Aristotle on Thises, Suches and the Third Man A rgument
1981; Brill; Volume: 26; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1163/156852881x00024
ISSN1568-5284
Autores Tópico(s)Philosophy and History of Science
ResumoAccording to Aristotle, questions concerning the basic framework within which a science proceeds are radically different from questions concerning the nature, existence and attributes various kinds within a science. The former are pre-scientific and can only be dealt with dialectically. Dialectic is not itself a science, yet it provides the path to the principles all inquiries (Top. 10lb4). These principles cannot be discussed within the sciences on pain regress or petitio principii, since they are the protai, the firsts, everything within them (Top. 101 a36101 b4). Thus, it could only be the business dialectic and not any science to consider whether we should speak thises (tode ti) and suches (toionde) and whether there are and qualities and quantities (Phys. 185a27-8). In a science, on the other hand, we ask such questions as: Does the sun suffer eclipse? What causes an earthquake? Are there centaurs? and What is man? (,4n. Post. B.l). Quine has pointed out that a radical distinction between framework questions and questions within the sciences is of little concern ... apart from the adoption something like the (Russellian) theory types.' Without some such theory, there will be no distinction in principle between such questions as Are there properties? and Are there substances on the one hand, and Are there centaurs? on the other. With the adoption some such type theory, however, although we can't know in advance, for example, what particular species there are, we can know that whatever we come across in the world will be assignable to one an antecedently determined number categories, so the division will make sense. There will be fundamental segregations expression and entities, and attempts to violate type distinctions will lead to absurdity and paradox. In light Quine's insight, it is perhaps not surprising to discover that a type distinction emerges early and remains fundamental throughout Aristotle's work. I owe notice it to Terry Penner.2 It is the distinction between a this (tode ti) and a such (toionde or sometimespoion), as Aristotle sometimes puts it. I shall assume that it is the same distinction he has in mind in charging Plato with trying to turn universals (katholou) into particulars (e.g. Met. 1038b34-1039a2, 1040b23-31, 1041a4, 1053b9-24,
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