Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

Blood, Thunder and Rosettes: The Multiple Personalities of Paramilitary Loyalism between 1971 and 1988

2011; Routledge; Volume: 26; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/07907184.2011.531105

1743-9078

Richard Reed,

Migration, Refugees, and Integration

Abstract During the modern conflict in Northern Ireland, the paramilitaries played an important role in shaping communal identities. The loyalist Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) enjoyed significant support in the Protestant community and should be understood as one expression of Protestant insecurity. This article considers the nature of this manifestation of Protestant fear during the formative years after the formation of the UDA in 1971 and up to the end of Andy Tyrie's leadership of the organisation in 1988. It argues that the evidence uncovered by an examination of paramilitary literature, as well as that of the loyalist political parties which were affiliated with the UVF and UDA, reveals a complex persona that cannot be understood as entirely violent and exclusive. Instead, after outlining evidence for moderation, it explores what this evidence can reveal about the emergence of political thinking within parts of the UVF and UDA, and concludes that the literature demonstrates how politics was restricted by the primacy of a historical consciousness and the prevalence of sectarianism in the loyalist community, the hardening effect of republican violence, and the lack of a political niche. Keywords: loyalismparamilitarynew loyalismmoderationUlster Defence AssociationUlster Volunteer Force Acknowledgements The author would like to thank Dr Keith Breen and Dr Cathal McCall for their comments on a very early draft of this paper, as well as the anonymous reviewers for their excellent feedback and Sarah Maitland and Maria Furniss for their suggestions and cheery proof‐reading assistance. The staff at the Linen Hall library must also be thanked for their patience and help researching the documentary evidence used here. Lastly, special thanks are reserved for those interviewed for this article, who willingly gave copious amounts of their time to in‐depth discussions with the author related to the issues raised in this article. Notes 1. All statistics are sourced from McKittrick et al. (Citation2007: 1551ff). 2. The UDA was formed in September 1971 when various 'defence associations' that had emerged to defend Protestant areas against republican attacks coalesced under the leadership of Woodvale‐based Charles Harding‐Smith. The inclusion of Protestant men and women of varying political ideologies, professions and backgrounds was compelled by the common need for protection, boosted by the co‐ordination of the activities of these groups (Boulton, Citation1973: 145; Bruce, Citation2001: 31, Wood, Citation2006: 3–4). 3. The UVF was formed in 1965 (Garland, Citation1997: 6), but following the murder of three Catholics in 1966 and the convictions later that same year of Gusty Spence, Hugh McClean and Robert Williamson for the murder of Peter Ward (McKittrick et al., Citation2007: 26), the organisation did not kill again until 1969. Aside from a series of bomb attacks in Northern Ireland and in the Republic of Ireland during 1969 and 1970 that inflicted no casualties and had been mainly intended to destabilise Captain Terrence O'Neill's leadership, the UVF remained relatively inactive until the 1971 bombing of McGurk's bar that killed 15 civilians (Taylor, Citation1999: 88). Six months later Gusty Spence spent four months on the run, during which time he was attributed with reorganising the UVF and re‐establishing the Young Citizens Volunteers (YCV). A group with this name had been connected with the first UVF in 1913 (Boulton, Citation1973: 164). 4. While leadership in the UVF remained more static, the first Stevens Inquiry in 1989 resulted in the arrest of many of the UDA's 'old guard' leaders who had supported Tyrie's regime (such as Jackie McDonald and Sammy Duddy; see Wood, Citation2006: 136, 147). Following an intensification of military training at the end of the 1980s (Crawford, Citation2003: 12), a new generation of militant leaders stepped into this power vacuum, foremost among whom was Johnny Adair (Wood, Citation2006: 154). 5. For instance, between 1989 and 1994, the UVF and RHC were responsible for 104 murders. In a similar six‐year period between 1983 and 1988, the same group killed 41 people. A full discussion of why this change occurred would merit discussion in a separate article, but is likely to have been a mixture of organisational restructuring in both the UDA and the UVF to counter the threat of informers, ideological shifts in response to Britain further neutralising its involvement in Northern Ireland following the Downing Street Declaration, strategic switching to 'soft' targets, a strategy epitomised by the slogan 'Any Taig will do', and an increasing cultural glorification of violence, guns and drugs that characterised Johnny Adair's early leadership of the UDA's West Belfast 'C‐Company' (see Wood, Citation2006: 154ff). 6. The RHC, lead by John McKeague, was strongly linked with the UVF and in 1972 made an agreement with the UVF to combine its forces in operational matters (Garland, Citation2001: 151–152). 7. The political groups referred to in this article are, on the UVF and RHC side, the PUP and its forerunner the Progressive Unionist Group (PUG), and on the UDA side the Ulster Loyalist Democratic Party (ULDP), the New Ulster Political Research Group (NUPRG), the Ulster Democratic Party (UDP) and the Ulster Political Research Group (UPRG). 8. In an interview with the author on 15 January 2010, one ex‐prisoner claimed that 'the media, and maybe some politicians, look upon loyalism as the 'dirty end' of unionism. In his recent interviews with loyalist community workers, Kevin Cassidy noted that loyalism was perceived by some as 'unionism with a gun' (Cassidy, Citation2008: 415). 9. These documents were preceded by manifestos containing similar proposals, such as Movement Towards a Democratic Devolved Administration for Northern Ireland (PUG, 1979). Dawn Purvis, former leader of the PUP, also claimed the Sharing Responsibility document was the 'blueprint for the Good Friday Agreement' (Purvis, 29 June 2009) and Henry Sinnerton argued that it was 'so far ahead of its time it must have seemed heretical to orthodox unionists' (Sinnerton, Citation2002: 83). 10. According to Garland (Citation1997, Citation2001), Spence was involved with discussions inside Long Kesh with leading republicans, including Billy McKee, David Morley (Provisional IRA), Billy McMillen, Peter Monaghan (Official IRA) and Frank Gallagher (Irish National Liberation Army). 11. Billy Mitchell (Citation2002) argues: 'Nationalism demands the right to embrace the politics of victim‐hood while denying that right to unionists'. His point has been reinforced during interviews with several former paramilitary men of both the UDA and the UVF. 12. Loyalist literature often claims that only 70/76 men returned from the 700/760 of the Shankill men who had enlisted from the Somme (see Combat, July 1975). While this number is important in the loyalist psyche in West Belfast, recent research has illustrated that it is inaccurate, both understating the contribution of Shankill‐based men to the war, and the number who returned (see Grayson, Citation2009: 200ff). 13. Tara was an evangelical Protestant organisation formed in 1966 by William McGrath, a member of Ian Paisley's Free Presbyterian Church, to resist and oppose the spread of the Catholic Church's influence in Northern Ireland. 14. Though McAuley (Citation1991) has argued that the UDA evolved into a multi‐purpose organisation, Bruce has suggested that there remained an essential 'division of labour' in Protestant culture that reinforced the militant raison d'être of the UDA, whereby politicians 'did' politics, and paramilitaries 'did' physical defence (Bruce, Citation1992: 235ff). 15. According to one interviewee (18 January 2010), his background as a trade unionist, and Dick Spring's as leader of the Irish Labour party, also help explain himself and Spring as the UVF's choice of intermediary and Irish contact during the 1990s.