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The Evolution of China's Naval Strategy and Capabilities: From “Near Coast” and “Near Seas” to “Far Seas”

2009; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 5; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/14799850902886567

1555-2764

Nan Li,

International Maritime Law Issues

Abstract This study first shows that China's naval strategy has undergone two major changes: from "near-coast defense" prior to the mid-1980s to "near-seas active defense" after the mid-1980s, and then to the advancement of a "far-seas operations" strategy. Related to the evolution of naval strategy is the change in naval capabilities: from limited capabilities for coastal defense to more expansive capabilities to operate more effectively in China's near seas by the late 2000s. The new strategy of "far-seas operations" endorsed since the mid-2000s may have major implications for the future development of China's naval capabilities. Second, this study argues that changes in naval strategy and capabilities can be accounted for by a combination of major variables, including the role of naval leadership and personal experience, endorsement of civilian leadership, changing perception of external security environment, availability of funding and technologies, and institutionalization of naval research. Also, while a major change in naval capabilities may be related to a change in naval strategy, it may also be driven by other highly contingent or idiosyncratic reasons. The author would like to thank Andrew Erickson, Peter Dutton, Bill Murray, and Jonathan Pollack for their valuable comments on an earlier draft. The author, however, is responsible for all the shortcomings. Notes 1. See Alexander Chieh-cheng Huang, "The Chinese Navy's Offshore Active Defense Strategy: Conceptualization and Implications," Naval War College Review Vol. 47, No. 3 (Summer 1994). 2. Ian Storey and You Ji, "China's Aircraft Carrier Ambitions: Seeking Truth from Rumors," Naval War College Review Vol. 57, No. 1 (Winter 2004); Andrew Erickson and Andrew Wilson, "China's Aircraft Carrier Dilemma," Naval War College Review Vol. 59, No. 4 (Autumn 2006). 3. Lyle Goldstein and William Murray, "Undersea Dragons: China's Maturing Submarine Force," International Security Vol. 28, No. 4 (Spring 2004); Eric McVadon, "China's Maturing Navy," Naval War College Review Vol. 59, No. 2 (Spring 2006); Lyle Goldstein and Andrew Erickson, "China's Future Nuclear Submarine Force: Insights from Chinese Writings," Naval War College Review Vol. 60, No. 1 (Winter 2007). 4. See Bruce Swanson, Eighth Voyage of the Dragon, a History of China's Quest for Seapower (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1982); Bernard Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, China's Navy Enters the Twenty-First Century (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001); Gabriel Collins, Andrew Erickson, Lyle Goldstein, and William Murray, China's Energy Strategy: The Impact on Beijing's Maritime Policies (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008). 5. "近岸" can also be translated as "inshore." "近海" is sometimes translated as "offshore." But "offshore" is too vague to reflect the relative distance that the Chinese term intends to express. To the extent the Euro-centric terms of Near East, Middle East and Far East are translated as 近东, 中东 and 远东, it is appropriate to translate the Sino-centric terms of "近海," "中海" and "远海" as "near seas," "middle seas" and "far seas" to reflect the relative distance from China's shores. 6. See Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," American Political Science Review Vol. 65, No.3 (September 1971). 7. A major example is the PLA's sea-crossing and amphibious-landing operations to capture Yi Jiangshan Islands off the coast of Zhejiang Province in January 1955. See Liang Guanglie et al., eds., Duhai Denglu zuozhan (Sea-Crossing and Landing Operations) (Beijing: National Defense University (NDU) Press, 2001), pp. 192–210. 8. See Liu Jixian et al., Haiyang zhanlue huanjing yu duice yanjiu (Research on the Maritime Strategic Environment and Policy Response) (Beijing: Liberation Army Press, 1997), p. 355. 