Constructing Peace in the Taiwan Strait: a constructivist analysis of the changing dynamics of identities and nationalisms
2013; Routledge; Volume: 23; Issue: 85 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/10670564.2013.809985
ISSN1469-9400
Autores Tópico(s)Hong Kong and Taiwan Politics
ResumoAbstractEconomic integration in the Taiwan Strait has become increasingly stronger recently. Economic integration should have led to stronger political convergence. Why hasn't it occurred? I argue that democracy in Taiwan and the continuation of the single-party rule in China have created two very different social experiences. These different social experiences have formed two different identities. People in Taiwan are increasingly thinking of themselves as Taiwanese rather than Chinese. The growing level of popular nationalism in China has also altered the political identity of mainland Chinese. Such change could force Beijing to accommodate citizens' demand to act more toughly towards Taipei. Further political integration is still possible, but it would require another norm change, perhaps already in the making. Notes 1. Francis Fukuyama, 'Asia's soft-authoritarian alternative', New Perspectives Quarterly 9, (1992), pp. 60–61; Denny Roy, 'Singapore, China, and the "soft authoritarian" challenge', Asian Survey 34, (1994), pp. 231–242. 2. For example, a special issue was dedicated to Taiwan's identity change and its influence on cross-Strait relations in Asian Affairs 44(4), (2004). 3. Cal Clark, 'Economic integration between China and Taiwan: no spillover into the identity and security realms', in Shale Horowitz, Uk Heo and Alexander C. Tan, eds, Identity and Changes in East Asian Conflicts: The Cases of China, Taiwan, and the Koreas (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), p. 71. 4. 'Taiwan's commonsense consensus: economic integration with China is not doing what China hoped and the opposition feared', The Economist, (24 February 2011), available at: http://www.economist.com/node/18229208/print on (accessed 31 July 2011). 5. The notion of 'political convergence' can be very hard to define. Especially when it is placed in a historical context, significant political improvements between the two sides have most definitely occurred. These include the general political trend between the two sides since 1949, particularly prevalent since Ma Ying-jeou took office in 2008. Political relations can be characterized as moving from 'tensions' to 'détente'. While there is no question that the overall political dynamics in the Taiwan Strait have improved, for the purpose of this paper, 'political convergence' more narrowly refers to a clear roadmap collectively developed by Beijing and Taipei towards an eventual unification. This is an important question to examine. As will become apparent later, there are signs from Taiwan of a new Taiwanese identity emerging. This new identity has prevented economic convergence from spilling over into more political convergence. 6. Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996). 7. Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Oxford: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 8. Ronald Jepperson, Alexander Wendt and Peter J. Katzenstein, 'Norms, identity, and culture in national security', in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). 9. David Mitrany, The Functional Theory of Politics (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1975).10. Albert O. Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1980).11. Weixing Hu, 'The political–economic paradox and Beijing's strategic options', in Edward Friedman, ed., China's Rise, Taiwan's Dilemmas and International Peace (New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 33.12. Clark, 'Economic integration between China and Taiwan'.13. Hu, 'The political–economic paradox and Beijing's strategic options', pp. 22–24.14. Clark, 'Economic integration between China and Taiwan', pp. 73–74.15. Preferential treatment was intentionally granted to Chinese compatriots from Taiwan for political reasons.16. Clark, 'Economic integration between China and Taiwan', p. 74.17.Ibid., p. 78.18. Thomas L. Friedman, The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century (New York: Picador, 2007).19. Daniel C. Lynch, Rising China and Asian Democratization: Socialization to 'Global Culture' in the Political Transformations of Thailand, China, and Taiwan (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006); also see Chen Qimao, 'The Taiwan Straits situation since Ma came to office and conditions for cross-Straits political negotiations: a view from Shanghai', Journal of Contemporary China 20(68), (2011), pp. 153–160.20. Clark, 'Economic integration between China and Taiwan', p. 80; Weixing Hu, 'Explaining change and stability in cross-Strait relations: a punctuated equilibrium model', Journal of Contemporary China 21(78), (2012), pp. 933–953.21. Susan L. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).22. Chien-min Chao and Chih-Chia Hsu, 'China isolates Taiwan', in Friedman, ed., China's Rise, Taiwan's Dilemmas and International Peace; Dennis V. Hickey, 'The high cost of excluding Taiwan from the WHO', in Friedman, ed., China's Rise, Taiwan's Dilemmas and International Peace.23. Clark, 'Economic integration between China and Taiwan'; Daniel C. Lynch, 'Taiwan adapts to the network society', in Friedman, ed., China's Rise, Taiwan's Dilemmas and International Peace; Hans Stockton, 'Taiwan: political and national security of becoming "Taiwanese"', in Horowitz et al., eds, Identity and Changes in East Asian Conflicts.24. Traditionally, the KMT is considered as a pro-unification party, but calling the Ma administration a pro-unification administration can be very controversial. Therefore, I use the term pro-status quo instead.25. Hu, 'The political–economic paradox and Beijing's strategic options', p. 34.26. Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939).27. Bruce Russett and John O'Neal, Triangulating Peace (New York: Norton, 2001); Qiang Xin, 'Beyond power politics: institution-building and mainland China's Taiwan policy transition', Journal of Contemporary China 19(65), (2010), pp. 525–539.28. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001).29. Stephen M. Walt, 'Alliance formation and the balance of world power', International Security 9, (1985), pp. 3–43.30. Hu, 'The political–economic paradox and Beijing's strategic options', p. 34.31. Melissa Brown, Is Taiwan Chinese?: The Impact of Culture, Power, and Migration on Changing Identities (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004).32.Ibid., p. 1.33.Ibid., pp. 2–13. Also see Charles F. Keyes, 'The dialectics of ethnic change', in C. F. Keyes, ed., Ethnic Change (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1981); G. Carter Bentley, 'Ethnicity and practice', Comparative Studies in Society and History 29, (1987), pp. 24–25; Brackette Williams, 'A class act: anthropology and the race to nation across ethnic terrain', Annual Review of Anthropology 18, (1989), pp. 401–444; Stevan Harrell, Cultural Encounters on China's Ethnic Frontiers (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1995); Mellissa J. Brown, Negotiating Ethnicities in China and Taiwan (Berkeley, CA: Institute for East Asian Studies, University of California, 1996).34. Masahiro Wakabayashi, 'Taiwanese nationalism and the "unforgettable others"', in Friedman, ed., China's Rise, Taiwan's Dilemmas and International Peace, pp. 6–15.35. Mao-kuei Chang, 'On the origins and transformation of Taiwanese national identity', China Perspectives 28, (2000), pp. 51–70.36. Brown, Is Taiwan Chinese?, p. 8.37.Ibid.38. Wakabayashi, 'Taiwanese nationalism and the "unforgettable others"'.39. The estimates range from 8,000 to 22,000. See Brown, Is Taiwan Chinese?, p. 252, endnote 10.40.Ibid., pp. 11–12.41.Ibid., p. 3.42. Stockton, 'Taiwan'.43. Daniel C. Lynch, 'Taiwan's self-conscious nation-building project', Asian Survey 44, (2004), p. 513; S. Philip Hsu, 'Between identity quest and risk aversion: lessons from the Chen Shui-bian presidency for maintaining cross-Strait stability', Journal of Contemporary China 19(66), (2010), pp. 693–717.44. Stockton, 'Taiwan', p. 59; Dongtao Qi, 'Divergent popular support for the DPP and the Taiwan independence movement, 2000–2012', Journal of Contemporary China 21(78), (2012), pp. 973–991.45. Clark, 'Economic integration between China and Taiwan', p. 83.46. Brown, Is Taiwan Chinese?, p. 245.47. Emerson Niou, 'Understanding Taiwan independence and its policy implications', Asian Survey 44, (2004), p. 555.48. Peter R. Moody Jr, 'The evolution of China's national interest: implications for Taiwan', in Horowitz et al., eds, Identity and Changes in East Asian Conflicts, p. 41.49. Shirk, China.50. Brown, Is Taiwan Chinese?, p. 22.51. Lynch, 'Taiwan adapts to the network society'.52. Brown, Is Taiwan Chinese?53.Ibid., pp. 23–24.54. Peter Hays Gries, China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005).55. Shirk, China; Christopher Hughes, 'Reclassifying Chinese nationalism: the geopolitik turn', Journal of Contemporary China 20(71), (2011), pp. 601–620.56.Ibid.57. Suisheng Zhao, 'Chinese nationalism and its international orientations', Political Science Quarterly 115, (2000), pp. 1–33; Suisheng Zhao, 'Conflict prevention across the Taiwan Strait and the making of China's Anti-Secession Law', Asian Perspective 30, (2006), pp. 79–94; Suisheng Zhao, 'Foreign policy implications of Chinese nationalism revisited: the strident turn', Journal of Contemporary China 22(82), (2013), pp. 535–553.58. Zhao, 'Conflict prevention across the Taiwan Strait'.59. Gries, China's New Nationalism, p. 14.60. Erik Eckholm, 'Crisis in the Balkans: Beijing; China assails "gross violation of sovereignty"', The New York Times, (8 May 1999), available at: http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res = 9A0CE3DB163FF93BA35756C0A96F958260 (accessed 1 January 2012).61. Shirk, China.62.Ibid.63. Gries, China's New Nationalism, p. 128. Also see Wenfang Tang and Benjamin Darr, 'Chinese nationalism and its political and social origins', Journal of Contemporary China 21, (2012), pp. 811–826; Yanqi Tong and Shaohua Lei, 'War of position and microblogging in China', Journal of Contemporary China 22(77), (2013), pp. 292–311.64. Gries, China's New Nationalism, p. 129.65.Ibid.66. Jose-Luis Duran, 'Carrefour CEO denies backing Dalai Lama', Forbes, (4 April 2008), available at: http://www.forbes.com/2008/04/19/carrefour-china-duran-face-markets-cx_pm_0419autofacescan01.html (accessed 1 January 2012).67. Zhao, 'Conflict prevention across the Taiwan Strait'.68.Ibid., p. 85.69.Ibid.70.Ibid.71. Brown, Is Taiwan Chinese?, p. 241.72. Moody, 'The evolution of China's national interest', pp. 41–42.73. Erik Eckholm, 'As Taiwan votes in close 3-way race today, a weak government is the likeliest outcome', The New York Times, (18 March 2000), available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2000/03/18/world/taiwan-votes-close-3-way-race-today-weak-government-likeliest-outcome.html?pagewanted = all&src = pm (accessed 1 January 2012).74. Brown, Is Taiwan Chinese?, p. 245.75. Shirk, China.76. Gries, China's New Nationalism, p. 129.77. M. Taylor Fravel, 'Regime insecurity and international cooperation: explaining China's compromises in territorial disputes', International Security 30, (2005), pp. 46–83.
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