Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

Legislative Strengthening Meets Party Support in International Assistance: A Closer Relationship?

2009; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 15; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/13572330903302505

1743-9337

Peter Burnell,

Political Conflict and Governance

Abstract Recent reports recommend that international efforts to help strengthen legislatures in emerging democracies should work more closely with support for building stronger political parties and competitive party systems. This article locates the recommendations within international assistance more generally and reviews the arguments. It explores problems that must be addressed if the recommendations are to be implemented effectively. The article argues that an alternative, issue-based approach to strengthening legislatures and closer links with civil society could gain more traction. However, that is directed more centrally at promoting good governance for the purpose of furthering development than at democratisation goals sought by party aid and legislative strengtheners in the democracy assistance industry. Keywords: legislative strengtheningdemocracy assistancepolitical party support Acknowledgements The author would like to thank the journal's referees for very helpful comments of an earlier version of this article. Notes Conceptual, methodological and source limitations make precise overall data elusive. For illustrative purposes, UNDP (Citation2006, p. 11) says it supports one in three parliaments in the developing world in some way; and political parties in over 60 countries have received support from the US's National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) according to information available at http://www.ndi.org. Four substantial public meetings on parliaments and development organised by the UK's Overseas Development Institute (ODI) and Africa All Party Parliamentary Group (AAPPG) in London, spring 2008 and a Wilton Park conference, ‘Enhancing the Effectiveness of Parliaments: Challenges and Opportunities’, October 2008, underscore the point: summaries of the first are available at http://www.odi.org.uk. See Michael and Kasemets Citation(2007) and the exchange with Rick Stapenhurst of the World Bank Institute in Journal of Legislative Studies (2008), 14 (3), 353–359. September 2008 saw the publication of Legislative Oversight and Budgeting: A World Perspective (Stapenhurst et al. Citation2008). For other development organisations like Britain's Department for International Development (DFID), Brösamle et al. (Citation2007, p. 19) say that the ultimate purpose of supporting parliaments, their budget oversight function in particular, ‘is fairly obvious’: ‘promote development and reduce poverty’ and create ‘the institutional conditions to make development aid effective’. The UNDP's flagship Global Programme for Parliamentary Strengthening, with core funding of six million Euros for 2004–08, supports projects in 12 countries including Algeria, Benin, Morocco and Niger plus regional and global initiatives. WFD's core programme countries include Belarus, Ukraine, Serbia, Egypt, Uganda, Kenya and Sierra Leone, the last being a special site of cross-party collaboration. Around one sixth of the USAID bid is earmarked for ‘political competition and consensus-building’, less than for each of rule of law and human rights, good governance, and civil society. Over 1990–2006 USAID spent around $240 million on legislative strengthening. Three-quarters of SIDA's parliamentary assistance is channelled through multilateral and international non-governmental organisations. The PCC receives funding from bodies like the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the World Bank, DFID and Denmark's DANIDA. It has a long-standing involvement in helping develop the committee system of Ghana's parliament, among other programmes. It is currently field-testing a Parliamentary Report Card to assess parliamentary performance, starting with Cambodia. CDI, an Australian government initiative in 1998 is funded by the Australian Agency for International Development. See Inter-Parliamentary Union Citation(2003): major findings included the observation that support did not correlate strongly with regime enthusiasm for democracy and good governance. Hudson and Wren Citation(2007), who found that DFID's 30 or so parliamentary strengthening projects since 1998 focused on parliament as an institution, the committee system for example, rather than training MPs, or on the wider political system. DFID co-sponsored a noteworthy international conference on ‘Enhancing the Effectiveness of Parliaments: Challenges and Opportunities’, at Wilton Park in October 2008. Germany's Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, close to the Social Democratic Party and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, related to the Christian Democratic Union, are the most active Stiftungen in democracy support; Sweden's Olof Palme Centre, linked to the country's Social Democratic Party, similarly has partnerships with like-minded parties abroad. On party strengthening see especially Carothers Citation(2006) and Burnell Citation(2004). The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), an inter-governmental policy research organisation based in Stockholm, offers commentary on party support, as in Catón Citation(2007) for instance. The recent flurry of informative reports on legislative strengthening includes Hudson and Wren Citation(2007), Hubli and Schmidt Citation(2007), Murphy and Alhada Citation(2007), Africa All Party Parliamentary Group (2008) and Hudson and Tsekpo Citation(2009). Significant studies from the WBI include Johnston and von Trapp Citation(2008), following previous reports by Pelizzo, Stapenhurst and Olson, all subsequently represented in Stapenhurst et al. (2008). The NDI now divides its party development support into four: operational and structural development; parties in elections; parties in parliament; legal and constitutional frameworks. Each is subdivided into further elements. NDI lists 12 criteria for selecting partners, and offers 14 different training techniques. Wehner et al. (2007, pp. 38–39) distinguish between technical assistance in legal reform, developing structure and processes, improving information access, physical infrastructure development, budget training, study trips, and analytic work, before going on to identify the portfolios of globally active core actors categorised as either funders or implementers. Hubli and Schmidt (Citation2007, p. 17) too note that ‘institutional repair’ packages are no longer considered sufficient. Hubli and Schmidt Citation(2007) is a prime example; see also Michael and Kasemets Citation(2007) and Hudson and Tsekpo (Citation2009, p. 7). For example a survey in Malawi found that, along with representation, easily the most frequently cited expectation of an MP by Malawians is to deliver development: ‘An MP's contribution to the collective functions of parliament such as legislation and holding the executive to account was not seen as important’ (AAPPG Citation2008, p. 23). See also Barkan Citation(2007). Apart from Power (Citation2008, p. 23) other evidence includes study of programmes, direct communication from CDI and observations of NDI in the Balkans shared by Maja Nenadović, complementing Miller's (Citation2005, pp. 10–11) characterisation of ‘organizational silos’ and ‘tunnel behaviour’ among Canadian organisations supporting democratic development. CDI's support for strengthening party discipline in Papua New Guinea's (PNG) parliament even had the aim of ending chronic government instability, which may look contrary to the objective of legislative strengthening. However, floor-crossing in parliament and mid-term upheavals had formerly undermined governmental accountability all round (Okole Citation2008). Catón Citation(2007) for instance does not mention cooperation with legislative strengthening. UNDP Citation(2005) subsequently listed 14 country offices engaged in capacity development for MPs, 13 each for parties and enhancing party dialogue, 11 for increasing women's participation, seven for strengthening party systems and ten for improving electoral systems, in 43 countries. A further example is Rasheed Draman speaking in the fourth ODI/AAPPG meeting mentioned in note 2. Together with the Overseas Office of the House of Commons, National Audit Office, UK branch of the CPA and other organisations, WFD in 2007 set up a Westminster Consortium for Parliaments; around the same time Hilary Benn (as Britain's Secretary of State for International Development) publicly called on DFID, WFD, FCO, IPU and European Parliament to work together in parliamentary strengthening, in ‘Governance, Democracy and Parliaments’. Available at http://www.dfid.gov.uk. Reilly and Nordlund Citation(2008) examine the effects of party regulation and electoral system engineering on parties. For example, AAPPG (Citation2008, pp. 27–28), citing evidence from Malawi and Kenya. The European Centre for Development Policy Management Citation(2005) evaluation of NIMD was largely positive. See for example USAID Citation(2006), Wehner et al. (2007), Hubli and Schmidt Citation(2007), Johnston and von Trapp Citation(2008). Of course there could be other issues like the environment or gender equity where policy support from outside is appropriate and might be welcome. AAPPG (Citation2008, p. 18) says that in donor eyes ‘parliament is often seen more as a part of the problem than part of the solution’. In Africa for instance while support for social (or societal) accountability is said to be in its infancy the demand is judged to be high (McNeil and Mumvuma Citation2006). For a review of aid donor attention to improving fiscal scrutiny by legislatures, see Bröm Brösamle et al. (2007). ‘Development partners need to be aware of (and not bypass) participatory and representative processes and institutions that already exist’ (World Bank and International Monetary Fund Citation2005, p. 10). On parliaments' role in ensuring more effective and accountable aid see for example AAPPG (Citation2008, pp. 19–20). Wehner et al. (2007) identify 15 international organisations now offering significant support to improving legislative financial scrutiny specifically. That the policy frameworks often still originate with donors is attested to by commentators as diverse as the World Development Movement's Jones and Hardstaff Citation(2005), Hubli and Schmidt (Citation2007, p. 23), and Zimmermann Citation(2007), the last arguing for increased parliamentary involvement in development planning, policy and budgeting. AAPPG (Citation2008, p. 7) adds that direct budget support particularly in Africa risks making the governments ‘more accountable to donors and less accountable to their people’. Between 2001 and 2004 DFID spent £4.4 million on promoting closer working between parliament and civil society and strengthening parliamentary committees in Malawi. Also, Hudson and Tsekpo (Citation2009, p. 1): ‘there is little systematic research or analysis about the effectiveness of parliaments or about the effectiveness of parliamentary strengthening’ more generally. But on Africa see Barkan Citation(2007) for a useful contribution.