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The Collective Nature of Lone Wolf Terrorism: Anders Behring Breivik and the Anti-Islamic Social Movement

2014; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 26; Issue: 5 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/09546553.2013.767245

1556-1836

Lars Erik Berntzen, Sveinung Sandberg,

Populism, Right-Wing Movements

Abstract Anders Behring Breivik, a lone wolf terrorist, killed 77 people in two terrorist attacks in Norway in 2011. This study uses framing theory from social movement studies to compare his Manifesto with the rhetoric of the anti-Islamic movement that inspired him. The anti-Islamic movement has a dual, and sometimes inconsistent, collective action framing. On the one hand, they portray Islam as an existential threat to the West and a warlike enemy; on the other, they promote peaceful and democratic opposition. The potential for radicalization is thus immanent. This case study reveals the importance of seeing lone wolf terrorists as acting from rhetoric embedded in larger social movements. It further demonstrates, in detail, the subtle and complex ways in which political narratives rejecting terrorism and political violence still end up inspiring such acts. Keywords: anti-Islamcounter-jihadlone wolvessocial movementsterrorism Acknowledgments The authors are grateful to Jan Oskar Engene, Mark Sedgwick, Bo Vignes, Susanne Bygnes, Mette Andersson, and Gavan Titley for comments to earlier versions of this article. Notes Notes Anders B. Breivik, 2083—A European Declaration of Independence, 2011, http://unitednations.ispnw.org/archives/breivik-manifesto-2011.pdf. https://www.politi.no/kripos/statistikk/drap/. Samuel Nunn, "Incidents of Terrorism in the United States 1997–2005," The Geographical Review 97 (2007): 89–111; Ramon Spaaij, "The Enigma of Lone Wolf Terrorism: An Assessment," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 33 (2010): 854–870; Peter J. Phillips, "Lone Wolf Terrorism," Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy 17, no. 1 (2011): 1–29. Spaaij, "The Enigma of Lone Wolf Terrorism" (see note 3 above). For example, Sajjan Gohel, Director for International Security at the Asia-Pacific Foundation, argues that it is the "next stage of terrorism in Europe" (http://edition.cnn.com/2012/03/21/world/europe/lone-wolf-future-of-terrrorists/index.html) and Gilles de Kerchove, the EU Counter-terrorism Coordinator, argues that there may be 400 lone wolves inspired by Al Qaeda in Europe alone (http://eu-digest.blogspot.com/2012/03/eu-could-be-home-to-400-lone-wolf.html). Jeffrey Kaplan, "Leaderless Resistance," Terrorism and Political Violence 9, no. 3 (Autumn 1997): 80–95; Chris Dishmann, "The Leaderless Nexus: When Crime and Terror Converge," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 28, no. 3 (2005): 237–252. Phillips, "Lone Wolf Terrorism" (see note 3 above); Sophia Moskalenko and Clark McCauley, "The Psychology of Lone-wolf Terrorism," Counseling Psychology Quarterly 24, no. 2 (2011): 115–126; Steven M. Chermak, Joshua D. Freilich, and Joseph Simone Jr., "Surveying American State Police Agencies about Lone Wolves, Far-Right Criminality, and Far-Right and Islamic Jihadist Criminal Collaboration," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 33, no. 11 (2010): 1019–1041; Edwin Bakker and Beatrice de Graaf, Lone Wolves: How to Prevent This Phenomenon? (The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, Expert Meeting Paper, 2010); Nunn, "Incidents of Terrorism in the United States 1997–2005" (see note 3 above). Christopher Hewitt, Understanding Terrorism in America: From the Klan to Al Qaeda (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), 80. Spaaij also notes that they "combine personal frustrations and aversion with broader political, social, or religious aims in constructing their ideology" (see note 3 above), 866. In outlining this relationship, others have used terms such as communities of belief and ideologies of validation; Jelle van Buuren, "The Multitude of Lone Wolf Terrorism," Terrorism: An Electronic Journal and Knowledge Base 1, no. 1 (2012): 1–23, 15; Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 11. Raffaello Pantucci, A Typology of Lone Wolves: Preliminary Analysis of Lone Islamist Terrorists (London: The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 2011); Ramon Spaaij, Understanding Lone Wolf Terrorism: Global Patterns, Motivations and Prevention (New York: Springer, 2011); Gerry Gable and Paul Jackson, "Lone Wolves: Myth or Reality," Searchlight, 2011. David Leheny, "Terrorism, Social Movements, and International Security: How Al Qaeda Affects Southeast Asia," Japanese Journal of Political Science 6, no. 1 (2005): 1–23; Colin J. Beck, "The Contribution of Social Movement Theory to Understanding Terrorism," Sociology Compass 2, no. 5 (2008): 1565–1581; Randy Borum, "Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories," Journal of Strategic Security 4, no. 4 (2011): 7–36. Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, eds., Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Norway has a history of right-wing extremism during the 1980s and 1990s; Tore Bjørgo, "Extreme Nationalism and Violent Discourses in Scandinavia: 'The Resistance,' 'Traitors,' and 'Foreign Invaders,' " Terrorism and Political Violence 7, no. 1 (1995): 182–220; Katrine Fangen, En Bok om Nynazisme (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2001). Bjørgo has noted many similarities between Breivik's views and these organizations and groups, and argues that Breivik's views and actions are consistent with right-wing violent ideology; Tore Bjørgo, "Højreekstreme voldsideologier og terroristisk rationalitet: Hvordan kan man forstå Behring Breiviks udsagn og handlinger?," Social Kritik, 131 (2012): 4–25, 6. David A. Snow, E. Burke Rochford, Jr., Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford, "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization and Movement Participation," American Sociological Review 51 (1986): 464–481; David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, "Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization," in Bert Klandermans, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Sidney Tarrow, eds., From Structure to Action: Comparing Movement Participants Across Cultures, International Movement Research, vol. 1 (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1988), 197–217; David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, "Master Frames and Cycles of Protest," in Aldon D. Morris and Carol M. Mueller, eds., Frontiers in Social Movement Theory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 133–155; William A. Gamson, "The Social Psychology of Collective Action," in Aldon D. Morris and Carol M. Mueller, eds., Frontiers in Social Movement Theory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 53–76; William A. Gamson, "Constructing Social Protest," in Hank Johnston and Bert Klandermans, eds., Social Movements and Culture (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), 85–106. Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience (New York: Harper Colophon, 1974); Snow et al., "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization and Movement Participation" (see note 15 above). Snow and Benford, "Master Frames and Cycles of Protest" (see note 15 above). Daniel M. Cress and David A. Snow, "The Outcomes of Homeless Mobilization: The Influence of Organization, Disruption, Political Mediation, and Framing," American Journal of Sociology 105, no. 4 (2000): 1063–1104, 1071. Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment," Annual Review of Sociology 26 (2000): 611–639, 617. We could have used other theoretical frameworks, such as that of Gamson, "The Social Psychology of Collective Action" and Gamson, "Constructing Social Protest," or we could have combined contrasting approaches of framing theory, such as that of Sveinung Sandberg, "Fighting Neo-liberalism with Neo-liberal Discourse: ATTAC Norway, Foucault and Collective Action Framing," Social Movement Studies 5, no. 3 (2006): 209–227, or even used wider-ranging rhetorical, narrative, or discursive frameworks. Michael Page, Lara Challita, and Alistair Harris, "Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: Framing Narratives and Prescriptions," Terrorism and Political Violence 23, no. 2 (2011): 150–172; Stuart A. Wright, "Strategic Framing of Racial-Nationalism in North America and Europe: An Analysis of a Burgeoning Transnational Network," Terrorism and Political Violence 21, no. 2 (2009): 189–210. Jeff Victoroff, "The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches," Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 1 (2005): 3–42; Moskalenko and McCauley, "The Psychology of Lone-wolf Terrorism" (see note 7 above). James A. Piazza, "Rooted in Poverty?: Terrorism, Poor Economic Development, and Social Cleavages," Terrorism and Political Violence 18, no. 1 (2006): 159–177. Simon Cottee and Keith Hayward, "Terrorist (E)motives: The Existential