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The Risks of Ignoring Strategic Insolvency

2012; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 35; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/0163660x.2012.725020

1530-9177

Michael J. Mazarr,

Global Peace and Security Dynamics

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1. Robert K. Massie, Dreadnought: Britain, Germany, and the Coming of the Great War (New York: Random House, 1991), xvii–xxxi. 2. Aaron Friedberg, The Weary Titan (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 103. 3. Fareed Zakaria, “The Future of American Power,” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 3 (May/June 2008). 4. John Lewis Gaddis, “What is Grand Strategy?” Duke University working paper, February 26, 2009; David S. McDonough, “Beyond Primacy: Hegemony and ‘Security Addiction’ in U.S. Grand Strategy,” Orbis, Winter 2009, 7–8. 5. See for example Michael Dobbs and John M. Goshko, “Albright's Personal Odyssey Shaped Foreign Policy Beliefs,” Washington Post, December 6, 1996, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/govt/admin/stories/albright120696.htm. 6. On this point see McDonough, “Beyond Primacy,” 10–12. 7. Barry Posen, “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony,” International Security 28, no. 1 (Summer 2003): 6. See also Posen, “Stability and Change in U.S. Grand Strategy,” Orbis, (Fall 2007): 563. 8. U.S. Congressional Budget Office, “U.S. Debt and Interest Costs,” December 2010, http://www.cbo.gov/publication/21960. 9. Cindy Williams, “The Future Affordability of U.S. National Security,” MIT Security Studies Program, October 28, 2011, p. 15, http://web.mit.edu/ssp/people/williams/Williams_Tobin_paper_102811.pdf. 10. Lawrence J. Korb, Laura Conley, and Alex Rothman, “Restoring Tricare: Ensuring the Long Term Viability of the Military Health Care System,” Center for American Progress, February 28, 2011, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/02/tricare.html; Defense Business Board, “Modernizing the Military Retirement System,” July 2011, p. 3, http://dbb.defense.gov/pdf/DBB_Military_Retirement_Final_Presentationpdf.pdf. 11. Stephen M. Walt, Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy (New York: W. W. Norton, 2005); Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World, Release 2.0 (New York: W. W. Norton, 2011). 12. Peter Rodman, Uneasy Giant: Challenges to American Predominance (Washington, D.C.: Nixon Center, 2000), vii. 13. See for example James R. Holmes, “U.S. Confronts an Anti-Access World,” The Diplomat, March 9, 2012, http://the-diplomat.com/2012/03/09/u-s-confronts-an-anti-access-world/?all=true; Wendell Minnick, “China's 10 Killer Weapons,” Defense News, April 9, 2012; Robert C. Rubel, “The Future of Aircraft Carriers,” U.S. Naval War College Review, Autumn 2001; Loren B. Thompson, “Iranian Unmanned Aircraft Signal New Threat,” Early Warning Blog, The Lexington Institute, February 17, 2012, http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/iranian-unmanned-aircraft-signal-new-threat?a=1&c=1171. 14. Ross M. Rustici, “Cyberweapons: Leveling the International Playing Field,” Parameters (Autumn 2011): 36–37. 15. Paul K. Davis and Peter A. Wilson, Looming Discontinuities in U.S. Military Strategy and Defense Planning (Washington, D.C.: The RAND Corporation, 2012), summary. 16. Christopher Cavas, “U.S. Carrier Costs Will Breach Cap Next Year,” AOL Defense News, March 16, 2012, http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120316/DEFREG02/303160003/U-S-Carrier-Costs-Will-Breach-Cap-Next-Year?odyssey=mod∣newswell∣text∣FRONTPAGE∣s/ 17. “National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” May 2010, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf. 18. Meg Bortin, “Survey Shows a Revival of Isolationism in U.S.,” New York Times, November 17, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/17/national/17cnd-survey.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print. 19. Lydia Saad, “Growing Minority Wants Minimal U.S. Role in World Affairs,” Gallup Politics Report, February 21, 2011, http://www.gallup.com/poll/146240/Growing-Minority-Wants-Minimal-Role-World-Affairs.aspx. See also the Chicago Council on Global Affairs poll which showed rising number of Americans interested in growing emphasis on domestic affairs, reported at “U.S. ‘Sees World Influence Declining’ Amid Economic Woe,” BBC Online, September 16, 2010, at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-11331265. 20. Jeffrey M. Jones, “Fewer Americans Say U.S. is No. 1 Military Power,” Gallup Politics Report, March 12, 2012, http://www.gallup.com/poll/153185/Fewer-Americans-Say-No-Military-Power.aspx. 21. “Public Takes Strong Stance Against Iran's Nuclear Program,” Pew Research Center, February 15, 2012, http://www.people-press.org/2012/02/15/public-takes-strong-stance-against-irans-nuclear-program/. 22. See for example the writings of Robert Kagan, such as “No Time to Cut Defense,” Washington Post, February 3, 2009, and “Against the Myth of American Decline,” The New Republic, January 11, 2012. 23. Paul K. MacDonald and Joseph M. Parent, “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment,” International Security 35, no. 4 (Spring 2011). 