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Empirical Evidence on the Selection Hypothesis and the Decision to Litigate or Settle

1990; University of Chicago Press; Volume: 19; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1086/467845

1537-5366

Linda R. Stanley, Don Coursey,

Construction Project Management and Performance

Previous articleNext article No AccessEmpirical Evidence on the Selection Hypothesis and the Decision to Litigate or SettleLinda R. Stanley and Don L. CourseyLinda R. Stanley and Don L. CourseyPDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Legal Studies Volume 19, Number 1Jan., 1990 Sponsored by The University of Chicago Law School Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/467845 Views: 9Total views on this site Citations: 27Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1990 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Murali Jagannathan, Venkata Santosh Kumar Delhi Identifying focus areas to decode the decision to litigate contractual disputes in construction, Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management 29, no.88 (Jun 2021): 2976–2998.https://doi.org/10.1108/ECAM-01-2021-0014Yun-chien Chang, William Hubbard New Empirical Tests for Classic Litigation Selection Models: Evidence from a Low Settlement Environment, American Law and Economics Review 23, no.22 (Oct 2021): 348–394.https://doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahab008Paul Pecorino, Mark Van Boening An empirical analysis of litigation with discovery: The role of fairness, Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 81 (Aug 2019): 172–184.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2019.06.009Paul Pecorino, Mark Van Boening Costly Voluntary Disclosure in a Signaling Game, Review of Law & Economics 0, no.00 (Mar 2019).https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2016-0074Michael McBride, Stergios Skaperdas, Pi-Han Tsai Why go to court? 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Testing Litigation Selection Hypotheses with Foreign Court Data, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2018).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3127728Paul Pecorino, Mark van Boening Costly Voluntary Disclosure in a Signaling Game, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2016).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2809174Mark van Boening, Paul Pecorino An Empirical Analysis of Litigation with Discovery, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2016).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2816642Paul Pecorino, Mark Van Boening Costly voluntary disclosure in a screening game, International Review of Law and Economics 44 (Oct 2015): 16–28.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2015.08.002Paul Pecorino, Mark van Boening Costly Voluntary Disclosure in a Screening Game, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2013).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2285718Yannick Gabuthy, Nicolas Jacquemet Analyse économique du droit et méthode expérimentale, Économie & prévision n° 202-203, no.11 (Jan 2013): 121.https://doi.org/10.3917/ecop.202.0121Florian Baumann, Tim Friehe Emotions in litigation contests, Economics of Governance 13, no.33 (Jun 2012): 195–215.https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-012-0110-1James Fallows Tierney Economic Theory of Bellwether Trials, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2011).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1754231Paul Pecorino, Mark van Boening An Empirical Analysis of the Signaling and Screening Models of Litigation, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2011).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1988244Walter W. 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Main, Andrew Park The impact of defendant offers into court on negotiation in the shadow of the law: experimental evidence, International Review of Law and Economics 22, no.22 (Aug 2002): 177–192.https://doi.org/10.1016/S0144-8188(02)00086-8 Paul Pecorino and Mark Van Boening Bargaining and Information: An Empirical Analysis of a Multistage Arbitration Game Pecorino and Van Boening, Journal of Labor Economics 19, no.44 (Jul 2015): 922–948.https://doi.org/10.1086/322825Amy Farmer, Jill Tiefenthaler Conflict in divorce disputes: the determinants of pretrial settlement, International Review of Law and Economics 21, no.22 (Jun 2001): 157–180.https://doi.org/10.1016/S0144-8188(01)00054-0Thomas J. Miceli Introduction: The law and economics of real estate, The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics 12, no.11 (Jan 1996): 7–8.https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00127762Martin J. Bailey, Paul H. Rubin A positive theory of legal change, International Review of Law and Economics 14, no.44 (Dec 1994): 467–477.https://doi.org/10.1016/0144-8188(94)90027-2 Terry L. Anderson , and Fred S. Mc Chesney Raid or Trade? An Economic Model of Indian-White Relations, The Journal of Law and Economics 37, no.11 (Oct 2015): 39–74.https://doi.org/10.1086/467306 George Loewenstein , Samuel Issacharoff , Colin Camerer , and Linda Babcock Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining, The Journal of Legal Studies 22, no.11 (Oct 2015): 135–159.https://doi.org/10.1086/468160Walter W. Austin, Linda L. Brennan, James L. Hunt Legal Truth and Consequences for a Failed ERP Implementation, (): 46–69.https://doi.org/10.4018/978-1-4666-3619-4.ch003