Attractions of Terrorism," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 34 (2011): 963–986. As others have noted, one should not imagine a singular pathway to terrorism, but several non-exclusionary ones. See for instance John Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism (London: Routledge, 2005). Grete Brochmann and Knut Kjelstadli, A History of Immigration: The Case of Norway 900–2000 (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2008). Statistics Norway (SSB), Immigrants and Norwegians Born to Immigrant Parents, 2012, http://www.ssb.no/english/subjects/02/01/10/innvbef_en/tab-2012-04-26-01-en.html. Lars Østby, "Muslimsk flertall i Norge?," Morgenbladet, 2011, http://morgenbladet.no/ideer/2011/muslimsk_flertall_i_norge. Directorate of Immigration and Diversity (IMDi) report, Integreringsbarometeret 2010—Holdninger til innvandrere, innvandring og integrering (Oslo: Author, 2011), http://www.imdi.no/no/Kunnskapsbasen/Innholdstyper/Rapporter/2011/Integreringsbarometeret- 2010/. In the questionnaire, respondents were given the following statements and questions (translated by the authors): "To what extent does the following statement correspond to your views? Statement: Immigration constitutes a serious threat against a common set of values in Norway. Very well. Well. Poorly. Not at all." Question: "Do you think that the values of Islam are compatible with the basic values of Norwegian society? Yes, completely compatible. Yes, partly compatible. No, mainly incompatible. No, completely incompatible. Not sure.". Directorate of Immigration and Diversity (IMDi) report 4-2010, Integreringsbarometeret 2009: Holdninger til innvandring, integrering og mangfold (Oslo: Author, 2010), http://www.imdi.no/Documents/Rapporter/Integreringsbarometeret2009.pdf. Respondents were asked the following question: "To what extent does the following statement correspond to your views? Statement: Muslim immigration should be limited. Very well. Well. Poorly. Not at all.". Diani and Bison define social movements as "networks of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups, or associations, engaged in a political or cultural conflict, on the basis of a shared collective identity"; Mario Diani and Ivano Bison, "Organizations, Coalitions, and Movements," Theory and Society 33, no. 3 (2004): 281–309, 282. The collective identity and the shared rhetoric are pivotal for a framing analysis. For a presentation of the network relations between the various Norwegian anti-Islamic SMOs see figure 6.4.1; https://bora.uib.no/bitstream/handle/1956/4905/82634079.pdf?sequence = 1. Mark Sedgwick, "Something Varied in the State of Denmark: Neo-nationalism, Anti-Islamic Activism and Street-level Thuggery," Politics, Religion & Ideology 14, no. 2 (2013): 208–233. We use the term anti-Islamic and not anti-Islamism based on an analysis of the various actors' views of Islam as a political ideology. Their views indicate that they are negative towards Islam in general, and not only Islamism, as it is generally understood. Use of the term anti-Islamic can be problematized, as some of the more moderate elements convey a more nuanced view on Islam, wherein they state, for instance, that one's religiosity should be contained within the private sphere. In the parliamentary elections of 2009, the Progress Party garnered 22.9% of the popular vote. The Progress Party cannot be described solely as an anti-Islamic actor, precisely because it is a multi-issue political party. This is in line with Sedgwick's perspective on the Danish People's Party (see note 32 above) in his analysis of anti-Islamic activism in Denmark, where he distinguishes between the many varieties of anti-Islamic opposition. Bernt Aardal, ed., Det politiske landskap. En studie av stortingsvalget 2009 (Oslo: Cappelen Damm, 2011), 119. Although Breivik cites the anti-Islamic Norwegian blogger Fjordman frequently, Fjordman is not included in this analysis because he is mainly active on foreign websites and thus not part of what we define as the Norwegian anti-Islamic movement. Mark Sedgwick, "The Concept of Radicalization as a Source of Confusion," Terrorism and Political Violence 22, no. 4 (2010): 479–494, notes that the use of the term radical can be problematic as it is used in a variety of ways and that without a specific description of one's use, it will remain unclear as to how the term is applied. The Progress Party is typically placed in the populist right "party family"; see, for example, Cas Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007); Elisabeth