Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

Terror's True Nightmare? Reevaluating the Consequences of Terrorism on Democratic Governance

2009; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 22; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/09546550903409593

1556-1836

Kristopher K. Robison,

American Constitutional Law and Politics

Abstract Some scholars argue that terrorism has few adverse consequences for political and civil liberties in democracies and that fears about a reversal of freedoms due to counterterror programs are unjustified. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that democracies respond to terrorism in ways that curtail at least some of the rights that define democratic governance. In an analysis of a large sample of the world's nations, this study finds that terrorism has deleterious effects on regimes' respect for civil and human rights but few consequences for overall political access. I conclude that terrorism has measurable negative influences on particular aspects of democracy. Keywords: civil rightsdemocracydemocratic governancedissentpolitical rightsrepressionterrorism Notes Robust z statistics in brackets. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Robust z statistics in brackets. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. For example see: James A. Dempsey, "Civil Liberties in a Time of Crisis," Human Rights Magazine (Winter 2002): 1–5; Richard B. Schmitt, "New Rules Would give FBI More Freedom in U.S. Operations," Los Angeles Times, September 13, 2008, 15; Human Rights Watch, "Terrorism Suspects Sent Back to Countries That Torture," available at: (http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2004/04/15/eu8432.htm), retrieved August 15, 2008; M. Shamsul Haque, "Government Responses to Terrorism: Critical Views of Their Impact on People and Public Administration," Public Administration Review 62, no. 5 (2002): 98–108; John Mueller, "Simplicity and Spook: Terrorism and the Dynamics of Threat Exaggeration," International Studies Perspectives 6 (2005): 208–234. For a discussion of the "trade-offs" between liberty and violence see: Haque (see note 1 above) and Leonard B. Weinberg, William L. Eubank, and Elizabeth A. Francis, "The Cost of Terrorism: The Relationship Between International Terrorism and Democratic Governance," Terrorism and Political Violence 20, no. 2 (Spring 2008): 257–270. Ibid. Jennifer Holmes, Terrorism and Democratic Stability (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2006). Michael Stohl and George A. Lopez, eds., The State as Terrorist: The Dynamics of Governmental Violence and Repression (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1984). Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights, Terrorism and Counter-terrorism, Fact Sheet No. 32. Amnesty International, In the Name of Counter-Terrorism: Human Rights Abuses Worldwide, available at: (http://iilj.org/courses/documents/HRW10CountrySurveyofConcernsaboutHumanRightsandCTCMeasures.pdf), retrieved April 4, 2009. Brenda Uekert, Rivers of Blood: A Comparative Study of Government Massacres (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1996). Jonathan White, Terrorism and Homeland Security (New York: Thomson-Wadsworth, 2005). M. Shamsul Haque, "Government Responses to Terrorism: Critical Views of their Impacts on People and Public Administration," Public Administration Review 62 (2002): 170–180; Susan Herman, "The USA Patriot Act and the U.S. Department of Justice: Losing Our Balances," Jurist (2001): 5–6. Daniel Cunningham, "Understanding State Responses to Left- versus Right-Wing Threats, " Social Science History 27, no. 3 (2003): 327–370. Amnesty International, In the Name of Counter-Terrorism: Human Rights Abuses Worldwide, available at: (http://iilj.org/courses/documents/HRW10CountrySurveyofConcernsaboutHumanRightsandCTCMeasures.pdf), retrieved April 4, 2009. For instance see: Stephen M. Shellman, "Leaders' Motivations and Actions: Explaining Government-Dissident Conflict-Cooperation Processes," Conflict Management and Peace Science 23 (2006): 73–90; Sabine C. Carey, "Domestic Threat and Repression: An Analysis of State Response to Different Forms of Dissent," in Sabine C. Carey and Steven C. Poe, eds., Understanding Human Rights Violations (England: Ashgate, 2004): 202–221; Mark I. Lichbach, Christian Davenport, and David A. Armstrong, "Democracy and the Violation of Human Rights: A Statistical Analysis from 1976–1996," American Journal of Political Science 48 (2004): 538–554; Scott Sigmund Gartner and Patrick M. Regan, "Threat and Repression: The Non-Linear Relationship Between