9. Liu Jixian et al., Research on the Maritime Strategic Environment , pp. 355–356. The PLAN's submarine force is primarily responsible for ambush and sabotage missions. 10. Zhang Feng, "Kang denglu zuozhan ying queli jianjue burang diren shanglu de zhidao sixiang" ("The Guiding Thought That the Enemy Must Not Be Allowed to Land Should Be Established for the Counter-Amphibious-Landing Operations"), Junshi xueshu (Military Art Journal) No. 8 (1983), in Military Art Journal Editorial Department, ed., Junshi xueshu lunwenji, xiace (A Collection of Academic Papers on Military Art, Book Two) (Beijing: Military Science Press, 1984), pp. 463–464; Xiong Shuozhi, "Guanyu daoyu kang denglu zuozhan wenti de tantao" ("An Inquiry into the Question of the Islands-based Counter-Amphibious-Landing Operations"), Military Art Journal No. 11 (1980), in A Collection of Academic Papers, p. 470; Zheng Guozhong, "Jin'an daji di haishang jidong biandui wenti zhi wojian" ("My Opinion on the Question of Striking Enemy Maneuvering Formation on the Seas from the Near Coast"), Military Art Journal No. 10 (1979), in A Collection of Academic Papers, p. 478. 11. Zhan, "The Guiding Thought," p. 467. 12. Chen Jingsan, "Kang denglu ruogan zhanshu shouduan de yanjiu" ("Research on Several Tactical Means to Counter Amphibious Landing"), Military Art Journal No. 12 (1981), in A Collection of Academic Papers, p. 442; Rao Shoukun, "Shilun kang denglu zhanyi zhong de luhaikong sanjun xietong" ("An Exploratory Comment on Coordinating Ground, Naval and Air Forces in Counter-Amphibious-Landing Campaign"), Military Art Journal No. 6 (1983), in A Collection of Academic Papers, pp. 457–458; Zhang, "The Guiding Thought," pp. 467–468. 13. See Liu Huaqing, Liu Huaqing huiyilu (Liu Huaqing's Memoirs) (Beijing: Liberation Army Press, 2004), pp. 482–485. 14. An exception to this highly vulnerable and defensive posture is the Chinese naval operations over the Paracels in early 1974. See John Garver, "China's Push to the South China Sea: The Interaction of Bureaucratic and National Interests," China Quarterly No. 132 (1992). 15. The PLAN's self-characterization of its capabilities during this period was "aircraft, submarines, and fast attack crafts" ("fei, qian, kuai", or "飞, 潜, 快"). 16. The standard displacement of a Romeo is 1,710 tons. See Jane's Information Group, Jane's Fighting Ships, http://jfs.janes.com/docs/jfs/browse_country_results.jsp?&SelPub=jfs&bucket=Country&selected=China; John Pike (director), Global Security, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/navy.htm; and Huitong, Chinese Military Aviation, http://mil.jschina.com.cn/huitong/index.html. The analysis of PLAN capabilities in this article is largely based on these three sources. 17. The full-load displacement of a Luda ranges from 3,670 tons to 3,730 tons (for the improved variant), while that of a Jianghu ranges from 1,702 tons to 1,925 tons (for improved variant). The displacement of a Han is estimated to be between 4,500 and 5,500 tons while submerged. Jane's Information, Jane's Fighting Ships; Pike, Global Security; and Huitong, Chinese Military Aviation . 18. PLA analysts, for instance, argue that development of PLA capabilities should be guided more by strategic and doctrinal innovation, citing US "air–land battle" and "Star War" concepts as examples. They also cite the German doctrine of "Blitzkrieg" as central to developing required capabilities quickly, leading to victory against France at the early stage of World War II. See Hu Guangzheng and Xiao Xianshe, Yingxiangdao ershiyishiji de zhengming (Contention Affecting the 21st Century) (Beijing: Liberation Army Press, 1986), pp. 202–204. For an English account explaining early German victory in World War II, see Earnest May, Strange Victory (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001). I want to thank Lyle Goldstein for bringing Earnest May's book to my attention. 19. Liu Huaqing's Memoirs, p. 314. 20. See Liu Huaqing's Memoirs, p. 316. 21. Both Mao and Liu cited in Liu Huaqing's Memoirs, p. 476. 