Ivarsflaten, "Immigration Policy and Party Organization: Explaining the Rise of the Populist Right in Western Europe" (PhD dissertation, Department of Politics and International Relations and Nuffield College, University of Oxford, 2005). However, Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 48 defines the Progress Party as an outlier in the European context because of its lack of emphasis on nativism, among other reasons. Radicalization does not necessarily lead to violence, and one should distinguish between violent and non-violent radicalization. See for instance Tore Bjørgo and John Horgan, eds., Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement (London: Routledge, 2008); John Horgan, Walking Away From Terrorism: Accounts of Disengagement from Radical and Extremist Movements (London: Routledge, 2009), 152; John and Kurt Braddock, "Rehabilitating the Terrorists? Challenges in Assessing the Effectiveness of De-radicalization Programs," Terrorism and Political Violence 22, no. 1 (Spring 2010): 1–25. For a discussion on the conceptual use of radicalization, see Jamie Bartlett and Carl Miller, "The Edge of Violence: Towards Telling the Difference Between Violent and Non-Violent Radicalization," Terrorism and Political Violence 24, no. 1 (2012): 1–21. Bat Ye'or, Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis (Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2005). The perception of Breivik as behaving unpleasantly and being an outsider is supported by different sources that either knew or had met him. For instance one participant at the website Document.no's meetings characterized Breivik as an "unpopular person" and a "lone island" that they distanced themselves from to the police, while a leader of the Norwegian Centre against Racism (ARS) also said she knew of him from monitoring online extremism and that "He has been viewed as a weirdo with clear ideologies—but without any backing"; http://www.dagbladet.no/2012/04/09/nyheter/anders_behring_breivik/terrorangrepet/utenriks/ islamkritikk/20667914/; http://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/22-juli/artikkel.php?artid=10080682. Liz Fekete, "The Muslim Conspiracy Theory and the Oslo Massacre," Race & Class 53 (2012): 30–47, describes it not as a movement, but rather as a broad political spectrum ranging from online counter-jihadists to neoconservative and conservative commentators and politicians. Mary Conway, From al-Zarqawi to al-Awlaki: The Emergence of the Internet as a New Form of Violent Radical Milieu (posted to ISODARCO website, 2012), http://www.isodarco.it/courses/andalo12/doc/Zarqawi%20to%20Awlaki_V2.pdf; Toby Archer, "Breivik's Swamp: Was the Oslo Killer Radicalized by What He Read Online?," Foreign Policy, May/June (2011), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/07/25/breivik_s_swamp?page=0,1. Ye'or, Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis (see note 41 above). E.g., Robert Spencer, The Politically Incorrect Guide to Islam (and the Crusades) (Washington, DC: Regnery Press, 2005); Robert Spencer, The Truth About Muhammad: Founder of the World's Most Intolerant Religion (Washington, DC: Regnery Press, 2006). We do not use the term counter-jihadist, even though this is how many belonging to the radical fringe describe themselves. Opposition to Islam, Muslim culture, and immigration is a broader phenomenon encompassing political parties and "mainstream" SMOs. He cites Robert Spencer 64 times and Fjordman 111 times, incorporating several of Fjordman's texts primarily in the second part of the Manifesto. For instance, in the beginning of the Manifesto, Breivik plagiarizes large parts of the writings by Ted Kaczynski, also known as the Unabomber. Three of the interviews were with representatives of "mainstream" anti-Islamic organizations: the Progress Party, the HRS, and the Document.no website. The other three interviews were with representatives of fringe groups: the Honestthinking.org website, the organization SIAN, and Kristenfolket (The Christian People), which represents the rightist faction of the Christian Democratic Party. Benford and Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements" (see note 19 above). Ibid., 617. The term snikislamisering or "sneak Islamization" was propelled into the general debate when Siv Jensen, the leader of the Progress Party, began using it during the election campaign in 2009. Her use of this term was met with heavy criticism and sparked a long-running public debate. The Progress Party's immigration