Government and Opposition Violence," The Journal of Peace Research 33, no. 3 (1996): 273–288; Karen Rasler, "Concessions, Repression and Political Protest: A Model of Escalation in the Iranian Revolution," American Sociological Review 61 (1996): 132–152; Ronald A. Francisco, "Coercion and Protest: An Empirical Test in Two Democratic States," American Journal of Political Science 40 (1996): 1179–1204; Will H. Moore, "Repression and Dissent: Substitution, Context and Timing," American Journal of Political Science 45, no. 3 (1998): 851–873; Mark I. Lichbach, "An Evaluation of 'Does Economic Inequality Breed Political Conflict?' Studies," American Political Science Review 41, no. 4 (1989): 431–470; Alfatooni and Allen, "Government Sanction and Collective Political Protest in Periphery and Semi Periphery States: A time series Analysis," Journal of Political and Military Sociology 19 (1991): 29–45; Ted Gurr, "The Political Origins of Sate Violence and Terror: A Theoretical Analysis," in George A. Lopez and Michael Stohl, eds., Government Violence and Repression: An Agenda for Research (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1986): 23–40. Steven Poe and C. Neal Tate, "Repression of Human Rights To Personal Integrity In The 1980s: A Global Analysis," American Political Science Review 88, no. 4 (1994): 853–872. Steven Poe, C. Neal Tate, and Linder C. Keith, "Repression Of Human Rights To Personal Integrity Revisited: A Global Cross-National Study Covering The Years 1976–1993," International Studies Quarterly 43 (1999): 291–313. Emile Hafner-Burton and Kiyo Tsutsui, "Human Rights Practices in a Globalizing World: The Paradox of Empty Promises," American Journal of Sociology 110, no. 5 (2005): 1373–1411. Bjorn Letnes and Anton Westveld, "Transnational Corporations and Human Rights: On the Importance of Assets and Institutions" (Prepared for delivery at Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 2004). Christian Davenport, "Multi-Dimensional Threat Perception and State Repression: An Inquiry into Why States Apply Negative Sanctions," American Journal of Political Science 39, no. 3 (1995): 683–713. Christian Davenport, David A. Armstrong, and Mark I. Lichbach, "Conflict Escalation and the Origins of Civil War" (2004), available at: (http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/davenport/research.htm), retrieved May 18, 2007. Will H. Moore, "Repression and Dissent: Substitution, Context and Timing," American Journal of Political Science 45, no. 3 (1998): 851–873; Will H. Moore, "The Repression of Dissent: A Substitution Model of Government Coercion," Journal of Conflict Resolution 44, no. 1 (2000): 107–127. Stephen Shellman, "Leaders & Their Motivations: Explaining Government-Dissident Conflict-Cooperation Processes," Conflict Management & Peace Science 23, no. 1 (2006): 73–90. Michael Stohl and George A. Lopez, eds., Government Violence and Repression: An Agenda For Research (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1986). Cass Sunstein, Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle (Cambridge University Press, 2005). For in-depth discussions on how people respond to the threats of terrorists see: Max Abrahms, "Why Terrorism Does Not Work," International Security 31, no. 2 (2006): 42–78. Susanna Hoffman, "The Psycho-Social Symbolism of Terrorism And Its Uses," Unpublished manuscript (2003). Cass Sunstein, Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle (Cambridge University Press, 2005). Polity IV Project. Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions 1897–2007, available at: (http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm), retrieved September 22, 2008. Nations in the full sample with the ITERATE terrorism variable. The time period nations appear within the sample are in parentheses. The number of years a nation appears as a democratic nation (see operationalization) are indicated after the parentheses by a hyphen followed by a number; nations not scored as democracies receive a "-0" to indicate no years as democracies: Albania (1992–2000)-8; Algeria (1968–2000)-0; Angola (1986–1997)-5; Antigua and Barbuda (1982–2000)-8; Argentina (1976–2000)-18; Australia (1976–2000)-25; Austria (1976–2000)-25; Bahamas (1997–1997)-1; Bahrain (1997–1997)-0; Bangladesh (1976–2000)-10; Barbados (1976–2000)-23; Belgium (1976–2000)-25; Bolivia (1976–2000)-19; Botswana (1976–2000)-24; Brazil (1976–2000)-16; Belize (1982–2000)-18; Bulgaria (1992–2000)-9; Burundi (1976–2000)-3; Cambodia (1994–2000)-6; Cameroon (1976–2000)-0; Canada (1976–2000)-25; Cape Verde (1992–2000)-9; Central African Republic (1976–1995)-3; Sri Lanka (1976–2000)-25; Chad (1976–2000)-8; Chile (1976–2000)-12; China (1976–2000)-0; Colombia (1976–2000)-25; Comoros (1981–1988); Congo Brazzaville (1976–2000)-4; Zaire (1976–1998)-6; Costa Rica (1976–2000)-25; Cyprus (1976–1997)-22; Benin (1976–2000)-10; Denmark (1976–2000)-25; Dominica (1979–1997)-13; Dominican Rep (1976–2000)-23; Ecuador (1976–2000)-21; El Salvador (1976–2000)-22; Equatorial Guinea (1995–2000); Fiji (1976–2000)-22; Finland (1976–2000)-25; France (1976–2000)-25; Djibouti (1997–1997)-0; Gambia The (1976–2000)-13; Ghana (1976–2000)-9; Greece (1976–2000)-25; Grenada (1995–2000)-6; Guatemala (1976–2000)-16; Guinea (1989–2000)-0; Guyana (1976–2000)-10; Haiti (1976–1999)-6; Honduras (1976–2000)-21; Hungary (1976–2000)-12; Iceland (1976–2000)-25; India (1976–2000)-25; Indonesia (1976–2000)-2; Iran (1976–2000)-7; Ireland (1976–2000)-25; Israel (1976–2000)-25; Italy (1976–2000)-25; Ivory Coast (1976–2000)-2; Jamaica (1976–2000)-25; Japan (1976–2000)-25; Jordan (1976–2000)-0; Kenya (1976–2000)-0; South Korea (1976–2000)-14; Laos (1997–1997)-0; Lebanon (1991–2000)-10; Lesotho (1976–2000)-8; Luxembourg (1976–2000)-25; Madagascar (1976–1999)-9; Malawi (1976–2000)-7; Malaysia (1976–2000)-25; Mali (1976–2000)-10; Malta (1995–1999)-5; Mauritania (1976–2000)-0; Mauritius and deps (1981–2000)-20; Mexico (1976–2000)-7; Mongolia (1997–1997)-1; Morocco (1976–2000)-0; Mozambique (1981–2000)-7; Oman (1997–1997)-0; Namibia (1991–2000)-10; Nepal (1976–2000)-11; Netherlands (1976–2000)-25; New Zealand (1976–2000)-25; Nicaragua (1976–2000)-12; Niger (1976–2000)-7; Nigeria (1976–2000)-9; Norway (1976–2000)-25; Pakistan (1976–2000)-12; Panama (1976–2000)-12; Papua New Guinea (1978–2000)-23; Paraguay (1976–2000)-12; Peru (1976–2000)-22; Philippines (1976–2000)-15; Poland (1991–2000)-10; Portugal (1976–2000)-25; Guinea-Bissau (1977–2000)-6; Romania (1988–2000)-12; Rwanda (1976–2000)-1; St. Kitts and Nevis (1985–1988)-4; Sao Tome and Principe (1995–2000)-5; Saudi Arabia (1997–1997)-0; Senegal (1976–2000)-1; Seychelles (1977–2000)-16; Sierra Leone (1976–1999)-3; Singapore (1976–2000)-0; South Africa (1976–2000)-25; Zimbabwe (1980–2000)-7; Spain (1976–2000)-25; Sudan (1997–1997)-0; Swaziland (1997–2000)-0; Sweden (1976–2000)-25; Switzerland (1976–2000)-25; Syria (1976–2000)-0; Thailand (1976–2000)-23; Togo (1976–2000)-2; Trinidad & Tobago (1976–2000)-21; Tunisia (1976–2000)-0; Turkey (1976–2000)-22; Uganda (1983–2000)-3; Egypt (1976–2000)-0; UK (1976–2000)-25; Tanzania Uni Rep (1989–2000)-1; USA (1976–2000)-25; Burkina Faso (1976–1995)-3; Uruguay (1976–2000)-16; Venezuela (1976–2000)-25; Zambia (1976–2000)-9. An anonymous reviewer suggested that in lieu of a complex three-sample strategy that I use seemingly unrelated regression in an effort to tease out the effects of terrorism separately on democratic/non-democratic nations through a system of correlated equations. Unfortunately, this method is inappropriate for this analysis because the equations involve different samples, thus introducing missing values when one democratic equation is run simultaneous to a non-democratic equation. The resulting missing data invalidates the use of this technique for this purpose. ologit (STATA 9). Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jaggers, Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2007. Center for Global Policy, School of Public Policy, George Mason University and Center for Systemic Peace (2004). Freedom House, available at: (http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=35&year=2006), retrieved June 3, 2007. M. Gibney, L. Cornett, & R. Wood, Political Terror Scale 1976–2006, available at: (http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/). Steven Poe and C. Neal Tate, "Repression of Human Rights To Personal Integrity In The 1980s: A Global Analysis," American Political Science Review 88, no. 4 (1994): 853–872; Steven Poe, C. Neal Tate, and Linder C. Keith, "Repression Of Human Rights To Personal Integrity Revisited: A Global Cross-National Study Covering The Years 1976–1993," International Studies Quarterly 43 (1999): 291–313. Ted Gurr, "State Terrorism," in Michael Stohl and George A. Lopez, eds., Government Violence and Repression: An Agenda For Research (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1986). Poe et al. (see note 12 above). The Poe and Tate (1993/1999)/Gibney and authors (2008) data are available at: http://www.psci.unt.edu/ihrsc/ and www.politicalterrorscale.org David L. Cingranelli and David L. Richards, The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset (2004), available at: (http://www.humanrightsdata.org), retrieved July 9, 2008. David Cingranelli. March 2009. Personal Communication. Rankings descript for state repression index: "Level 1: Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their view, and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare. Level 2: There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. However, few persons are affected, torture and beatings are exceptional. Political murder is rare. Level 3: There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is accepted. Level 4: The practices of level 3 are expanded to larger numbers. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas. Level 5: The terrors of level 4 have been expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals." Quoted in Poe et al. (see note 12 above). Edward Mickolus, International Attributes of Terrorism Database (ITERATE) (2004). Electronic Database. Unfortunately, the Terrorism Knowledge Base from RAND/MIPT is no longer freely available to the public and instead is accessible only as a subscription service from RAND. 1993 is missing from the Global Terrorism Database. See website for details: (http://www.start.umd.edu/data/gtd/). See (http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/faq/) for information about the absence of a set definition and the coding rules used for GTD. I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting that I note this problem with the GTD. World Bank, World Development Indicators CD-ROM (2004). See S. P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991) and S. M. Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," American Political Science Review 53 (1959): 69–105. National Materials Capabilities Database (2006), available at: (http://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2%20Data/Capabilities/nmc3–02.htm), retrieved March 6, 2007. See research on coup d'états: Edward Luttwak, Coup D'Etat: A Practical Handbook (Harvard University Press, 1968). Robert W. Jackman, "The Predictability of Coups d'état: A Model with African Data," American Political Science Review 72 (1979): 1262–1275. C. J. Jenkins and A. Kposowa, "The political origins of African military coups: Ethnic competition, military centrality and the struggle over the post-colonial state," International Studies Quarterly 36 (1992): 271–291. A. Belkin and E. Schofer, "Toward a Structural Understanding of Coup Risk," Journal of Conflict Resolution 47, no. 5 (2003): 594–620. See Rasler (note 10 above) and Francisco (note 10 above). Arthur Banks, Cross-National Times Series Databanks (2000), available at: (http://www.databanksinternational.com), retrieved October 15, 2008. Nils Petter Gleditsch, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg & Håvard Strand, "Armed Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset," Journal of Peace Research39, no. 5 (2002): 615–637. In this database, civil wars are defined as a war that reaches at least 1,000 annual battle deaths. See for example: Pamela Paxton, "Social Capital and Democracy: An Interdependent Relationship," American Sociological Review 67 (2002): 254–277. Yearbook of International Organizations, Union of International Associations (2000). Contact author for detailed tables. David. C. Rapoport, "The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11," Antropoetics 8, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 2002): 1–5. Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State (New York: New York University Press, 1986); Weinberg and Eubank, "Terrorism and Democracy: What Recent Events Disclose," Terrorism and Political Violence 10, no. 1 (1998): 108–118. Quan Li and Drew Schaub, "Economic Globalization and Transnational Terrorist Incidents: A Pooled Time-Series Cross-Sectional Analysis," Journal of Conflict Resolution 48 (2004): 230–258; Brian Lai, "Explaining Terrorism Using the Framework of Opportunity and Willingness: An Empirical Examination of International Terrorism," Political Science Workshop Series (University of Iowa, Spring 2004). See Kansas Event Data System research methodology (http://web.ku.edu/keds/) for publications using samples of nation-states with data on state-based violent actions against domestic groups. Also, see the TWEED or terrorism in Western Europe database (http://www.uib.no/people/sspje/tweed.htm) as an example of police and other state agents' use of force against terrorists. Additional informationNotes on contributorsKristopher K. Robison Kristopher K. Robison is an assistant professor in Sociology at Northern Illinois University in De Kalb, IL. His interests include the causes and consequences of civil and state terrorism and the drivers of the global digital divide.