22. Deng Xiaoping, "Haijun jianshe yao jiang zhenzheng de zhandouli" ("Real Combat Effectiveness Should be Stressed for Navy Construction"), in Deng Xiaoping lun guofang he jundui jianshe (Deng Xiaoping on National Defense and Army Construction) (Beijing: Military Science Press, 1992), p. 63; Deng cited in Tang Fuquan and Wu Yi, "A Study of China's Sea Defense Strategy," Zhongguo junshi kexue (China Military Science) No. 5 (2007), p. 92. As a general concept to guide future naval development, the strategy was advanced as early as in 1970 by Zhou Enlai. See Liu Jie, "The Strategic Thought of Zhou Enlai on Navy Construction and Revelations," Junshi lishi (Military History), No. 2 (2008), p. 22. 23. Liu was the PLAN commander during 1982–88 and a CMC vice chair during 1988–97. The new strategy was particularly substantiated in his speech delivered to a military research class of high-ranking naval officers, entitled "Several Questions regarding Implementing the Strategic Principle of Active Defense by the Navy." See Liu Huaqing's Memoirs, p. 434. 24. Liu promoted the idea at several high-level meetings of the PLAN leadership between 1984 and 1986, and by early 1987 he was able to formulate a formal report entitled "On the Question of Clarifying the Naval Strategy," and forwarded it to the CMC and the General Staff Department (GSD). This was followed by a GSD Operations Department meeting where representatives from nine PLA central institutions were invited to discuss the report. The participants of the meeting largely endorsed the concept. See Liu Huaqing's Memoirs, pp. 434–439. 25. Liu Huaqing's Memoirs, pp. 432, 434, 436, and 437. 26. Liu Huaqing's Memoirs, p. 437; Tang and Wu, "A Study of China's Sea Defense Strategy," pp. 92–93. 27. Liu Huaqing's Memoirs, pp. 437–438. 28. See Yang Yushu, "Shilun lianhe denglu zhanyi zhong duoqu he baochi zhihaiquan wenti" ("An Exploratory Comment on the Question of Capturing and Maintaining Sea-Control in Joint Amphibious-Landing Operations"), in NDU Scientific Research Department and Campaign Teaching and Research Section, eds., Gaojisu tiaojianxia zhanyi lilun yanjiu (Research on Theory of Campaign under High-Technology Conditions) (Beijing: NDU Press, 1997), p. 188. 29. Yushu, "An Exploratory Comment," pp. 189, 189–190, 190–191; Wang Yongguo, "Haishang fengsuo zuozhan tantao" ("An Inquiry into the Question of Sea-Blocking Operations"), in Research on Theory of Campaign, pp.197–198; Li Dingwen, "Lun haijun bingli zai lianhe duhai jingong zhanyi zhong de diwei he zuoyong" ("On the Status and Role of the Naval Force in Joint Sea-Crossing Offensive Campaign"), in Research on Theory of Campaign, pp. 201–202, 205. 30. Zhao Shengtang, Fan Jinfa, "Haishang fengsuo zuozhan ying chulihao liuge guanxi," ("Six Relationships That Should Be Handled Well in Sea-Blockade Operations"), in Hu Wenlong et. al., eds., Lianhe fengsuo zuozhan yanjiu (Research on Joint Blockade Operations) (Beijing: NDU Press, 1999), pp. 34–39. See also Zhao Rongtang, "Haishang fengsuo zhanyi zuozhan zhidaoshang ying bawo de jige wenti" ("Several Questions that Should be Grasped in the Operational Guidance of Sea-Blockade Campaign"), in Research on Joint Blockade Operations, pp. 30–31; Mou Yuefu, "Tantan fengsuoqu he haizhanqu wenti" ("A Discussion of the Question regarding Blockade Zone and Naval Operations Zone"), in Research on Joint Blockade Operations, pp. 40–45. 31. Zhao Rongtang, "Several Questions," pp. 31–32; Chen Li, Lai Qiaoguo, "qiantan dui di daxing daoyu zhuyao chuhaikou de fengsuo" ("A Preliminary Discussion on Blocking the Main Exits of the Enemy's Large Islands to the Sea"), in Research on Joint Blockade Operations, pp. 46–49; Zhang Baoshan, "Shuilei fengsuo zai haishang fengsuo zuozhan zhong de zuoyong" ("The Role of Water Mine-Based Blockade in Sea-Blockade Operations"), in Research on Joint Blockade Operations, p. 78. 