24. See for example Daryl G. Press, Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996) and his “current calculus theory.” The broader literature questioning the veto power of reputation and credibility—two related and often poorly-defined concepts—is enormous; for three representative and thoughtful examples see Ted Hopf, Peripheral Visions: Deterrence Theory and American Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965–1990 (Ann Arbor: University of Michogan Press, 1994); Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); and Shiping Ting, “Reputation, Cult of Reputation, and International Conflict,” Security Studies, Vol., 14, No. 1 (January–March 2005). 25. On the balanced view in Chinese circles, see Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi, Addressing U.S.–China Strategic Distrust (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2012), pp. 8–9, http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2012/03/30-us-china-lieberthal. 26. See for example Pew Global Attitudes Project, “From Hyperpower to Declining Power,” September 7, 2011, http://www.pewglobal.org/2011/09/07/from-hyperpower-to-declining-power/; and Bonnie S. Glaser and Lyle Morris, “Chinese Perceptions of U.S. Decline and Power,” China Brief 9, Issue 14 (Jamestown Foundation: July 9, 2009), http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=35241&cHash=db9748f805; Craig S. Cohen, editor, “Capacity and Resolve: Foreign Assessments of U.S. Power,” (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, June 2011), http://csis.org/program/foreign-assessments-us-power. 27. Robert Haddick, “If You Build Up, Who Will Come?” Foreign Policy, July 20, 2012, at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/07/20/this_week_at_war_if_you_build_up_who_will_come. 28. See for example Robert Art, “Selective Engagement in an Era of Austerity,” in Richard Fontaine and Kristin M. Lord, America's Path, (Washington, D.C.: Center for a New American Security, 2012), p. 21, http://www.cnas.org/americaspath. 29. Friedberg, 189. 30. See for example Jan van Tol et al., “AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, May 18, 2010, http://www.csbaonline.org/publications/2010/05/airsea-battle-concept/. 31. Randall L. Schweller and Xiaoyu Pu, “After Unipolarity: China's Visions of International Order in an Era of U.S. Decline,” International Security 36, no. 1 (Summer 2011). 32. Stephen M. Walt, “The End of the American Era,” The National Interest, November/December 2011, http://nationalinterest.org/article/the-end-the-american-era-6037. 33. Nicholas Gvosdev, “Political Contests Abroad Show Limits of U.S. Power,” World Politics Review, October 21, 2011, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/10415/the-realist-prism-political-contests-abroad-show-limits-of-u-s-power. 34. One broad treatment of Army force issues is Army 2020: Generating Health and Discipline in the Force Ahead of the Strategic Reset (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2012), http://www.army.mil/article/72086/;William Astore, “The Price of Pushing Our Troops Too Far,” The Huffington Post, December 15, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/william-astore/the-price-of-pushing-our_b_393226.html. 35. Mackenzie Eaglen, “Pentagon Struggles To Keep Ships Sailing, Planes Flying As Budget Cuts Loom,” AOL Defense News, July 18, 2011, http://defense.aol.com/2011/07/18/pentagon-struggles-to-keep-ships-sailing-planes-flying-as-budge/; Eaglen, “A Military Teetering on the Ragged Edge,” Time Online Edition, July 27, 2011, http://nation.time.com/2011/07/27/a-military-teetering-on-the-ragged-edge/; Matthew M. Burke, “USS Essex Unable to Fulfill Mission for Second Time in Seven Months,” Stars and Stripes, February 1, 2012, http://www.stripes.com/news/navy/uss-essex-unable-to-fulfill-mission-for-2nd-time-in-seven-months-1.167330. See also Mike McCarthy, “Admiral Warns of ‘Burning Out’ Ships, Aircraft,” Defense Daily, March 1, 2012, http://www.defensedaily.com/sectors/navy_usmc/Admiral-Warns-Of-Burning-Out-Ships-Aircraft_16910.html. 36. Joshua Stewart, “Navy: Aircraft Better Off Than Reports Say,” Military Times, July 30, 2011, http://www.militarytimes.com/news/2011/07/navy-aviation-rates-deployment-073011w/. 37. General Philip Breedlove, “Total Force Readiness,” testimony before the U.S. House Armed Services Committee, July 26, 2011, http://www.airforce-magazine.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/Testimony/2011/July%202011/072611breedlove.pdf. 38. Stewart. 39. Harold and Margaret Sprout, “Retreat from World Power: Processes and Consequences of Readjustment,” World Politics 15, Issue 4 (July 1963): 668, http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2009462?uid=3739584&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21101124536081. 40. Michele Flournoy and Janine Davidson, “Obama's New Global Posture: The Logic of U.S. Foreign Deployments,” Foreign Affairs 91, no. 4 (July/August 2012): 55. 41. The author is indebted to a conversation with Robert Keohane for raising the connection to the concept of conditional preferences. 42. As Robert Keohane recently argued, states cannot hand off power to multilateral institutions—but they can use them as vehicles “to pursue their own interests”; Keohane, “Hegemony and After,” Foreign Affairs 91, no. 4 (July/August 2012), 116. Additional informationNotes on contributorsMichael J. MazarrMichael J. Mazarr is professor of national security strategy at the U.S. National War College. The views expressed here are his own and do not reflect the policy or position of the Defense Department or the U.S. government.