spokesperson bragged about coining the term in our interview with him. An interview with the spokesperson for the HRS on the American, conservative, anti-Islamic webpage Frontpagemag.com, whose contributors include Bernard Lewis and the Norwegian blogger called Fjordman: http://frontpagemag.com/2011/05/02/is-europe-doomed/. The HRS stands out in this regard as the sole SMO that does not explicitly single out the Labour Party. Authors' translation. This excerpt is from an article by the leader of the Progress Party in Oslo titled "Drøm fra Disneyland" (Dream from Disneyland), http://www.aftenposten.no/meninger/kronikker/article3783373.ece. Interviews with the spokesperson for the Progress Party and the editor of the Document.no website. See e.g., SIAN's pamphlet; http://www.sian.no/sites/default/files/file/brochure_1.pdf. Such as in this demographic analysis on the website Document.no: http://www. document.no/2012/11/demografiske-endringer-i-tidsrommet-2004-2012/. Gamson, "The Social Psychology of Collective Action" (see note 15 above). Interviews with the spokesperson of the HRS (October 4, 2010) and the leader of SIAN (October 1, 2010). Benford and Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements" (see note 19 above). Interview with the spokesperson for the Progress Party (September 30, 2010). Ibid. The HRS is the SMO that most clearly advocates an emphasis on teaching about democracy in schools, for which it has argued in several articles, as well as in our interview with its representatives (October 4, 2010). Interview with the leader of SIAN (October 1, 2010). For this purpose, the HRS has published several reports on the rate of immigration and population growth based on datasets from Statistics Norway (SSB). Interview with the editor of Document.no (September 29, 2010). Interviews with the spokesperson for the Progress Party, the HRS, and editor of Document.no. Benford and Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements" (see note 19 above), 619. Gamson, "The Social Psychology of Collective Action" (see note 15 above). Interview with the spokesperson of the Progress Party (September 30, 2010). Interview with the leader of SIAN (October 1, 2010). This vocabulary illustrates the many similarities between the anti-Islamic framing and the rhetoric of the anti-immigrant extremists in Norway and Denmark in the 80 s and 90 s; Bjørgo, "Extreme Nationalism and Violent Discourses in Scandinavia" (see note 14 above). Interview with the leader of the rightist faction of the Christian Democratic Party (September 21, 2010). The number 3000 refers to the victims of 9/11. Francesca Polletta, Pang Ching Bobby Chen, Beth Gharrity Gardner, and Alice Motes, "The Sociology of Storytelling," Annual Review of Sociology 37 (2011): 109–130. Francesca Polletta and John Lee, "Is Telling Stories Good for Democracy? Rhetoric in Public Deliberation after 9/11," American Sociological Review 71 (2006): 699–723. Ye'or, Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis (see note 41 above). In the rest of the analysis, references to Breivik's Manifesto are given only by page number. PCCTS is the acronym for the organization to which Breivik claims to belong in the Manifesto (and also in police interrogations and during the trial), but in this particular quote he describes the organization as fictional (which it probably is). Along the lines of the "oppression" of white, Christian men, Breivik also espouses clearly anti-feminist views, as documented by Stephen J. Walton, "Anti-feminism and Mysogyny in Breivik's 'Manifesto,' " Nordic Journal of Feminist and Gender Research 21, no. 1 (2012): 4–11. Reputational shield as a concept was first devised by the political scientist Elisabeth Ivarsflaten in her study of right-wing parties in Europe; Ivarsflaten, "Immigration Policy and Party Organization" (see note 39 above). The concept refers to how the only right-wing parties that have been able to succeed electorally are those that not only focus on immigration, but also include other political concerns such as law and order, economic liberalization, and welfare. The key words identifying nonviolent solutions were: non-violent, political campaign, reputational shield, female spokesperson, rhetorical strategy, fact based argument, deconstruct, toning down rhetoric, strategic rhetoric, education, objective truth, educating Muslims, educating non-Muslims, school system, school agenda, correct rhetoric, secondary platform, Norwegian model, successful movement, mass movement, conservative movement, youth