32. Ding Yiping, "Da di daxing jianting biandui de zhuyao zhanfa" ("Major Methods to Strike the Enemy's Large-Scale Combatants Formation"), in Research on Joint Blockade Operations, pp. 55–59; Yuan Caijin, "Da di daxing jianting biandui ying zhongshi fahui qianting bingli de zuoyong" ("The Role of Submarine Force should be Stressed and Given Full Play in Striking the Enemy's Large-Scale Combatants Formation), in Research on Joint Blockade Operations, pp. 69–74; Wu Lianqing, "Hangkongbing xietong qianting da di daxing jianting biandui de jige wenti" ("Several Questions regarding Coordinating Aviation Force and Submarine Force to Strike the Enemy's Large-Scale Combatants Formation"), in Research on Joint Blockade Operations, pp. 60–63. 33. A Ming-class submarine weighs 2,100 tons while submerged. The displacement of a Xia-class submarine is estimated to be between 6,500 and 8,000 tons. See Jane's Information, Jane's Fighting Ships; Pike, Global Security; and Huitong, Chinese Military Aviation. 34. The full displacement of a Luhu is 4,800 tons, while that of the single Luhai is 6,600 tons. The displacement of a Jiangwei ranges from 2,250 tons to 3,000 tons (for the upgraded variant). See Jane's Information, Jane's Fighting Ships; Pike, Global Security; and Huitong, Chinese Military Aviation. 35. According to a Chinese official report, one Ming was lost in the Bohai Bay in late April or early May of 2003 because of a critical mechanical failure. In late May of 2005, another Ming was crippled by a fire onboard in the South China Sea, and had to be towed back to the home port on Hainan Island. 36. The full displacements of a Sovremenny, a Luyang I, a Luyang II and a Luzhou are 7,625 tons, 6,600 tons, 7,000 tons and 7,000 tons respectively. The full displacement of a Jiangkai is estimated to be between over 3,000 tons and 4,000 tons (for Type 054A). Jane's Information Group, Jane's Fighting Ships; Pike, Global Security; and Huitong, Chinese Military Aviation. 37. The submerged displacement of a Kilo is estimated to be 3,076 tons. Jane's Information Group, Jane's Fighting Ships; Pike, Global Security; and Huitong, Chinese Military Aviation. 38. The submerged displacement of a Song is 2,250 tons. Jane's Information Group, Jane's Fighting Ships; Pike, Global Security; and Huitong, Chinese Military Aviation. 39. The full displacement of a Shang is estimated to be between 6,000 and 8,000 tons. Jane's Information Group, Jane's Fighting Ships; Pike, Global Security; and Huitong, Chinese Military Aviation. 40. The displacement of a Jin is estimated to be between 8,000 and 9,000 tons. Jane's Information Group, Jane's Fighting Ships; Pike, Global Security; and Huitong, Chinese Military Aviation. 41. Ian Story and You Ji, "China's Aircraft Carrier Ambitions: Seeking Truth from Rumors," Air Power Journal Vol. 1, No. 2 (September–December 2004), p. 126. 42. Liu Huaqing's Memoirs, pp. 265, 266, 268, 269–270, 271. 43. Liu Huaqing's Memoirs, pp. 432–433. 44. Liu Huaqing's Memoirs, p. 439. To determine whether Liu is influenced by Gorshkov or Mahan is important mainly because it may help to understand whether the PLAN would stress bastion defense or power projection in its future development. 45. See Nan Li, "The PLA's Evolving Campaign Doctrine and Strategies," in James Mulvenon and Richard Yang, eds., The People's Liberation Army in the Information Age (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999), p. 165. 46. Liu Huaqing's Memoirs, p. 437. While serving as a brigade political commissar in the Second Field Army led by Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping, Liu participated in one of the most well-known PLAexterior-line operations in 1947, known as "advance a thousand li into Mount Dabie." Such an experience cannot have an insignificant influence on Liu's thinking about China's naval strategy. 47. Liu Huaqing's Memoirs, p. 435. 48. The 1985 decision led to downsizing of the PLA by a million personnel, or elimination of four military regions and 12 infantry corps. See Liu Huaqing's Memoirs, p. 329. It is quite clear that the PLA land forces suffered much more from the downsizing than the PLAN. 49. Liu Huaqing's Memoirs, pp. 435–436. 50. See Nan Li, "The PLA's Evolving War-fighting Doctrine, Strategy and Tactics, 1985–1995," in David Shambaugh and Richard H. Yang, eds., China's Military in Transition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 185. 