Defense Programs at a Glance, undated, available at www.armscontrol.org/print/4061, downloaded May 19, 2010. 14. Thus, for example, Russia's permanent representative to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin, insisted that Russia must play an equal role with NATO in setting up any European missile defense system because its paramount interests "lie in the protection of our sovereignty and independence that are guaranteed by our strategic nuclear potential." Rogozin, cited in "Russia Wants To Be Nato's Equal Partner in Euro ABM—Envoy," Interfax, March 3, 2011, in Johnson's Russia List 2011, no. 40, March 4, 2011. 15. See, on this topic: Daniel Wagner and Diana Stellman, "The Prospects for Missile Defense Cooperation Between NATO and Russia," Foreign Policy Journal, February 10, 2011, from www.foreignpolicyjournal.com, available in Johnson's Russia List 2011, no. 24, February 10, 2011; Dr. Donald N. Jensen, "Disagreements over Missile Defense Threaten to Undermine new START Treaty," Voice of America Russian Service, February 9, 2011, from www.voanews.com/Russian/news, available in Johnson's Russia List 2011, no. 25, February 11, 2011; and Vladimir Kuzmin, "From START to Euro-ABM," Rossiyskaya Gazeta, January 31, 2011, in Johnson's Russia List 2011, no. 18, January 31–February 2, 2011. 16. See Stephen J. Blank, Russia and Arms Control: Are There Opportunities for the Obama Administration? (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, March 2009), for an assessment of possible areas of U.S.–Russian cooperation and pertinent obstacles. Important trends in Russian security and defense policy are traced in Olga Oliker, Keith Crane, Lowell H. Schwartz, and Catherine Yusupov, Russian Foreign Policy: Sources and Implications (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009), ch. 5, esp. pp. 162–174. 17. Possible scenarios are examined in George H. Quester, Nuclear First Strike: Consequences of a Broken Taboo (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006). On the concept of a nuclear taboo, see Nina Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), esp. pp. 327–360. 18. As Colin Gray has noted, a small nuclear war is an oxymoron. See Gray, Second Nuclear Age, 93–97. 19. I gratefully acknowledge Gregory Treverton for this felicitous phrase. He bears no responsibility for its use here. 20. Kenneth N. Waltz, "More May Be Better," ch. 1 in Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995), 1–45. 21. Scott D. Sagan, "More Will Be Worse," ch. 2 in Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth L. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (New york: W.W. Norton, 1995), 47–91. See also on these points: Richard Ned Lebow, Nuclear Crisis Management: A Dangerous Illusion (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), and Jervis, Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution, ch. 5. 22. On this point, see especially Desmond Ball, "The Development of the SIOP, 1960–1983," ch. 3 in Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson, eds., Strategic Nuclear Targeting (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), 57–83; and Desmond Ball, "U.S. Strategic Forces: How Would They Be Used?" in Steven E. Miller, ed., Strategy and Nuclear Deterrence (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 215–244. 23. Grateful acknowledgment is made to Dr. James J. Tritten for the use of a model originally developed by him and modified by the author. He has no responsibility for its use here, nor for any arguments or conclusions in this study. 24. Forces are hypothetical structures, although not unrealistic ones, used for analytical purposes, not predictions of actual deployment decisions. For pertinent estimates of U.S. and Russian future deployments, see Podvig, "New START Treaty in Numbers"; Podvig, "Russia's New Arms Development," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 16, 2009, available at http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/pavel-podvig/russias-new-arms-development; and U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, April 2010). 25. Associated Press, "US Launches New Missile Defense Program for Europe," March 2, 2011, available at www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5hulwA3apIb2YtB7eB; "U.S. Says Radar Ship Deployment Part of Missile-Defense Shield," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, March 2, 2011, available at http//www.rferl.org/articleprintview/2325314.html. 26. Vladimir Frolov, moderator, "Russia Profile Weekly Experts Panel: Russia Raising the Stakes on Missile Defense," Russia Profile, February 25, 2011, in Johnson's Russia List 2011, no. 36, February 28, 2011. 27. "Warning of New Arms Race, Medvedev Calls for Cooperation with West On Missile Shield," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, available at www.rferl.org/content/russia_medvedev_parliament/2234566.html. 28. Yuri Solomonov, expert missile designer at the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology, told a press conference in March 2011, that the proposed U.S. missile defense plan for Europe presented no threat to Russian strategic nuclear forces. He added that European missile defense agitation "is created by politicians on one side and the other for gaining certain concessions and resolving totally unrelated problems with package agreements." See "U.S. Missile Defense in Europe does not threaten Russia—Solomonov," Interfax, March 17, 2011, in Johnson's Russia List 2011, no. 50, March 18, 2011. 29. "The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation," from, www.Kremlin.ru February 5, 2010, available in Johnson's Russia List 2010, no. 35, February 19, 2010. 30. U.S. modernization might create a situation of Russian nuclear inferiority or jeopardy regardless of U.S. intentions, according to some analysts. See Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, "The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy," Foreign Affairs, March/April 2006, available at www.foreignaffairs.org/20060301faessay85204/keir-a-lieber-daryl-g-press/html. Rejoinders to Lieber and Press include Peter C W. Flory, Keith Payne, Pavel Podvig, and Alexei Arbatov, "Nuclear Exchange: Does Washington Really Have (or Want) Nuclear Primacy?" Foreign Affairs, September/ October 2006, available at www.foreignaffairs.com/print/61931. 31. Deterrence studies have not infrequently disappointed even some of their most important contributors. For example, according to Patrick Morgan, "Neither purveyors of rational deterrence nor their critics provide a reassuring theory for guiding policy. As a result, debates about deterrence strategy never get resolved." Morgan, Deterrence Now, 167. 32. Some have argued that the United States and Russia are ready for this step now. See Samuel Charap and Mikhail Troitskiy, "Time to Put an End to MAD," The Moscow Times, January 18, 2011, available at www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/time-to-put-an-end-to-mad/429055.html.
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