movement, Young Europeans, Christian European Renaissance movement, Cultural conservative student organization, cultural defence, distribute, student organization, common man, common sense, uncensored history, UN, inclusive, judging, ban Muslim, ban immigration, sociology, character assassination, newspaper, blog. The key words identifying violent solutions were: assassination, civil-war, non-democratic, armed resistance, military action, military coup, military force, military power, traitor, European Resistance Movement, PCCT, Knights Templar, shock attack, deprive Muslim, arm themselves, punish, execute, guerilla, lynch, biological, mass destruction. All keywords were checked qualitatively to see if they indicated political solutions and only if they did were they included. http://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/22-juli/tidslinjeabb/. Breivik envisages his Manifesto as an attempt to unify "1. Militant cultural conservatives, 2. militant 'right wing' liberalists, militant Christian extremists, militant ethno-centrists and other groups" (p. 1117). Christian Leuprecht, Todd Hataley, Sophia Moskalenko, and Clark McCauley, "Winning the Battle but Losing the War? Narrative and Counter-Narratives Strategy," Perspectives on Terrorism 3, no. 2 (2009): 25–35, 26. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996). In an op-ed piece in the New York Times, Thomas Hegghammer, a senior research fellow at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment in Oslo, describes Breivik as a new kind of macro-nationalist, arguing that he has more in common with Al Qaeda than with traditional right-wing nationalism, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/31/opinion/sunday/the-rise-of-the-macro-nationalists.html?_r=1&ref=andersbehringbreivik. William A. Gamson and David S. Meyer, "Framing Political Opportunity," in Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, eds., Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 275–290. The two pairs of psychiatrists in the trial diagnosed him either as being paranoid schizophrenic or as having a narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder. http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/iriks/Skjerper-nettovervaking-av-hoyreekstreme- 6284793.html. Hewitt, Understanding Terrorism in America (see note 8 above); Spaaij, "The Enigma of Lone Wolf Terrorism" (see note 3 above). On August 24, 2012, Breivik was found sane and sentenced to 21 years in prison, with the possibility of indefinite extension on a five-year basis. As opposed to the first court-appointed psychiatric evaluation, the court argued that although Breivik had mental problems, the terrorist attacks were a product of extremist right-wing and anti-Islamic ideology and an act of political violence. The verdict can be viewed in full online at http://www.domstol.no/upload/DA/Internett/domstol.no/Aktuelt/2012/toslo-2011-188627-24.pdf. Beck, "The Contribution of Social Movement Theory" (see note 12 above), 12. It is important not to overstate the similarities, beyond parts of the rhetoric, between Behring Breivik and other anti-Islamic actors. This study can nonetheless be seen as an effort to integrate and increase the dialogue between research on terrorism and other fields of social science, by broadening the scope beyond a singular focus on perpetrators of terrorism, as well as contributing to the interdisciplinary methodological conversation surrounding terrorism studies. For an analysis of the benefits an interdisciplinary perspective can bring, see Michael J. Boyle, "Progress and Pitfalls in the Study of Political Violence," Terrorism and Political Violence 24, no. 4 (2012): 527–543, 529. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power: In Science, Nature, Society and Art (New York: Random House, 1968), 267, 283. Chantal Mouffe, On the Political (London and New York: Routledge, 2005). Additional informationNotes on contributorsLars Erik Berntzen Lars Erik Berntzen is a PhD researcher in the Department of Political and Social Sciences, European University Institute. His research focuses on normative conflict, diffusion of ideas, and political violence, with an emphasis on right-wing populism, extremism, and anti-Islam. Sveinung Sandberg Sveinung Sandberg is an Associate Professor in the Department of Criminology and Sociology of Law, University of Oslo. His research focuses on processes of marginalisation, violence, masculinity, illegal drugs, and social movements, often using a narrative or discourse analytical approach.