51. Liu Huaqing's Memoirs, p. 434. 52. For Liu's aircraft carrier program, see Liu Huaqing's Memoirs, pp. 477–481. 53. This refers to the foreign forces that entered Beijing in 1900 following the suppression of the Boxers' Rebellion. For a discussion of the PLA's difficulties in integrating foreign technologies, including the example of Luhu-class DDGs, see Eric McVadon, "Systems Integration in China's People's Liberation Army," in James Mulvenon and Richard Yang, eds., The People's Liberation Army in the Information Age (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999), pp. 217–244. 54. See Liu Huaqing's Memoirs, p. 665. 55. Liu Huaqing's Memoirs, pp. 449, 451. 56. See Liu Huaqing's Memoirs, p. 351. 57. See Ye Xinrong and Zuo Liping, "Guanyu haijun you jinhai zouxiang yuanhai de zhanlue sikao" ("Strategic Reflections Regarding the March of the Navy from the Near Seas to the Far Seas"), Military Art Journal No. 10 (2004), p. 30. 58. PLA analysts, for instance, believe that a combination of military, diplomatic, economic and legal strategies employed in recent years has had the effect of convincing the leaders and people in Taiwan that the cost of pursuing formal independence is too high and the benefit too low. Some also acknowledge that without Taiwan's declaration of formal independence, the PLA lacks the legitimacy to attack Taiwan because the people in Taiwan are considered Chinese. The election of the anti-independence KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou as Taiwan's new president in 2008 seems to have reinforced this view. 59. The 1985–87 round of downsizing led to demobilization of a million personnel. The 1997–2000 round removed 500,000, while the 2002–05 round demobilized another 200,000. These numbers represent the positions that have been eliminated. They do not include those that are regularly demobilized every year, whose positions are replenished by the new recruits. 60. See "863 jihua gaikuang" ("A General Introduction of Plan 863"), http://www.chinatech.com.cn/techachieve/intro/plan863.htm. 61. Yang Chunchang, Deng Xiaoping xinshiqi jianjun sixiang yanjiu (Study of Deng Xiaoping's Thought on Army Construction in the New Period) (Beijing: Liberation Army Press, 1989), p. 277. 62. See Liu Huaqing's Memoirs, p. 353. Liu argues that the US and the Soviet Union had also adopted an incremental approach in their naval development. 63. See Liu Huaqing's Memoirs, p. 678. This is especially true with the air defense system, the propulsion system, the CDS system and the CIWS, which are all based on either a Russian or a Dutch system. The author wants to thank Bill Murray for fleshing out this point. 64. See Richard Bitzinger, "Dual-Use Technologies, Civil-Military Integration, and China's Defense Industry," in Nan Li, ed., Chinese Civil–Military Relations (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 183–184. 65. See Liu Huaqing's Memoirs, p. 437. The PLAN planners divide the world's navies into three categories: the far-oceans offensive type (yuanyang jingong xing, or global blue-water type), regional defensive and offensive type (quyu fangyu jingong xing, or regional blue-water type) and coastal defensive type (yan'an fangyu xing). The US Navy belongs to the first category, while the British, French, German, Italian, Japanese and Russian navies belong to the second category. The Indian Navy is alleged to be "sub-regional" ("ci quyu"), or somewhere between the second and the third categories, while other navies belong to the third category. The medium-term (around 2020) goal of the PLAN is to become the second type. This type of navy can operate effectively for control of the seas within its own region. In the meantime, it also possesses the capability to project power beyond its own region and compete effectively for sea-control and impose sea-denial in the seas of the other oceans, as did the British Navy during the Falklands War. The concept of "far seas" is in line with the second type, while the concept of "far oceans" ("yuanyang", or "远洋") is compatible with the first type. China's medium-term goal is to develop a far-seas but not a far-oceans navy. 66. Jiang and Hu cited in Tang and Wu, "A Study of China's Sea Defense Strategy," p. 93; Jiang cited in Wang Zhigang, "Haijun shi hanwei guojia liyi tuozhan de zhongyao liliang" ("Navy Is an Important Force in Defending the Extension and Development of National interests"), Guofang daxue xuebao (Journal of NDU) No. 10 (2005), p. 24. Wang is from the PLAN Submarine Academy. 