E Pluribus Unum: Arguments against Conceptual Schemes and Empirical Content
2004; Wiley; Volume: 42; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1111/j.2041-6962.2004.tb01001.x
ISSN2041-6962
Autores Tópico(s)Philosophical Ethics and Theory
ResumoThe Southern Journal of PhilosophyVolume 42, Issue 4 p. 411-438 E Pluribus Unum: Arguments against Conceptual Schemes and Empirical Content Nathaniel Goldberg, Nathaniel Goldberg Mount Saint Mary's University Nathaniel Goldberg received his Ph.D. in philosophy in January 2004 from Georgetown University and is currently a visiting assistant professor at Mount Saint Mary's University. He has published on skepticism, the principle of charity, and Kant's account of empirical-concept acquisition. His interests include epistemology, the history of modern and analytic philosophy, and philosophy of language.Search for more papers by this author Nathaniel Goldberg, Nathaniel Goldberg Mount Saint Mary's University Nathaniel Goldberg received his Ph.D. in philosophy in January 2004 from Georgetown University and is currently a visiting assistant professor at Mount Saint Mary's University. He has published on skepticism, the principle of charity, and Kant's account of empirical-concept acquisition. His interests include epistemology, the history of modern and analytic philosophy, and philosophy of language.Search for more papers by this author First published: 26 March 2010 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.2004.tb01001.xCitations: 8 AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Works Cited Baghramian, Maria. 1998. 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