67. See particularly Ye Xinrong and Zuo Liping, "Strategic Reflections Regarding the March of the Navy from the Near Seas to the Far Seas," Military Art Journal No. 10 (2004), pp. 30–33. Both authors are from the Navy Military Art Research Institute. 68. Liu Huaqing's Memoirs, p. 434. 69. Su Jinrong, "Haijun zhanyi ying guanche 'xiaojiqun jidong zuozhan' de zhidao sixiang" ("Navy Campaign Should Implement the Guiding Thought of 'Small Group Maneuvering Operations"), Journal of NDU No. 3 (2004), pp. 30–32. See also Wang Yemin, "Haishang zhandouqun daji di jidong biandui de zhuyao yangshi" ("Major Ways for Sea Battle Group to Strike the Enemy's Maneuvering Formation"), Military Art Journal No. 1 (2004), pp. 62–64. Such a multifunctional battle group clearly can serve as escort flotilla to secure SLOC far away from the home waters. It can also serve as the organizational basis for incorporating much larger platforms such as aircraft carriers in the future. 70. See Jiang Kaihui, "Youhua Haizhan huanjing, jiaqiang zhanchang jianshe" ("Optimize Sea Operations Environment, Enhance Battlefield Construction"), Military Art Journal No. 5 (2005), pp. 51–52; Zhou Hanrong, "Xinxihua tiaojianxia haishang zuozhan houqin baozhang yanjiu" ("Research on Logistics Services for Sea Operations under Informatized Conditions"), Military Art Journal No. 1 (2005), pp. 62–64; Sun Baolong, "Yitihua lianqin baozhang tizhi xia haishang zuozhan houqin baozhang mianlin de wenti yu duice" ("Problems Faced by the Logistics Services for Sea Operations under the System of Integrated Joint Logistics Services and Policy Response"), Journal of NDU No. 3 (2005), pp. 15–17. 71. See Cheng Xiaochun and Hu Limin, "Jiawu haizhan dui xinshiqi zhenxin haijun de qishi" ("Revelations of the Sino-Japanese War on Rejuvenating the Navy in the New Period"), Military Art Journal No. 10 (2004), p. 26; Zhang Wei and Zheng Hong, "Lun wo haijun fazhan de zhanlue xuqiu yu jiyu" ("On the Strategic Necessities and Opportunities for Developing Our Navy"), Military Art Journal No. 10 (2004), p. 34. All four authors are from the Navy Military Art Research Institute. 72. China's value of foreign trade in 1978 was $20.6 billion. It grew to $620.79 billion by 2002 and reached $851.2 billion by 2003. By 2005 it grew to $1.42 trillion, up 23.2% from a year earlierand nearly tripled the figure in 2001. For the first three figures and shipping by sea, see Ye and Zuo, "Strategic Reflections," p. 31; Zhang and Zheng, "On the Strategic Necessities," p. 34; Liang Fang, "Haiyang zai guojia anquan zhong de diwei zuoyong ji duice" ("Status and Role of Oceans in National Security and Policy Response"), Military Art Journal No. 1 (2005), p. 66. For the rest, see Chris Buckley, "China Urged to Step up to WTO Plate," Reuters, August 29, 2006. See also Wang, "Navy Is an Important Force," p. 23. 73. China's merchant fleet is allegedly the fifth largest in the world, and China has more than 30 shipping lines reaching more than 600 ports in 150 countries and regions. It is predicted that Chinese shipping will handle businesses that will be worth $720 billion by 2010 and $1.08 trillion by 2020. Ye and Zuo, "Strategic Reflections," p. 31; Liang, "Status and Role," p. 66. 74. China imported 80 million tons of oil in 2000. The figure reached 91.12 million tons by 2003, the year when China overtook Japan as the second largest consumer of oil. China's dependence on imported oil grew from 36.1% in 2003 to more than 40% by 2004, and is predicted to reach 80% by 2020. Also, four-fifths of China's imported oil has to be shipped back to China through the major SLOC in the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea, and "chokepoints" such as the Strait of Malacca. See Ye and Zuo, "Strategic Reflections," p. 31; Zhang and Zheng, "Strategic Necessities," p. 34; Liang, "Status and Role," p. 66; Hou Zhiping, "Dui weihu woguo shiyou anquan de zhanlue sikao ("Strategic Reflections on Safeguarding the Oil Security of Our Country"), Journal of NDU No. 8 (2005), p. 86. 75. Half of the 45 types of strategic minerals, including oil, natural gas, zinc, manganese, molybdenum and silver must either be imported or mined from the oceans. See Ye and Zuo, "Strategic Reflections," p. 31; Liang, "Status and Role," p. 66. 76. In 1978, China's maritime economy was worth $8 billion. In 2003, the figure grew to about $129 billion. Zhang and Zheng, "Strategic Necessities," p. 34; Liang, "Status and Role," p. 66. 77. Zhang and Zheng, "Strategic Necessities," p. 24; Liang, "Status and Role," p. 65. 78. By 2003, the total value of the Chinese overseas investment was $13.2 billion. Excluding those in the banking sector, China had 7,720 overseas enterprises. By 2005, the total value reached 57.2 billion and the number of the Chinese overseas enterprises reached more than 10,000, largely due to the growth of the Chinese direct investment overseas, which hit $12.26 billion, a 123% increase from 2004. The Chinese investment overseas for the first six months of 2006 was $6.44 billion, a 65.3% increase from the same period in previous year. For 2003 numbers, see Zhang and Zheng, "Strategic Necessities," p. 24. For others, see "China Overseas Investment Reaches Record," United Press International, September 4, 2006; Zhu Zhu, "Overseas Investment Expected to Increase," China Daily, September 6, 2005; Caijing shibao (Financial and Economic Times), September 9, 2006. 79. Ye and Zuo, "Strategic Reflections," p. 31; Zhang and Zheng, "Strategic Necessities," p. 34; Liang, "Status and Role," p. 66. 80. For quotation, see Ye and Zuo, "Strategic Reflections," p. 31. For others, see Cheng and Hu, "Revelations of the Sino-Japanese War," p. 29. See also Liang, "Status and Role," p. 67. 81. Ye and Zuo, 'Strategic Reflections," p. 32; Zhang and Zheng, "Strategic Necessities," p. 34. Naval researchers predict that the Chinese economy will constitute 17.5% of the world's total GDP by 2015 and 22% by 2020. 82. Ye and Zuo, "Strategic Reflections," p. 31; Zhang and Zheng, "Strategic Necessities," pp. 34–35; Zhang Jiyu, Mu Yongpeng, "Jiji tuijin haijun xinxihua jianshe," ("Actively Carry forward Navy Informatization Construction"), Guofang bao (National Defense News), June 24, 2004, p. 3; Li Jie, "Meiguo haijun 'wangluo zhongxin zhan' jianshe ji qishi" ("Construction of 'Net-centric Warfare' by the US Navy and Lessons"), Military Art Journal No. 10 (2004), p. 36. Li is from the Navy Military Art Research Institute. 83. Zhang had been ill for some time, and this may have also contributed to his subdued profile. He recently died and his position was taken over by Wu Shengli. Wu once commanded the 6th DDG Flotilla of the East Sea Fleet and was a deputy chief of the PLA General Staff. 84. This is also the timetable set by Jiang Zemin for completing the PLA mechanization. 85. Partly for technical maintenance reasons, the anti-ship DDGs newly acquired from Russia are deployed in the East Sea Fleet, while the indigenously built air-defense DDGs are deployed in the South Sea Fleet and North Sea Fleet. This may also have to change in order to organize multifunctional battle groups. 86. The development of such facilities on the Paracels and similar facilities reported to be developed in Burma and Pakistan for the future may serve such a purpose. See Bill Gertz, "China Builds up Strategic Sea Lanes," Washington Times, January 18, 2005. For a discussion of the validity of the claims on Chinese bases in Burma, see Andrew Selth, "Burma, China and the Myth of Military Bases," Asian Security Vol. 3, No. 3 (2007), pp. 279–307. 87. The author wants to thank Peter Dutton for highlighting this point. 88. See Ye Zicheng, Luchuan fazhan yu daguo xingshuai (Land Power Development and Rise and Decline of Great Powers) (Beijing: New Star Press, 2007). Author's interview with Ye, Beijing University, Beijing, April 22, 2008.